

Russia and the Soviet Union in the Far East

Russia and the Soviet Union in the Far East

BY
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WITH MAPS

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*"That which is past is gone and irrecoverable and
wise men have enough to do with things present
and to come."*

—BACON.

PREFACE

This book represents the author's humble endeavor to fill a somewhat noticeable gap in that body of literature in English which pertains to Russia's activity in the Extreme Orient. Many thousands of words have been written on the problems of the Pacific. But few of the books on this vital subject have concentrated on Russia's part therein; and none, so far as the author is aware, has covered the entire topic of "Russia in the Far East" and the policies of the Soviet Union as Russia's successor.

The author is conscious that his literary qualifications are limited. But he has had the benefit of considerable experience in the Far East, both under the Russian Imperial Regime and later, and has devoted long years of work and study to conditions in China, Japan, and the Asiatic possessions of Russia. During his residence in the United States he has come, while lecturing on Oriental topics, into contact with a large number of students of Far Eastern problems, including the high authorities in his particular field. Encouraged by some of these to essay the present task, he ventures to put forth his book, first as a chronology and statement of facts hitherto uncorrelated; secondly as an attempt to offer a new interpretation of the factors now at work in China as the main arena and chief danger spot in Asia of international rivalry; and thirdly as an analysis of the problem of the Pacific Ocean with special emphasis on Russia's interests and activity therein and her possible contribution to its solution. Furthermore, he trusts that the Appendices, containing a large number of treaties, agreements, and similar documents, some of which have never before been published while others are here translated into English for the first time, will be of value to students; and that the bibliography in English and Russian, with a few titles in French and German, will be sufficiently comprehensive for their needs.

In the composition of his book the author naturally owes much to other students, and has quoted freely from their pages.

He trusts that due acknowledgment has been made wherever possible. It may even be considered that the number of quotations is excessive, and that the author has laid himself open to the charge of too great deference to the opinions of others. The explanation is to be found in his method of work. During his period of research the author amassed a large number of notes on the views of others which seemed to him either to illustrate his own interpretation of events or to explain his dissent from established interpretations. Many of these notes are now incorporated *verbatim* in the text, partly because the author prefers to be blamed for excess of quotation to omitting credit where credit is due, and partly because he realizes that inasmuch as his book is a work of reference the material should be substantiated, checked, and documented wherever possible.

In conclusion, the author wishes to express his sincerest appreciation to Professor George H. Blakeslee, Mr. E. C. Carter, Mr. Jerome Green, Dr. Stanley Hornbeck, Dr. Edward Hume, and Professor Karl C. Leebrick for their encouragement and advice. His warm thanks go to Mr. Manuel Komroff for friendly and helpful suggestions on various technical matters; to Dr. Charles P. Howland, who was kind enough to read the manuscript and made numerous valuable suggestions; and especially to his dear friend J. Fletcher Smith for patient struggles with the author's inadequate English. He is also very grateful to Mr. L. M. Karakhan, Mr. Kozlovsky, and to Professor A. Kantorovitch for the permission to consult and copy in the Archives in Moscow the documents included in the Appendices. He wishes, however, to make clear that none of the foregoing is in any way responsible for the point of view of this book or for opinions with which some of them may very likely disagree.

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INTRODUCTION

Importance of the Pacific. "Now is the dawn of the Pacific era!" So spoke President Roosevelt years ago; and the rise of the Pacific as an international problem, foreseen by him and many other Americans and Europeans, is now a reality. For while it is yet premature to speak of the decline of the Atlantic, with all the wealth and culture of its adjacent countries, it seems clear that the center of the world's trade is definitely shifting westward to the other ocean.

America's Rôle. The United States of America is a "bi-oceanic" country, bounded by both Atlantic and Pacific. Already she has very considerable interests in the latter. As a young and growing nation, alert to the future, she is rightly concerned in the destiny of Asia, with its rich natural resources and enormous markets. Millions of Asiatics, now awakening and receptive to modernization, are becoming consumers of Western goods; and the United States, producing such goods in quantities far beyond the needs of the domestic market, eagerly seeks an outlet for the surplus. One such outlet she has found in the Orient; while the entire Asiatic trade of the U. S. A. in 1913, one year before the World War, did not exceed \$125,000,000, in 1920-21 it had already reached \$575,000,000 and in 1928 was about \$2,000,000,000, a growth of over 1500 per cent in fifteen years.

The World War seriously undermined the economic situation of Europe and impoverished many of America's former customers. Hence the European trade of the U. S. A. has not shown in post-war years an advance comparable with that of her Asiatic trade.¹ Her South American business, though growing appreciably, suffers also from the same comparison.

Captains of American industry, even before the outbreak in 1898 of the Spanish-American War, were beginning to talk of the need for new foreign outlets, where their feverishly growing

¹ Even before the World War the Asiatic trade of the U.S.A. had started to grow at the expense of the European.

industries could dispose of excess production. Indeed, this war was really the first step in the conquest of the Pacific markets. According to this interpretation, Cuba, Porto Rico and the other Caribbean Islands, as guardians of the Panama Canal, were keys to the "gate of the Pacific," while the Philippines were and remain America's advance posts at the door of China.

Russia in the Far East. Among Asiatic problems that constituted by Russia's presence in the Far East seems for many reasons to be of special concern to the U. S. A. "Russia used to be a European nation with interests in Asia but is now an Asiatic nation with interests in Europe," remarks Nicholas Roosevelt;² and while his terse witticism, like most epigrams, is not irreproachably exact, it contains a good deal of truth. Russia has, indeed, larger holdings in Asia than in Europe, and in that respect can be called an Asiatic Power. Often, too, she is described as "Eurasian," a term which conveys a deeper meaning to some interpreters than the geographic sense. It is a name implying Russia's position as connecting link between Europe and Asia, between the West and the East.³

Undoubtedly there is reason for such statements; but it is another thing to draw hasty conclusions from them. Actually Russia's population is predominantly Caucasian, and the overwhelming majority still live in the European part of Russia (or, to be more up-to-date, of the U. S. S. R.). Her economic interests are still primarily European, her cultural bonds decidedly more Western than Eastern—i.e., Asiatic.

But many Europeans and Americans attach the adjective "Asiatic" to the Russia of today on account of her sympathies and influences in Asia! This attitude intensifies their apprehension at the real or imagined spread of Communist doctrine, and is an offshoot of their desire to penetrate into the future of Asia. It is the desire to know the future of the white man's domination over the Asiatics; for there are still many "optimists" who cannot be persuaded that this "domination" is a phenomenon of the past. It is the desire to foresee the outcome of the conflict in Eastern Asia.

² "The Restless Pacific." New York, 1928.

³ Such an interpretation was re-advanced recently by a small group of Russian *émigrés* who call themselves "Eurasians" and profess, among other things, this theory originated by certain Slavophiles.

China as a World Problem. "At all times within the memory of living man China has been a problem," writes Thomas Millard, who is not only a well known American authority on things Far Eastern, but also a counselor to the present Chinese Government of Nanking. "That problem has two aspects: one, the national, about the fate of that country and its people, and another—international, or as a World problem."⁴

The emergence of China as an international problem coincides with the growth of the United States as a World Power and with the advance of Japan. China is now a center of the conflicting interests of many nations. What the next chapter of her history will be remains a puzzle even to well informed students. On the solution depends much in the field of international relations not only in Asia but throughout the world!

Whither Japan? Among other important results of the World War was the fermentation of the "Revolt of Asiatics," encouraged by the quarrels of the "Whites," not alone on the Eastern arena, but throughout the World. What Japan's attitude in this will be is no idle speculation.

"Another important event of the World War," writes Mr. Millard, "was the transformation of the United States into a military Power."⁵ Japan, as one of the aspirants for the mastery of the Pacific, is herein actually concerned. "In her struggle for a better future Japan cannot remain isolated. She has no way to ultimate success if she would fight alone. She has to make her choice whether to ally herself with the Asiatics or the whites."⁶ Japan must choose between an alliance or combination with Westerners to repress her Asiatic neighbors or with Asiatics to liberate Asia from Western domination—that is, at least, how the Chinese and Hindus envisage the situation. But to say "ally with Westerners" does not mean with all Westerners, as they are far from presenting a united front; their interests in Asia are not of a kind to be easily coördinated and adjusted.

Whither Russia? Some students of this problem believe that a Pan-Asiatic Alliance is not so unthinkable as others maintain.

⁴ Thomas Millard, "China, Where it is Today and Why." Harcourt, New York, 1928.

⁵ Though one might wish to qualify such a statement. Probably more far-reaching in its consequences was the opening of the Panama Canal, enabling the U.S.A. materially to extend its position in the Pacific.

⁶ Millard, "China, Where it is Today and Why."

Where would Russia stay in such a case? Russia, being the only "white" nation in Asia, which is actually bordering on China and Japan, should be of the "greatest importance in the conflict between the white and yellow races."⁷ How Russia would act in such a conflict is a question the answer to which is still in the making. But it is of interest to all concerned to shape it to their own best advantage. What that answer will be remains to be seen!

There is plenty of evidence that not all Americans regarded the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 and its outcome as exactly coinciding with American interests in Asia, though there were some who had contributed to its financing.

Mr. H. K. Norton, in his book "China and the Powers,"⁸ makes observations on this point which are well worth quoting. "Russia across Manchuria," he writes, "is the best guarantee against any Japanese-American War . . . Japan could afford to go to war with Russia in some contingencies. The United States at her back would not constitute a threat to her success. But no Japanese statesman with right mind would seek a War against the United States with Russia at his back . . ." If this is so, the question, "Whither Russia?" must be of great concern.

Danger of Generalizations. Some observers contend that the objectives of Soviet Russia's diplomacy in the Far East are not essentially different from those of Imperial Russia; they consider that Russia must inevitably press on towards the Pacific Ocean and prevent any other Power or Powers from obtaining the hegemony in China. But generalizations which deem the diplomacy of Old and New Russia in the Far East to be the same, seems poorly based on facts and their proper interpretation. Over-simplification in such matters rarely supports a retest.

The Situation Changing. Conditions have changed drastically, owing to the World War and the Revolutions in Russia and China. To study this new situation, to analyze the factors now at work in the Orient, and, if necessary, to revise the dilapidated

⁷ Probably the basic stimuli for armed conflicts are economic, but we should hesitate to deny the possibility of a conflict on the basis of racial differences, considering the existing discriminations and misunderstandings between races that play a rôle, artificial or not, in their intercourse. Besides, such a conflict might be at the same time economic.

⁸ Henry Kittredge Norton, "China and the Powers," N. Y. 1927.

formulae, the worn-out definitions and the old explanations that no longer explain, should be a profitable task.

The Aim of this Work. The aim of this work is to find, through an analysis of Russia's interests in the Far East, the proper explanation of her rôle there in the past, and a reliable interpretation of her present position; then, in the light of this analysis, to offer material for a reasonable forecast of her future. One of the difficulties of such a task is that of changing long-established views, however wrong they may be. "Secret diplomacy" is one of the factors to blame for the endless misunderstandings among nations. Another is the habit of imputing motives, especially those of the baser sort, in the effort to read the minds of others. Many people are tempted by the French saying, "Calomniez, calomniez; il y en restera quelque chose!"

Inaccessibility of Russia. In such misunderstandings the inaccessibility of Russia has played undoubtedly a prominent part. We mean by "inaccessibility" the difficulties, not yet entirely removed, which used to confront the foreign observer who tried to understand the land of the Tsars. These difficulties included not only the immense size and diversity of the country, but also its peculiarities in structure as well as the customs of a large and, to the European mind, somewhat exotic nation. The Tsar's Government never encouraged too much curiosity from outsiders, and made their visits to Russia far from easy.

This served, of course, to increase misinformation; imagination supplanted observation and fairy-tales masqueraded as facts. Exaggerated fears of Russia's growth, misleading interpretation of passing episodes as basic trends, overindulgence in forecasts without proper substantiation by facts, deliberate misinterpretation by such interested parties as business men or quasi-statesmen—all served to create an unhealthy atmosphere around the imaginary Russia in the Far East, and to obstruct the view of the real one.

Emotional vs. Rational. Exaggerated alarm at the power of Tsarist Russia has been replaced latterly by a fear and hatred of the Soviets. Their communistic influence on China has likewise been exaggerated by the numerous poorly informed and panic-stricken individuals who are in a position to influence public opinion.

The emotions have many noble functions, but they often

play too conspicuous a rôle in this process of molding public opinion. Especially is this true of our own day, when, after such calamities as the Great War, and the numerous revolutions, even philosophers have forgotten how to keep calm.

Emotional interpretation impairs or destroys the value of facts to those who must use them in dealing with sober realities! There are, unfortunately, plenty of misunderstandings among the nations, which are not easy to overcome; but why should we tolerate those wrong interpretations, which—if the facts were properly understood—could be removed, leaving the situation clarified?

Objectivity and Methodical Analysis. To clarify the facts, to offer a sound, impartial interpretation of them is the earnest desire of the present author. It does not enter into his plans to "whitewash" past abuses committed by Russia in the Orient; neither is he inclined to be lenient in setting forth the present or rash in forecasting the future. His desire is limited to submitting the facts essential to enable the reader to construct an unbiased, comprehensive, and well substantiated picture of Russia in the Far East.

To accomplish this aim he has employed the principle of *audi alteram partem*, and supported his narrative by much documentary evidence in the Appendices.

The first part of the book, "Old Russia in the Far East," being a historical compendium, serves as the background on which the rest is projected. It is necessarily a recapitulation of facts generally known and well authenticated, which are presented in the setting of the causes that produced them.

The second part, "Modern Russia, i.e., the U. S. S. R. in the Far East," or "The Present Situation," especially its analysis of the factors now at work in the Far East, leaves more room for disagreement. It is based on the method of dialectics not yet universally accepted, but the choice of a method has been without prejudice to objectivity.

The third part is an attempt to dissect the complex "Problem of the Pacific" into its constituent parts; and, by discovering Russia's place in each of these separate problems, to define her place in the whole.

PART ONE

OLD RUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST

(The Historical Background)

I. HOW AND WHY DID RUSSIA COME TO THE FAR EAST?

CHAPTER I

HISTORY OF SINO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS (UNTIL 1905)

A. Mongolian Invasion of Russia, 1223-1480. B. Russian Advance to the East: (1) Period of Peaceful Penetration Uncontrolled by Moscow; (2) Period of Legalization; (3) Period of Manchurian Adventure. C. End of Russia's Penetration to the Far East: (1) Russo-Japanese War; (2) The Peace of Portsmouth. D. Summary.

A. Mongolian Invasion of Russia.

The first contact between the Russians and those Mongols who came to Europe from the present-day Mongolia, early in the XIIIth century, was not a pleasant one.

In 1223,¹ or four years before the death of Jenghiz Khan, the great Mongolian conqueror, some of his lieutenants penetrated from Asia into the southeastern part of Europe. Advancing along the southern shores of the Caspian Sea, and through the Caucasus, they entered and occupied the domain of the Polovetzs. The defeated princes of that land applied for help to their neighbors, the South Russian princes. After a conference at Kiev, the Russians decided to meet the request² to bring their troops into the lands of Polovetzs, and to fight the intruders. Having crossed Dnieper River, they met the advance posts of the Tartars in the steppes and defeated them near Kalka.³ One of the princes, Mstislav the Brave, eager to get the credit of the victory, crossed that river without coördinating his actions with others, and being met by superior forces of the Tartars, was routed before any reinforcement could reach him. Therefore the battle was lost to the Russians. The Tartars, however, did not pursue the enemy into his territory, but soon returned to Asia.

A few years later, in 1237, the Tartars started their European conquests. Ogotay (Ugaday), a son of Jenghiz Khan, sent his

¹ Other historians give 1224 as the year of this invasion.

² Though the Polovetzs had annoyed them in the past by raids and pillage.

³ A river now called Kaletz, flowing into the sea of Azov.

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nephew, Batu (Bati), with plenty of well equipped and well trained troops, to the lands of Russians. Having crossed the Urals, Batu hewed down the Volga Bulgars, then crossed the Volga River and penetrated into what was at that period the center of Russia. Defeating and sweeping away all the troops that offered any resistance, pillaging and killing the population, burning the towns and spreading terror by unheard of cruelty, the Tartars devastated an enormous area, including Moscow, Riazan, Suzdal, and Vladimir; but after having almost reached Novgorod in 1238, they started back towards Asia, taking with them booty and prisoners.

In 1239 the Tartars renewed their raids, at that time following southern routs. Having seized Pereyaslav and Tchernigov, they occupied Kiev and demolished the city in 1240. Then they entered Poland and what is now Hungary, crossing these lands with sword and fire. They attempted to go further West, but, meeting stubborn resistance in Bohemia, finally turned back towards the Lower Volga. Some historians explain this by the death of Khan Ogotay, which, according to Tartar custom, forced the recall of his chieftains for the election of a new ruler.

Before withdrawing, the Tartars left representatives in the main communities of the conquered lands, and for over 200 years Russia was under a Mongolian yoke, a yoke that served as a brutal lesson, but also facilitated her unification and growth. During all these years the Russians had to pay heavy tribute to the Tartar Khans and the Tartars constituted themselves their over-lords.

But even as consolidation strengthened the Russians, the Tartars were undergoing an opposite process. They were disintegrating and weakening, partly through the growth of parasitism (of conquerors and exploiters), partly through the adoption by them of Buddhism and Lamaism—whose teachings encouraged meditation, acquiescence and non-resistance. Finally, about 1480, the Mongolian yoke was cast off by the Russians. Gradually the Tartars returned to Asia. Only a few remained around the Volga River; and for a while there were practically no clashes between the Tartars and the Russians, except for small raids by the former along the Volga.

In the XVIth century it became imperative to put a stop to

all these raids, as Russia was stabilizing, growing and bringing order not only into her own house, but also into the regions along her borders. Thus in 1552 the conquest of the Kazan Khanate was undertaken and achieved. Astrakhan, on the Lower Volga, was taken four years later; and these victories, extending the frontier to the Urals, opened the way for Russia's expansion eastward, and marked the turning point of her relations with Asia.

B. Russian Advance to the East.

(1) PERIOD OF PEACEFUL PENETRATION, UNCONTROLLED BY MOSCOW.

(a) *The "Conquest" of Siberia.* The first step in Russia's expansion was the "conquest" of Siberia in 1582. Western Siberia had, of course, been known to the Russians long before that time,—as early indeed as the XIth century, when certain enterprising traders of Novgorod first penetrated the country in search of valuable furs. But it was not until 1555 that the chain of events commenced which led directly to the conquest. In that year the Tartar Chief Ediger sent envoys to Moscow to entreat the Tsar to take Sibir (or Siberia) under protection against his enemies; and from then on events proceeded apace. Between 1571 and 1572 envoys were sent to Moscow by Khan Kuchum, who had taken the town Sibir (or Isker) from Ediger, to offer submission to the Tsar. It was not for nothing that Ivan the Terrible, writing to Edward VI of England, had already styled himself "Lord of all Sibir."

In its early stages the Eastern expansion of Russia was left largely to private initiative. The vast territory of Siberia, rich in big game, was slowly penetrated and even colonized by hunters, trappers, and other adventurous individuals. Then, in 1558 an event of definite importance took place. Ivan the Terrible received a petition from the rich merchants Stroganoff, whose trading operations extended to the basin of the Kama, one of the great tributaries of the Volga. In this petition the Stroganoffs begged a concession to develop and exploit this region, offering to protect it from outside encroachments; and as administration of such a remote and sparsely populated district was extremely difficult the Tsar acceded. He accorded the Stroganoffs various trading

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privileges and, what is more important, conferred on them the right to administer justice and levy troops.

The Russian conquest of Siberia had commenced. Twenty-three years later, in 1581 (or 1582), the military chieftain of the Stroganoffs, Vasili Timofeieff, known under the name of Yermak, descended eastward from the Urals with eight hundred Cossacks. Clearing the way by skirmishes with the Kuchum Tartars, the Russians descended the Tobol River, reached the Irtysh in September 1582, and finally came to Sibir, the capital of Kuchum, already about to be abandoned. Having occupied it, Yermak sent to Moscow a deputation to lay before the Tsar rich tribute in furs, to salute humbly the Lord Ivan the Terrible with the acquisition of the new Siberian Kingdom, and to implore pardon for the misconduct of his followers, for which a sentence of death had been passed upon him by the Tsar.

Moscow's foreign policy in the XVIth century definitely concentrated on two objectives: (1) to monopolize the river route from Europe to Asia from the Baltic Sea, via the Volga River, to the Caspian Sea; and (2) to establish a direct contact with the Western countries having outlet to the ocean.¹ As to the East, Ivan the Terrible considered the danger from the Tartars practically eliminated by the conquest of Kazan and Astrakhan, which had enabled the extension of the frontier to the Urals. Further advance into Asia did not greatly interest him at that time. Consequently the Stroganoffs and Yermak were acting in Western Siberia against his wishes. Yet, the success of Yermak pleased the Tsar. He not only pardoned Yermak's past, but even presented him with "a cloak and a medal for his loyal services." Yermak was at once hailed as a great hero by his countrymen, and his achievements have been regarded as a sort of heroic legend even down to the present time.

(b) *Further Advance into the Lands that No Man Claimed as His Own.* Within a few years the Russians reached the River Obi. The scattered aborigines of that region (Ostiaks, Voguls, Tartars, etc.) were poor hunters and fishermen. They recognized Russian sovereignty without reluctance.

The struggle with the Tartars continued for a short while, but gradually closed. Russia now turned her attention to actual colonization. As early as 1586 peasants, sent to cultivate new

¹ M. N. Pokrovsky, "History of Russia."

lands, were charged with the duties of collecting tribute and defending the territory against the raids of the Tartars.

Administration of the new lands, prior to the founding of a new seat of government at Tomsk in 1629, was directed mainly from Tiumen and Tobolsk. Natives found little change from the Tartar system. They merely paid tribute now to the "voyevodas," officers representing Moscow, instead of to the Tartars. Ostensibly the duties of these "voyevodas" were to "maintain peace in the province and to prevent lawlessness, distilling, drunkenness, and gambling, which would diminish the revenue and unfit the men for service." In reality they were quite often corrupt and so busily engaged in feathering their own nests. Neither the appointment of special customs officers ("golova"), in charge of all money and tributes, nor other devices were successful in checking the corruption.

As for traders, they were permitted to come into Siberia on payment of a general license fee, a certain percentage of all goods bought and sold, and a ten percent import and export duty.²

The northern part of Asia, like Russia in Europe, has magnificent plains and river systems. In its first stage the Russian colonial advance followed the rivers and so was directed by them. By 1619 the Cossacks had reached the Yenissei and in 1628 they crossed this waterway and advanced to the Lena. In 1636 they reached the mouth of the Yenissei, and in 1637 established in the basin of the Lena the fort Yakutsk, destined to become an important headquarters for further expansion to the Amur region. Now, with their main stations in the valley of the Lena, and their power extending over the Obi and the Yenissei, the Cossack adventurers pushed on in all directions.

During the years between 1630 and 1650 Russia made remarkable progress in Siberian expansion. In the first decade (1630-40) they reached the Arctic Ocean on the extreme North (1636) and the Pacific (Sea of Okhotsk) on the extreme East (1639). Indeed, within fifty-seven years (1582-1639) the whole continent had been traversed from end to end. It was an unparalleled achievement, for the advance of the American settlers from the Atlantic to the Pacific occupied nearly two centuries. This might be explained by the fact that while the

² F. Golder, "Russian Expansion on the Pacific." Cleveland, 1914, pp. 20-28.

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American colonists had to fight the Indians, the Russians, having entered the lands of "no man," had met little serious resistance, though some opposition was offered by the Tunghus in the Yenissei basin and by the Buriats around the Baikal Lake.

(c) *Pioneers—Not Parasites.* In general the Russians advanced to the Pacific fighting nature and not men. They came to the Orient as pioneers, not parasites; they had not taken away lands from toilers, or benefited by labor already performed by others. "The intense cold in the winter and great heat in the summer," wrote Professor Treat, one of the well known American authorities on the Far East, "would have checked a people less familiar with such extremes than the Russians."

The discovery of the most easterly rivers flowing into the Arctic Ocean was the work of Michaelo Stadukhin, who reached the Kolyma in 1644, having made about one thousand miles in small boats from the mouth of the Lena eastward. In 1647 another expedition, under Simon Dejnief, forged even farther, and in 1648, according to the historian Müller, actually reached Anadyr. About this time Dejnief and Alexeieff visited Kamchatka,³ and in the same year the Russians reached Cape Chukotsky and entered the straits, subsequently named after Bering, another Russian explorer, who did not arrive until almost a century later.

In 1651 Ataman Khabarov established himself on the Amur, where he discovered other Cossacks who had already descended this river in 1643. Poyarkoff and Perfilieff were the earlier explorers of the Amur and its affluents—Shilka and Zeya. Though the details of the explorations of Poyarkoff and Khabarov are found in documents the authenticity and historical value of which cannot be questioned, they have the glamour and wonder of a fairy tale. A small group of brave, adventurous men, fascinated by vague stories heard from the natives about far-away lands lying along some river unknown, started on these exploits and, fighting the wilderness, conquering nature, advanced, step by step, towards the ocean known to us at the present time as the Pacific. Undergoing incredible hardships, hunger and violent cold, they still plowed on. Finally, they reached the sea of Okhotsk after having covered five thousand

³ Kamchatka was not subjugated until 1607, when Ataman Atlasov was despatched to the island with sixty Cossacks.

miles in three years. Surely, the steel-like will and fearless determination of these men deserve the highest tribute from posterity.

(d) *First Contact with the Manchu.* At this juncture the Russians found themselves face to face with the Manchus, who had just conquered China. In consideration of this, Khabarov calculated that a force of 6000 would be required to defend the region. He petitioned the Russian Government for help, but, without awaiting an answer from Moscow, decided to rely on the help of the voyevodas, who supplied him with 170 "promyshlenniki" or traders, and 21 Cossacks with three cannons. Before winter he met the forces of a native prince, Lofka, and defeated them. At the spot of the Prince Lofka's camp a town was founded by the Russians. It was named Albazin, and played a conspicuous historical rôle a few years later.

On receiving Khabarov's report, Moscow sent an embassy to the Khan. The entire embassy was massacred by the natives.⁴ Early in 1652, however, Khabarov again descended the Amur and reached the Sungari and Ussuri rivers, bringing the Russians into contact with the Dahours and Achans. These tribes could hardly stand against the Russian cannons and so decided to appeal to a stronger power for help and protection.

The Manchus, having obtained the upper hand in China at that time, extended their influence to the Amur region. Early in 1652 General Hai-se of Lingoda (in the Kirin province of today) and 2000 Manchu soldiers, equipped with guns, hastened to the assistance of the Achans. "They bravely besieged the Russian fort on the mouth of the Ussuri, and reduced the town walls to ashes," writes Mr. Fu-Kuang-Chen, "but the Cossacks, though greatly outnumbered, made a desperate charge against the Manchu soldiers, drove them back, capturing two cannons and many muskets; 676 of Manchu soldiers were killed, the Russians losing 10 killed and 78 wounded."

Having learned that the Chinese Emperor had prepared a large army for another contest, Khabarov began to abandon the winter fort he had defended, and started back to the Zeya River. On his return to Moscow "another embassy was sent to

⁴ Fu-Kuang-Chen, "Sino-Russian Diplomatic Relations Since 1689." In "Chinese Social and Political Science Review," 1926, pp. 137, 138.

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Peking, but the Russian envoy was killed en route by his interpreter.”⁵

While Poyarkoff and Khabarov were exploring the lower and the middle parts of the Amur, the exploration of the Baikal region was under way. Early in 1654 Peter Beketoff, descending the Vitim plateau and tracing the Ingoda and the Shilka rivers, came to the Nercha, where he laid the foundation of Nerchinsk. This settlement on the upper valley of the Amur, within easy reach of the Baikal by the way of the Selenga with its tributaries, the Uda and Khilok, greatly facilitated communication between West Siberia and the Amur region.

(e) *The Chinese Pressure*. In the summer of 1654 Stepanoff (who succeeded Khabarov) sailed with 370 men down the Sungari River to collect grain, and in June encountered a big Chinese army. After an insignificant skirmish the Russians retreated to the Kamara River, where they founded a fort, “Kamarsk,” which in March 1655 was besieged by a Chinese army of 10,000. The Cossacks, though few in number, desperately held out against their enemy. Being unable to force the Russians out, the Chinese general decided to starve them. He therefore ordered the natives (Doucheris) to desert their homes and to abandon the cultivation of their land. “Starvation,” says Fu-Kuang-Chen, “drove the Cossacks to a desperate plan; they turned toward the Amur in an attempt to force their way down to its mouth. But at the end of June 1655, while stirring down the Sungari River, Stepanoff with 500 men was suddenly surrounded by a big Chinese flotilla consisting of 47 vessels.”⁶ Stepanoff and 270 of his Cossacks were killed and the others dispersed.

(f) *The Siege of Albazin*. During the years that followed, the Russians set about to construct “ostrogs,” or blockhouses, along the Amur and its tributaries in order to consolidate their holdings and provide for defence.

“In 1682 the Chinese Emperor Kuang-Hsi had despatched his general Lang-Tan to examine and report on the situation in Albazin, under the pretext of hunting, and in the meanwhile I-San-Oh, the Minister of Finance, was sent to Lingoda to build warships. Fortresses were built in Tsitsihar and Mergen and

⁵ Fu-Kuang-Chen, *ibid.*, p. 140.

⁶ Fu-Kuang-Chen, *ibid.*, p. 141.

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water communications were improved for transportation of munitions and provisions."⁷

Sa-Pu-Su was appointed the military governor of the Amur with Aigun as his headquarters. "To starve out the Russians," writes N. Steinfeld, "the frontier garrisons were ordered to destroy the corn and grain around the region of military operations. In 1683 the Chinese troops, reinforced by the Mongols, advanced to Mergen and Aigun. At the same time, sixty Cossacks from Albazin also reached the vicinity of Aigun. They were attacked and made prisoners. The following two years witnessed the destruction of most of the Russian 'ostrogs' on the Lower Amur and Albazin was thus isolated. . . ."⁸

In June 1685 General Peng-Chen with 10,000 soldiers, 5000 sailors, 200 pieces of artillery and 100 transports advanced to Albazin from Tsitsihar, both by land and by water. "Before resorting to attack the town the Chinese tried to persuade Alexei Tolbuzin, the voyevoda of Albazin, to abandon the place. With only 430 Cossacks, three cannons and 300 muskets, he refused to give in and determined to hold out to a man."⁹

In June the Chinese troops began the attack. Unable to stand the gun-fire, 25 Cossacks submitted to General Peng. They were sent to Peking as prisoners, and later enlisted as bodyguards to the Emperor Kuang-Hsi. Tolbuzin with the rest escaped to Nerchinsk.

In October Tolbuzin returned with 200 Cossacks of Beiton and regained what remained of the town, now in ruins and already abandoned by the Chinese. Learning of this General Sa-Pu-Su of Aigun, with 8000 soldiers and 40 pieces of cannon, hastened to Albazin for another attack. "The Cossacks (less than 300 of them) were resolved to hold out desperately," narrated Fu-Kuang-Chen. "In July the Chinese began to besiege the town. In the course of the siege Tolbuzin was killed, but, in spite of the loss of their leader, the Cossacks continued to defend the town under his successor, Beiton, with so much tenacity and patience that the Chinese were worn out and began to retire for winter."

Early in the following year (1687) another attack was made

⁷ Fu-Kuang-Chen, *ibid.*, pp. 484-493.

⁸ N. Steinfeld, "Russkoye Dielo v. Manchurii." Harbin, 1910. (In Russian.)

⁹ Fu-Kuang-Chen, *ibid.*, pp. 142-144.

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by the Chinese, but this time the Cossacks had actually only 66 fighting men, most of the rest having died of rheumatism. General Sa-Pu-Su sent physicians, but Beiton not only refused to accept this magnanimity, but also presented the general with corn and grain to show that he still had sufficient provisions to sustain the resistance.

However, as the town was on the verge of falling into the hands of the Chinese, a decree came from the Emperor to the effect that, since the two Powers were going to negotiate peace, the siege should be promptly raised. The Chinese began to retire in September 1688 to Aigun and Mergen. In the words of Fu-Kuang-Chen "the chapter of War between the two countries thus came to an end; and that of peace was resumed."

(2) PERIOD OF LEGALIZATION.

(a) *Treaty of Nerchinsk*. Soon after the first contact between the Chinese (or rather the Manchus, who then became rulers of China) and the Russians was established in the middle of the XVIIth century, the Chinese Government decided to clear up the situation on its northern borders and to draw up some definite agreement with the Muscovites.

The need for legalization was felt in Russia also. This can be seen from Moscow's attempts to bring order to the administration of the newly acquired lands, and from a series of embassies sent by Russia to her neighbor for establishing mutual understanding. The Chinese historian of the Sino-Russian relations of that time writes: "As far as Peking and Moscow were concerned, peaceful relations between the two countries had never ended since they began. They were occasionally interrupted and hindered, especially when Russian adventurers came into contact with and encroached upon the northern territory of China. But those interruptions and hindrances were merely incidental consequences."¹⁰

The Russian Asiatic Empire was founded by a number of enterprising adventurers. Afterwards, it is true, it was accepted by the Tsars as a *fait accompli*. But "although nominally dragged sometimes into hostilities with China, Moscow, chiefly with a view to extending trade in the farther East, had never abandoned its cherished policy of peace and amity with China,"

¹⁰ Fu-Kuang-Chen, *ibid.*, p. 476.

continues the Chinese author quoted above. "Their penetration into Northern Asia and later on into the eastern parts of it were not considered by China as any kind of intrusion just because China had no claims for these lands."¹¹

From the correspondence between the Emperor Kuang-Hsi (1662-1721) and the Tsar of Moscow one can see clearly that the Chinese Emperor did not consider the regions adjoining Amur River as belonging to his crown. Only in the latter part of the XVIIth century, after the conquest of China by Manchus, are we able to discover some attempts of the Manchurian chieftains to subjugate their neighbors, including those dwelling in the lower Amur and at Ussuri—i.e., in the northeastern part of Asia already explored and occupied by Russians. And at the same time the new rulers of China were forced to pay increased attention to the Mongols, who for long years had been the neighbors and rivals of the Manchus.

The Manchus knew, from the experience of the past, that the tribes of Eleuthes or Kalmucks,¹² then inhabiting the Western (or Outer) Mongolia of our days, were hard to cope with, being war-like and ambitious. Many of their former attempts to subjugate the Eleuthes had failed. On the other hand, the Manchus also learned that the relations between Russia and these aborigines were growing friendly, and became alarmed at the possibility of an alliance.

Since 1676 Prince Galdan had established himself as the master of the Eleuthes, of Turkestan and Tibet, and cherished the still bigger ambition of moving his victorious army to Eastern Mongolia (Kalka). Seriously concerned with this menace, and knowing that it is easier to cope with only one enemy at a time, the Chinese Emperor welcomed the desire of Moscow to negotiate. This facilitated the conclusion of the treaty signed at Nerchinsk in 1689, the first between Russia and China and, incidentally, the first ever concluded by China with a European country.

In the past a number of Russian envoys to Peking had not been permitted to arrive. Some were assassinated; others, who reached Peking, were not well treated on their refusal to "kow-

¹¹ Fu-Kuang-Chen, *ibid.*, pp. 484-493.

¹² Also called Oirads, which name is also applied to other Mongolian tribes.

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tow"¹⁸ to the Bogdohan, or on account of the incorrect addressing of the Tsar's letters, or improper dating through use of the Russian calendar instead of the Chinese. Sometimes the envoy was refused an audience because he failed to bring gifts or on some other insignificant pretext.

The first Russian envoy who had actually obtained results in the attempt to establish proper relations with China was a certain Baikoff. It is true he was not received by the Emperor because "he had not the slightest idea how to show respect to a sovereign" (as he refused to "kow-tow"), but a letter of the Emperor to the Tsar was handed to him, nevertheless, by a high Chinese official and he was allowed to return to Moscow.

In the year 1667 a Tunghus prince, Gantimur, went over to the side of Russia. In 1670 Emperor Kuang-Hsi sent one of his councilors to Nerchinsk to demand the surrender of Gantimur. His demand was left unanswered and a letter addressed by the Emperor to the Tsar in 1677 had the same result, for being written in Manchu, a language unknown in Russia at that time, it was left untranslated.

This submission of Gantimur to the sovereignty of Russia and the non-surrender of him to the Chinese, as well as the ignoring of the Bogdohan's letter, contributed, apparently, a *casus belli* and explained the activities of the Chinese troops that attacked Albazin. Theirs was a punitive expedition rather than a war; a reprisal on the part of China, coupled with a reconnaissance, as one can judge from the instructions given to the General Lang-Tan "to examine and report the situation" first under the pretext of hunting, and later on to drive the Russians away.

But, as it has been stated above, the desire for peace with Russia was strong in China. The Moscow proposal to negotiate a treaty was readily accepted by Peking; the siege of Albazin was raised, and hostilities immediately ended. Actually the proposal for negotiations came from Moscow as an answer to the two letters (written in Latin and dated May 1683) from the Emperor Kuang-Hsi to the Tsar. These letters complained that a number of the Emperor's previous communications remained

¹⁸ To kneel before the Emperor.

unanswered by Russia and demanded that Albazin should be evacuated by the Cossacks.

The Russian plenipotentiary Golovin left Moscow in February 1686. In November of the same year he reached Udinsk, then proceeded to Selenginsk, where he remained for two years in the midst of the momentous changes around Albazin already described.

China was represented at the negotiations by Prince Sag-Ma-Tu (or Sogatu). For a long while the envoys disputed regarding the place of their meeting and finally decided on Nerchinsk. After a short period of negotiation the Treaty was signed on August 27th, 1689.¹⁴ This Treaty (see Appendices) was rendered in five languages: Chinese, Russian, Latin, Manchu and Mongol. But only the Latin copy was signed by the plenipotentiaries.

The Treaty of Nerchinsk had actually legalized or recognized *de jure* what was before only the *de facto* situation, and left to the Russians most of the lands to the North of the Amur River though excluding them from the River itself and from the southern slopes of the mountains to its North. The lands to the East of the Ussuri were left undefined until further negotiations. These lands remained for a long time under doubtful jurisdiction, though, being sparsely populated, they did not produce any actual controversies.

It was not until 1858-60 that the final legalization of Russians in the Far East was completed through the Treaties of Aigun, Tientsin and Peking. The Treaty of Nerchinsk legalized for the first time the relations between China and Russia, established boundaries between them (as far as it was possible with rather poor knowledge of geography and with very imperfect maps ¹⁵) and laid a basis for the lasting friendship of these two neighbors.

Freed on the Russian front, China now concentrated her attention on liquidating the Mongolian menace from the West, and finally succeeded in stopping the advance of the Kalmuks (Eleuthes) headed by Galdan. In 1690 Galdan was defeated

¹⁴ Russian calendar.

¹⁵ The frontier nearest to Mongolia was well defined, as it was of more concern at the moment than any other part of it.

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and taken prisoner, and the Manchus acquired Mongolia to the North of the Gobi desert.

(b) *Sino-Russian Relations in the XVIIIth Century.* The foreign policy of Russia during the XVIIIth century can be divided into two parts. Until 1760 her main attention is directed to the West, and her advance on the Far East and struggle with Turkey are more or less neglected. After 1760 the struggle for the Baltic gives place to the struggle for the Black Sea; and while in the latter period Russia pays little attention to the expansion of her Far Eastern possessions, she takes pains to continue exploration. By that time the increase of Imperial authority and the more regular organization of the State had subdued the adventurous and enterprising spirit of the Cossacks, and in the middle of the XVIIIth century Siberia was actually opened as a field of colonization. Generally speaking, the XVIIIth century can be considered as a period of slowly developing but only partially systematized colonization of the Russian lands in Asia, and of the cultivation of friendly relations between Russia and China.

"Soon after the defeat of the Kalmuks," writes Fu-Kuang-Chen, "the Emperor Kuang-Hsi became suspicious of the connections between them and the Russians."¹⁶ In the desire to clear up these suspicions of the Chinese, and to find solution for some problems left unsettled before, such as the extension of commerce and the establishment of a Church at Peking, the Russian Tsar, Peter the Great, sent to China in 1719 a new mission headed by Captain Izmailov.

This was at the time of Russia's brilliant victories over the Swedes, and the growth of her prestige in Europe. Nevertheless the new envoy was instructed to render all the courtesies to the Bogdohan required by the Chinese etiquette, including "kow-tow." The letter of the Tsar now addressed the Emperor as "Your Majesty," instead of Your Highness in the previous correspondence; and the instructions given to Izmailov included an attempt to obtain the consent of China for the establishment of a consulate-general of Russia at Peking, to be charged not only with administration of Russian commercial affairs, but also with legal jurisdiction over the Russians in China. "If these plans had been carried out," says Fu-Kuang-Chen, "the principle of extraterritoriality would have been established in China 124

¹⁶ Fu-Kuang-Chen, *ibid.*, p. 933.

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years before it was actually introduced by the U. S. A. in 1844."

As a matter of fact, one of the Secretaries of Izmailov, Lorentz Lange, a man fluent in Chinese and well acquainted with the country, was allowed to remain in Peking. This was the first time (1721-25) that China permitted a foreign consul to reside for a number of years in Peking. Izmailov himself returned to Moscow in 1721, but Lange's four years' stay in China saw many important changes in the relations between the two countries.

In December 1722 the old Emperor Kuang-Hsi passed away and was succeeded by Yung-Chen. The latter was a man of mediocre talents, and under his reign the Chinese Government, becoming more and more disinclined to intercourse with foreigners, restricted Russian trade in Peking. The Russian Government (now at St. Petersburg) was forced to reply with similar measures against the Chinese merchants in Siberia.

Nevertheless the policy of peace was not abandoned. The Chinese foreign policy of that period was still influenced by the desire to bring the Kalmuks to submission, and Peking considered it well to isolate them from Russia through a sort of *entente cordiale* with the latter.¹⁷

(c) *Treaties of Bur and Kiakhta*. In 1725 a new envoy was sent by Catherine I to Peking. His name was Count Sava Vladislavovich Ragousinsky. The result of his mission was the conclusion of two treaties: one at Bur (signed in 1727) and the other at Kiakhta (signed in 1726 and ratified in June 1728).

By these Russia had practically realized her commercial ambitions in China with the exception of establishing a consulate at Peking, that of Lorentz Lange having been only a temporary arrangement. She had gained the right of sending priests and students to the Chinese capital for religious and other purposes.

(d) *Further Russian Exploration and Colonization*. As already stated, the Russians reached the mouth of Amur River, in the middle of the XVIIth century and also penetrated Kamchatka. Vladimir Atlasov had explored this peninsula after it had already been visited by other Russians. Here, then, was the first Russian port in the Pacific.

¹⁷ Fu-Kuang-Chen, *ibid.*, v. XI., p. 156.

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At that time many maps represented America as a large outlying island of Asia, not far from Japan, or even as a part of the Asiatic mainland. Soon after the return of Luzjin and Yevreinov, Peter the Great set on foot another expedition to determine whether Asia and America were united. Vitus Bering, a Dane by birth, connected with the Russian Navy since 1704, was selected as the leader of the expedition. His chief lieutenants were Captain Spanberg, also a Dane, and N. Chirikoff, a Russian. The two attempts of Bering (1725-32) to reach America by journeying westward from Asia were not entirely successful. But another Russian, Gvozdeff, reached America (he called it the Large Country) in 1732. About a century elapsed before further attempts were made to ascertain if Asia and America were united.

The survey of the coast of Sakhalin was delayed until the middle of the XIXth century. "Russia deserves the chief credit for carrying this work to a successful end," writes Mr. F. Golder, and points out that "our earliest knowledge of Sakhalin comes to us neither from the Chinese, Japanese, Dutch, nor Jesuits, but from the Russian hunters of Siberia, who in their efforts to explore the Amur regions came in contact with Sakhalin in 1643."^{17a} (These hunters were Maxim Perfilieff and W. Poyarkoff, and though the latter reported in 1644 that Sakhalin was an island, still, for a long time, it was considered to be a peninsula.) The Straits of Tartary were discovered only in 1849 by Captain Nevelskoy of the Russian Navy, and not until then was it finally established that Sakhalin was an island.

The colonization of the Trans-Baikalia started by the Cossacks, who founded Nerchinsk, Udinsk and other towns, was continued more actively by new settlers coming from European Russia, partly as colonists, sent by the Government, but mainly as fugitives of the Government's persecuting wrath. Many of the newcomers (serfs) were driven to the East by the unbearable abuses of the landlords. Others were the persecuted dissenters from the Established Church ("old believers" and of other different "sects").

"In spite of many obstacles, which the system of serfdom in Russia placed in the way of peasant emigration, the population of Siberia reached already in 1851 (i.e., ten years before

^{17a} Golder, *ibid.*, p. 253.

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the liberation of the serfs in 1861) 2,700,000, a figure which although not very large, considering the immensity of the region, was in excess of the population of Canada at the same period which numbered only 1,800,000 souls." ¹⁸

So wrote Leroy-Beaulieu in 1900, further pointing out that "from this point of view the Russians had no reason to be ashamed of their colonization and, as a matter of fact, have none today. According to the census of 1897 there were 5,731,782 Siberians living on a territory of 4,812,800 sq. miles, whereas in 1891 there were only 4,883,000 Canadians inhabiting the 3,721,800 sq. miles of the Dominion."

Leroy-Beaulieu, writing when the Franco-Russian Alliance was in its "honeymoon" and all the Russian schemes in Asia were encouraged and glorified by many Frenchmen, who had or expected something to do with the Chinese Eastern Railway, the Russo-Chinese Bank, etc., was subsequently supported in these comments by another writer, not of French extraction. This other author was that world-famous Norwegian explorer, the late Fritjof Nansen, who was closely connected with many things Russian, especially in the recent years when he became some sort of a guardian angel of the refugees, but at the same time continued to be an unbending friend of Russia notwithstanding the prevailing animosity of others towards the Soviet rule.

In his huge volume, "Through Siberia, the Land of the Future" Nansen wrote: "It may seem strange to many that an agricultural country like Russia, should have possessed Siberia for three centuries with its almost inexhaustible wealth and its boundless extent of fertile land, without making more out of it than she has done. If we exclude the recently acquired territories in Central Asia, the population of Siberia and the East Asiatic provinces may be put at about eleven millions."¹⁹

"The Russians are said to have no aptitude for a continued, stubborn purposeful work of civilization. This last assertion may be doubtful, but it must be admitted that Russia has shown a remarkable power of expansion."

"From the earliest foundation of the Russian Empire at

¹⁸ P. Leroy-Beaulieu, "The Awakening of the East." New York, 1900. pp. 1-4.

¹⁹ F. Nansen, "Through Siberia, the Land of the Future." William Heineman, London, 1914, pp. 282-303.

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Moscow about 1500,²⁰ to our day, its territorial increase has had no parallel in the history of the world, with the exception of the British Empire."

"During the whole of this period the Russian Empire has grown at the average rate of fifty-five square miles a day or 20,000 square miles a year,—or a territory as large as the Kingdom of Norway, every seventh year unceasingly."²¹

From Trans-Baikalia, as well as from the basin of the Lena the Russians penetrated into nearby Mongolia. Trade developed mostly with Mongolia, and if with China, again through Mongolia. The commercial relations of the early Russian settlers with Manchuria were not of importance. Whatever was the trade (almost exclusively barter), it was transacted in Kiakhta or on the borders, not in Manchuria itself.

(e) *Treaties of Aigun, Tientsin and Peking.* In the middle of the XIXth century the Russians again turned their attention to the Eastern part of Asia, where their possessions remained rather neglected for a long time, until the activity of other Powers (especially of England) gave an impulse for this renewal of interest in the Far East. This was the time of N. Mouravieff, the young, able and energetic Governor General of Eastern Siberia, which coincided with the explorations by Nevelskoy of Sakhalin, mouth of the Amur, etc.

Until Mouravieff's day the only contact between the metropolis and the faraway Asiatic possessions such as Kamchatka, Sakhalin, the Okhotsk Sea region, and Alaska, was by the water route around Africa (Cape of Good Hope) or, if by land, via northern routes through Yakutsk. Mouravieff was an enthusiastic promoter of Russia's interests in the Far East, with an opinion about the great future of Russia there.

When Mouravieff was appointed, in 1847, Governor General of the Eastern Siberia, the Tsar Nicholas I, after some general remarks about the gold mining in that region, the Russian trade at Kiakhta and the relations with China, told him: "As for the Russian river Amur, you will hear from us later," and concluded his conversation with a significant phrase: *à bon*

²⁰ Moscow was founded in 1147, but at the close of the XVth century it became a recognized center of the Moscow Russia that succeeded already to accumulate many "principalities" and started building Empire. (V.Y.)

²¹ F. Nansen, *ibid.*, pp. 282-283.

entendeur peu de paroles (to one who knows how to listen even a few words are enough to understand!)

Mouravieff, apparently, knew how to listen, and understood that the Tsar had some plans about the Amur. (These plans, incidentally, were not looked upon with favor by the members of his Government: the Chancellor Count Nesselrode, the Minister of Finances Vronchenko and Count Panin, who feared that this might injure Russia's then friendly relations with England.²²)

The discovery of the Tartary Straits by Nevelskoy, and his hoisting of the Russian flag at the mouth of the Amur (1850) was approved, and Mouravieff's report to St. Petersburg describing the advantages Russia would obtain in getting a shorter route to the Far East via Amur, was also favorably received and a survey of the Amur was authorized.²³

The instructions Mouravieff received in this connection included a very positive warning not to use arms against China, and no money was appropriated by St. Petersburg for these explorations. These restrictions were imposed by the Minister of Finances, who was against any adventures in the Far East and arranged everything in his power to prevent them. Mouravieff's expeditions had not met any resistance. No signs of Chinese authority anywhere along the left bank of the Amur River were discovered. In four years the Russians founded a series of towns alongside the Amur, among them Blagovestchensk, Khabarovsk, Mariinsk, Nikolaievsk; and some Cossacks, miners, and farmers were "transferred" from the Trans-Baikalia to the Amur region as new settlers.²⁴

In 1858 Mouravieff arrived at Aigun²⁵ in person to negotiate with the Chinese; and on May 29th of the same year concluded a Treaty with them (the Treaty of Aigun) by which all doubts about Russia's right to the possession of the left bank of the Amur were removed. The somewhat obscure wording of

²² "Priamurie," pp. 30-33.

²³ Actually an earlier expedition headed by Dr. Middendorf, sent by the Academy of Science in 1842 to investigate the flora and fauna of Eastern Asia, had surveyed some parts of that region and made in 1845 similar suggestions to the Government as Mouravieff did in 1849-50. ("Priamurie," pp. 30-35.)

²⁴ Mouravieff had planned to attract Americans into the Russian Far East, but St. Petersburg considered it a "danger" to Russia's internal politics. ("Priamurie," p. 166.)

²⁵ In Northern Manchuria, at the right bank of the Amur.

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the Nerchinsk Treaty was replaced now by very definite demarcation by the river Amur itself, instead of the valley of the rivers flowing into it, as was the case in the Treaty of Nerchinsk; and the right of navigation for Chinese and Russian vessels alike, sought by Mouravieff, was included in the first article of that Treaty.

Almost exactly at the same time other negotiations were carried on at Tientsin by Count Poutiatin together with the plenipotentiaries of other Great Powers. The story of this Treaty of Tientsin has its beginnings in still another treaty, namely that of Nanking, concluded by Great Britain and China in 1842, at the end of the "Opium" War.

The Treaty of Nanking stipulated the opening of five Chinese ports ²⁶ for European and American trade, omitting Russia, for which Kiakhta remained the only trading point with China. These new privileges for others, excluding Russia, constituted a serious menace to her still insignificant ²⁷ but rapidly developing commercial intercourse with China, and St. Petersburg was rightly alarmed.

In a few years England was at war with Russia, having joined France, Turkey and Piedmont (Crimean War). Her Pacific squadron had invaded the Russian Far Eastern possessions, and, though failing to annihilate the Russian flotilla which had escaped into the Amur (using the Tartar Straits, unknown to the British), aroused in St. Petersburg serious doubts about the future of these unprotected far-away provinces.

In 1857-58 China was attacked by Great Britain and France (who occupied Canton and Tientsin). The Taiping Rebellion was growing in the South. Under this pressure, China decided—finally—to negotiate with the victorious foreigners the Treaty signed at Tientsin.

The Treaty signed by Poutiatin ²⁸ at Tientsin on June 14th eliminated the injustice created by the Treaty of Nanking. The five ports were now opened for the Russian trade also, and the question of the frontiers between Russia and China, left undecided by the Treaty of Nerchinsk, had to be settled without

²⁶ Formerly there was only one, namely Canton, opened by China, under pressure, for the foreign trade.

²⁷ Only 10,000,000 roubles a year. ("Priamurie," p. 33.)

²⁸ With whom the American envoy was in close accord. (T. Dennett, "Americans in Eastern Asia.")

further delay. The latter point was included by Poutiatin because he was not aware that this problem was already settled by the Treaty of Aigun, just signed by Mouravieff.

Soon it became obvious that Peking was not inclined to ratify the Aigun Treaty. I-Shan, who signed it for the Chinese, was dismissed "for stupidity and overstepping of his authority."

The Chinese suggested interpreting the Treaty as "a mark of Bogdohan's good-will towards the poor Russian settlers, and his consent to allow them to reside in some places of the Amur basin, and to cultivate the lands that were not occupied by anybody else."²⁹ As for the basin of Ussuri there was no intention on the part of China to give it up to Russia. If the Russians stubbornly insisted on this, China would discontinue any trade with her in Kiakhta, Chuguchak and Kuldja. The Russian envoy, Nicholas Ignatieff, received a note to this effect on his arrival at Peking for ratification of the Tientsin Treaty, and started negotiations for adjustments at once. Failing, he left Peking in May of 1860 and the diplomatic relations of Russia with China were suspended. In October of the same year, however, Ignatieff returned to China and succeeded in arranging the Treaty of Peking signed on November 15th, 1860.

The difficulties introduced by China for the ratification of the Tientsin Treaty forced the Anglo-French Allies to advance towards Peking. The Emperor fled, and the capital was menaced by foreign guns. Ignatieff offered his services for reconciliation, succeeded in bringing the parties to an agreement, and gained the Chinese consent for his own demands at the same time.

The Treaty of Peking "in confirmation and elaboration" of the Treaties signed at Aigun and at Tientsin, restated that the Amur shall be and remain the frontier between China and Russia, and recognized the territory to the East of Ussuri River (i.e., the present day Maritime Province) as a Russian possession. It is of interest to note here that the native population of the latter region was then estimated to be not over 2000 souls. The entire area to the North of the Amur (i.e., the present day Amur Province) had a native population of less than 11,000.³⁰

From the time of these Treaties the colonization of the Russian Far East attracted more attention from St. Petersburg. But,

²⁹ "Priamurie," p. 57.

³⁰ "Priamurie," pp. 58-59.

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unfortunately, this vital problem had been solved rather poorly, if one is justified in using the word "solved" at all.

For years, down to the time when Russia came to a clash with Japan in 1904-05, this colonization was going on at an extremely slow pace. After having acquired the confirmation of the title for the Far East in 1858-60, Russia left it neglected for a while, being occupied on other "fronts." Internal affairs, the liberation of serfs (1861), the juridical and military reforms of Alexander II, as well as the struggle in the Near East (Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 and the conquests in Central Asia) necessitated the concentration of attention and energy in the opposite corner of Russia.

The Cossacks, the traditional pioneers and new settlers of Russian expansion, some not very numerous detachments of the army,³¹ a few volunteer emigrants, a number of religious dissenters, belonging to different sects persecuted by the government of the Tsar, and a few colonists brought under official auspices, together with the former convicts from the Siberian prisons, and the political exiles who were forced or encouraged to settle in the Far East, constituted a nucleus that remained anaemic for all these years.³²

Among other explanations of the slow development of colonization of the Russian Far East in the past, a prominent place should be given to the lack of good communications in Russian Asia until the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway. To transport colonists around Africa by sea, or even, later on, via the Suez Canal (opened in 1869), was not an easy matter, especially as Russia possessed practically no merchant marine of her own until the Volunteer Fleet was started in 1878.

With the growth of the Russian population, the Chinese and the Koreans also started to migrate to these regions. Attracted by new opportunities (more work, and a higher standard of living, than in China and Korea), these Orientals constituted

³¹ In 1897 there were 31,274 soldiers all together.

³² Up to 1869 arrived only 18,519 Cossacks (including their families). After the construction of the Ussuri Railway more than 8185 of them were transferred to the Far East, making a total of Cossacks (male only) in 1901, 18,600 persons. As for the farmers, the number of them arriving in the East between 1858 and 1882 was below 1800 per year; between 1882 and 1900 about 6000-7000 annually. ("Priamurie," pp. 88-94.)

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in 1904 (at the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War) a very considerable part of the entire population.

(f) *Treaties of Livadia and St. Petersburg.* The struggle with the Eleuthes and other Mongols occupied the Chinese for centuries. Even after the defeat of Galdan, the powerful state of Kalmuks continued for almost a century to disturb the Chinese. At length in 1720 the Kalmuks were driven from Tibet, and in 1757 Eastern Turkestan (or Sinkiang) fell into the hands of China. The eastern expansion of Russia and the spread of Buddhism and Lamaism among the Mongols were strong allies of China in this struggle. She found more difficult the subjugation of those more war-like tribes who embraced Islam.

The tribes that formerly occupied the basin of the Tarym (Dzungaria) attempted in the middle of the XIXth century to create anew their own state in Central Asia alongside the Chinese frontiers, and even invaded some territory under the Chinese jurisdiction (1864-78). It was the more difficult for China to cope with this pressure, as it coincided with the rebellion in the South. Only the lack of real leaders and of coöperation among the disunited Mongolian tribes, prevented them from dealing a serious blow to the Celestial Empire.

In 1864 the Taiping Rebellion was curbed, and in 1878 the basin of Tarym was reinstated as a Chinese province.

In the second half of the XIXth century Russia acquired considerable holdings in Central Asia (Turkestan, etc.) by virtue of which her frontier with China was extended materially. At the time of the Mohammedan Rebellion in the Western Provinces of China, which Peking had been unable to check, Russia sent her troops into Kuldja (Ili) in 1871. She occupied that region practically without resistance, as the population showed decidedly its preference for Russian rather than Chinese rule. But this occupation was declared by Russia herself to be only a neighborly help to China for which she expected to be rewarded later.

In 1878 China sent a special envoy, Chung-How, to negotiate the restoration of the Chinese rights in the region of Ili (Kuldja). A treaty was agreed upon in 1879 at Livadia, in Crimea, by which Kuldja was to be evacuated by Russian troops, Chinese sovereignty restored, and China was to pay Russia 5

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million roubles to cover the expenses of that occupation and grant extensive privileges for Russian merchants in that province.

Such terms, though accepted by the envoy, were disavowed by Peking. China insisted on restoration, pure and simple. Russia stubbornly insisted on her demands; and for a while the relations between the two countries became so tense that in 1880, for the first time in over 200 years, a war seemed imminent.

Finally the parties came to an agreement, and a new Treaty was signed at St. Petersburg in 1881 by Marquis Tseng on behalf of China. By this treaty only a tiny strip on the western border of Ili (Kuldja) remained in the hands of Russia, trading privileges (though less extensive than the ones first demanded) were granted to Russia, and the indemnity was raised from five to nine millions.

It would be superficial merely to charge Russia with aggressiveness on this front and then to dismiss the case. The important point was the struggle of two different cultural stages. The restless nomads of Central Asia had for centuries raided European Russia and continued to annoy her even after their retreat from Europe to Asia. Now the stabilization of Russia, her development first as an agricultural nation and then as a mixed agrarian, industrial, and commercial state, necessitated activity on her borders to put a stop to alien disturbances and nomad raids.

(3) PERIOD OF MANCHURIAN ADVENTURE.

(a) *Trans-Siberian Railway*. The difficulties experienced by the Russians in the colonization of their Far Eastern possessions and even in their administration, together with a growing menace from the activities in Asia of the other Powers, especially Great Britain,³³ prompted Russia's decision to build a railroad across her Asiatic provinces, "not only to connect the Atlantic with the Pacific for economic reasons, but also, undoubtedly, for strategic considerations."³⁴

The idea of this gigantic route originated at the time of

³³ From the time of Lord Palmerston and Lord Beaconsfield Russia had to be worried about England's moves.

³⁴ M. N. Pokrovsky, "History of Russia in XIX Century" (in Russian), pp. 214-217.

Mouravieff; ³⁵ but, owing to scarcity of capital not less than lack of proper initiative and determination, it was not realized before the '90's of the last century.

In 1887 Count Alexis Ignatieff, the brother of the Ignatieff who signed the Peking Treaty of 1860, submitted to the Tsar Alexander III a report indicating the necessity of a railroad to connect Eastern Siberia with European Russia. This report was favorably received by the Tsar, and in the same year a commission was formed to consider the recommendations in detail.

In 1891 construction was started at both ends. In that year the Ussuri Railway, between Khabarovsk, on the Amur, and Vladivostok was begun by the Heir to the Throne, later the Tsar Nicholas II, who was sent by his father to make a round the world trip including a visit to the Russian Far East.

By 1896 some parts of the gigantic route were already in operation. Between 1899 and 1901 the Trans-Baikalian Railway, constituting the farthest eastern part of the Siberian road, was completed as far as Chita, so connecting Moscow almost with the Manchurian border.

"By no circumstances," wrote Witte, "was the Trans-Siberian Railroad to serve as a means for territorial expansion. It had primarily economic aims." ³⁶

(b) *Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95*. The feverish activities of the Western Powers in Asia at the close of the XIXth century alarmed Japan. Only then did this country start her transformation from a small, secluded, non-important Asiatic country into a modernized World Power. Whether because of the foresight of those newly Westernized statesmen of Japan who grasped the idea of Imperialism (though there were not as yet all the prerequisites for it in Japan at that time), or because of the need for new territories prompted by the redistribution of lands that followed the end of feudalism in Japan, her ruling class decided to get a footing on the mainland of Asia.

To find a pretext for war with China was not difficult. To defeat the quasi-modernized Chinese army and navy with the already well trained force of Japan was not difficult either.

In April 1895 this war was ended by a Treaty signed at

³⁵ First project to build a railroad from Nijni-Novgorod to the mouth of the Amur was drawn in 1858.

³⁶ Witte, "The Memoirs." New York, 1921, p. 87.

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Shimonoseki. Notwithstanding the warnings given by some of the Powers ³⁷ against demanding too much for their victory, the Japanese plenipotentiaries included in the terms of this treaty not only Formosa and Pescadores, but also the ceding of the Liaotung Peninsula by China to Japan.

This appearance of Japan on the Continent was considered by Russia as a menace to her own holdings. Therefore she made (together with France and Germany) on April 23rd a strong representation to Japan advising her to return the Liaotung to China, and advocating instead a larger indemnity to be paid by Peking to Tokyo. Japan's occupation of Liaotung, a point close to Peking, would menace the Chinese capital and make the independence of Korea problematic.

The situation for Japan was such as to leave no alternative but to accept this unsought for advice, and to relinquish the peninsula in question.

This "timely" interference of Russia, coupled with the good services rendered by her to China in floating a loan of 400,000,000 francs through the French bankers ³⁸ in order to enable her to pay the indemnity, created for Russia in China the status of a "friend in need." The chance to capitalize this friendship soon arrived.

(c) *Sino-Russian Treaty of 1896*. The same Li-Hung-Chang who represented humiliated China at Shimonoseki was sent to Moscow, as special envoy of the Emperor, on the occasion of the coronation of Tsar Nicholas II. He was charged also to extend China's appreciation of the rôle which Russia had played after the defeat of China by Japan.

On the arrival of Li-Hung-Chang, negotiations carried on by the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Prince Lobanov-Rostovsky, and the Minister of Finance, Sergius Witte, resulted in a Treaty signed on June 4th, 1896, and known as the Li-Lobanov Secret Treaty.

Even today the text of this document has not officially been made public, though accounts of its alleged contents have appeared in the press of China and Europe. One version published

³⁷ The "Secret Diary of Count Hayashi" reveals that this warning was known to the Japanese representatives.

³⁸ With a guarantee by the Russian Government of the payment of interest on the bonds; a *conditio sine qua non* to get money cheaply after a lost war.

in "The North China Herald" on October 30, 1896, became known as the "Cassini Convention";³⁹ but this "convention" was declared in the diary of Gérard, the former French Minister to China, to be apocryphal. But, though "apocryphal" in the sense that this "convention" never was signed and never became a valid document, its contents constituted the *desiderata* advanced by Cassini and discussed by him with the Chinese. Another version, also incorrect, was published from memory by the son of the then late Li-Hung-Chang in the "Daily Telegraph" of London.

Among the documents made public by the Soviet Government of Russia after the Revolution of 1917 this Treaty did not appear at all. Only at the time of the Washington Conference did a presumably authoritative text of this treaty come to light.⁴⁰ Asked to present all and any treaties ever concluded by China with the Powers, the Chinese delegations produced a telegraphic summary, which has since been regarded as the authentic text of this document. But neither China nor Russia has ever published the agreement in full. The present writer, however, succeeded in copying the original Treaty found in the Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Moscow, and its translation is included in the Appendices to this work.

From the illuminating diary of Count Witte, seemingly reliable, since it was not prepared for purposes of rehabilitation and was published posthumously, one can trace the details of the making of this treaty. Now, certainly one cannot doubt that it was actually concluded. But, as is usual with the mysterious and unknown, the meaning and aims of the document were misinterpreted and did a sinister service to Russia.

The actual hostility of 1900, when no treaty of friendship or even alliance could survive, has long since robbed the Li-Lobanov agreement of its validity. Yet even recently it has been disinterred by certain ingenious persons to prove that at the time of the Russo-Japanese War, China had been an ally of Russia; and that therefore Japan might claim the Liaotung Peninsula, possibly even the whole of Southern Manchuria, as a

³⁹ Cassini was at that time the Russian Minister of Peking.

⁴⁰ Some quasi copies were also circulated in 1918 during the Versailles Conference.

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reward.⁴¹ Count Witte, who could hardly have foreseen such a use for this Treaty, wrote in his diary: "the agreement was an act of the highest importance. Had we faithfully observed it we should have been spared the disgrace of the Japanese War." And further: "I may say here that we ourselves broke the agreement and brought about the situation which we are now facing in the Far East."

It seems obvious that the Treaty lost any meaning after the Boxer uprising and its curbing by the Powers, including Russia; and has only an historic interest.⁴² Moreover, one cannot doubt that this Treaty was purely defensive in character and directed solely against the aggression of Japan (see Appendices). Furthermore any part that such Chinese as Chang-Tso-Lin took in the conflict was on the Japanese side against Russia and not *vice versa*.

If we have given here probably more space to the "secret Sino-Russian Treaty of Alliance" than it deserves at face value, it is on account of our desire to give an example of how the erroneous notions about Russia's actual dealings and her "intentions" were created and spread!

(d) *Chinese Eastern Railway*. One of the most important advantages Russia received from the visit of Li-Hung-Chang was the concession to build across Manchuria the railway later known as the Chinese Eastern.

The Alliance agreed upon by the Secret Treaty, signed in June 1896, meant the military coöperation in case of Japan's aggression. This coöperation could be materialized if Russia should bring her troops to China in such an emergency. To facilitate the transportation of these troops a direct railroad from Russia to China was naturally desirable. China had no funds to construct such a railway, so Russia came with her offer.

With some reluctance Li-Hung-Chang agreed on this also. The railroad had to be built by a "private" concern, and the Russo-Chinese Bank, actually controlled by the Russian Ministry of

⁴¹ The Secret Sino-Russian Alliance of 1896. "The Key to the Chinese Puzzle," by George Bronson Rea.

⁴² Such was apparently also the opinion of those who were conferring at Washington in 1921-22, as their reaction to this treaty when read by the Chinese was: "Mr. Hughes (i.e., the Chairman) proceeded to the next order of business."

Finances, had to sign the contract (September 1896). A company, The Chinese Eastern Railroad Company, was organized with some rather nominal participation by China;⁴³ and in 1898 construction was started.

Summing up the meaning of the Russo-Chinese Alliance and the Chinese Eastern Railway to Russia, Count Witte wrote: "The Russo-Chinese Alliance meant two things: first a great railroad extending as far as Vladivostok on a straight line, without curving northward along the Amur River, and second, firmly established peaceful relations with our neighbor, the Chinese Empire."⁴⁴

By this statement Witte emphasized the meaning of the Chinese Eastern as a connecting link with Vladivostok (when no Amur Railway was, as yet, in existence), and the necessity for keeping friendship with China, because—in his opinion—a pro-Chinese policy was best for Russia in Asia.

Another project was offered at that time by a certain Dr. Badmaïeff, a Buriat, who became later very influential with the Tsar Nicholas II, when he "attended" the Tsarevitch with "herbs." This project suggested building the railway from Kiakhta to Peking. Witte opposed it bitterly because (1) he considered Vladivostok as the most desirable terminus of the Trans-Siberian Railway and (2) he believed that a line to Peking would arouse the other Powers against Russia.⁴⁵

In July 1903 the Chinese Eastern Railway was opened for operation.

(e) *Tri-partite Intervention and the Occupation of Port Arthur.* It was in November 1897, not long after the tri-partite intervention of France, Germany and Russia forcing Japan to withdraw from Port Arthur, Talien-wan, and the Liaotung that Germany extorted from China her "consent" for a lease of Kiao-chow. In December of the same year a Russian squadron arrived at Port Arthur.

The occupation of Kiao-chow by Germany was agreed upon by the Kaiser Wilhelm II and the Tsar Nicholas II in Peterhof

⁴³ Who invested not over 5,000,000 taels. The cost of construction being actually 400-600,000,000 roubles; the Chinese Directors remained for long years in a rather dubious position.

⁴⁴ Witte, "The Memoirs," p. 91. This attitude of Witte was recognized by the Japanese in their "Official History of Japanese-Russian War."

⁴⁵ Witte, *ibid.*, p. 86.

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during a visit of the former to his cousin. Whether the occupation of Port Arthur by Russia was discussed on that occasion or not, it seems probable that some understanding was reached between the cousins, then or later. In any case the appearance of the Russian squadron at Port Arthur in December 1897 with the intention to occupy the fortress was a result of a special secret order issued by the Tsar without preliminary consultation with his ministers.

At a conference convoked by the Tsar to discuss the project of Mouravieff, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, to occupy Port Arthur, as Germany had occupied Kiao-chow, Witte "indignantly protested" against the measure. "I reminded my hearers," wrote he, "that we had declared the principle of China's territorial integrity and that on the strength of that principle we forced Japan to withdraw from the Liaotung Peninsula."⁴⁶

Notwithstanding this protest of Witte and others, a Sino-Russian convention resulted by which the Russian Government acquired a lease of the southern part of the Liaotung for a period of 25 years. The convention was signed in March 1898, and on the 29th of the same month the Russian flag was hoisted in Port Arthur.

To connect this newly acquired territory with the Russian possession, a new concession was obtained in July by Russia from China for building an extension of the Chinese Eastern to the South. Soon afterwards the construction of this road, now known as the South Manchuria Railway, was started.

In 1899 the building of a "free port" in Talien-wan was begun. The new town was christened Dalny (which means in Russian a "far-away one," but was nicknamed by the Russian public "Lishni" or "not-needed-one" as a mark of disapproval of the entire adventure!)

"The Chinese Eastern Railway," wrote Witte, "was designed exclusively for a cultural and peaceful purpose, but jingoist adventurers turned it into a means of political aggression involving the violation of treaties, the breaking of freely given promises and the disregard of the elementary interests of other nationalities."⁴⁷ These "other nationalities" quickly became alarmed and acted accordingly. An armed clash of Japan with Russia soon became inevitable.

⁴⁶ Witte, *ibid.*, p. 99.

⁴⁷ Witte, *ibid.*, p. 102.

(f) *The Boxer Rising.* In 1900 a widespread uprising of Chinese against foreigners took place, not without encouragement from the Throne. The Chinese Eastern, then still under construction, was not only menaced but seriously damaged by the "Boxers" or militant anti-foreign groups heading this uprising. To protect the railway from further recurrence of the Chinese raids, Russia brought her troops into Manchuria and only after many delays agreed to evacuate in June 1902.

In the period following the Russian occupation of the Liautung, St. Petersburg took steps to appease her alarmed rivals in Asia.⁴⁸ By a series of agreements with Japan, Russia recognized, in April 1898, the preferential rights of the former in Korea in exchange for the Japanese recognition of some special Russian rights there. By exchange of notes on April 28th, 1899, an Anglo-Russian agreement established an understanding between these two countries in respect to further railroad building in China. Great Britain engaged not to seek any railway concessions to the North of the Great Wall of China. Russia, on her part, engaged not to seek any railway concessions in the basin of the Yangtze River.

At the time of the subduing of the Boxer Rising Russia co-operated with the other Powers, and behaved as badly as the rest.⁴⁹

In September 1901 an international agreement was signed by the Powers on liquidation of the Boxer Rebellion, imposing on China a heavy indemnity and other penalties. Russia's moderation in the demands and her decision to start at once the evacuation of her troops, impressed China favorably. But soon came a change; for some of the military high officials persuaded the Government to postpone the evacuation. Russia's delay in this respect aroused suspicions and fears, and, apparently, prompted the decision of Great Britain to contract, early in 1902, a treaty of alliance with Japan. This agreement undoubt-

⁴⁸ About this time (1899-1900) came the notes of Secretary John Hay enunciating the "Open Door" policy in China, as advocated by the U.S.A.

⁴⁹ The sensational story, written by Ular, about Russia's secret agreement with China to help her against the Westerners, belongs to the numerous diatribes about Russia. But the shocking episode at Blagovestchensk, where a large number of Chinese were drowned in the Amur by criminal order of some local Russian officials, cannot be denied.

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edly served to encourage Japan to take further steps in her struggle for a foothold on the mainland of Asia, and helped to bring about the Russo-Japanese War.

(g) *Concessions in Korea.* In 1901 the Japanese Emperor sent Marquis Ito, one of his ablest statesmen and an avowed advocate of Russo-Japanese *rapprochement*, to St. Petersburg to arrange the settlement of numerous misunderstandings between the two countries.

Unfortunately, the elements working for a conflict were, at that time, already too influential at the Court of the Tsar. Irresponsible persons without official standing, such as an unscrupulous courtier named Bezobrazoff, and others of his kind, had obtained practically complete control over the Tsar's moves in all that concerned the Far East. Consequently Marquis Ito was received coldly and his hint about recognition of Japan's exclusive interests in Korea was dismissed. At length after having lost all faith in success, he left Russia empty handed for England, where final steps towards the Anglo-Japanese Alliance were taken. The treaty was signed in January 1902.

In the meanwhile the "jingoist adventurers of Russia developed their sinister plans in Korea."⁵⁰ Instead of giving up, as the Marquis Ito requested, Russia was going in more deeply!

Hunting for profits, seeking their own ends, under the screen of Russia's interests, but actually neglecting them, these private advisers of the Tsar succeeded in entangling the Royal family in their schemes. Some of the Grand Dukes invested their money together with the Tsar's own funds in the timber and mining concessions of Korea. The originator of the whole scheme, Bezobrazoff, became a kind of Tsar's private secretary for foreign affairs in the Far East.⁵¹

Notwithstanding the protests of Witte and other high officials, including the Minister of War, no attention was paid to any warnings, and the adventure developed fast. Official control of events finally was lost, and catastrophe followed.

Further delay in the evacuation of Manchuria⁵² and certain

⁵⁰ Witte, *ibid.*, p. 102.

⁵¹ Emperor Nicholas II, writes Witte (p. 83), "was anxious to spread Russian influence in the Far East. Not that he had a definite program of conquest. He was only possessed by an unreasonable desire to seize Far Eastern lands."

⁵² According to the agreement Russia had to evacuate her troops from Manchuria during 1902-03, in three periods separated by 6 months one from

new movements of troops towards the Korean border served further to irritate the Powers. The troops moved under the disguise of guards for the timber concessions on the Yalu River on the demands of Bezobrazoff, who reached the Far East, early in 1903, as managing director of the "East-Asiatic Trading Corporation." This "knight of black deeds" even declared openly that "we are looking for a clash with the Japs!"

In the summer 1903 the Russian possessions in the Far East were segregated in a Vice-Royalty, and one of the advocates of the aggressive policy, Admiral Alexeieff, was made Viceroy, directly responsible only to the Tsar.

Seeing the danger of the new arrangement, and probably offended by it personally, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Lamzdorf, presented his resignation; and General Kuropatkin, the Minister of War, followed his example. But their resignations were not accepted. A little later Witte resigned. After having visited the Far East, he made a report renewing his warning against any aggression. His report was looked upon unfavorably by the Tsar and also by Plehve, who as Minister for Interior Affairs, was the only member of the "cabinet" to consider a war not undesirable as a means of diverting the growing domestic troubles.

As for the Russian nation *en masse*, passive and not organized, with no place in politics, domestic or foreign, it was not even informed what was coming!

Japan, having used the large indemnity paid her by China (with Russia's help!) for building a strong army and navy, being backed by England, her ally, and the U. S. A., her banker, was on the verge of trying her forces with Russia. Events continued to prepare for this contest, and in January 1904 Japan decided to risk a war.

C. The End of Russia's Penetration to the Far East.

(1) RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR.

Notwithstanding the solid opposition of her abler and more responsible statesmen, Russia was rapidly drifting into an armed wrangle with Japan. Iswolsky, the Russian Minister at Tokyo,

the other. (See History of Japanese Russian War, v. I, p. 4 of the Russian translation. V. Yakhontoff, Editor. Khabarovsk, 1914.)

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sent a warning; and the Russian military experts, from Colonel Samoyloff, the military attaché at Tokyo, to General Kuropatkin, the Minister of War, who had visited the Far East in 1903, attested highly the efficiency of the Japanese Army and Navy and confirmed Japan's readiness to start and carry on a long war. But the Tsar and some of his "advisers" did not expect that their arrogance would end in an actual conflict of arms. Some of them ridiculed the idea that Japan would dare to fight Russia, but their acts certainly pointed towards a clash.

Prolonged but fruitless negotiations followed at St. Petersburg and at Tokyo. But neither series of conversations terminated successfully, and on February 5th, 1904, the Japanese Government finally severed relations with Russia. Then, without awaiting the delivery to the Tsar of the communication concerning this decision, and without a formal Declaration of War, the Japanese opened hostilities by an attack upon the Russian squadron at Port Arthur.

More detailed summary of the events that followed will be found in the next chapter, dealing with the Russo-Japanese relations. Here it suffices to state that the Russo-Japanese War (from February 1904 to September 1905) that was fought on Manchurian soil¹ ended not only the unfortunate Manchurian adventure of the Russian Tsar, but actually terminated the penetration of Russia into the Far East.

(2) THE PEACE OF PORTSMOUTH.

By the treaty signed on September 5th, 1905,² at Portsmouth, N. H., Russia lost all her concessions in Korea and Manchuria except the part of the Chinese Eastern Railway connecting Trans-Baikalia with the Maritime Province (i.e., from Manchuli to Pogranichnaia), and its branch to the South from Harbin to Kuan-cheng-tzu (or Changchun). Russia had been all but eliminated from Manchurian affairs, and since the war has not even had a chance to attempt the restoration of her position as a paramount factor.

It is true that soon after the war was over and the ani-

¹ As already stated, the only part China had played in this contest (besides providing the theatre of war) was the participation of Chang-Tso-Lin on the side of Japan. Having at his disposal numerous bands of brigands (khonghouzs) he raided the Russian rears and so helped the Japanese command.

² Ratified at Washington on November 26th, 1905.

mosity had abated, the activities of some outsiders forced Russia and Japan to unite in their resistance to foreign encroachment in Manchuria and for their own intrenchment, the two coming, through the agreements of 1907, 1910, 1912 and 1916, to some understanding on their common interests there and in Mongolia; but the World War and the Revolutions in Russia and China prevented them from realizing the fruits of these agreements.

D. Summary.

In glancing over the history of Sino-Russian relations, one has to agree that this was not a chronicle of wars and armed conflicts, but a history of continued friendly relations of two peace-loving neighbors, only occasionally marred by abuses and minor disagreements. As Witte has pointed out, "With the exception of two serious misunderstandings good neighborly relations have existed between China and Russia for two and a half centuries." Almost identical is the opinion of Fu-Kuang-Chen, the Chinese historian of the Sino-Russian relations. "As far as Peking and Moscow were concerned," he wrote, "peaceful relations between the two countries had never ended since they began. They were occasionally interrupted and hindered . . . but those interruptions and hindrances were merely incidental consequences."¹

Sino-Russian relations were actually started in the second half of the XVIIth century, when the Russians first met the Manchus in the upper Sungari and Ussuri.²

The Russians penetrated into the Far East as pioneers, fighting nature and not man, as they had entered lands "of no man" and had not deprived any toilers of their holdings.

The Chinese pressure in the second half of the XVIIth century (when the Manchus, after having conquered China, started to expand) had interrupted Russia's further advance, and negotiations between the two countries resulted in the Treaty signed at Nerchinsk in 1689. This treaty started official relations and the legalization of Russia's position in the Far East.

Through a series of agreements from 1689 to 1860 the lands

¹ Fu-Kuang-Chen, p. 476.

² In their earlier expansion, the Russians had not to deal with China, as they did not enter the lands belonging to her.

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actually occupied by the Russians from the XVIIth century, or even earlier, and never before claimed by China, were recognized by both parties as belonging to Russia. With the increase of knowledge in geography and cartography the frontiers between Russia and China were defined and firmly set up, and have since remained practically unaltered.

The unfortunate adventure in Manchuria, entirely alien to actual Russian interests, not only was never approved by the Russian people but was even vigorously protested. The Russian Revolution of 1905 to a great extent was a mark of people's indignation at the undeserved humiliation incurred by the aggressive policy of the Tsar Nicholas II, and inspired by his irresponsible and unscrupulous private "advisers."

The outcome of the war with Japan, prompted by this adventure, brought on an entirely new situation. Japan became the dominating factor in Manchuria. China continued to lose. Russia had to withdraw from Manchuria, into which she had been dragged against the advice of her statesmen, and so was forced to stop her unjustifiable penetration into territory belonging to China.

Any further schemes the Tsar's government had for restoring the lost "prestige" in the Far East, and for new expansion (if such were actually the plans) were cut short by the World War and the Revolutions in China and Russia, altering the Manchurian situation drastically.

This alteration will be considered in subsequent chapters, especially in those dealing with the economic potentialities of Russia and with her interests in the Orient.

CHAPTER II

HISTORY OF RUSSO-JAPANESE RELATIONS

- A. Attempts to Establish Relations Before the Meiji Era. B. Prelude to the Conflict: (1) Japan's Aggression on the Mainland of Asia; (2) Shimonoseki Treaty; (3) Tri-partite Intervention; (4) "Orgy of Leases"; (5) Negotiations on Manchuria and Korea. C. Russo-Japanese War: (1) How did Japan Start It? (2) How did it Develop? (3) What was the End? (4) How did it Affect Russo-Japanese Relations? D. Summary.

A. Attempts to Establish Relations Before the Meiji Era.

The first casual and short-lived contact between Russians and Japanese was established at the end of the XVIIth century, when some Russian navigators were brought by a storm to the shores of Japan. Shortly afterwards a mission was sent to Japan to establish regular relations, but met with no success.

In 1700 a Cossack ataman, Atlasov, reached the Kourile Islands (between Kamchatka and Japan) and reported to Moscow. But although Peter the Great ordered an immediate investigation, it was not until the end of 1710 that Russians living in Kamchatka succeeded in acquiring, from certain Nipponese brought to the peninsula by a storm, some very meager information about Japan. Between 1711 and 1713 a certain Kozyrevsky, with a group of Cossack fugitives from the tax-collectors, penetrated to the Kourile Islands and, returning, brought further information about this archipelago.

In 1719 an expedition, headed by Yevreinov and Luzjin, was sent by the Naval Academy of St. Petersburg to make a survey of the route from the Okhotsk Sea and Kamchatka to Japan. After two years' work in those waters, they succeeded in preparing a map that included the Kourile Islands.¹

In 1732 Bering, then on his second expedition to the Far Eastern seas, commissioned his aide, Spanberg, to collect data

¹ This group consists of 32 islands. The three most southern were then claimed by Japan, as her possessions.

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on Japanese ports and commerce. Spanberg managed to reach Yezo, the large Japanese island in the North, but obtained no results so far as the establishment of an official contact with Japan was concerned. During the next thirty years Russian merchants and tax-collectors frequently visited the Kouriles on business, not always of a legitimate kind. Some of them abused the natives; and the latter offered resistance.

In 1766 the Governor of Eastern Siberia, Soimonoff, authorized the officials of the Okhotsk region to send an expedition to the Kourile Islands in order to bring the natives under Russian sovereignty. This expedition sailed almost immediately and visited some of these islands, even going as far South as the nineteenth, but, apparently, achieved nothing else.

In 1772 another expedition, under the leadership of Antipin, who had some knowledge of the Japanese language, was despatched by two merchants, Lebedeff and Shelehoff, with the same double purpose of collecting data on Japan and subjugating the natives of the Kourile Islands. It was not until 1780 that Antipin, with Shabalin and Petoushkoff, finally obtained from the Japanese a permit to call at Nagasaki.

The insignificance of the results and the heavy expenses borne by those who backed this expedition financially, coupled with the depressing effect of the earthquakes the Russians experienced while in Japan, discouraged for a while any further private initiative in that direction. In 1792, however, the Government equipped a new expedition under Lieutenant Adam Laxman. Under the pretext of negotiating repatriation of several Japanese navigators who had been brought to the Russian shores by a storm, the Laxman expedition was to attempt the task of establishing business relations. Setting sail late in the fall, Laxman headed directly to Yezo, but spent the winter in Nemuro Bay. Not until the next summer did he proceed to Hakodate for negotiations with Japanese.

The local authorities refused to negotiate, but sent a letter in which they explained that according to the Japanese law any foreigner landing on Japanese territory must be imprisoned for life. Nevertheless they let the Russians free on consideration of their ignorance of this law and recommended them to apply at Nagasaki for trading privileges.

In the autumn of 1793 Laxman returned home empty-handed.

For a while any further attempts in this direction were discontinued owing partly to the perplexity created among the Governments, including that of Russia, by the French Revolution; and partly to the death of the Empress Catherine the Great and the changes in the administration that followed. But in 1798 the Russian-American Trading Company was founded, and its charter included the privilege of trade with Japan.

In 1803 two vessels laden with food supplies for the Pacific possessions of Russia were sent around the world, under Captain Krouzenstern. Using this opportunity the Russo-American Trading Company charged a director, named Riazanoff, as special envoy with the task of establishing business relations with Japan. The instructions given him included: (1) obtaining a confirmation by Japan of her trading permit granted to Laxman in 1793 and (2) making a survey of the Kourile Islands and of Sakhalin.

The negotiations carried on in 1803-04 at Nagasaki proved unsuccessful. The Japanese refused to honor the document given to Laxman, and asked the Russians to send no more vessels to Japan.

Disappointed by the failure of the first part of his mission, Riazanoff decided to arrange a new expedition with Lieutenants Khvostoff and Davidov as leaders. Without giving any proper instructions to these young officers, Riazanoff started homeward, and died en route. The expedition, however, remained for almost two years in the waters around Sakhalin and the Kouriles, and, visiting the islands, badly abused both natives and Japanese. On their return to Okhotsk the two officers in charge were arrested and court-martialed for misconduct and overstepping their authority. After a long period of negotiations with St. Petersburg, they were released in consideration of their youth, inexperience, and Riazanoff's failure to supply them with proper instructions.

In 1811 Lieutenant Golovin, on duty in the North American possessions of Russia,² was commissioned to make a survey of the Okhotsk Sea and the Kourile archipelago. In July of that year he anchored near the island of Kunashir. Here he found some Japanese fortifications, and on landing was arrested, together with his party, by the Japanese. The reason for this ar-

² Alaska and several places in California.

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rest was not the fact that Golovin had approached a fort, but the desire of the Japanese to avenge the victims of Khvostoff and Davidov.

After several unsuccessful attempts to get the prisoners released by Japan, Rickord, who succeeded Golovin in command of his frigate "Diana," sailed homeward. He returned, however, in 1813 with an official document written in Japanese, certifying that the Russian Government was in no way responsible for the abuses committed by Khvostoff and Davidov. On receiving this communication, the Japanese released Golovin and the other prisoners but refused to answer the letter of the Russian Governor. Nevertheless, in expectation of obtaining some answer other Russian vessels called at the Japanese shores again and again in 1815, 1816, and 1817, but with no results whatever. So having lost hope of establishing relations with Japan, and considering the serious expenses involved by these attempts, the Russians decided to give them up.

Not until the middle of the XIXth century were new steps taken in this direction. But in 1848 Captain Nevelskoy, of the Russian Navy, visited Sakhalin on one of his expeditions to Far Eastern waters, and, hoisting a flag, declared the island to be a Russian possession; and in 1853 a Russian squadron, under Admiral Poutiatin (frigate "Pallada," etc.) arrived at Nagasaki. Poutiatin's aim was to start negotiations on commerce and demarcation. His visit coincided with that of Commodore Perry; and the latter incidentally tendered Poutiatin the support of his vessels, but this offer was not accepted.

In the midst of these negotiations the Crimean War broke out. Early in the Spring of 1854 the Russian squadron had to leave Japan and headed for Petropavlovsk, on Kamchatka, to escape the superior forces of the British fleet. At the close of 1854, having learned of Perry's success in establishing relations with Japan, Poutiatin returned and this time entered Shimoda.*

In January 1855 there was signed at Shimoda the first Treaty establishing Russo-Japanese relations. By this document the boundary line between Russia and Japan was drawn so that Sakhalin was not assigned to either party; and for a few more years the island remained under joint jurisdiction of the two countries.

* Not far from Tokyo.

In August of the same year another agreement was reached elaborating the Treaty of Shimoda. Both documents granted Russia the same rights and privileges as the other Powers had obtained, including the rights of sojourn in Japan, of commerce and of the establishment of consulates.

In December 1867 a new convention was signed at Yeddo (Tokyo) and included a clause advocating the exchange of the Japanese or southern part of the Sakhalin island for the Kouriles.⁴ Actually this exchange took place, on the initiative of Japan, in 1875.

Soon after this the period of independent dealings between Russia and Japan came to an end, being replaced by the co-ordinated policy of all the Powers.

In 1895 (May 27th-June 8th) Russia concluded with Japan a Treaty similar to those of other Powers. This Treaty was ratified at St. Petersburg in July and at Tokyo in August of the same year, but did not come into force until July 5-17th, 1899. It annulled the extraterritoriality of all the foreigners, including the Russians, but opened all Japan to commerce and free sojourn. The Treaty remained valid until 1904, when Japan broke it as a result of the commencement of the war against Russia.

From this outline it will be clear that the early history of the attempts to establish Russo-Japanese relations was marked by almost consistent failure. The series of expeditions which visited the Japanese islands between the beginning of the XVIIIth and the middle of the XIXth centuries were able to ascertain only that Japan was not disposed to deal with any foreigners, commercially or otherwise. In 1854, however, the Russian Admiral Poutiatin commenced the negotiations which terminated in 1855 with the signing of the Treaty of Shimoda. And this happened only after the American Commodore Perry had, by a demonstration of warships and guns, succeeded in persuading Japan that the Westerners meant business.

From 1895 onwards, Japanese relations with the Powers, including Russia, became established on a more or less normal basis. Extraterritoriality and other special privileges were abol-

⁴ Japan suggested first to draw the boundary by the 50° parallel, bisecting Sakhalin, but Russia declined it. Then Japan offered to purchase the title to Sakhalin for 2,000,000 yen, but also unsuccessfully. Exactly at that time Russia sold Alaska to the U.S.A. for \$7,200,000.

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Philippine Islands from Spain after the Spanish-American War of 1898. She opposed any preferential rights in Asia and therefore enunciated the so-called "Open Door" policy.

Naturally Japan was not pleased by this kind of European justice, but probably no other "lease" from this series rightly irritated Japan so much as that by Russia, who obtained the same Port Arthur and Talien-wan that had been dragged away from Japan a mere two years before. Claiming that Japan's encroachment was a menace to peace, Russia was now doing exactly the same herself. Against the advices of her responsible statesmen, against her actual interests and needs, Russia, or rather her Tsar, was undoubtedly pursuing an aggressive policy.

No wonder the minds of certain Japanese now turned to thinking of some scheme for "getting even" with Russia and the other Europeans; for extending Japan's prestige; and for re-establishing herself upon the mainland!

(5) NEGOTIATIONS ON MANCHURIA AND KOREA.

The occupation of Port Arthur and Talien-wan by Russia, and even her determination to build a railroad southward, connecting Harbin with Liaotung, were not sufficient in themselves for a *casus belli* with Japan. But the machinations of those irresponsible Russian elements in Manchuria and Korea, already described in the Chapter I, alarmed Japan to such extent that she finally decided to risk a war with Russia.

In Korea, Japan claimed to have exclusive interests. This was based not only on consideration of her geographical proximity to Korea, and the rather sentimental recollection of her conquest of that country at the time of Toyotomi Hideyoshi, but also on the fact that Japan was the first Power to open Korea to foreign trade. For the treaty concluded with Japan in 1876 had been the first commercial agreement Korea had made with any foreign country; and by the close of the '70's Japan was to some extent a monopolist in trade with Korea. Gradually she acquired political influence also, and this was now increasing rapidly.

China, on the other hand, considered Korea as her vassal; but being unable to compete with Japan and still less to compel Japan to withdraw from Korea, she adopted another method frequently employed by her before and since. She planned to

get the same end by bringing about a conflict between Japan and other Powers. At the same time the Chinese officials in Korea utilized, as far as possible, the discontent of the Koreans, who were opposed to the foreign (Japanese) domination. Several "uprisings" of Koreans finally brought about the decision of Japan to send her troops into Korea ostensibly for "protection of the lives and property of her subjects."

This was in 1894, when the revolutionary spirit was brewing in Japan herself, and therefore an "external diversion" was in order. Having entered Korea, the Japanese decided not to leave it. The Shimonoseki Treaty had ended any theoretical dependence of Korea on China and Korea became an "independent" country. That meant that Korea fell under control of Japan, and the Japanese Minister at Seoul became practically its ruler.

Some disturbances created by the unorganized opposition to the new régime were ruthlessly suppressed and ended on the one hand with the assassination of the Queen and of several Ministers; and on the other with the tragi-comic flight of the King and his heir, in disguise, to the Russian Legation. As an "apotheosis," a royal manifesto was issued to the effect that all the reforms introduced by Japan were annulled. By an agreement between Japan and Russia signed on May 14, 1896, a "condominium" of these two over Korea was established and after that time all the internal affairs of this decaying Kingdom were to be decided jointly by the Ministers of these two countries residing at Seoul. To some extent Russia drew the better bargain in this arrangement, as she was "invited" to furnish instructors for the Korean Army, and a counselor for the Ministry of Finances, who became practically the head of it. A Russian-Korean Bank was founded similar in nature to the Russo-Chinese Bank.

In other words, Russia's sphere of influence in Korea expanded materially; and considering the negligible rôle Russia had played at that time in the foreign trade of Korea, one has to agree that her influence was not built on economic bases but purely on political factors. As for Japan her commercial interests in Korea were undeniably paramount.

When Russia obtained from China, in 1898, the lease of Liaotung and the concession for building the South Manchuria Railway, she had to do something to appease Japan's indigna-

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tion and found an easy solution in offering to recognize Japan's exclusive interests in Korea. On April 25th an agreement was signed by which the independence of Korea was, of course, reaffirmed; but the exclusiveness of Japan's economic interests there was also recognized.

"On consideration of widely developed commercial and industrial interests of Japan in Korea and the large number of Japanese subjects residing there," Russia undertook not to obstruct further growth of Korean-Japanese relations.

It was not a monopoly for Japan, but actually Japan had no rivals; 90% of the vessels that visited the Korean ports at that time flew the Japanese flag. Many mining and other concessions were in Japanese hands. The railroad from Seoul to Chemulpo, started by Americans, was purchased by a Japanese syndicate. A concession to build another railway from Seoul to Fusan was granted also to a Japanese concern. Several Japanese banks had opened their branch offices in Korea and one of them even issued its own bank-notes, which, though protested by Korean authorities, finally became a recognized currency.

The understanding between Russia and Japan just described and the Anglo-Russian agreement of April 1899, delimiting their mutual interests in China, served to offset the bad impression created by Russian moves in Manchuria. But it served for a short time only; and the Boxer Rising of 1900, seized by the Tsar's Government as a justification for sending Russian troops into Manchuria, started new suspicions in Japan.

Not until 1902 did Russia sign an agreement with China by which her troops had to be evacuated (in three echelons, one every six months) and even then she delayed it under different pretexts. Parallel with this the activity of Bezobrazoff and his associates on the Yalu and other concessions in Korea, the establishment of the Vice-Royalty of the Russian Far East, and the concentration of the Russian fleet in Port Arthur in 1903, gave Japan further cause for worry. The official history of the Japanese-Russian War, published by the General Staff at Tokyo, characterized these latter movements, coupled with the manœuvres of the Russian squadron and the target practice of the Vladivostok artillery, as "aimed to scare Japan."¹

¹ "The History of Japanese-Russian War," v. I, pp. 4-5 of the Russian translation, edited by V. Yakhontoff. Khabarovsk, 1914.

At this juncture Japan's international position was strengthened by her alliance with Great Britain, signed at London in January 1902 by Lord Lansdowne and Count Hayashi; and by the attitude of the United States, which was gratified by Japan's declaration of readiness to adhere to the principle of the "Open Door."

Russia's position in that respect was not so clear. It is true that France, her ally, had concluded on March 16th, 1902, an agreement with Russia confirming the *status quo* in Manchuria.² Germany in her agreement with England (October 1900) excluded Manchuria in order to stress Russia's special interests there. But there were no allies on whom to count in case of a war with Japan—another indication that such a war could hardly have been conceived by any responsible people in Russia.

As already stated in the first chapter, the negotiations carried on by Prince Ito with the Russian Government, while in St. Petersburg, in 1901, failed under the pressure of the irresponsible coterie.

In June 1903, on a special conference of the Japanese Cabinet, with the Emperor present, a decision was taken to enter at once into negotiations with Russia and to try again to clear up the situation in Manchuria and Korea.

The Russian Government answered favoring such negotiations, and on August 12th the Japanese Government came out with the following preliminary terms for a treaty: "(1) to respect the independence and territorial integrity of China and Korea; (2) to adhere to and support the principle of the "Open Door" in China and Korea, i.e., the principle of equal commercial and industrial opportunities for all the foreign countries; (3) to recognize the preferential interests of Japan in Korea and those of Russia along the railroad concessions in Manchuria, and their right to apply means necessary to protect their respective interests, provided they do not violate the articles 1 and 2 of this agreement; (4) to recognize the exclusive rights of Japan to give advice and support to any reforms in Korea; (5) to promise not to hinder the future construction of railroads connecting the Korean railways with those of South Man-

² This was a reply to the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Alliance, declaring their policies in China and determination to coöperate for the maintenance of the *status quo*.

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churia, the Chinese Eastern and the Shanghaikwan-Newchwang." ³

A few days after these preliminary terms were received, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lamzdorf, suggested transferring the negotiations to Tokyo. The Japanese Government declined, considering it more desirable to carry them on at St. Petersburg. There had just occurred some administrative changes in the Russian Far East, and Admiral Alexeieff was appointed Viceroy with exclusive authority to deal with the Oriental problems. Exactly at that time Witte resigned and the Minister of War, Kuropatkin, presented his resignation, which, as we have seen, was returned to him.

St. Petersburg insisted on transferring the negotiations to Tokyo and introduced some counter-proposals to the Japanese draft. These counter-proposals were worked out at Port Arthur by the Viceroy, Admiral Alexeieff, and Baron Rosen,⁴ then Russian Minister at Tokyo, and handed to the Japanese Government on October 3rd, 1903.

Russia concurred in Japan's declaration of Korea's independence, but disapproved the inclusion in the Treaty of a guarantee for Chinese territorial integrity, and especially the application of the "Open Door" principle to Manchuria. She favored Japan's demand for the right to send troops to Korea, but objected to her use of Korea for strategic purposes.

St. Petersburg was inclined even to recognize a Japanese protectorate over Korea, provided Russia's position in Manchuria would be strengthened thereby; but Alexeieff insisted that Russia must settle the Manchurian and Korean questions directly with China, and stood firm against allowing Japan to get a stronghold in Korea.⁵

The exclusive position created for Alexeieff in the Far East (he was practically independent from the Central Government), and especially his influence on the Tsar through the court channels, made it possible for his opinion to prevail and to obtain the sanction of the Tsar.

³ "History of Japanese-Russian War." Russian translation, v. I, pp. 7-8.

⁴ Same Baron Rosen that was appointed later on as Russian Ambassador to Washington and joined Witte as a delegate at Portsmouth.

⁵ Kuropatkin suggested at that time (Nov., 1903) to return to China the Liaotung and the rest of the concessions in So. Manchuria in exchange for more privileges in the North. (B. Romanoff, "Rossija v. Manchuzii," p. 37.)

Hence Japan received the Russian proposals in a form unacceptable to Tokyo. Looking for international support in this matter, Japan addressed the Powers with notes pointing to the danger inherent in the position taken by Russia. In the course of further negotiations between Komura⁶ and Baron Rosen (October 6th to 13th) the Japanese Government drafted a new revised list of terms.

In the meanwhile more changes had occurred in the Russian Administration. A special Board on Far Eastern Affairs was founded and Admiral Abaza was made its head. This was tantamount to giving complete control over these affairs to his collaborators Alexeieff and Bezobrazoff.

The answer of the Russian Government to the October communication of Japan was received in Tokyo only on December 11th. It ignored completely the Manchurian problem but in the case of Korea announced Russia's willingness to make some concessions. Deeming this answer unsatisfactory, Japan asked Russia on December 21st to reconsider the question by eliminating all restrictions on Japan's right to use Korea for strategic aims.

"At the same time, losing hope for amicable settlement, Japan started some preparations for emergency," writes the official Japanese historian of the war.⁷ On December 22nd an Imperial decree authorized special appropriations for military needs and ordered the construction of the railroad from Seoul to Fusan to start at once.

On January 5th the press was barred from publishing any data on the movements of troops and vessels, or discussion of any strategic and military technical questions. Two days later Japan purchased in Italy two warships that had been built for Argentina, and adopted various other precautionary measures.⁸

On January 6th Baron Rosen transmitted to Komura the second answer of St. Petersburg. This included Russia's former demand to restrict the use of the Korean territory and to establish a neutral zone between Korea and Manchuria; on the other hand it expressed Russia's willingness not to hinder Japan in acquiring from China certain privileges in Manchuria similar

⁶ Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs.

⁷ "History of J.-R. War," v. I, p. 11.

⁸ "History of J.-R. War," v. I, p. 11.

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to the other Powers, provided Japan would accept the rest of the terms. As for the territorial integrity of Manchuria, it was again omitted.

Not satisfied with this answer, Japan sent on January 13th a new offer to Russia to revise the question, but seemingly had already decided that a war was unavoidable. Nevertheless the negotiations continued between Kurino and Lamzdorf.

Receiving no immediate answer, Tokyo began to press for one. On January 28th Lamzdorf promised Kurino to have the answer ready for February 7th; but on February 4th he informed the Japanese Minister that an answer was already wired to Alexeieff with authorization to make changes in it at his discretion. Without awaiting the answer, Japan sent on February 5th an ultimatum to Russia; and, without ascertaining its delivery, started hostilities on February 6th by an attack on the Russian fleet at Port Arthur.

Glancing over these long negotiations between Russia and Japan, one can sympathize with Japan's irritation, at the delays, the changes and the unreliability of the St. Petersburg Government. The latter, deserted by her best statesmen, who objected to any adventures in the Far East, and dependent on such weaklings as the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lamzdorf, must have been very vexing. But one can hardly find justification for accusing Russia or even its Government of deliberately provoking war. The members of official circles, excluding Plehve and a very few others, were definitely opposed to any aggressiveness and recommended a more considerate attitude towards Japan's demands. The public had not the slightest idea of what was resulting from the intrigues of "Bezobrazoff and Company" and was not aware even of his moves. Only the irresponsible but influential coterie was heading towards war; some of them probably consciously like Bezobrazoff (but with no idea of the result), and the rest undeliberately. The aggressiveness of these "Empire-builders" sprang from the unhealthy soil of "too much power and no responsibility" and developed under the shade of unwarranted and ignorant belief that insignificant little Japan would never dare to fight the Russian giant. As for Japan, her need to expand, economically at least, made her determination to oppose Russia's schemes, as imperiling her vital interests, natural.

Whether Russia wanted a war or not was immaterial to Japan; the penetration of Russia into Manchuria, the construction by her of railroads, and difficulties set up by her in the way of Japan's expansion were facts too serious to be ignored by Yamato, the country of the Rising Sun, and Tokyo decided to act.

C. Russo-Japanese War.

(1) HOW DID JAPAN START IT?

Having declared her despair of coming to any understanding with Russia through negotiations which she asserted had been deliberately delayed by the Russian Government, Japan had broken off relations and started the war. It was her second armed struggle for Manchuria, but the first on a large scale and with a European country!

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the friendly attitude of the United States were the deciding factors enabling Japan to risk a war. The U. S. A. were disposed at that time to believe that it was Russia who endangered the "Open Door" of China by her aggressiveness in Manchuria, and that Japan, who hastened to declare her adherence to this principle enunciated by the U. S. A., was sincerely against preferential rights there for any Power. The indemnity paid by China, with Russia's help, for the defeat in 1894-95, was well used by Japan in building up a large modern force to contest any rival to her expansion; ¹ while American bankers assisted the financing of this venture.

Considering the immensity of Russia, her inexhaustible resources in man-power and raw materials, and the possibility of financial backing from France, the ally of Russia, it was natural that Japan should want to play safe. It was for this reason, apparently, that she decided to start the war without a formal declaration. She wanted to use the advantage of a surprise attack to undermine the Russian naval forces before an open contest could begin.

The official Japanese history describes this decision as follows: "Conscious of the fact that if the advantageous moment

¹ In 1895 the Japanese Navy was inferior to that of Russia, and her army numbered 80,000 men; in 1904 her navy was superior to that of Russia and her army had about 1,000,000 men.

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were not utilized it hardly could be duplicated, and that Japan might fall into a critical situation, the Japanese Government decided at a special meeting on February 4th, and in a conference at which the Emperor was present, to sever diplomatic relations with Russia immediately and to take necessary precautions for self-defence.”² The Imperial order to start hostilities was issued on February 5th, with no formal declaration of war, and the Russian fleet at Port Arthur—unprepared for an attack—suffered serious losses. Russian warships in Korea were also attacked.

The Japanese plan was to carry on the war upon the mainland. Hence she had to bring her army by transports over the sea and land them in Korea. This necessitated, of course, providing good landing places, safe from raids by the enemy's navy. Here was an additional reason for starting the war by striking at the Russian fleet.

Several attacks on Port Arthur followed the first surprise assault; the Russian fleet soon was practically paralyzed;³ and the entrance to Port Arthur Bay was partially blocked by a group of vessels sunk for that purpose by the Japanese with a display of heroism.

(2) HOW DID IT DEVELOP?

After having secured mastery on the seas, Japan next turned her attention to the occupation of Korea, as the base for her campaign, and of the Liaotung Peninsula for besieging Port Arthur. Victorious in a series of encounters and battles (at Yalu River, Feng-Kwang-Cheng, Nanshan, Vafangou, and other points in Korea and Liaotung), the Japanese forces continued their northward advance into Manchuria.

The great battle of Liao-Yang (from August 28th to September 4th, 1904) was won by the Russians, but the High Command was unaware of the victory. Unduly impressed by the attack of Kuroki's army on the flank, they gave orders to shorten the position and then to evacuate it. The Japanese, exhausted and short of ammunition, had themselves been making prepara-

² “The History of Japanese-Russian War.” Russian translation, v. I, p. 15.

³ A new squadron under Rozhdestvensky, sent by the Tsar from the Baltic around Africa, suffered defeat at Tsushima. The vessels comprising this squadron were not only inferior to those of Japan, but worthless as battleships.

tions for retreat; but they immediately grasped the new chance offered by the Russian mistake, and, starting an attack, turned a lost battle into a victory. Liao-Yang was occupied by the Japanese, but no pursuit was possible.

The extended siege of Port Arthur, after many fierce but unsuccessful assaults by the Japanese, repulsed with heavy losses, terminated at last in the capitulation of the fortress on January 2nd, after almost a year of gallant defence.

A tedious period of trench-war, when the enemies remained dug in along the Hun-ho (Hunkhe) and Sha-ho (Sha-khe) rivers, with occasional fighting, was followed by the protracted battle of Mukden (February 19th to March 11th, 1905), which ended in another general retreat of the Russians.

Kuropatkin's strategy advocated gaining time and the concentration of forces in the North, around Harbin. Troops, ammunition, food, everything, had to be brought from European Russia, and transported by the single-tracked Trans-Siberian Railway over thousands of miles!

Very cautious by nature, Kuropatkin was handicapped in his moves, first by Alexeieff, the Viceroy,⁴ and then by the intrigues of St. Petersburg. Hence his actions lacked decision and were unduly delayed. The circles close to the Court, disapproving the appointment of "this commoner" as Generalissimo, put all sorts of difficulties in his way. The Minister of War, Sakharoff, who had a personal grievance against Kuropatkin, probably accomplished more in this respect than anyone else, since as occupant of the post, from which the mobilization, training, and transportation, of the troops and supplies were directed, he was able by so many means to sabotage Kuropatkin's success.

About the time of the Mukden battle the Japanese High Command (Marshal Oyama) received as reinforcements the Third Army of General Nogi, transferred from Liaotung after the fall of Port Arthur. The total forces at his disposal now reached 263,000 infantry, 7800 cavalry, and 842 light and 170 heavy cannon. The Russians concentrated at that time 276,000 infantry, 16,000 cavalry, and 1219 light and 178 heavy cannon.

Oyama's plan was to attack the Russians along the entire front, starting on the eastern end of his lines with the Fifth

⁴ Who, being quite ignorant of military science, interfered with every detail of Kuropatkin's plans and made them ineffective.

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Army of Kawamura and administering the final blow at the western end with the Third Army of Nogi. The "khonghouzs" (Chinese brigands) under Chang-Tso-Lin were to raid the Russian lines of communications and the rears.

At the same time Kuropatkin was also preparing to launch an attack. The plan of the battle was, indeed, originated by him, and the large forces he had succeeded in concentrating were already slightly superior in numbers to the Japanese.⁵ But Kuropatkin's plan was to start on the 12th; and Oyama, ordering his advance for the 6th, gained that advantage of initiative which is so important in military actions. This interference with his plans, necessitating regrouping effected by the breaking of the units and therefore disorganizing their control, poor coördination of the activities of his armies, inadequate intelligence service, lack of actual control of his own troops, and his own indecisiveness, were responsible for Kuropatkin's defeat.

After the battle of Mukden, Kuropatkin was dismissed from the High Command. But it was too late. Too many battles had already been lost by him; and Japan, though exhausted and financially undermined, was favored by circumstances and emerged victorious from the war. When Russia again succeeded in gathering large forces, this time much better equipped and supplied than at the outbreak of the war, for which she was so decidedly unprepared, she was given no chance for a contest. Not long afterwards, on the initiative of President Roosevelt, negotiations were started by the belligerents; and on September 5th, at Portsmouth, N. H., was signed the treaty which ended the war.

(3) WHAT WAS THE END?

From the beginning to the end of the Russo-Japanese War the United States had played a very important unofficial rôle. That President Roosevelt's attitude was decidedly pro-Japanese can be seen from his correspondence at the time. He even served notice on Germany and France that in case they entered the affair in support of the Tsar, "he would promptly side with Japan and proceed to whatever length was necessary on her behalf."⁶

⁵ Not counting the Chinese brigands under Chang-Tso-Lin. who coöperated with the Japanese.

⁶ Charles A. Beard and Mary R. Beard, "The Rise of American Civilization." Part II, p. 496. N. Y., 1930.

After over one year and a half of struggle, Japan was almost exhausted. Her economic situation was shaken, her finances drained, and further financial help from abroad was becoming more and more difficult to obtain. Russia, on the other hand, had already accumulated large forces. She achieved some reorganization of her armies and delivered to the East large stores of supplies.

It is true that the economic burden of the war was badly felt. France was not willing to lend more money while her ally was still in arms and the internal situation was disquieting. Nevertheless, continuation of the war could only spell disaster for Japan; her armies far away from home, provisioning was becoming more and more difficult, and the problem of manufacturing ammunition was growing more embarrassing.

At that time President Roosevelt came out (on June 9th) with a suggestion to start negotiations for peace. The suggestion was accepted, with some hesitation and against the advice of the military people in Russia; ⁷ and finally Portsmouth, N. H., was offered and agreed upon as place for the conference.

The movement of President Roosevelt to bring the war to an end was warmly supported, among others, by the German Kaiser, though for different reasons.

In a letter of the German Ambassador at Washington to President Roosevelt, dated July 13th, 1905, one can read "that the Kaiser was very much concerned about the possibility of a revolution in Russia." The Kaiser did not mind, of course, the humiliation of Russia. He feared that the Tsar, his cousin, would lose the throne! It was not a question of humanitarianism, but of keeping the thrones intact.

Another interesting illustration of the Kaiser's attitude may be found in the memoirs of his Chancellor, Prince von Bülow. In a conversation with him about the Russo-Japanese front, the Kaiser once stated: "I thought the warmth of my last letters would induce the Tsar to employ his whole might against Japan. Instead of doing that, his attitude remains, now as before, flabby. It looks as if he didn't want to fight. . . . In the interest of Monarchy something must happen to make Nicholas act more

⁷ Minister of War Sakharoff, answering Witte's inquiry, wrote: "I have the honor to inform you that in my judgment under the present conditions to conclude peace is impossible." (Dr. Dillon, "Eclipse of Russia," p. 229.)

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energetically . . . the Tsar is damaging the Monarchistic principle through his deplorable attitude. . . . It is really shameful that France leaves her Russian Allies in the lurch and that England and the United States sympathize with Japan. . . ."

Negotiations were started on August 10th. Japan was represented by Baron Komura (Minister of Foreign Affairs), and Takahira (her Minister at Washington); Russia by Sergius Witte (President of Committee of Ministers and Minister of Finances), and Baron Rosen (former Minister at Tokyo then Ambassador at Washington).

"On the eve of the Portsmouth conference the chiefs of the Russian Army were quite confident of a speedy victory and ultimate success, and were consequently impatient of the folly of the mere civilian who craved for peace before the army had plucked a laurel in the campaign," wrote Dr. E. J. Dillon,⁸ who accompanied his friend, S. Witte, to the conference. "The Russian military critics," he continued, "who could and should have known the real facts, calculated that, as things then stood, the odds were largely in favor of Lienevitch's⁹ army, which was also increasing in numbers much more quickly than the enemy's troops."

But if such were actually the feeling and hopes of those in command on the front, the situation in the rear justified the decision to negotiate for peace. Those who knew how restless the Russian nation had grown and "what ravages dissatisfaction have made in the army saw that an immediate peace was Russia's last hope of salvation. . . ." ¹⁰

The choice of Witte as the head of the Russian delegation, supported incidentally by A. Iswolsky, the former Minister of Russia at Tokyo, on consideration of the "exceptional prestige which Witte enjoyed in Japan," was most fortunate for the Russian interests. Faced by able Japanese diplomats, who insisted on rewards for the victories of their gallant army and navy; not properly supported at home; receiving orders and

⁸ Dr. E. J. Dillon, "The Eclipse of Russia," pp. 299-300. Doran Co., N. Y., 1918.

⁹ The new Generalissimo, who replaced Kuropatkin.

¹⁰ As it is well known, the indignation of the Russians at the humiliating defeats in Manchuria (created by the adventure there, that never had the approval or support of the public), prompted a revolution in 1905 that was a protest against this adventure.

then counter-orders; Witte nevertheless fulfilled his mission brilliantly. Undoubtedly the friendly and very tactful interference of President Roosevelt at that time helped Witte a great deal in preventing the rupture of negotiations that seemed imminent.

Japan insisted on retention of Sakhalin, limitation of Russia's fleet in the Far East, and an indemnity. Witte was instructed by the Tsar not to grant any of these demands. When he suggested compromising on Sakhalin, a message arrived (on August 12th) expressly forbidding him to surrender this island.

A few days later the Tsar wrote "inasmuch as the negotiations are bound to be broken in a few days, no armistice must be concluded!" On 19th Witte cabled to Lamzdorf: "In view of Tsar's resolution on my telegram No. 15, I consider further negotiations useless . . . we may request the President to summon a new conference whenever he may deem it opportune." The Tsar's resolution which thus discouraged his plenipotentiary was embodied in the following sentence scribbled across Witte's telegram about Japan's demands: "It has already been said: not a foot of territory, not a rouble of money for military expenses. On this ground I will stand to the end."

But, "after having painfully dislodged mountains of obstacles Witte stood already (through a curious thing that happened on August 21st) in sight of his goal and within a few hours of attaining all that Russia could reasonably expect," wrote Dr. Dillon. Takahira informed Witte, that day, that the Japanese delegation suggested postponing the last sitting for one day as it awaited instructions from Tokyo.

On Witte's cable to that effect the Tsar answered through Lamzdorf: "Send Witte my command to end the discussions at all hazard tomorrow! I had rather go on with the war than await gracious concessions from Japan." But "Witte paid no heed to this behest and ended everything satisfactorily." On September 5th the Peace Treaty was signed.

By the Treaty of Portsmouth, the Liaotung Peninsula (as leased to Russia in 1898) had to be transferred to Japan, subject to the consent of China, as also was the southern part of the Chinese Eastern Railway (from Changchun to Port Arthur and Dalny) together with the coal mines in that area which had belonged to or were worked by the Russians for the benefit of the railway. In Korea, Russia acknowledged that Japan pos-

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essed paramount political, military and economic interests, and engaged not to obstruct nor interfere with the measures of guidance, protection and control which Japan might find it necessary to take in Korea. Russian subjects were accorded most favored nation treatment and both parties agreed to abstain from military measures on the Russo-Korean frontier, which might menace the security of Russian or Korean territory.

By Article III Japan and Russia mutually engaged "to restore entirely and completely to the exclusive administration of China all portions of Manchuria" then in occupation or under the control of the Japanese and Russian troops (with the exception of the Liaotung).

The Tsar's Government declared that Russia had not in Manchuria "any territorial advantages or preferential or exclusive concession in impairment of Chinese sovereignty or inconsistent with the principle of equal opportunity."

By Article IV they reciprocally engaged "not to obstruct any general measures common to all countries, which China might take for the development of the commerce and industry of Manchuria."

The Sakhalin island was divided in half by the 50° parallel, the northern part remaining in Russian possession, the southern becoming Japanese; the boundary to be decided in detail by a special commission.

Article VII stipulated that Russia and Japan engage to exploit their respective railways in Manchuria exclusively for commercial and industrial purposes (with the exception of the railways in the Liaotung leased territory).

On November 25th, 1905, ratifications of the Treaty of Portsmouth were exchanged at Washington. So ended not only the war but also Russia's unfortunate adventure in Manchuria.

Russia retained only the Chinese Eastern Railway as a joint commercial enterprise with China and the northern section of the line southward from Harbin to Changchun. Since then, we see no further advance of Russia in the Far East.

The defeat of Russia by Japan was, indirectly, a defeat by England, in so far as it marked the end of Russia's plans to undermine Great Britain in the Far East—an aim offered by some historians as explanation of Russia's expansion there.¹¹

¹¹ M. N. Pokrovsky, in the "History of Russia in the XIX Century," sug-

Having forced Russia to break, later on, with Germany, the diplomacy of Great Britain brought Russia into her own orbit. Soon after the Russo-Japanese War and after having concluded a very unfavorable commercial treaty with Germany, Russia loosened her German orientation and turned towards England and also to Japan; though her alignment with the latter was influenced by motives somewhat different from those that served to ally her, for a while, with Great Britain.

(4) HOW DID IT AFFECT RUSSO-JAPANESE RELATIONS?

The Treaty of Portsmouth stipulated in Article VIII that in order to encourage and facilitate their mutual commercial relations a special convention concerning railways, navigation, etc., should be negotiated by Japan and Russia without delay.

On July 28th, 1907, such a convention was signed at St. Petersburg. But that was not all. Before the conference of Portsmouth was started Witte had scouted the chances for a *rap-prochement* with Japan. In London Dr. Dillon, who accompanied Witte on this mission, had seen Count Hayashi, then the Japanese Ambassador to Great Britain, and found him, to some extent, in accord with Witte's plan. In a private letter Hayashi wrote Witte somewhat cautiously: "Japan will welcome peace, and will cultivate friendship with her present enemy after the conclusion of peace."¹² Iswolsky took the same attitude, and both France and England looked favorably upon the plan.¹³

On July 30th, 1907, a Russo-Japanese Convention was signed, by which Russia and Japan agreed mutually "to respect the actual territorial integrity of the other and all the rights accruing to one and the other party from the treaties, conventions, and contracts in force between them and China" in so far as these rights were not incompatible with the principle of equal opportunity and the special conventions concluded by Japan and Russia.

By Article II the High Contracting Parties agreed to "recognize the independence and the territorial integrity of the Empire of China and the principle of equal opportunity in what-

gested that Russia went to the Far East in order to attract some forces of Great Britain there and so to facilitate the struggle with her in the Near East.

¹² E. J. Dillon, "The Eclipse of Russia," p. 301

¹³ Gérard, "Nos Alliés d'Extreme-Orient," pp. 125-128. Paris, 1918.

ever concerns the commerce and industry of all Nations in that Empire, and undertake to support and defend the maintenance of the *status quo* and respect for this principle by all the peaceable means within their reach."

This Convention, preceded by a Franco-Japanese agreement of June 10th, and followed by an Anglo-Japanese accord, of August 31st, constituted the declaration by the Powers of their desire to support the *status quo* in Manchuria.

Besides the political Convention just quoted, Russia and Japan had concluded a secret Convention which contained a recognition of the respective sphere of interests of the Powers in Manchuria, special interests of Japan in Korea and certain interests of Russia in the Outer Mongolia.

In 1909 Japan imposed on China a Convention concerning the reconstruction of the Mukden-Antung Railway. This, coupled with the Japanese plans for new railroads in Korea, gave some anxiety to Russia, who considered them as menacing her frontiers. But something soon happened that not only prevented any aggravation of this feeling but even brought closer the reconciliation of the former enemies.

The American Secretary of State, Philander C. Knox, advanced in November 1909 a plan for neutralization of the Manchurian railways. This was an outgrowth of a former plan, outlined by the same Secretary Knox in 1902 when the negotiations for construction of the Chinchow-Aigun Railway were under way between China and American and British banking interests.¹⁴

In reply to the memorandum of Secretary Knox, the British Government declared on November 25th, 1909, that though in accord with the "general principle" it disapproved the entire scheme. But in January 1910 the American Chargé d'Affaires at Peking secured China's approval of the neutralization plan. Russia and Japan, however, answered on January 21st, by identical notes, that they considered the Knox plan as contrary to the Treaty of Portsmouth and the subsequent agreements. So the Knox plan was abandoned and together with it the ambitious plans of the American consul-general at Mukden, Willard Straight, who was the soul of the entire project. Willard Straight dreamed of a gigantic railroad scheme, but, though backed by

¹⁴ C. Walter Young, *ibid.*, p. 107.

J. P. Morgan, the First National Bank of New York, Kuhn, Loeb & Co., etc., it failed to materialize.

Having jointly opposed this attempt to curtail their rights in Manchuria, Japan and Russia decided to enforce them by a new understanding.

On July 4th, 1910, a Convention was signed at St. Petersburg by Baron Motono, for Japan, and Iswolsky, for Russia, by which the two countries became actually Allies, though for the single definite purpose of maintaining the *status quo* in Manchuria and protecting their respective interests. By Article III "in case an event of a nature endangering the above mentioned *status quo* should be brought about, the two High Contracting Parties shall in each instance enter into communication with each other for the purpose of agreeing upon the measures that they may deem it necessary to take for the maintenance of the said *status quo*."

Besides this text, made public at the time of its signing, a further understanding or "secret Convention" was concluded.

This secret agreement elaborated the clauses of a similar document of 1907, delimiting the spheres of interests of Russia and Japan in Manchuria and Mongolia; and included their mutual promise not to seek privileges or concessions in the spheres of interest of the other contracting party.

In 1912, after the abdication of the Manchu Dynasty of China, the establishment of the Chinese Republic raised the question of recognition of the new régime. This was an opportunity for some of the Powers to attempt a settlement of outstanding issues with China.

From the very beginning of Russia's penetration into Asia, her relations with Mongols were closer than those with China. More trade was transacted between them, more contacts maintained.

In 1911, simultaneously with the outbreak of the Chinese Revolution, the Mongols declared their determination to establish independence of Mongolia.

"To determine more exactly the provisions of previous agreements on Mongolia," Russia and Japan, by initiative of Sazonov, who succeeded Iswolsky as Minister of Foreign Affairs, negotiated in 1912 a Convention signed on June 25th (July 8th). This document confirmed the previous delimitation of their re-

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spective spheres of interests in Manchuria and in the Outer and Inner Mongolia. The eastern part of the latter was recognized as belonging to the Japanese sphere of interest.

Completing the series of Conventions concluded by Russia and Japan after the war of 1904-05 and before the 1917 Revolution in Russia, are the Conventions signed on July 3rd, 1916, and practically establishing an alliance between these former adversaries.

By comparing these documents with the Conventions of 1907, 1910, and 1912, one can gain an idea of the way in which Russo-Japanese relations developed gradually from 1905 to a point at which the former enemies became virtual Allies.

The agreements of 1907 not only confirmed the actual situation reached at Portsmouth, but also bound the Contracting Parties to respect the independence and territorial integrity of China. The agreements of 1910 defined more specifically the spheres of their common interests in Manchuria, established friendly coöperation of the two countries, and declared their determination to defend the *status quo*. The agreement of 1912 added Mongolia to the delimitation of the spheres of interests in Manchuria.

The agreements of 1916 constituted a *rapprochement* even more binding than an *entente cordiale* and almost equal to an alliance for the maintenance of peace in the Far East. Article I of the open Convention stipulated that neither Russia nor Japan will be "a party to any arrangement or political combination" directed against the other contracting party, while Article II said: "in the event that the territorial rights or the special interests, in the Far East, of one of the Contracting Parties, recognized by the other Contracting Party, should be menaced, Russia and Japan will confer in regard to the measures to be taken with a view to the support or coöperation to be given each other in order to safeguard and defend those rights and interests."

The secret Convention provided (Article I) that Russia and Japan recognized the vital interests of each other in China and bound them to come to an understanding for coöperative action in case the actions of any third power having hostile designs against Russia or Japan should bring about a state of affairs menacing China's sovereignty. Therefore (stated Article II) if—

in consequence of the development of a situation as characterized in Article I—a war should be declared against either Russia or Japan the other party at the first demand of its ally must come to its aid, and not conclude peace with the common enemy without preliminary consent thereto from the Ally. The conditions of such armed assistance were to be determined (Article III) by the proper authorities. But armed aid was to be given conditional (Article IV) upon the obtaining of guaranties from the Allies that the latter would give assistance corresponding in character to the gravity of the approaching conflict.

As a matter of fact the agreements arrived at by Russia and Japan and listed above did little more than duplicate the relations which had existed between Japan and Great Britain since 1902, when the Treaty of Alliance, renewed in 1905 and in 1911 (for 10 years) was first signed in London.

D. Summary.

If we compare the histories of the relations between China and Russia on one hand and between Russia and Japan on the other, we note immediately one very marked difference.

The history of Sino-Russian relations may be properly characterized as one of confidence, peace and friendliness, marred only occasionally by abuses and misunderstandings of which both countries were equally guilty. The history of Russo-Japanese relations, however, was born in suspicion, developed among intrigues, passed through a "purgatory" of war, and only gradually reached the stage of mutual understanding, growing confidence and hopes for sincere friendship in the future.

The Manchurian adventure of Tsar Nicholas II, with its dream of glory and false conception of Russia's future in the East, contributed directly to a crisis in the relations of Russia and Japan. The abuses resulting from the Tsar's secret dealings against the advice of his ministers, produced an atmosphere intolerable to Tokyo; ¹ looking to expansion, suspicious of foreigners whose ways were still new to her, and protesting self-defence, Japan easily, though probably not entirely consciously, stepped out upon the road of aggression.

¹ Dr. E. J. Dillon, in his reminiscences of Russia, characterizes the Russo-Japanese War as "one of the most heinous crimes of the Czardom." *"Russia Today and Yesterday."* New York, 1930.

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After the war was over, and animosity had abated, the two combatants found that actually they could be friends as well. The interests of Russia and Japan were not after all irreconcilable; there were ways and means of working together. Finally, in 1916, with the active help of France and England, they became allies.

PART ONE—(*Continued*)

II. WHAT WAS THE SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST AT THE
OUTBREAK OF THE WORLD WAR?

CHAPTER III

RUSSIA'S INTERESTS IN CHINA BEFORE THE WORLD WAR

A. The Chinese Eastern Railway. B. The Mongolian Question. C. The Russo-Chinese Relations in General.

A. The Chinese Eastern Railway.

In compliance with the Li-Lobanov Treaty of 1896, a contract for the construction and operation of the railway across Manchuria was signed on September 8th of the same year, by which the Russo-Chinese Bank had to form a special agency under the name of Chinese Eastern Railway Company. The Russo-Chinese Bank was founded in St. Petersburg on December 22nd, 1895, under a charter approved by the Russian Minister of Finance. Its object was "to develop commercial relations with the Eastern countries;" and it was actually controlled by the government of Russia.¹ However, under the contract, China invested 5,000,000 taels and so participated in the profits and losses of the bank. Her investment was to be repaid after the completed railroad was opened for traffic.

The contract further empowered the newly formed Company² "to acquire land necessary for construction, operation, and protection of the line" and to procure necessary materials. Article VI gave the Company the "Absolute and exclusive right of administration of these lands" and the right to erect buildings and construct telegraph lines. The complete and exclusive right to operate the road was granted to the Chinese Eastern Railway Company, and it was stipulated that the President of the Company should be a Chinese. But actual control over the line was vested in a Russian Manager.³

¹ In 1910 the Russo-Chinese Bank was merged with the Banque du Nord and formed the Russo-Asiatic Bank. Some of the French banks had a considerable interest in both of them.

² The shareholders of this company to be exclusively Chinese and Russian.

³ The cost of the Chinese Eastern, including its southern branch, was over 400,000,000 roubles.

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The concession was given for a period of eighty years, after which, said Article XII, "the line with all its appurtenances will pass free of charge to the Chinese Government. At the expiration of 36 years from the day on which the entire line is finished and traffic is in operation the Chinese Government will have the right to buy back this line upon repaying in full all the capital involved, as well as all the debts contracted for this line, plus accrued interests." The statutes for the management and operation of the railroad had to conform to Russian law, and when ready, were sanctioned on December 16th, 1896.

Though China agreed to protect the railway and its employees, the statutes included a clause by which the preservation of law and order on the lands assigned to the railway was confined to the police agents appointed by the Company. This was done on the basis of Article VI, giving the Company "absolute and exclusive right of administration," but it was frowned upon by the Chinese and contested by them later.

The construction of the Chinese Eastern was started in 1898⁴ and through a Convention with China on March 27th of the same year Russia acquired the right to extend the line southward to connect Harbin with Port Arthur and Talien-wan (or Dalny), thus securing a new terminus for the Trans-Siberian in "warm-water" ports at the shores of the Gulf of Pechili. In 1902 the Tsar's Government extorted from China still another concession, this time for construction of a railway from Changchun to Kirin. It was a part of the price China had to pay for the evacuation of Russian troops from Manchuria, though actually this road was not built by Russia. Construction on the original route was meanwhile nearly complete and it was opened for traffic in 1903.

The Treaty of Portsmouth transferred to Japan the South Manchuria line up to Changchun with all the other Russian concessions there; and China was forced to sanction this by "agreements" reached at Peking on December 22nd, 1905.⁵ Russia's interests in Manchuria were thus curtailed to the Chinese Eastern main line and the short branch southward from Harbin

⁴ The surveying began in 1897.

⁵ The alleged "secret protocols" were not officially published; therefore the authenticity of their content, as given by some sources, could not be established. It seems that China had never accepted their authenticity or the interpretation which the Japanese Government sought to attribute to them.

to Changchun. The terms of the concession, as provided in the original contract of 1896, remained unaltered.

During the years that followed, China attempted to persuade Russia to make certain revisions, especially in regard to the municipal administration of the communities along the road. But a convention, signed in May 1907, reaffirmed the Russian rights so strongly that it was objected to by the Powers, as allowing an unwarranted interpretation that the Chinese Eastern Railway Company was not a private commercial enterprise but a governmental agency.

Seven years later, Russia's special position in respect to the municipalities was recognized by England in the agreement signed in April, 1914, to which all the principal Powers, except the United States, adhered. In compliance with this, the subjects or citizens of these countries, living in the railway zone, were to be taxed on the same basis as the Russians, provided these taxes were used for the common welfare; and were also to be subject to local regulations, but exempt from arrest by Russian police except in case of breach of peace. As for the guards that Russia had established on the road from its beginning and then had increased at the time of the Boxer Rising, they were cut down in number by the terms of the Portsmouth Treaty to not over 15 per kilometer of the line, and constituted therefore not more than 30,000 men.⁶

Since 1907 the Chinese Eastern Railway Company was charged with the management and operation of the Ussuri Railway with its branch to the Suchan coal mines. Through long years of inefficient exploitation of these lines the balance-sheet of the Company showed deficits, even before it had to compete with the Japanese owned South Manchuria railroad. But these deficits were to a great extent explained by the burden laid on the road in the form of the troops, or "guards," kept for its protection, and by the heavy overhead expenses of the Company's headquarters at St. Petersburg.

Nevertheless with the development of Manchuria (the growth of its population, extension of agriculture and building of industry) the amount of goods shipped over the Chinese Eastern

⁶ By her endorsement of the Treaty of Portsmouth, through the Peking agreement of December, 1905, China actually sanctioned the presence of these guards.

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Russia's future in Manchuria, characterized the situation as offering the strange dilemma:—"To fight or to trade."

Those Russians who considered economic progress as the only desirable form of expansion, and were therefore opposed to the adventurous plans for revenge upon Japan and the conquest of Manchuria and Mongolia, recommended a Japanese Alliance. They considered it quite feasible to divide Manchuria and Mongolia into "spheres of interests," reconciling Russia and Japan completely. If allied, they reasoned, these two countries could become unrivaled masters of the Far East! The weak point of their scheme was, of course, their apparent neglect of China.

Actually, as we have seen in the previous chapter, Russia and Japan did enter into a form of alliance in 1916. But the outcome of the World War and the Revolutions in Russia and in China shuffled all the cards.

B. The Mongolian Question.

The enormous area of present-day Mongolia, covering 1,200,000 square miles, was not always the domain of the Mongols.¹ Before Jenghiz Khan had conquered these lands, part of them had belonged to the Tunghus, Tartars and others. They constituted a part of the Empire of the Huns (IIIrd century B.C. to the Ist century A.D.) and later (VIth century to VIIIth century A.D.) were under the domination of the Turks. In the middle of the VIIIth century the Oighurs, who came from the North of Asia, conquered some of these lands, only to be forced out in the IXth century by the Kalmucks and Kirghis tribes.² In other words, for many centuries Mongolia was passed from one group of nomads to another.

The most brilliant chapters of Mongolia's history are found in the years of Temuchin (or Jenghiz Khan) and his family, who conquered almost all of Asia and a part of Europe, and founded the Dynasty of Yüan (Kublai Khan), that ruled China for almost a century but, finally, in 1368, was superseded by a Chinese Dynasty of Mings. Partitioning the lands among their heirs, the Khans dismembered their Empire, and created a num-

¹ The name Mongolia was applied first by Jenghiz Khan in 1203.

² Y. Kotvich. Outline of the History of Mongolia. (In Russian) St. Petersburg, 1910.

ber of small separate principalities which remained segregated into three main groups: those of the North—Kalkas; those of the South; and those of the West—Oirads, also known as Kal-mucks or Eleuthes.

In the XVIIth century some of the Mongols were subjugated by the Manchus, who had conquered China in 1644 and founded the dynasty which ruled over the Celestial Empire till the fall of the monarchy in 1912. The Eleuthes resisted the Manchu invasion longer than the other Western Mongols, and worried China by raids and plundering till 1690, when their great Khan Galdan was defeated and their lands were annexed. Never completely pacified, they continued to trouble the Chinese administration by sporadic risings until the middle of the XIXth century, when they took advantage of the difficulties experienced by Peking in dealing with the Taiping and the Mahommedan rebellions, and declared again their independence. Subdued in 1871 by Russia, they were brought back into the orbit of China in 1881, and remained there until the revolution of 1911.

Through long centuries of contact with Mongolia, sometimes as conquerors, sometimes as conquered, the Chinese made no real attempt to colonize the waste lands of these roaming nomads. Not until after the Russo-Japanese War, when the Peking Government was engaged in sponsoring emigration of the Chinese to Manchuria, did Mongolia also experience an influx of immigrants. Then, as Chinese merchants, Chinese officials, and Chinese settlers continued to pour into Mongolia, the Mongolian princes, alarmed by this menace to their holdings and their prerogatives, induced their people to rise against the invaders.

Though forced to submit to the Manchu Dynasty (the last rulers of the Chinese Empire), the Mongols never considered their country as part of China and had always enjoyed a large measure of independence. Even the Barguts³ who, from the middle of the XVIIIth century had occupied the northwestern part of Manchuria (Barga), did not recognize the suzerainty of China until 1900, when the Chinese Government started colonization of Manchuria and forced acknowledgment of its authority.

Displeased by the increasing Chinese activity in their lands,

³ Under this name are commonly known different Mongolian tribes living in that district—namely, the Solons, Dahours, Buriats, Barguts, etc.

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the Mongols turned their eyes towards Russia as a possible support against the Chinese encroachment, and in August 1911 sent a delegation to St. Petersburg. But the Chinese Revolution shortly afterwards warranted more audacity, and in the same year the Mongols declared their autonomy. Russia lost no time in granting her recognition to this welcome new state and concluded in 1912, at Urga, a treaty with autonomous Mongolia.

Throughout the long years of Russia's activity in Asia, she had constant and close contact with Mongolia. Russian trade (or barter) with the Mongols was the basis of relations. The Mongols were friendly to the Russians for many generations. Some of their brethren became Russian subjects while continuing to speak their own language, and to worship their own gods. For a considerable time the center of the Russian trade in China was at Kiakhta, just on the border of Mongolia; while Maimachin, on the other side of the boundary, continued to play the same rôle even after the railroad was built, and trade with China was largely diverted to a new route. Russian caravans laden with various goods passed and repassed across Mongolia, with Mongols furnishing the guard. On several occasions in the past the Mongols had expressed their preference for Russia after experiencing abuses from the Chinese side; so it was nothing new when in 1911 they again applied to St. Petersburg.⁴

In 1912, when Russia recognized autonomous Mongolia, she concluded also a Treaty with Japan delimiting their respective interests. Outer or Northern Mongolia was defined as the sphere of Russian interests, and the eastern part of Inner Mongolia, adjoining Manchuria, as that of Japan.

The new régime of China did not approve the direct dealing of Russia with Mongolia and started negotiations for a compromise. In November 1913 a Sino-Russian convention was concluded, by which China declared her willingness to recognize the autonomy of Outer Mongolia under Chinese sovereignty, and agreed to consult Russia on any political and territorial problems arising in that part of Mongolia. The Mongolian authorities were supposed to partake in such consultations.

In 1915 at Kiakhta, a new treaty was signed by Russia,

⁴ Russia's interest in Mongolia found expression in the Russo-Chinese Treaty of St. Petersburg (1881), which gave the Russians the right to trade in Mongolia free from payment of some duties.

China, and Outer Mongolia, confirming the autonomy of the latter under suzerainty of China. This Treaty remained in force till the Russian Revolution of 1917, when Outer Mongolia was made the scene of fighting between the different Russian factions. Finally, through a process of forming the People's National Government and then establishing local soviets, Outer Mongolia became a semi-independent country nominally federated with China, but influenced, if not actually controlled, by Soviet Russia.

C. Russo-Chinese Relations in General.

Certain over-romantic and mystically inclined people (among them many Slavophiles, such as Danilevsky and others) have developed a theory of the spiritual kinship of Russia with the Orient and of her providential mission of awakening the sleeping East and bringing it into contact with the West by transplanting Western culture. We are inclined to take more seriously the economic explanation of Russia's advent to the East. But it is one thing to find the cause and to appreciate its importance, and quite another to agree with the interpretation given in a particular case, or to approve the ways and means applied to secure the ends.

It is useless to deny that the conquest of Siberia by the Russians and their penetration into Asia were stimulated by economic causes. The Cossacks, who started this penetration, were restless and energetically in revolt against the economic system prevailing in Russia at the time; they were mainly peasants, who deserted the landlords (and later on the serfdom) and were seeking liberty and better living conditions. The hunters, who followed, were naturally concerned with finding better places rich in fur-producing game with which to trade. Merchants such as the Stroganoffs were anxious to acquire larger opportunities in the form of new markets and raw materials.

The reports of the numerous explorers invariably described the forests as abounding in animals, the rivers as teeming with fish, the ground rich in minerals, and the soil remarkably fertile—and enlarged upon the income they might produce. And how could it be otherwise? The stimuli were of an economic nature and these material considerations of primary importance.

The direction in which the expansion developed was defined, as usual, by the ways of communication. In Siberia, and

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in Eastern Asia as well, those ways were down the rivers. Following the streams, Russians came to the shores of the Arctic in the Far North and of the Pacific in the Far East. The Arctic at that time especially did not encourage the establishment of any regular routes. But in the Pacific there were bays offering good harbors, though all were not ice free; even Vladivostok,¹ the farthest to the South, was frozen three or four months every year.

From the time of Mouravieff a number of Russians, mostly sailors, had insisted that Russia must secure a port in warm waters—for instance, they suggested, in Pechili. Nor did this dream entirely evaporate till the beginning of Manchurian adventure when two ports on the Gulf of Pechili were “leased,” and the Russian squadron was stationed at one of them, namely Port Arthur.

Who can deny that, in principle, it is very important for every country to have a free outlet to an open sea? But is it not also imperative to remain within logical bounds? There must be some limit to the application of this principle.

A primitive economic stage must, in due time, give place to some other more advanced stage. So, because it supplanted a nomadic with an agricultural civilization, the conquest of the Kazan and Astrakhan Khanates, those last Tartar remnants in European Russia, was probably inevitable. Normal too was the conquest of Siberia, which, being little more than an occupation of waste lands, followed the line of least resistance and was accomplished practically without fighting. And the colonization of Siberia, which developed smoothly, originated in a normal process of expansion, for a long time not even directed by the Government. But the Russian expansion into Manchuria is a very different matter. This was no natural continuation of a process justified by history, but an entirely artificial adventure forced on by superior authority. In no sense a colonization, it was in point of fact a military occupation of a zone not needed by the country,—an occupation not demanded by the nation and not even recommended by the Government.

If the long and insistent struggle of Russia for outlets to the Baltic and Black seas was justified by the necessity of opening the gates for Russian trade with the outside world, the

¹ Vladivostok means in Russian, “the possessor of the East.”

stretching of Russia over the entire continent of Asia, through the then almost empty Siberia and the Far Eastern possessions to obtain an outlet on the Pacific Ocean, was a too ambitious undertaking. Foresight may be carried too far, and to provide for the welfare of coming generations without paying attention to the actual needs and potentialities of the present day often spells disappointment and occasionally disaster.

The Pacific outlets obtained by Russia, namely Port Arthur and Talien-wan, were not only too far away from the metropolis, but were located in a foreign country not entirely friendly towards the intruders. The railway built to connect them with Moscow was a military strategic road. It was not a link for economic expansion, or likely to become one for many years, since Russia as yet was industrially in her infancy. In short, the Manchurian adventure was a typical example of what may happen when normal expansion is artificially stretched. It was the purely imperialistic scheme of a country that had not, as yet, developed the prerequisites necessitating it.

Russian financial capital was, as yet, embryonic, her industry still of no importance, her strength not justifying ambitions of such magnitude, her domestic affairs not such as to permit adventures!

The defeat that Russia suffered from Japan, who contested the right for the same concessions in Manchuria that the Tsar's Government had previously obtained, proved rather beneficial, as it cleared up the situation and adjusted somewhat her policies in the Orient. Beyond the financial loss that she experienced in giving up to Japan, free of charge, the Liaotung and South Manchuria Railway with all the concessions along it, and the unnecessary expenses she had to bear in carrying on the war, Russia suffered little economically. What she had to relinquish, actually was not needed by her.

The outcome of the war with Japan, though curtailing Russia's holdings in China, did not entirely eradicate from her ruling circles at that time the unfortunate policy of treating China as an inferior, decaying nation, with no other future but a partition by the Powers. But China, having learned from the success of Japan, that the "whites" might be dealt with less ceremoniously than she had believed necessary before, now offered more resistance. Russia did not succeed in obtaining any new concessions

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or special privileges in China; and consequently her chief concern was now to keep intact what she had left, and to protect it from any outside attempts to undermine her.

Closely following the other Powers in their endeavor to strengthen their grip on China and to increase their influence, Russia concluded a series of agreements with Japan, England and France by which her special rights and interests in Manchuria and Mongolia were confirmed and more specifically defined. The "rights and privileges" were plain, but the real nature of the "interests" was less clear; for, as already stated, the trade between Russia and China was rather negligible in volume and far behind that of the other big Powers. This and the fact that China sold to Russia many times what the latter exported to China, made it doubtful that Russia had any chance to dominate the Chinese market. She had little enough to export anywhere, and was not particularly interested in the Chinese market. The main article of her meager imports from China was tea, and tea was shipped mostly overland, leaving the sea-going trade very insignificant.

If economic considerations were rightly advanced by the originators of the Trans-Siberian Railway, they had another meaning when applied to the Chinese Eastern. In the first case it was a sound plan to develop the rich possessions that remained idle for too long a time; in the latter it was "scheming and dreaming" of exploitation of what did not belong, was not needed, and actually was far beyond the capacity of Russia of those days to utilize. It was a race for aggrandizement, a *mania modus gubernandi* for which Russia eventually paid dearly in humiliation.

While the agreements just mentioned established Russia's spheres of influence in China, this influence nevertheless was not increasing. In many instances Russia was losing ground, to say nothing of "prestige"; and many of her officials and private individuals, living in Manchuria, did not contribute to the good name of Russia in the East. Harbin, the official and commercial center of the Russian sphere in Manchuria, was known, with much justification, as a center of corruption, graft, and loose morals. The mistreatment of the Chinese by these Russians, suffering from the "superiority complex" did not serve, of course, to breed good feeling towards the intruders, and prepared the

ground for all the ugly abuses the Chinese in their turn committed after the Russian Revolution, which played havoc everywhere, including Harbin.

The inconsistency of Russia's status in Manchuria was obvious from the beginning, and to some extent persisted even after the Portsmouth Treaty and the conventions and other agreements subsequently concluded. From one point of view she held a lease to land belonging to a foreign country with special rights and privileges; and from another was in occupation of Chinese territory under the pretext of protecting a railway operating there as a private concern. On the one hand there was a fiction qualifying as "private" a governmental enterprise; on the other, no one could longer doubt its international political character.

From the beginning this situation held no solutions for Russia but to annex at least a part of Manchuria after the war with Japan, or sell out the railway and withdraw. The understanding between Japan and Russia, reached by the treaties of 1907-16 prepared the way for the first of these two solutions; but, fortunately or not, the events which followed prevented its realization.

It is to be doubted if such a surgical settlement of the Manchurian problem could ever be of benefit to Russia, though it seems true that, for a while at least, China would be unable to resist the vivisection. Nor would outsiders find interference easy; for Russia and Japan could then present a solid unified front such as no Power would care to fight; and to fight which no combination of Powers is likely to be formed. One may accept as probable all these assertions, and still be forced to grant that such a settlement would place an even heavier and more unpleasant burden on Russia than before.

There were and are some students of this problem who consider the Chinese Eastern Railway indispensable to Russia. They assert that only by controlling the North of Manchuria and continuing the ownership of the Chinese Eastern can Russia insure possession of the Maritime Province. But this would seem too categorical an assertion, and hardly a valid argument for annexation of what belongs to China. Besides, China would not be likely to give up her rights without a fight, sooner or later.

The foregoing outline should serve to show that Russia's

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major interests in China before the World War were limited to her ownership and operation of the Chinese Eastern Railway and to her spheres of influence in Northern Manchuria and Outer Mongolia. There were, in addition, several concessions and holdings in the foreign settlements such as Tientsin and Hankow; the privileges of extraterritoriality, consular jurisdiction, and special postal rights; and her pecuniary interests as one of the participants in the Multi-Power Consortium (as per agreement signed at Paris in 1912) and as one of the recipients of payments due per Protocol of 1901 under the name of the Boxer indemnity.

CHAPTER IV

JAPAN'S GROWING RÔLE AS WORLD POWER

A. Her Rôle in Manchuria and Mongolia. B. Railroad Concessions. C. Relations with the Powers.

A. Her Rôle in Manchuria and Mongolia.

Victories in the Orient in 1895 and 1905, and coöperation with the Europeans and Americans in the Boxer Rebellion of 1900, had introduced Japan into the society of nations as one of the Great Powers, and forced her further Westernization at a speed never before witnessed. The Treaty of Portsmouth gave her an important and recognized status on the mainland of Asia, and she now automatically became a prominent factor in the South Manchurian problem. Furthermore the Peace Treaty sanctioned her protectorate over Korea (effected on November 17th, 1905), prepared the way for complete annexation of the latter country in 1910,¹ and facilitated Japan's gradual expansion into Inner Mongolia.

The Treaty of Portsmouth had bound Japan, as well as Russia, to return Manchuria (except the leased territory of Liaotung) to China. The agreements signed on December 22nd, 1905, not only contained the sanction by China to the transfer of former Russian rights to Japan, but also stipulated ² that Japan should withdraw her troops and railway guards in the event of St. Petersburg agreeing to the removal of the Russian railway guards. But these agreements apparently were so worded that some loop-holes remained, allowing elastic interpretations. The withdrawal of guards was made conditional upon the reëstablishment of tranquillity in Manchuria and upon China's capacity to afford full protection to the lives and property of foreigners. In regard to the leased territory as well as in the matter of railway

¹ Notwithstanding the Mikado's solemn declaration in 1904 that Korea's independence was vital to the existence of Japan.

² Article 2 of the "additional agreement."

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construction and exploitation, Japan engaged to conform "so far as circumstances permit" to the original agreements concluded between China and Russia.

We cannot attempt a lengthy analysis of the Peking agreements, by which Japan acquired the sanction of the Chinese Government for her new rights. It is not even definitely established as yet that the "secret protocols," on which are based certain Japanese claims in Manchuria, were ever signed by both parties, neither are there available any authentic or even reliable texts.³ So it must suffice to state that China was inclined neither to recognize wholeheartedly the validity of all these claims, nor to admit the Japanese interpretations of some of them. What is obvious is this: at various times Japan insisted on divers rights and privileges, supposedly deriving from these agreements, and China was neither prepared to accept the Japanese point of view, nor willing to grant the concessions asked. She was unable to resist the pressure of Japan, and therefore usually had to acknowledge the *fait accompli*, whatever it was, though under mild protest.

For a time the impotence of China and the indulgence of the Powers, also involved in exploiting the deplorable state of affairs in the decaying Celestial Empire (and since 1912 in the new Chinese Republic), allowed Japan to gain on almost every point in the controversies with China. In this way she acquired the right to construct and operate the Mukden-Antung Railway, constructed after the original time limit had expired. Later she succeeded in obtaining, through railway loan agreements, the control over the Changchun-Kirin the Kirin-Tunghua and other railways, which extended her control practically over the entire province of Kirin; and laid down an extensive program of industrial development in Manchuria. Through all this she entrenched herself on the mainland of Asia solidly enough to make it difficult to dislodge her from this unique position. Gradually she became the paramount factor in Manchuria's politics and economics and eventually knew no rival.

Her first steps in Manchuria after the ratification of the Portsmouth Treaty were to organize a company to operate the

³ China did not make them known to the Washington Conference, when asked to expose all and any agreements with the Powers.

newly acquired railways and to establish administration of the leased territory of Liaotung.

After the model of the Chinese Eastern Railway Company, Japan created by an Imperial Ordinance of June 7th, 1906, a joint stock company, under the name of the South Manchuria Railway Company, for the management of these lines, and placed it under direct control of the Government at Tokyo. The shareholders of the new company were to be Japanese or Chinese only. Moreover, the controlling interest was reserved to Japan, her Government securing one half of the shares, the bulk of their balance being subscribed by private Japanese capital.⁴ The president, vice-president, and directors of the company were to be appointed by the Japanese Government, subject to Imperial sanction, and were subordinated directly to the Prime Minister. In other words, the South Manchuria Railway became a Government-controlled enterprise with no participation by China in its management or any other respect. Soon after the annexation in 1910 of Korea, the Korean Government Railways were also brought temporarily under the jurisdiction of the South Manchuria Railway Company.

Administration of the leased part of Liaotung was set up by an Imperial Ordinance published on August 1st of the same year, establishing the Government-General of Kwantung, as this territory was now called. In addition to his administrative functions, civil and military, the Governor-General was given authority to protect and supervise the railways in South Manchuria. In 1919 some modifications in this scheme were effected; the "Government-General" was replaced by the "Kwantung Government" removing the military functions from its head and placing under his supervision the "business of the South Manchuria Railway."

Being authorized to develop subsidiary industries, mines, lumber concessions, water transportation, electrical enterprises, warehousing, real estate, and the like, the South Manchuria Railway Company soon became the most important economic factor in South Manchuria and adjacent territories. By virtue of several agreements with China the company acquired direct or

⁴ As the Chinese Government was unwilling to subscribe, only a few Chinese purchased the shares. No other foreigners were allowed legally to participate.

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indirect control over the Fushun, Yentai, and Pensihi⁵ collieries, the Anshan iron works, and the Yalu River lumber industry. The importance of this to Japan, deprived of many basic raw materials in her own domain, may be judged from the fact that the Yentai and Fushun collieries have jointly a deposit of about 1,500,000,000 tons of coal, while the reserves of iron ore around Anshan are estimated as over 300 million tons.⁶

To develop these concessions Japan naturally had to find large sums of money and up to 1928 she had actually invested in Manchuria altogether about 2 billion yen.⁷ Foreign bankers offered their money for the industrial development of Manchuria on several occasions, either for the definite purpose of building railroads or for general use; but never with much success. A loan of £10,000,000, offered in 1911 by the Four Power Consortium for the industrial development of Manchuria, was realized to some extent, but the Chinese Government obtained only £400,000 from the £10,000,000 offered.

Russia and Japan as the countries having special interests in Manchuria, recognized by other Powers and confirmed by a series of agreements,⁸ eventually asked to participate in the Four Power Consortium. In 1912 therefore a "Six Power Consortium" was formed. A year later the American bankers withdrew and no more loans were offered to China. Thus the field was left almost exclusively to the Japanese, who had since actually borrowed money from abroad for their needs in Manchuria, but objected, as far as possible, to direct financing by foreign groups of any enterprises there.

Having annexed Korea and solidly established herself in Manchuria, where she gained control over Chang-Tso-Lin, the War Lord of the "Three Eastern Provinces," Japan had actually formed a state within a state, and continued to expand to the North and West. New railroad projects, new sources of raw materials to be exploited, new industries to be developed, new

⁵ Pensihi actually belonged till 1909 to the Okura Company, and from 1910 to the Sino-Japanese Coal Mining Company, Ltd.

⁶ Henry W. Kinney, "Modern Manchuria and the South Manchuria Railway Company." Dairen, 1928.

⁷ The capital of South Manchuria Railway alone being 440,000,000 yen.

⁸ The Treaty of Portsmouth and the Peking agreements of 1905, the Anglo-Japanese Treaties of 1905 and 1911, Franco-Russian and Franco-Japanese agreements of 1907, Russo-Japanese conventions of 1907, 1910 and 1912.

markets to be secured, attracted much of Japan's energy. This, incidentally, aroused considerable anxiety among the other Powers, and contributed in some measure to a change in their attitude towards the Empire of the Mikado.

On the other hand Japan, alarmed by such foreign schemes as the Harriman railroad projects and Knox's neutralization plan, found it necessary to safeguard her interests by allying herself with Russia. Gradually she succeeded in delimiting her spheres of interest by a series of understandings with her old enemies, and, through the agreement of 1912, extended her control even over the eastern part of Mongolia adjoining Manchuria. This was important chiefly in opening new opportunities for Japanese railway projects. But it was important to the Japanese business men as well, since it increased their control over this region. The Japanese Eastern Company and that of Okura obtained considerable possessions in Mongolia and developed large plantations of rice and various industrial enterprises.

Not content with all these achievements, the Japanese tried also to undermine the Russian position in Manchuria, fragile though it became after the war of 1904-05. Japanese merchants, genuine or in disguise, penetrated into Northern Manchuria, and Japanese agents of divers classification worked in the Russian Far East and in Manchuria with the aim of increasing Japan's influence and control, and of obstructing any Russian attempt to acquire new rights or interests. Actually, as already stated, Russia had not obtained after 1905 new privileges or concessions in Manchuria of any importance.

The Japanese-owned South Manchuria Railway very soon became a serious competitor of the Russian-owned Chinese Eastern, diverting freight from it; and Dairen, the former Dalny, ice-free all year round, became not only a rival to Vladivostok, frozen three to four months in the year, but a serious menace to the latter's economic development.

The series of treaties, contracted by Russia and Japan between 1905 and 1916, brought some adjustments and created a *modus operandi*. This, however, was delayed for a long time, as the World War and the Revolutions in Russia and in China introduced new situations, necessitated revision of all former agreements, and forced new arrangements.

B. Railroad Concessions.

The Portsmouth Treaty (with the consent of China registered in the Peking agreements of December 22nd, 1905) established Japan as a railway concessionnaire in Manchuria by transferring to her the Russian rights to the lines connecting Changchun with Port Arthur and Dalny, and now known as the South Manchuria Railway. The Peking agreements also granted to Japan the right to retain and rebuild the Mukden-Antung narrow-gauge military railway; and, though delayed beyond the terms of the agreement, this reconstruction was only completed in November, 1911.

A series of loan agreements negotiated by Japan with the Chinese Government enabled her to obtain control of the Changchun-Kirin Railway, a concession which was secured by Russia in 1902 but had remained unrealized. She also obtained the concession for the Kirin-Tunghua Railway. This was followed by projects for further railroad construction in Manchuria, including its northern parts, and in Mongolia.

The South Manchuria Railway Company was formed, as we know, "for the purpose of engaging in railway traffic in Manchuria." Hence it became interested in furthering new railroad construction, having in mind of course, that this would not interfere with its own interests. Moreover Japan has asserted that the Chinese Government expressed, in one of the alleged "protocols" signed at Peking in 1905, its consent not to construct any main line in the neighborhood of, and parallel to, the South Manchuria Railway—an assertion not supported, however, by China. So far Japan has prevented participation of foreign capital in financing any railroad building in South Manchuria. Even for reconstruction of the Hsinmintun-Mukden military railway returned to China by Japan in 1907 under one of the agreements reached at the close of the Russo-Japanese War, Japan insisted that any necessary borrowing should be effected by China through the South Manchuria Railway Company. The same condition was included in the agreement on the Changchun-Kirin line; China had to construct it with capital to be raised by herself, or in case of insufficiency of funds, borrowed from Japan. This convention also contained a provision that if China should thereafter build branch lines or extensions to this

line, and should need money, she must apply for financing to the South Manchuria Railway Company. Being an unprofitable line, the Changchun-Kirin Railway failed for several years to pay off the annual instalments on this indebtedness and therefore in 1917 the management of the road was taken over by the South Manchuria Railway Company.

In October 1913 Japan obtained from China an agreement to finance the construction of three railways, as branches or "feeders" of the South Manchuria, namely: (1) Changchun-Taonanfu, (2) Scupingkai-Taonanfu, and (3) Kaiyuan-Heilungchen. Thereafter she obtained options for more concessions on financing the construction of new lines: one between Kirin and Heilungchen; another in Inner Mongolia from Jehol to Taonanfu and a third from Jehol to some point in the Gulf of Pechili.

Of these lines the Scupingkai-Taonanfu, together with extensions to Angangchi and Tsitsihar, has actually been constructed. The Kaiyuan-Heilungchen line was completed only in sections between Kaiyuan and Taolu on one end, and Heilungchen-Hsian on the other. The Kirin-Heilungchen line actually was built by the Chinese themselves against the protest of the Japanese Government.¹ All the constructions just enumerated were effected during or after the World War. One other railway of strategic rather than economic importance was projected before 1915, with the purpose of connecting the Manchurian lines with those of Korea. The contract for its financing was concluded in 1918, and the section from Kirin to Tunhua, 130 miles long, was completed in 1927. From Tunhua it is still to be built to Kainei, where it will join the Korean state lines.

All these railways in Manchuria naturally involved economic, political and strategic considerations. It is hardly debatable that their functions up to the present time have been mainly economic, as they served for the traffic of goods, and facilitated the development of colonization of Manchuria with its fertile but, as yet, not fully occupied lands, still open for settlement by many millions of immigrants. But at the same time one can not deny their strategic importance: they would constitute an essential factor in military operations if Manchuria should again become a battlefield. "Japan makes no secret of the fact that

¹ This line already is connected with the recently completed one from Mukden to Heilungchen.

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in case of a war Manchuria must be her first line of defence," declares a publication of the South Manchuria Railway.²

Having no legal right to own land in Manchuria (though such a right was demanded in the "21 Demands," served by Japan on China in 1915), the Japanese actually control only small stretches of territory at some of the more important stations along the railway owned or controlled by them. Upon these limited areas "the railway has built small towns equipped with all modern conveniences," writes K. K. Kawakami in an article entitled "Japan Seeks Economic Empire in Manchuria."³ "and as soon as such towns are built the Chinese swarm to their fringes, which often develop into distinct Chinese cities overshadowing the original Japanese sections. . . ."

At the beginning of her expansion to the mainland, Japan hoped that Manchuria would serve as an outlet to her excess population and so divert those emigrants then going to America, where they were not welcome. But very soon it became evident that the Japanese could not compete with the Chinese, the latter being satisfied with a lower standard of living and better fitted for the work in Manchuria, the climate of which is too rigorous for the Japanese. Hence quite a number of newcomers from the country of the Rising Sun were forced to return home. On the other hand the Chinese migration once started, developed rapidly; and with the growth of her population with 6,000,000 in 1890 to about 30,000,000 in 1929, Manchuria became less and less a land of promise to the Japanese farmers. In other words, Tokyo's hopes for a solution of the population problem were not satisfied in Manchuria at all. What Japan had secured was a splendid source of raw materials so badly needed by her home industries—a source which she has already succeeded in utilizing to a great extent.

Although the opening up of Manchuria was begun through Russian initiative and railroad-building, Japan contributed much to the further development of this vast and rich country. She greatly benefited by obtaining in Manchuria a fairly good market for her manufactured goods, and a still more profitable

² "Modern Manchuria and the South Manchuria Railway Company." *ibid.*, 1928, pp. 6-7.

³ "Current History." New York, September, 1929.

opening for her financial capital, which was now offered a large investment field in railroads and divers industries.

C. Relations with the Powers.

On the eve of the Russo-Japanese War the Great Powers were divided. France and Germany gave informal support to Russia; Great Britain and the United States stood behind Japan.

The developments of that war surpassed by far the expectations of all concerned, and especially surprised those who had backed Japan in her decision to start the contest, and had financed her when started. The defeat of the Russian army and navy demonstrated to them not only that the Tsar's Empire was decaying, but also that Japan was becoming a factor to be reckoned with seriously. They understood, though probably too late for their best interests, that their moral support and material assistance, in the form of loans, were not as cleverly invested as they had thought. They found they had favored the rise of a competitor in the Orient and had contributed to his development as a serious opponent to their own penetrations into the Far East. The newly born Asiatic adept of Imperialism had become not only a rival in their economic expansions, but also a living example to the endless millions of the "yellows" of what their race could accomplish, as well as a living denial of the notion concerning the superiority and omnipotence of the "whites."

Worried by the military success of Japan, the Government of the United States had altered its policy and now came out as a mediator offering good services in starting negotiations for peace. Economic pressure similar to that of the French bankers upon Russia was placed by American banking circles upon Japan,¹ and forced her to accept terms of peace utterly disappointing to the public opinion at Tokyo.

The outcome of the Russo-Japanese War reshuffled the international combinations. By joining the Franco-British Entente, Russia now leaned toward England, her traditional rival in the Orient, and Germany consequently was alienated from Russia. The United States moderated its attitude towards Japan, whose potentialities and aims became alarming.² China unexpectedly

¹ Charles Beard and Mary Beard, "The Rise of American Civilization," p. 497.

² Not only to America but to England as well; Canada and Australia since became very sensitive to the developments in Japan.

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gained from all this, as the new situation loosened somewhat the pressure extended upon her by the Powers.

The agreements concluded by Japan with France on June 10th, 1907, and with Russia on July 30th of the same year gave decided recognition to her dominant position in the Far East, though at the same time they aimed to limit Japan's further acts towards China. Both agreements stressed the common obligation of the contracting parties to respect the territorial integrity of China and asserted support of the *status quo*. Indirectly they served, therefore, to strengthen the Celestial Empire by diminishing the aggressiveness of the Powers and so liberating her energy for the domestic reforms.

Being left alone, China incidentally became more susceptible to revolutionary propaganda; and Japan, though unofficially, rendered her sympathetic support to the revolutionary leaders.

The agreements of 1910 between Tokyo and St. Petersburg were less favorable to the interests of China because, though confirming again the determination to protect the *status quo*, they interpreted it in a way that prejudiced Chinese sovereignty. Delimiting their respective spheres of interest and influence, they established actually their control over Manchuria.

Through a series of understandings with Japan the position of the other Powers in the Far East was gradually weakened; Westerners had to moderate their dictatorial policy in China, and did so to some extent during the years that followed the Russo-Japanese War. While weakening the position in Asia of the other Powers, Japan, herself, though unofficially, not only supported the Chinese revolutionary movement, but also encouraged the rise of Nationalism in the Orient.

For a number of years Japan's policy in China was twofold. On one hand she sided with the Powers, as in the case of the Boxer Rebellion of 1900; on the other she gave unofficial support to the rise of the Chinese Nationalism, favored to some extent the Pan-Asiatic movement, and on certain occasions took advantage of her racial kinship with China, when fighting some of her "white" competitors there.

k、 Japan, meanwhile, was deriving considerable benefit from her
2 "Alliance with Great Britain, then the strongest of all the Powers
in, 192. Far East. In entering the alliance England had been
3 "Current influenced by the apparent threat of the Tsar's Empire

to her position in India, and saw in an agreement with Japan a means of preventing Russia from acquiring too much influence in the Far East. She was prepared to tolerate Japan's expansion on the mainland as constituting a barrier against Russia's farther advance. Hence England was prepared to lend her support to many of the schemes of Tokyo, or at least to leave them unopposed. To please Japan she even went so far as to relinquish rights obtained by British subjects, as in the cases of the Hsinmintun-Fakumen Railway and the Chinchow-Aigun project.

The attitude of the United States, already modified at the end of the Russo-Japanese War, continued for several years to undergo further revision. At the time of the Conference at Portsmouth, Witte and his able associate, Dr. Dillon, had cleverly and successfully influenced public opinion in the United States for the benefit of Russia. "The American public opinion," writes P. H. Clyde, "was decidedly pro-Japanese during the war, but through Witte's wisely planned diplomacy the situation was in large measure reversed before the close of the negotiations."³ But Japan had also played a card to obtain the sympathy and support of some influential circles in America; and the negotiations carried on with consent of Katsura,⁴ then the Prime Minister, about the possibility of selling the South Manchuria Railway to American interests, was the card. It looked as if Japan were willing to dispose of this line; but, after the Treaty was signed, the negotiations were discontinued and the railway became a Japanese possession controlled by the Government at Tokyo.

Following the end of the War a number of railway projects for Manchuria were advanced by foreigners, mostly Americans and British. One such project, for a line traversing Northern Manchuria between Chinchow and Aigun, played an interesting part in brewing international rivalries. It was originated by an Anglo-America group⁵ who contemplated connecting the Chinese owned Peking-Shanghai-Hsinmintun Railway with Aigun, a

³ P. H. Clyde, "International Rivalries in Manchuria, 1689-1922." Columbus, Ohio, 1926, p. 137.

⁴ Though Komura, the chief delegate of Japan at Portsmouth, was, apparently, against this.

⁵ Paulding and Company represented the British interests, J. P. Morgan and Co., Kuhn, Loeb and Co., the National City Bank of New York and the First National Bank of New York, the American.

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Chinese city on the right bank of the Amur River. After long negotiations beginning in 1907, a preliminary contract was signed late in 1909 by this Anglo-American group and the Viceroy of Manchuria, on behalf of the Chinese Government. On January 21st, 1910, this preliminary agreement was sanctioned by Peking, but construction was never started.

The Knox plan for neutralization of the Manchurian railways, advanced in connection with the Chinchow-Aigun project in November 1909, failed to secure the approval of other Powers, and prompted the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese Convention of 1910. This made the materialization of the Chinchow-Aigun project unfeasible even after England had suggested, and the United States had consented to, inviting Japan's participation. According to the Japanese reply the most serious objection to the Knox proposal "lies in the fact that it contemplates a very important departure from the terms of the Treaty of Portsmouth . . . that Treaty was designated to establish in Manchuria a permanent order of things. . . ."

The Russian and the Japanese Governments sent to Peking a protest against the Chinchow-Aigun Railway project and made it clear that they expected China first to consult them on any Manchurian railway to be constructed with foreign participation. Hence and on consideration of her Alliance with Japan and understanding with Russia, signed in 1899, Great Britain decided to withdraw her support of the Chinchow-Aigun plan. France also concurred in the Russo-Japanese stand.

The Chinese policy of the United States from the time of John Hay's notes of 1899 and 1900 was based on the principle of the "Open Door." Every agreement concerning China since concluded by the Powers had a special reference to this principle, but its interpretation differed a great deal from the time of its enunciation.

In 1908, through an exchange of notes between the United States and Japan, this series of understandings on the Far East was supplemented by the Root-Takahira agreement. Its main concern was the maintenance of the *status quo* in the Pacific region, adherence to the policy of supporting the territorial integrity of China and equal opportunity for commerce and industry. Naturally this last point was not of advantage to Japan,

industrially far behind the United States; and consequently she tried on many occasions to close the "open door" in Manchuria.

The relations of Japan with the United States in the period between the Russo-Japanese and World Wars were, generally speaking, strained. In Asia their interests conflicted in regard to railroad plans and Japan's interpretation of her newly acquired rights; in America they had to undergo a trying test in the problem of Japanese immigration to the United States, especially in California and the Hawaiian Islands.

The change of administration at Washington in 1912 gave promise of improvement in Japanese-American relations, and a more conciliatory approach to vexing problems was to be noted. Already steps in this direction had been taken, as when Mr. Taft, then Secretary of War, had visited Japan in October 1907 on his way to the Philippines, and in 1912 when Secretary Knox attended the funeral of the Emperor Mutsuhito. But the efforts of the new Federal administration were seriously handicapped by some of the individual states, as when California passed the Webb bill. The pressure of the United States upon Japan in previous years, especially between 1907 and 1910, and recurring even under Wilson, prompted Tokyo's decision to ally with Russia.

CHAPTER V

OTHER POWERS

A. The Struggle for Concessions. B. The "Open Door" Policy. C. The Neutralization Plan. D. The Consortiums. E. Summary.

A. The Struggle for Concessions.

However aggressive the Manchurian schemes of Tsar Nicholas II may have been, they can scarcely be classified as an original contribution by St. Petersburg to European policy in the Far East. Neither would it be accurate to call Russia the pioneer in acquiring concessions in China, even though in the Chinese Eastern Railway she obtained one very important grant and, unfortunately, precipitated thereby a serious international wrangle—a wrangle which, after thirty years, remains unsettled. In securing this concession, however, Russia was following the established practice of other countries, though such practice had developed in a peculiar, rather unexpected, way.

The opening up of China to permanent foreign trade became a fact late in the XVIIth century, but the Celestial Empire had entered into intermittent business relations with Europeans long before. The prolonged visit of Marco Polo in the XIIth century might, in a sense, be taken as an example, and possibly there were other casual contacts even earlier. But by the XVIth century the Portuguese were definitely carrying on trade with Canton, following the Spaniards, who, though they had arrived earlier, had at first failed to establish any relations. In 1594 several Dutchmen visited Canton, and in 1622 their compatriots occupied some of the Pescadore Islands, obtained a foothold on Formosa, and in 1655 even sent a mission to Peking. The British, appearing first in China in 1637, had by 1670 already established regular trade with Amoy. In 1689 the British East India Company obtained permission to have its own warehouses at Canton and in 1715 began regular relations with the inland of China through that port. In 1784 the first American ship, though

laden with the merchandise of the British East India Company, arrived at Canton.

The first steps of the Westerners in Asia, though not always either gentle or gracious, were less arrogant than might have been expected. But the Chinese, never cordial to intruders, and considering these foreigners to be barbarians, did not hide their unwillingness to cultivate relations. The Westerners, however, quickly learned that the Chinese were inferior on at least one point: they were not equipped with firearms. This discovery solved the controversy: the trading privileges were granted. Then followed the opening of ports, additional rights, special privileges, concessions of all kinds, and finally even plans for partitioning the invaded lands of the Bogdohan.

The Nanking Treaty of 1842, that concluded the "Opium" War, inaugurated this process officially by the cession of Hong Kong to England and virtually introduced a long hiatus in the independence of China. Besides Canton, the ports of Shanghai, Amoy, Fuchow and Ningpo were also opened to foreign trade and residence. Furthermore the extraterritoriality of foreigners in China was established. The next war, waged by England jointly with France, ended in the Tientsin and Peking Treaties which elaborated the special rights and privileges not only of the Westerners who had fought China, but of all others as well, through the application of the principle of "most favored nation."

The curbing of the Taiping Rebellion with the participation of British troops under General Gordon naturally opened new vistas to the Europeans. The Japanese victories of 1894-95 weakened China further.

By 1862 France had already obtained a considerable piece of Chinese territory in Cochin China. In 1874 she arranged for the "independence" of Annam, later to become a French protectorate. In 1881 Russia added to her possessions a strip of Chinese territory in the Far West at Kuldja and Western Turkistan. Great Britain occupied Lower Burma in 1862 and Upper Burma in 1886. In 1885, Japan acquired Liuchiu Islands and in 1895 captured the Pescadores, Formosa, and a part of Liaotung, later relinquished but reoccupied in 1905. Germany seized Kiaochow in 1897. In the following years Russia acquired a "lease" to Port Arthur and Talien-wan, England to Wei-hai-wei (July 1st,

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1896) and new territory in Kowloon (opposite Hong Kong); and France to Kuan-chan-wan.

The United States refrained from applying for any territorial concessions in China. But by taking over the Philippines from Spain in 1898, she nevertheless acquired in a different way ¹ a solid foothold close to Chinese territory. This was, of course, a departure from the long established policy of Washington, but it was a departure prompted by the events.

The traditional "stay-at-home" policy of the United States was largely the result of conditions in the new republic during the first half century of its independence. Economic growth was forcing an expansion from the New England and other Atlantic states westward to the Pacific. But at this time the states were both predominantly agricultural and politically far from strong; and the introduction of some defensive device was logical. The Monroe Doctrine was originally such a device. Advanced in 1823 partly on consideration of Russian expansion to America through Alaska and some settlements in California, it was essentially a safeguard against any further foreign encroachments whatsoever in the New World. But at length, when the United States ceased to be merely a market for European goods and became an industrial country, this defensive attitude had to be abandoned as no longer justifiable.

With the growth of production of agricultural commodities and manufactured goods the United States had to look for outside markets, and in the last quarter, if not by the middle of the XIXth century, America became a competitor to Europe. Her exports developed to considerable proportions, but—meeting handicaps in the lower prices of the European goods, produced with cheaper labor, America had to turn elsewhere.

The westward advance of the colonizing process, and some contacts established by the American merchants in Asia, naturally contributed to the cultivation of Pacific markets by the United States. The experience of the New Englanders, who carried on business with China by sailing around South America, and who had learned the inconveniences and disadvantage of this route when competing with the British, coupled with the opening of China and Japan for trade in 1842 and 1854 respectively, prompted the idea of shortening the voyage by cutting

¹ Paying to Spain \$20,000,000.

through the narrow strip of land connecting North and South Americas. When advanced by Hernando Cortez, the conqueror of Mexico, and again by General Simon Bolivar, the great President of Colombia, this plan had failed of acceptance, but later it was revived and a project similar to that of the Suez Canal was worked out by certain French engineers, the most prominent of whom was the hydrographer Lucien Napoleon Bonaparte Wyse (1844-1909) son of the British Ambassador at Paris and Princess Letitia Bonaparte. The project appealed to Lesseps, the originator of the Suez Canal, and he arranged for an international congress to discuss the Panama venture. Opposing the American alternative of building the canal across Nicaragua, Lesseps succeeded in securing in 1879 an approval of the Wyse project and in 1881 founded a corporation to materialize it. Owing to numberless difficulties, partly geographical but more often arising from graft and corruption of the administration, the whole affair collapsed in 1888 and ended in a grandiose scandal.

It was not until 1902 that the United States took over the completion of the work and, finally, in August 1914 with some modification of the original draft the Panama Canal was opened for traffic and the dream of a shorter route to the Pacific was realized. The process included dissection of the Republic of Colombia into two parts, and the creation of a new Republic of Panama. The necessity for protecting the canal prompted the acquisition in 1898 of some of the largest islands in the Caribbean group, even before construction was resumed by the Americans;² and some stations in the Pacific at the midway to Asia were secured—namely, Hawaii in 1898, and Guam and “American” Samoa in 1900.

The Philippines were the next logical step and they became in 1898 the advance posts of American economic expansion at the very door of Asia.

Thus the United States became a world Power with colonial possessions similar to those of other nations. The Monroe Doctrine continued to claim America for the Americans. But there was as yet no corresponding Oriental doctrine of “Asia for the

² The United States were interested in the project from the time of Henry Clay, Secretary of State under President John Quincy Adams.

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Asiatics," for there was no chance that such a policy would be honored by the outside world.

The territorial acquisitions of the Powers in China enumerated above were not essential as such; they were only "spring-boards" for obtaining railroad and other concessions and for starting economic conquest.

France received mining concessions in Yunnan, Kwangsi, and Kwangtung, and the right to build an extension of the Annam Railroad into Yunnan. In 1896 Russia secured the concession for the Chinese Eastern Railway. In 1898 Germany obtained concessions to build two railroads in Shantung; while Great Britain and France declared Yunnan and Szechwan their joint sphere of influence. In 1899 England came to an understanding with Russia about the delimitation of their spheres. Then the principle of "no alienation" of certain territories was declared by Great Britain, France and Japan, barring any interference or attempts to restore these territories, leased or controlled by these countries.

Railway construction in China was started in 1875 by China herself. The first line ran from Shanghai to Wusung, and developed very slowly owing to lack of funds and the administrative and financial chaos then prevailing in the lands of Bogdohan.

After the Sino-Japanese War this important industry fell more and more under the control of foreigners. Besides the railways built and operated by foreign concessions, such as the Chinese Eastern with its southern extension, many other lines, already built or just planned, also became dependent in one way or another on the Westerners.

In 1898 England, through the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation participated in the financing of some Chinese-owned lines and obtained, together with Germany, the right to build the Tientsin-Pukow Railway. At this juncture the United States also entered into the struggle for concessions by bidding, through the China Developing Company (represented by Carey and Washburn) for the Peking-Hankow Railway. Actually the financing of this was effected by Belgium. But, unsuccessful in that project, the Americans, through Senator Brice, applied for another concession—namely, the construction of the Hankow-Canton line—and on April 14th, 1898, signed a contract to this

effect.⁸ The concession for the Canton-Kowloon Railway, though promised in 1901 to the Americans, actually was not granted notwithstanding even the intervention of President Taft.

In addition to those enumerated above, the foreigners obtained concessions for their settlements in Shanghai, Tientsin, Hankow, Amoy; residential areas in Canton, Hangchow, Soochow, Kiukiang, Chinkiang and all the "treaty ports," as well as the Embassy quarters at Peking. The United States, not having obtained any concessions of that kind, nevertheless availed themselves of the benefits offered by some of the foreign settlements.

B. The "Open Door" Policy.

Though the "orgy of leases" in China was at its height in the period between the Sino-Japanese and the Russo-Japanese Wars, the process of penetration into the Empire of Bogdohan and its gradual partition into spheres of influence was started, as outlined in the opening of this chapter, much earlier. At that time the United States were not willing or even as yet able to enforce their wishes in the manner of the other Powers; and they entered this period empty-handed. As for the European Powers, already well intrenched in the Far East, they were not disposed to favor American expansion in Asia and therefore, though often disagreeing on other policies in the Orient, presented a more or less united front in obstructing Uncle Sam's advance.

It is true that for many years the United States preferred independent action in the East. After Secretary Seward's time "the policy of international coöperation was abandoned and for over thirty years our Government pursued an independent course of action," writes Professor George H. Blakeslee.¹ But, independent action not only failed to gain the chief aims of Washington in the Far East, but even contributed to the strengthening of the opposing forces. To check this, the American Secretary of State, John Hay, addressed the Powers in 1899 and then again in 1900 with notes opposing any preferential rights and enunciating the "Open Door" policy as understood by his country.

⁸ The China Development Company of New Jersey sold her rights in this railway for \$6,750,000 by an agreement signed on August 29th, 1905. (MacMurray, v. I., p. 519.)

¹ George H. Blakeslee, "The Recent Foreign Policy of the United States," pp. 194-195. The Abingdon Press, N. Y., 1925.

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By circular notes of September-November 1899, differing in some details as addressed to different countries, the United States Government declared that "it will in no way commit itself to any recognition of the exclusive rights of any Power within or control over any portion of the Chinese Empire under such agreements as have been recently made," and did not conceal its apprehension that "there is danger of complications arising between the treaty Powers which might imperil the rights insured to the United States by its treaties with China." By these notes America advocated a policy insuring equality of opportunity for commerce and industry of all nations in China and of maintaining the latter's integrity, and invited the Powers to adhere to it, especially within the so-called "spheres of influence or interest."

The replies of the Powers expressed their acceptance of the American declaration, but with reservations, and conditional upon the attitude of the others. England demurred at its application to Kowloon; France objected to the use of the term "spheres of influence"; Germany suggested minor changes; Italy offered no objections, and Japan immediately declared that she "adheres willingly." Russia's reply was to the effect that she had already demonstrated a firm intention to follow the policy of "open-door," but it did not contain a clear-cut statement of adherence, and left the interpretation doubtful.

On March 20th, 1900, the American Secretary of State sent to the Governments concerned copies of all these replies, as evidence that their assent was final and definitive. Such a statement, with no specification of what should be understood by "final and definitive," naturally allowed freedom of interpretation, and later actually caused embarrassment.

In July 1900 a further elaboration of the American policy in regard to China was cabled to the Powers as follows: "The policy of the Government of the United States is to seek a solution which may bring about permanent safety and peace to China, preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire."

Being merely a declaration of policy no reply was necessary to this telegram, but certain of the addressees, including Japan, answered at once by somewhat identical declarations of attitude.

Others confirmed it by a reference in the agreements reached in the years that followed, or otherwise expressed their adherence to the principle of equal opportunity, though the interpretation of the principle itself varied and the territorial limits for its application were understood differently. This became very evident after the Russo-Japanese War, when the spheres of interests and influence were again proclaimed or confirmed by agreements and even declared as enforceable.

As for the United States, whose interests dictated strict observance of the "Open Door" principle, they continued to oppose any violation by others and fostered, as far as possible, their own interests by developing the numerous opportunities found in this area. The American trade with China and the Far East in general experienced accordingly a rapid growth; its relative importance lost in the two preceding decades was restored early in the XXth century to a place in the Chinese markets third only to England and Japan² and to first place in the Japanese.

The development and outcome of the Russo-Japanese War, as already stated, induced Edward H. Harriman and some American banking groups (J. P. Morgan and Co., Kuhn, Loeb and Co., the First National and the City Bank of New York), represented by Willard Straight, then the American Consul-General at Mukden, to advance an ambitious plan for railroad building in Manchuria, seemingly covering the eventual purchase of the Chinese Eastern and South Manchuria Railways. This plan failed, owing to the Russo-Japanese opposition, as did the project for Chinchow-Aigun Railway planned by the same group, together with the English concern of Pauling and Co., and the still more ambitious project of Secretary Knox to neutralize the railways in Manchuria.

"With the high sanction of the 'Open-Door' policy," declare Charles and Mary Beard,³ "Secretary Hay and his successors under Roosevelt and Taft bent their energies to the work of securing for American citizens equal trading privileges in all parts of China and equal opportunities for investment in the

² In 1913 the foreign trade of China was estimated as follows: Great Britain, 472,991,000 lams; Japan, 195,292,000, and the United States, 73,077,000. Kuhn, "Modern History of China." (In Russian.) Vladivostok, 1927.

³ "The Rise of American Civilization," part II, p. 495. The Macmillan Company, New York, 1930.

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development of railways and natural resources. In particular they gave continuous attention to the economic penetration of Korea, Manchuria and Mongolia thereby coming into collision with Russian enterprise."

Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts wrote to Roosevelt on May 21st, 1903, about Manchuria as follows: "Our trade there is assuming very large proportions, and it seems to me we ought to take very strong grounds." But, these "strong grounds" first ploughed by Jacob Schiff, New York banker, when he helped Japan to carry on the war against Russia, did not provide a real basis for early large American enterprises in Manchuria as we have just seen on the example of the unsuccessful projects of Harriman, Willard Straight and others.

C. The Neutralization Plan.

The "Open Door" policy and the declaration of intention to respect China's territorial integrity were considered by some people as really beneficial to that country because they aimed to prevent the partition of China and to check the preferential rights within her boundaries for any outsiders. But the Knox neutralization plan of 1909, being decidedly interwoven with the railroad projects of certain groups, was not received favorably by many people outside those groups directly interested in its materialization. Of course, it came into existence in a more complicated way than as a mere outgrowth of Willard Straight's vivid imagination and vision, as some students are inclined to picture it. It was a product of many causes.

Undoubtedly the large-scale plans of the Americans in Manchuria, visioning the building of gigantic lines and willing to absorb the Chinese Eastern and South Manchuria Railways, alarmed Tokyo and St. Petersburg and so helped them to forget their recent animosity and quarrels and to unite in 1907 their efforts to protect their holdings. On the other hand this combination of Russia and Japan assured a situation in Manchuria which could not be looked upon without apprehension by the United States, and so brought about the emergence of the Knox plan. In other words, one event necessitated the other.

Following the same process, this American attempt to break the grip of Japan and Russia on Chinese territory by neutralizing the important railways made logical a further cementation

of Russo-Japanese understanding. Their agreement of 1907 being simply a declaration of a common desire to see the *status quo* in Manchuria maintained, became now, in 1910, a kind of Alliance, stipulating joint action for protection of their common interests, because they had detected in the Knox project the contours of a plan to open the entire Manchuria to American enterprise.

The "neutralization" of the foreign owned railways in Manchuria, as planned by Mr. Knox, was to be accomplished first by their redemption from China and then by the creation of an international board of control. To enable China to accomplish such a transaction, it was suggested that a sufficiently large multi-power loan should be floated and, when the ownership of these railways should become vested in China, to bring them "under an economic and scientific and impartial administration" of this foreign board.

"At this juncture," say the Beards, "the Russian Foreign office learned through French sources in Washington that Secretary Knox, in supporting the loan, proposed to have an American supervisor put in charge of the disbursement therewith in effect setting up American political influence in Peking and Manchuria."¹

"Frightened by the news, St. Petersburg and Tokyo were now convinced that the 'open-door' policy was in reality a subterfuge to cover an American invasion of their Chinese property," conclude the authors of book quoted above. And who could deny that in making an attempt to liberate Manchuria from Russian influence in the North and Japanese in the South, and so restoring the Chinese authority there, Secretary Knox had in mind also the interests of the United States? For if his project were realized American merchandise would be given an unusual opportunity to compete with the Russian and especially with the Japanese goods under most favorable circumstances.

But the plan failed to win the approval of the Powers and did not materialize. The reply of the Russian Government declared that "as nothing threatens either the sovereignty or the open-door policy in Manchuria, it cannot discover in the present conditions there any reason necessitating the placing on the order of the day of the questions raised by the United States Government" and therefore "must declare with absolute frankness that the

¹ Charles A. Beard and Mary R. Beard, *ibid.*, part II, p. 499.

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establishment of an international administration and control of the Manchurian Railroads, as proposed by the Federal Government, would seriously injure Russian interests, both public and private, to which the Imperial Government attaches capital importance.”²

The Japanese note was practically identical. It asserted that the Knox plan was “unnecessary and undesirable, unwarranted by conditions,” and could only upset the order well established in Manchuria by the Treaty of Portsmouth. It stated also that the “Open Door” policy in its application to Manchuria possessed “a more comprehensive significance than it has elsewhere in China,”—a statement the somewhat obscure meaning of which has since offered food for controversy.

D. The Consortiums.

Facing the stubborn opposition of Japan and Russia, and not supported by other Powers,¹ the United States had to withdraw the Knox plan. But this did not mean any fundamental change in policy. There remained other ways open for acquiring control over the existing railways, or at least for participating in the construction of new lines. One was through consortiums for the financing of such projects.

In September 1905 the Viceroy of Kwangtung promised to a British firm a concession for building the Canton-Kowloon Railway. This was protested by the United States, whose citizens had obtained in 1903 a similar promise from Prince Chun. So the concession was withheld. As a compromise it was offered late in 1908 to a German concern; but to this, objections were now raised by England, and a conference of the newly interested parties was summoned at Berlin in June 1909 to find a settlement. France participated, and the bankers of the three countries signed a contract with the Chinese Foreign Office, by which a loan of 5,000,000 pounds was to be arranged. But on the eve of the signing of this agreement the American Minister at Peking addressed the Chinese Government with a note protesting against such an arrangement. This note, followed by the personal inter-

² Quoted from C. Walter Young's “The International Relations in Manchuria,” p. 108.

¹ Including England, notwithstanding the interests of a British concern (Pauling and Co.) in some of the projects connected with it.

vention of President Taft, forced the foreign banking group to yield and finally the United States joined the combination.

In May 1910 another understanding was reached at Paris—this time between banking groups of England, France, Germany and the United States,—by which a Chinese loan of 6,000,000 pounds was arranged. Thereby a corner-stone for the coöperation of these four Powers in China was laid down, though events prevented its realization to any appreciable degree.

In 1911 broke out the Chinese Revolution. The Manchu Dynasty was forced to abdicate, facing the widespread discontent with its incompetence, and early in 1912 the Celestial Empire passed away, giving place to a Republican régime.

The leader of that Revolution, Dr. Sun-Yat-Sen, was abroad at the time. Being aware of a plan to raise some \$100,000,000 on the foreign markets through the "Four-Power Consortium" formed by the Powers just enumerated in order to finance large railroad projects in China, he hastened to London to prevent its realization as far as the advances to the Imperial Government were concerned. The advances were actually stopped; only a small amount, some £400,000, having been previously paid to Peking. The consortium's position towards the Revolution was that of watchful waiting. The two republics, of the United States and France, were showing signs of sympathy; monarchist England and Germany joined Russia and Japan in opposition and openly sided with the Manchu Dynasty. But with the triumph of the Revolution, the Consortium had no choice but to do business with the new Republican régime.

The first and the only loan negotiated by the Four-Power Consortium with the still existing Imperial Government of China was the so-called "Chinese currency reform and Manchurian industrial development loan," arranged on April 15, 1911, for an amount not over £10,000,000. Some £1,000,000 of this was obtainable for "the promotion and extension of industrial enterprises," in Manchuria, but "the entire loan had to be secured by and made a charge upon revenues of the Chinese Government, one half of which was designated (Article 5) as derivable from Manchuria."²

Russia and Japan, the two Powers whose rights and interests in Manchuria were paramount, had nevertheless not been invited

² C. Walter Young, *ibid.*, p. 105.

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to join the "Four-Power Consortium" in floating a loan for development of this region and chargeable upon its revenues. Accordingly, St. Petersburg and Tokyo naturally requested that their respective banking groups might be allowed to participate in future loans to China. In compliance with this request the Four-Power Banking Consortium was reorganized, and with the inclusion of Russia and Japan, represented respectively by the Russo-Asiatic and the Yokohama Specie Banks, formed the Six-Power Consortium.

On June 18th this enlarged body signed an agreement to arrange a "reorganization loan" for the Chinese Government; and on this occasion the Russian and Japanese banking groups stressed the special interests of their respective countries in Manchuria and gained the point of including their reservations in the minutes of the meeting.

Embracing, as it now did, two conflicting groups, the new combination was doomed to disintegration and actually was short-lived. One group, represented by the Americans, sought to establish coöperation by support of the "Open Door" policy and thus secure a free hand in Manchuria; while the other, represented by the Russians and Japanese, aimed to prevent a too close coöperation, as decidedly unfavorable to their interests. The attitude of England and France was not so definite because their interests coincided sometimes with one group, sometimes with the other.

The United States remained consistent in promoting the idea of coöperation, and refrained from separate dealings with China. But Russia and Japan, later followed by France and England, negotiated with the Chinese independently and ignored the United States.⁸ Finally the latter withdrew, though reserving the right to participate in the future; and though the name continued to exist, and even an agreement for the "Chinese Government 5% Reorganization Gold Loan" was signed by it on April 26th, 1913 (under which Yuan-Shi-Kai received £25,000,000 as the first instalment), the "Six-Power Consortium" became inactive.

⁸ As a matter of fact the policy of international coöperation was not followed by the United States for over 30 years from the time of Secretary Seward on, and Washington preferred to deal with Peking independently during all those years.

E. Summary.

In closing both the present chapter and the First Part of this book it is well to recapitulate in brief the main facts constituting the situation prevailing in the Far East at the outbreak of the World War.

The Great Powers, well intrenched in the Far East, continued their policy of hunting for concessions in China; and, though quasi-united by this aim, were at odds with one another. The fact was appreciated at Peking and widely used to hinder, if not to prevent, the encroachment of the Powers in China and their enrichment at her expense.

The safeguard introduced by the American Secretary of State, John Hay, under the name of the "Open Door" policy never worked perfectly and fell somewhat into discredit in the years between the Russo-Japanese and the World War, owing to railroad and other projects characterized by many students of the period, as blunders on the part of American diplomacy.

The interpretation of the "Open Door" idea became so confused and so much at variance with the original meaning of Secretary Hay's declaration, that revision became imperative and the establishment of a more generally acceptable definition became necessary. But this task was postponed until the end of the World War, and was partly achieved only in 1922 at the Washington Conference.

At the outbreak of the international conflagration of 1914-1918 the situation in the Far East favored the Allies. Their rivalries already were somewhat abated through a series of agreements, based, as usual, on compromise. Russia and Japan, the former enemies in the War of 1904-05, became virtually Allies, partly through the adjustment of their respective interests, partly through delimitation of their spheres of influence. This was accomplished with the assistance of France, the Ally of Russia, and of England, the Ally of Japan, united also with Russia by an *entente cordiale*, and under the necessity of opposing jointly the "neutralization plan" of Mr. Knox, which they considered to be a menace to their status in Manchuria.

The International situation just outlined made it possible for Russia to withdraw practically all her forces from the Far East and send them to fight on the battlefields of Europe. Japan's

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Alliances with Great Britain and Russia and her understanding with France insured at least her neutrality but by the logic of things brought it actively into line with the Allies and even forced her to enter into the fighting though on a very modest scale. Whatever remained as belonging to or represented by the Central Powers in the Far East was taken care of by Japan. As representative extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the Allies in the Orient, Japan missed none of her advantages and China became soon her victim.

As for the United States, who remained for a long time outside the struggle, though probably had, consciously or subconsciously, expected finally they would have to take part in it, they continued the policy of developing their economic interests in the Far East, supporting the "Open Door" principle, and opposing the attempts of others to abuse China or to acquire preferential rights and privileges there. As we shall see in subsequent chapters the situation actually gave much cause for concern and necessitated resourcefulness and finesse in diplomacy.

PART TWO

NEW RUSSIA (U.S.S.R.) IN THE
FAR EAST

(The Present Situation)

I. FACTORS THAT ALTERED THE SITUATION

CHAPTER VI

THE WORLD WAR

A. Objective Lesson to China. B. The "21 Demands." C. The Versailles Treaty. D. The Washington Conference.

A. Objective Lesson to China.

From the very beginning the attitude of the Powers towards China had been far from kindly. It is true that the Chinese were not disposed to encourage an influx of foreigners whom they regarded as barbarians. But, they were unable effectively to resist,—since firearms, the real mark of superiority of the Westerners, were not a part of their own equipment. Furthermore, the use of brute force had never been among the virtues honored by the Chinese.

A long series of abuses, among which the importation of opium was conspicuous, brought about an uprising of the Chinese masses in the South (1851-64). The so-called Taipings were for a time successful in their struggle against the Peking authorities, charged with incompetence in dealing with the foreigners; and they attracted much sympathy even from Europeans and especially from Americans. Finally, however, they were crushed with the help of the British, under the leadership of General Gordon.

The part played by the Powers on this, as well as on many other occasions, was one of obstruction to Chinese awakening; it was a rôle of the most reactionary character, delaying the progress of China and serving to intensify that hatred of Chinese towards foreigners which burst into flame with the Boxer Rising of 1900 and again in the events of recent years.

The behavior of the Powers in suppressing the Boxer Rebellion; the "orgy of leases" beginning with Germany's seizure of Kiao-Chow; the results of the Russo-Japanese War, for which China had to pay, though at the same time observing that a "yellow" army had defeated a "white" one; the steady attempts

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of the Powers to increase their annexations and to encroach further on everything Chinese; and finally the World War, demonstrating to the Asiatics that the "whites" are after all neither united nor so all-powerful as they liked to make the "backwards" believe; all worked for a change in the Chinese attitude towards the Powers and prepared the ground for a revolt against the white man's domination in Asia.

The World War opened the eyes of the Chinese to many anomalies; the Russian Revolution subsequently indicated some ways to liberation. Finally the Chinese Revolution, when renewed, contributed most powerfully of all to the changes that occurred in the Far East under the pressure of these important factors.

The internal situation in China at the time of the outbreak of the World War was far from satisfactory. The Revolution had achieved little beyond the abdication of the Manchu Dynasty and the establishment of a Republic. The masses of China were not yet ready to assume government; they were unorganized, politically ignorant, and unable to offer solid resistance to the reactionary elements. But on April 8th, 1913, the first Parliament was convoked and next day the Chinese Republic received its first official recognition from Brazil and Peru. On May 2nd the United States followed. The rest of the Great Powers withheld their recognition until 6th-7th of October, after the election of Yuan-Shi-Kai as the first President.

The animosity of the South, where the Revolution was planned and started, towards the North, where the remnants of the Monarchy were intrenched, boded ill for the new Republic. Yuan-Shi-Kai was decidedly a conservative and a believer in the "strong-hand" policy. By November 1913 he had already declared the only real political party, the Kuo-min-tan, to be illegal, and on January 11th, 1914, issued a decree for dissolution of Parliament (inactive though it was), thus becoming a dictator. In March a commission to revise the Constitution was appointed and on October 1st of the same year a new one declared in force. About two months later, the President made personally the offering at the Temple of Heaven, a prerogative of Emperors, thus demonstrating his determination to restore the Monarchy.

The influence of the Revolution on the foreign relations of

China was not salutary; in the period between October 1911 and October 1912 the Powers had added 6230 soldiers to their troops at Peking; the terms of the loan arranged in 1912 by the Six Power Consortium were severe; concession-hunting was not waning; and the World War encouraged Japan in her expansion on the mainland.

The idea of participation in that war was not popular in Japan for many reasons; the army having been built on the German pattern, many Japanese officers regarded their mentors so highly that in their eyes a war against Germany was a hopeless adventure; the meaning of the struggle was not generally appreciated; the prospects were obscure. But the statesmen of Tokyo did not delay their declaration of alignment with the Allies, probably not because they were certain of final success but because their country was bound by a series of agreements with England, Russia and France, between 1902 and 1914. These agreements were, generally speaking, in accord with Tokyo's realistic policy and Japan's interests as understood by her ruling class. Besides, the German "lease" of Kiao-chow was an attractive prize; the German sphere of influence could, they thought, become Japanese. There was still another consideration, the desire to undermine Germany's status in China and through it also that of her favorite, Yuan-Shi-Kai, whom Tokyo had disliked for many years.

On August 8th Japanese warships appeared near Tsingtau. Two days later Tokyo suggested that the British Government might call for its coöperation under the terms of the Alliance. But London hesitated to make the call. On August 14th China declared her neutrality, though some of the Peking authorities insisted that it would be better for her to enter the war on the side of the Allies and forestall the Japanese by recapture of the German leased territory.

On August 15th Japan sent an ultimatum to Germany, advising unconditional surrender of her leasehold of Kiao-chow on or before September 15th "with a view to eventual restoration of the same to China." The reply was asked for August 23rd. Failing to receive an answer at the appointed time, Japan declared war on Germany and proceeded to military action.

Yuan-Shi-Kai, foreseeing the danger to China if Japan should take Kiao-chow over from Germany and so obtain control over

Shantung, offered his country's coöperation in Japan's campaign. His offer was rejected. "The Chinese feared Japanese intrigue at every point," wrote Mr. Paul Reinsch, then American Minister at Peking.¹ "They believed that Revolutionary activities, as in the past, were getting encouragement from Japan. The Japanese were ready to take advantage of and to aggravate any weakness which might exist in Chinese social and political life."

On September 3rd Japanese troops landed at Lun-Kou in Shantung; on the 26th they seized the Wei-hsien station on the Tsingtau-Tsinan Railway; and on October 6th they were in Tsinan itself, controlling the entire line together with the German-operated mines adjoining the railway. On November 7th the fortress of Tsingtau capitulated.

When, after the occupation of Tsingtau by Japan and the liquidation of German jurisdiction, Peking asked Tokyo to withdraw from that Chinese territory, Japan not only refused to comply, but soon served on her neighbor the imperious document known to the world as the "21 Demands."

On the declaration of war against Germany the Prime Minister, Count Okuma, stated that the Empire of the Mikado "neither plans to acquire any territories, nor to deprive China or other nations of any of their possessions." It was the same Count Okuma who advanced the "21 Demands" and later sent an ultimatum to force their acceptance.

The United States protested against this high-handed diplomacy, and the other Powers followed, though in very mild terms, but there were no appreciable results. "The British looked upon the new adventure of Japan with a decided lack of enthusiasm . . . it was plain that the Russians, too, while allied with Japan, were quite aware of the dangers inherent in the Chinese situation. . . . In fine the general temper and direction of Japanese action was not relished by the Allies of Japan. Japan had taken advantage of a conflict, which was primarily European, into the rigor of which she did not enter for the purpose of gathering up the possessions of Germany in the Far East and the Pacific at a time when they could be but weakly defended. . . . This policy of Japan deeply affected American prospects and enterprise in China, as also that of the other leading nations,"

¹ Paul Reinsch, "The American Diplomat in China," p. 127. New York, 1922.

commented the American Minister.² And still, the new position of Japan in China was, if not sanctioned, at least acknowledged by the so-called Lansing-Ishii agreement of November 2nd, 1917,³ when by an exchange of notes the United States had given "formal recognition of the principle declared contemporaneously by way of interpretation to the Chinese Government that Japan actually possessed, by virtue of geographical propinquity, certain special advantages which universally follow from proximity."⁴ Or more exactly, the American note declared "consequently the Government of the United States recognizes that Japan has special interests in China, particularly in that part to which her possessions are contiguous."⁵

The Japanese representative, Viscount Ishii, in addressing the Americans at the beginning of those negotiations, said: "We, Japanese, had taken to arms against Germany because agreements are not scraps of paper for us. We entered the war not for securing any egotistic interests or achieving any ill conceived plans."⁶ So the Americans, in making the Agreement of November 2nd, 1917, had to rely upon this "pronunciamento" and . . . await the results.⁷

Moreover, the signatories referred to their mutual obligation to preserve the independence or territorial integrity of China and to adhere to the principle of the "Open Door." But, nevertheless, Japan (and Russia in some instances) continued to claim "special interests" and dealt with the "spheres of influence" in a way widely differing from the American interpretation.

The Convention signed by Russia and Japan on July 4th, 1916, constituted a basis for a more audacious policy in Man-

² Paul Reinsch, *ibid.*, pp. 127-128.

³ It is interesting that the negotiations for this agreement were carried on by Washington without the knowledge of the American Minister at Peking, and even the signing of the agreement was announced to the latter by his Japanese colleague. (P. Reinsch, *ibid.*, pp. 307-308.)

⁴ C. Walter Young, *ibid.*, p. 132.

⁵ George H. Blakeslee, "The Recent Foreign Policy of the United States," p. 201.

⁶ Quoted from a Russian translation of that speech as given by V. Belly in his "The Struggle for the Pacific." Moscow, 1929.

⁷ Undoubtedly that agreement was influenced by the request of the Japanese Ambassador in June 1917 that the United States take appropriate means to reassert its friendly attitude towards Japan in respect of Chinese problems. A request prompted by Washington's advice to China to establish a responsible central government "without previously consulting Japan."

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churia, but it was only Japan who received benefit from the newly created situation. Russia's attempt to do it was limited by a sole concession secured by the Russo-Asiatic Bank in March 1916, before the Convention was signed—namely, to finance the Pin-Hei Railroad from Harbin to Sakhalin on the right bank of the Amur River, with a branch from Mergen to Tsitsihar.⁸ No advantage of this concession was ever taken by Russia.⁹

Generally speaking, St. Petersburg's influence in Manchuria was steadily waning, while that of Tokyo was becoming paramount. During the World War this process was especially manifest, for Russia was too busy on the fighting front, and Japan was favored by a unique position as almost unrivaled aspirant for domination in the Far East. She obtained at that time numerous concessions for financing the railroad¹⁰ and the industrial development of Manchuria; her banking groups were vitally concerned in the negotiations attending the formation and the delimitation of the scope and character of the activities of the International Consortium, revived in 1920.

Besides Japan, the only Great Power that remained free in her dealings in the Far East was the United States, which did not participate in the World War during its first years. Certain American concerns had also obtained various concessions in China during that period and some of them alarmed Japan. A very favorable contract, signed in 1913 by the Standard Oil Co., authorizing the prospecting and exploitation of oil fields in the provinces of Shensi and Chihli, was in point of fact a sixty years oil monopoly for the company and was farther elaborated during the World War.¹¹ The Bethlehem Steel Co. concluded in 1914 a contract with the Chinese Navy Department to build dockyards near Fuchow. A railroad concession was secured in 1916 for the Hukung line west of Ichang.

⁸ John van MacMurray, *ibid.*, pp. 1267-1270, v. II. The Russo-Asiatic Bank was authorized to issue a gold-loan of 50,000,000 roubles for the construction and operation of that line.

⁹ The American group of bankers, that claimed a contract for Chinchow-Aigun Railway, protested against this concession to Russia as quasi-infringing their rights.

¹⁰ Scuping-kai-Cheng-chiatun Railway Loan Agreement of 1913-15; the Kirin-Changchun Railway Loan Agreement of 1917; agreements of 1915-1918 on Kirin-Kainei; and agreements of 1913-1918 for four Manchurian and Mongolian Railway loans.

¹¹ John van MacMurray, *ibid.*, p. 1007, v. II.

In 1915 and 1916 the United States or its citizens had entered into still other important agreements with China. The banking house of Lee, Higginson and Company signed on April 17th, 1916, a contract with the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Wellington Koo, for a loan of \$5,000,000. Two days later the American International Corporation reached an agreement with the representatives of the province of Shantung about a concession for the restoration of the Great Canal, and issued a loan for \$3,000,000. On November 17th, 1917, this contract was extended, and an additional loan of \$6,000,000 was arranged.¹² By a contract of May 17th, 1916, the American firm of Simes-Carey secured a concession for building 1500 miles of highways in Shensi, Hunan, Kwangsi, Kwangtung, Kiangsu, and Chekiang, with a view to expanding that extremely important concession later and introducing telegraphs and other utilities.

This activity of the United States in China greatly irritated Japan and prompted the conclusion, in 1916, of her Treaty of Alliance with Russia. At the same time Tokyo was considering the advantage of bringing China into the War on the side of the Allies.¹³ She wished partly to undermine American activities, and partly to acquire more control over China by inducing her to entrust Japanese officers with the delicate task of training her army. But this plan was not materialized before Washington began to favor it, and even then with much delay.

After three unsuccessful invitations by the United States, made in February and March 1917, China, or rather General Tuan-Chi-Jui with his group acting against the advice of Dr. Sun-Yat-Sen and many other leaders,¹⁴ decided to join the Allies, and on August 17th declared war against the Central Powers,¹⁵ four months after the United States.

In March 1917, between the invitations extended to Peking to join the Allies and China's actual declaration of war, Great

¹² John van MacMurray, *ibid.*, p. 1304.

¹³ Already at the end of 1915 England, France and Russia approached China with a proposal to join them in the War, but with no results.

¹⁴ Besides the existence of two parties, one favoring the entrance into the War, and another objecting to it, China had at that time plenty of domestic troubles, including two attempts to restore the monarchy, the death of Yuan-Shi-Kai, etc.

¹⁵ Diplomatic relations with Germany were severed by China on March 18th, 1917, i.e., after Germany started her merciless submarine warfare against the merchant marine.

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Britain served on Peking her "12 Demands" concerning Tibet. Those were not so numerous as the more famous "21" of Japan, but were nevertheless impressive and "instructive" to the Chinese nation. It was soon after Mongolia was "divided" by Russia and Japan through the Secret Convention of 1912 that England secured St. Petersburg's consent to her freedom of action in Tibet in return for recognition of Russia's exclusive sphere of influence in Northern Manchuria, Mongolia and Western China. These "12 Demands," if not actually annexing Tibet to England, at least made it a "sphere of Great Britain's influence."

So, after having remained neutral for three years, China came into the War for the benefit of those who had just occupied some of her territories (Japan, the Shantung; England, Tibet), had served on her "21" and "12 Demands," and had obtained divers concessions and privileges. Even after China became one of the Allies, they forced on her the new situation in Manchuria created by the Lansing-Ishii Agreement.¹⁶

All this, and the treatment by the Allies of the Germans and Austrians and of their holdings in China, provided an object lesson for the Chinese people which soon proved to be of great consequence. After the World War was over, and its outcome was made known to China by the Versailles Conference, she started to fight for her own.

B. The "21 Demands."

The entry of Japan into the World War on the side of the Allies was the starting point of a marked change in her Chinese policy, which became more aggressive and less conciliatory. On the one hand Japan was left free to deal with the Far Eastern problems at her discretion; on the other, the internal situation in China was chaotic. Impatient advocates of "keeping order by force," who belonged mostly to the militarist group (then at the height of its prestige and influence thanks to the War and war psychosis) pushed the Japanese Government towards more activity and less hesitation, more aggressiveness and arrogance and less consideration of consequences. Besides, the War encouraged

¹⁶ An agreement that, recognizing Japan's special rights in China, actually left the latter at former's mercy and therefore made some Chinese suspect that the policy of the U.S.A. did not differ much from the other Powers: a notion then new for China, who believed it for long years to be otherwise.

a feverish growth of Japanese industry and a considerable increase in her foreign trade; for the European belligerents not only had to withdraw from the foreign markets (including Asia) leaving them open to Japan, the United States and a few neutrals, but were themselves in need of all kinds of goods to be imported from abroad. In a natural way the Chinese market became the field of special attention and activity by Japan. The speedy accumulation of capital acquired from the Allies¹ necessitated acceleration of the financial expansion. China was not only the close neighbor, but also the best known customer; and therefore the bankers and merchants of Japan decided to try their utmost to take advantage of the opportunities created by the War, and to establish themselves in China solidly and, if possible, as monopolists. Hence these elements also were pressing the Tokyo Government to adopt more active and "positive" policies.

The occupation of Shantung, extended beyond the boundaries of the German leasehold, was the first step. Then followed the far-reaching "21 Demands," and the ultimatum served by Count Okuma on Peking to force their acceptance.

On January 18th, 1916, Mr. Hioki, the Japanese Minister in Peking, handed to President Yuan-Shi-Kai the draft of an agreement prepared by Viscount Kato, the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Cabinet of the "liberal" Count Okuma, and containing 21 demands segregated in five groups. The first group required the transfer to Japan of Germany's rights in Shantung; the second demanded recognition of Japan's preferential status in South Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, and extension of the terms of the lease of the Kwantung territory, and the South Manchuria and Mukden-Antung Railways for 99 years;² the third demanded new concessions in Chihli; the fourth precluded cession in the future of seaboard territories or islands to any foreign country (a clause suggested apparently by the American contract of the Bethlehem Steel Co. for the construction of dockyards in Fuchow); and the fifth required the invitation of Japanese advisers exclusively. In case of China's need for loans and other financial assistance in building railroads, etc., Japanese bankers

¹ For the war materials and different commodities Japan was asked to supply.

² The lease of Kwantung territory expired in 1923 but the demand was for extending it till 1997. The right of exploitation of the South Manchuria Railway was asked till 2002 and that of the Mukden-Antung line till 2007.

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were to be consulted first. In addition Japanese subjects were now to be allowed to own land in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia.

After long but fruitless negotiations and notwithstanding the opposition of the American Minister in Peking, Paul Reinsch, and Secretary of State Bryan, on May 7th Tokyo served on Peking an ultimatum to comply immediately with all the 21 demands. On May 9th Yuan-Shi-Kai declared his readiness to yield and on May 25th signed the agreement. The Chinese Parliament has never ratified this document and consequently it did not become legally valid. Nevertheless, the "Treaty" and the numerous notes to it, nominally granted to Japan practically everything she wanted.

The "Treaty" itself contained eight articles, by which China agreed to extend the lease of Port Arthur and Dairen and the term of the Japanese possession of the South Manchuria and Mukden-Antung Railways to 99 years respectively (Article I). The subjects of Japan were permitted to lease land in South Manchuria for periods up to 30 years (Article II) and to enter, travel, reside and carry on business therein at liberty (Article III). Joint undertakings in Eastern Mongolia of the Japanese and Chinese were permitted (Article IV); extraterritoriality of Japanese subjects in China was confirmed by Article V. The opening of suitable cities and towns in Inner Mongolia was agreed upon by Article VI. China undertook to revise the Kirin-Changchun Railway Agreement (Article VII); and all the existing treaties between Japan and China with respect to Manchuria were to remain in force (Article VIII).

By exchange of notes China conceded to Japanese nationals the rights to prospect for and work certain coal and iron mines in Fengtien and Kirin provinces, including new areas in Pen-hsiu, Heilung, Tunghua, and the Anshan districts in Fengtien province and some others in Kirin Province.³

China conceded also to Japanese capitalists "the right to be first consulted for a loan in any case where the Chinese Government proposes to build railways in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia with foreign capital. Also, whenever China proposes to raise a loan abroad on the security of the taxes of South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia (with the exception of the salt gabelle and the customs) they will first consult Japanese

³ C. Walter Young, pp. 137-139.

capitalists." Peking further promised that "if, in future, the Chinese Government desire to employ foreign advisers and instructors on political, financial, military and police affairs in South Manchuria preference will be given to Japanese."⁴

The exclusive status thus created for Japan in China, or at least in some parts of that country, was never recognized by China as valid, since it was obtained under duress and was not legally ratified by the Peking Parliament. It was protested by the United States, and (though temporarily recognized under the Lansing-Ishii Agreement) was materially revised at the Washington Conference of 1921-22. Nevertheless it served as a basis for Japan to strengthen her control over South Manchuria and the eastern part of Inner Mongolia, a control that remains a reality at the present time and hardly likely to be eliminated in the near future.

If, in 1915, at the time of the ultimatum, the Chinese nation was united in its indignation at this high-handed policy (the day of its presentation, May 7th, became known as the "Day of Humiliation" and has since been observed in China by demonstrations of protest), the situation was quite different at the end of the War. Yuan-Shi-Kai, who defamed himself by affixing signature and seal to the documents of May 25th, apparently did so under the influence of his cherished plan of restoring the throne and ascending it with the approval of Japan; and he continued to neglect both the advice of Russia, England, and Japan, given him on October 28th, 1915, "not to force restoration," and another warning in which France and Italy joined the others on December 14th. On the previous day Yuan-Shi-Kai, assenting to the petition of the State Council (composed of his partisans), had already a solemn audience in the Emperor's palace, had received royal homages including kow-tow and had made it to be known that on February 16th, 1916, the Monarchy would be officially restored. But contrary to his plans, and under the pressure of the widespread disapproval of these acts, he issued on March 22nd a decree abolishing monarchy; and on June 6th, less than three months later, he passed away. The confusion that followed, and the chaos that prevailed in China for a long time afterwards, made her still more easily a prey for all sorts of schemes, including that of dragging her into the War.

⁴ Quoted from C. Walter Young, *ibid.*, pp. 137-139.

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Hence at the time of settlement she appeared not as a solid entity to be reckoned upon, but as a weak, amorphous conglomerate, readily to be neglected by her own Allies.

C. The Versailles Treaty.

The great Powers directly concerned with Far Eastern problems entered the Peace Conference at Versailles and the task of reshaping the world on a very unequal footing. Japan, thanks to the War, was stronger than ever. She had gained economically, and at the same time had managed to preserve her forces better than any of the other actual participants in the *débâcle*. Moreover she had consolidated her position as holder of special interests in China through the "21 Demands" and the Lansing-Ishii Agreement, and was free from her obligations to Russia. That former ally was excluded from the Versailles Conference, and Japan's position had been strengthened accordingly. Through her very active participation in the Allied intervention in Russia's Oriental possessions, Japan was in by far the best position to realize her wishes at Versailles.

The United States, curiously enough, was not particularly antagonistic to Japan's excessive demands. It is true that relations between the two countries were not good at that time. But it must be remembered that America was still partly bound by the Agreement of 1917, while President Woodrow Wilson, her chief delegate at Versailles, was engaged in fostering plans of a more general and far-reaching nature than those confined to the Orient. Nor was London antagonistic to Tokyo; Great Britain was still an ally of the Mikado's Empire, and was not so directly concerned with the changes that had occurred in China during the War. As for the other Powers they were in the main indifferent, though there were rumors that they were bound by commitments made to Tokyo at the close of the War, when currying Japanese favor seemed of advantage; it was said that Japan had received assurance that she might retain the former German possessions in the Far East. China was represented, but in spite of the promises made her when she was persuaded to join the Allies and enter the War, was not treated as an equal. Russia, then in the throes of revolution, was absent.

At the sessions of January 27th and 28th, 1919, the Shantung question was discussed by the Council of Ten. The Japa-

nese delegate, Baron Makino, asserted that this territory, which formerly belonged to Germany, should be transferred to Japan. But Wellington Koo, representing China, countered with his country's demand that all the German leaseholds should be returned to China. The Japanese delegate then informed those present that the question had already been settled amicably to the effect that Shantung should remain under the jurisdiction of Tokyo. The protest of Wellington Koo, disclaiming the validity of the treaty extorted by that ultimatum under duress which followed the "21 Demands," was of no avail, and the question remained unsettled for the time being. On April 30th, however, a compromise was reached by which Japan agreed to evacuate her troops from Shantung and restore Chinese sovereignty, but retained economic privileges and the right of settlement at Tsingtau. When, however, this agreement was embodied in Articles 156 and 157 of the Versailles Treaty, it was worded in quite a different way. China naturally posted a protest, and on June 28th declared her unwillingness to assent. But on the same day the Treaty was signed by all the Powers except China, and instantly enforced. Thus the Chinese nation received another lesson in what she might expect from foreigners, and soon took active steps to liberate herself and restore her position of a sovereign state.

The results of the Versailles Conference prompted an energetic rise of the Chinese. Humiliation suffered at the hands of Westerners and Japanese worked towards an awakening of Nationalism and strengthening of the Revolutionary spirit, towards organization of the masses, towards the emergence of real leaders, and towards more decisive action.

D. The Washington Conference.

After the first post-war period of adjustment in the European field of international relations it became imperative to bring some order to the Far Eastern situation. Many anomalies, left over from the past or newly created by the War, remained to be straightened out. Besides, preliminary steps in preparing the stage for the next coming world's drama had to be taken. This drama was that of the Pacific. Therefore, on the initiative of the United States (seemingly predestined to play the leading

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rôle), a Conference was convoked at Washington in November 1921.

The growing arrogance of Japan in her dealings with China, for a long time deprived by disintegration and civil war of the power of resistance; the unwelcome overstepping by the Japanese militarists of the limits agreed upon by the Allies in their intervention in Russian possessions in the Far East; the apprehension of the United States regarding American economic interests in the Orient menaced by those activities of the Empire of the Rising Sun; and the necessity of adjusting international relations in general, were instrumental in summoning the Powers to Washington for this conference on "disarmament." So, at any rate, it was described by the uncensored press until it became obvious (partly through a halloo from official circles) that such an overwhelming change in the field of international relations was premature.

"In Siberia, as well as in China, Japan appeared to be violating American principles and policies," wrote Professor George H. Blakeslee.¹ The exclusive position obtained in these countries by Tokyo against the protests of Washington, and through the "Treaty" and Notes of 1915, and the unfortunate Lansing-Ishii Agreement (approving that Treaty against the best interest of the United States), were worrying enough; but the defiant policy of the Mikado's Government during the intervention in Siberia irritated Washington to the point of a threat to enforce an economic blockade of Japan if she did not immediately withdraw her troops from Siberia.²

It was a moment when a war between Japan and the United States seemed probable. "Aside from the extremists and jingoes, a considerable number of thoughtful people in touch with the diplomatic situation in the Pacific, felt that Japan and the United States were both traveling along roads which, much as each would regret it, would eventually converge in War."³ But the great naval building program, inaugurated by the United States in 1916 and continued even after the World War, the erection and strengthening of naval bases in the Pacific; and mere con-

¹ George H. Blakeslee, *ibid.*, p. 201.

² This was revealed by Dr. Frederick Lee at the 1926 session of the Institute of Politics, at Williamstown, Mass.

³ George H. Blakeslee, *ibid.*, p. 206.

sideration of the economics on both sides of that ocean all led to the acceptance by Japan of this otherwise unwelcome invitation.

It was plain that the conference was an attempt to readjust the situation in the Far East created by the absence of the Allies from Asia when, according to Mr. Reinsch, "Japan was using the War to displace the influence of her associates in China and to make her own power predominant."⁴ It was probable that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance would have to be sacrificed and many other concessions would be asked from Japan, but she had no choice but to join the gathering and try to make the best of it.

At the Washington Conference the United States and Japan were in reality the main actors. They were the two most powerful factors in the Pacific and the only two Allies to come out of the War economically and financially strengthened. Both were seeking new markets to invest capital accumulated during the War.

Europe, on the other side, was seriously undermined. Asia offered unlimited opportunities, so Asia was the coveted prize and the chief problem to be solved at the Conference. Great Britain—after a short period of high hopes in 1919-20—entered a crisis in 1921. France, the former banker of the world, experienced difficulties at home and was looking for funds to restore her devastated regions; Europe, generally speaking, was not yet back to "normalcy"; the accounts of the War remained unsettled, the reparation problem far from being straightened out. All this made the Europeans very lenient and accommodating, virtually leaving the center of the stage at the Washington Conference to the United States and Japan.

On November 12th, 1921, the Conference was opened and after sessions lasting until February 1922 resulted in two treaties ("Four-Power" and "Nine-Power") and several resolutions of importance. The "21 Demands" were in large part revised or withdrawn;⁵ the Japanese claims regarding China—in general—modified. The return of Shantung to China was ar-

⁴ Paul Reinsch, *ibid.*, p. 303.

⁵ The Chinese Delegation at the Washington Conference reserved their country's right to "seek a solution, on all future appropriate occasions, concerning those portions of the "Treaty" and notes of 1915, which did not appear to have been expressly relinquished by the Japanese Government."

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ranged in a bilateral agreement between her and Japan at the close of the Conference. Evacuation of the Russian territories occupied by the Japanese was also agreed upon (and effected in 1922). The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, viewed by the Americans with some deep concern, and opposed even by some of the British Dominions (especially Canada), was terminated. The way was prepared for cancelling the Lansing-Ishii Agreement (effected on April 14th, 1923); and the interpretation of the "Open Door" principle was revised and clarified.

The agreement on limitation of naval armament establishing also the ratio of 5:5:3:1.75:1.75 respectively for Great Britain, the United States, Japan, France, and Italy, was reached. This was hailed at the time as a great achievement, though in truth it meant little beyond the economy it permitted to the seriously drained treasuries of the Allies. It was also agreed to discontinue further fortification of naval bases in the Pacific; and the differences over the little island of Yap and the mandates were amicably settled.

The Four-Power Treaty of December 13th, 1921, concerning possessions of the Powers in the Pacific, was signed by the United States, Japan, Great Britain and France, who pledged themselves: (1) mutually to respect each other's rights in that ocean; (2) to refer any and all controversies arising out of the Pacific questions, to joint conferences of the High Contracting Parties for consideration and adjustment. The latter stipulation was "no commitment to use armed force, no alliance, no obligation to join in any defense," as was explained in the United States Senate before the ratification of this Treaty.

The Nine-Power Treaty, signed on February 6th, 1922, by Belgium, China, France, Holland, Italy, Japan, Portugal and the United States, dealt with the Chinese problem, and became known as the "Treaty relating to Principles and Policies concerning China." The High Contracting Parties therein pledged themselves to respect China's sovereignty, independence, territorial and administrative integrity; to maintain equality of opportunity there for the trade and industry of all nations; "to refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights and privileges" and to "provide fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government." The Powers

further agreed not to enter into treaties or agreements of any sort "which would infringe or impair the principle of equal opportunity"; and "spheres of influence" were specifically denounced. China engaged not to discriminate with respect to the railways in her territories. Powers not signatories to that Treaty, as stipulated by Article VIII, were to be invited to adhere.

Considered on the whole, the results of this conference were highly favorable to the United States, as increasing her international prestige, straightening out her relations in the Far East, postponing a conflict, strengthening her economic position in China, and so opening up new opportunities. Japan on the other hand was a decided loser. She had to withdraw from Shantung and from Siberia and was compelled to modify her stand on Manchuria and revise her attitude towards China in general.

As for China, she emerged from the Conference with some gains, or at least with greater hopes. Not only were many promises given by the Powers (some of them repeatedly made in the past, as well, though not always fulfilled); respect of her sovereignty and integrity and the gradual revision of the "unequal treaties" were assured; and even the repeal, in the future, of extraterritoriality was promised. But more tangible commitments were also made; as for instance the restoration of some of the "concessions" and withdrawal from such leaseholds as Shantung, Hankow, and Wei-hai-wei. Naturally all these modifications were prompted by the actual situation in China herself.

Within ten years China had advanced to a degree which would have seemed incredible a few years before, even to those who pretended to understand that calm, slowly moving country. But the events of the recent years had changed the entire situation in the Far East to such an extent that what was unthinkable twenty-five or thirty years before had now become a reality. Proper interpretations of that time are of little assistance to those desiring to understand and judge correctly the present-day situation and make safe conclusions and prognoses. To put it in another way, many hopes and expectations failed to materialize; and the drift of events was in a direction unforeseen or undesired by some observers. Forces that had been snubbed, neglected, or underestimated became of actual importance, and secured a more or less free hand to experiment and demonstrate

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their power; while others proved not to have been real forces or to have been overestimated, disappearing when met by organized and militant groups of younger, more vigorous, disciplined, and more ably conducted elements.

CHAPTER VII

THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION

A. Foreign Intervention. B. The Peking Agreement of 1924. C. The Popularity of Soviet Russia in China. D. The Struggle of the Powers against Soviets.

A. Foreign Intervention.

As we have seen in the preceding chapter, Russia was not present either at Versailles or at Washington, owing to the disfavor with which the Revolutionary changes of 1917 were met by those who directed the world's affairs.

Exhausted by a long war, for which she was not prepared, indignant at her unpopular and incompetent government, humiliated by recent defeats which overshadowed all the brilliant victories of the early days of the world conflict, Russia burst out in Revolution at the most inopportune moment, namely, in the midst of a war in which she was allied with others.

The Provisional Government of March 1917 was formed by those in whom the progressive elements of the upper part of the country had placed their trust. It was unable to keep the power in its hands; and, after several changes in composition followed by a weak struggle with more radical elements, it was overthrown. In its place came the Bolshevik party, a strong, remarkably well organized group, able to succeed where its predecessors had failed.

The attitude of the outside world towards these new rulers of Russia was hostile from the beginning. No one wanted to believe that the Bolsheviks would last. But, as in the case of predictions about the possible length of the World War, the prophets were wrong. The new régime had established itself too solidly, and the short-sightedness of many foreign statesmen and business men proved costly to themselves and their countries.

Russia's "bloodless" Revolution of March 1917 was widely

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acclaimed all over the world, including China. The Peking Parliament sent greetings to the Russian Duma; the Chinese Government recognized the new government of Petrograd.¹ Dr. Sun-Yat-Sen wired his greetings to the speaker of the Duma and expressed a hope that through the efforts of the two newly born Republics of China and Russia, "the principles of liberty, equality and fraternity will be established soon all over the world!"

The "October" revolution,² on the other hand, was met by official China and some part of the population with the same hostility that marked the European and American attitudes. The explanation of this could be found partly in the fact that China was closely connected with the capitalistic system overthrown in Russia by that October Revolution, and partly in the pressure applied to China by other Powers, and particularly by Japan.

One of the first acts of the Soviet Government was to proclaim its desire to have peace with all and every nation, its opposition to the policy of aggression, and its determination to annul all unequal treaties and to return to China the concessions extorted under the Tsarist régime. But the only actual result of this general declaration was the termination of war, as far as Russia and the Central Powers were concerned, on the Eastern front; an event that simplified the decision of the Allies to intervene in Russia's affairs under pretext of "preventing the Germans and Austrians, kept there as prisoners of war, from taking to arms and forming a front against the Allies."

In March 1918 China recalled her Minister to Russia along with all the other foreign diplomats. By May of the same year she had already consented to sign an agreement with Japan by which she obligated herself to coöperate with the latter in case any military resistance should be necessary. In September, Peking declared its readiness to send troops to Siberia to coöperate with the Allies, who were busy trying, though unsuccessfully, to curb the Russian Revolution by interventions from all sides, including Asia.

The main task confronting the Allies was to eradicate Bol-

¹ St. Petersburg was so "translated" by the Tsar's decree on the outbreak of the war under the ridiculous mania to get rid of everything German, though actually the name of St. Petersburg came from Holland and not from Germany.

² According to the Julian calendar it occurred in October; by the Gregorian, on November 7th.

shevism as a menace to the economic system on which they were built. Particularly was this of importance to Japan and China as immediate neighbors. But the Japanese Government went farther, and made at this time of political unsettlement a definite effort to extend its influence over the Chinese Eastern Railway. Though actually the originator of this intervention, through sending warships to Vladivostok early in 1918, Japan was bound in her activities by an agreement with the other Allied Powers, and was therefore forced to participate in the Inter-Allied control of the railway instead of dealing freely and independently. When this control was first contemplated, Japan raised objections on the strength of the previous commitments of China in the agreement of March 25th, 1918, supplemented by another on September 6th of the same year. Finally, however, she had to yield and join the Inter-Allied Committee and at the same time withdraw her troops policing the Chinese Eastern, leaving only a garrison at the Manchuli station.

Though intervention was started "to prevent the Germans from forming a front," it was nevertheless not terminated with the end of the War on November 11th, 1918. The other pretext, the protection of the evacuation of Czecho-Slovaks from Siberia, gradually amounted to coöperation with them in military action against Russia, under the cloak of fighting Bolshevism.

Thanks to the tact of John F. Stevens, a distinguished American engineer who became President of the Inter-Allied Technical Board in control of the Chinese Eastern Railway, numerous attempts by the Japanese to acquire the upper hand over this line were frustrated. Notwithstanding all the intrigues in which—unfortunately—certain Russian refugees unpatriotically took a part, and including the interesting "agreement" between China and the Russo-Asiatic Bank, the attitude adopted by the Washington Conference prevented the road from being taken by Japan.

Having brought into the Russian Far East almost ten times as many troops as the United States, though the agreement provided for equal numbers, Japan kept them there even after the withdrawal of the Americans (in January 1920), and others.³

³ So necessitating an unusual *démarche* of the United States—namely, a threat of economic blockade. Orders were issued by Washington through the Shipping

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It was one of the tasks of the Washington Conference (successfully achieved) to make Tokyo agree to evacuate her troops and to withdraw from the Chinese Eastern, which remained until October 1922 under Inter-Allied control. The intervention had at least two unexpected results: the first of these was the cementing of the Russian nation around the slogan "Resist the intruders, defend your mother-country!" as demonstrated by their final victory over all the interventionists; the second, the exposure of the conflict of economic interests of the Powers in Manchuria.

Notwithstanding the fact that Peking failed to reply to the overtures of the Soviets in 1917 and 1918 and continued to co-operate with all the numerous governments of the "Whites," Moscow, which the October Revolution had reestablished as the capital of Russia, sent on July 25th, 1919, a new note to China, signed by Karakhan, the acting Commissar of Foreign Affairs.⁴ This note expressed Russia's readiness to adhere to the principles already announced, i.e., to annul the old treaties, to renounce concessions and special privileges, including extraterritoriality, and to abandon financial claims, including the Boxer indemnity. The Chinese later stated that they did not receive the note, but a copy of it was handed at Moscow in 1920 to the Chinese General Chang-Si-Lian, formerly the military representative of China with the Omsk Government of Admiral Kolchak and after the latter's defeat sent to Moscow. In 1920 a serious change in the Chinese attitude towards the Soviet Government was manifest, partly under the effect of the latter's successful drive against the interventionists, partly owing to greater independence in China's foreign policy, advocated after Versailles by the General Wu-Pei-Fu, who was at that time very powerful, and other influential leaders. When, therefore, the Far Eastern Republic was formed in 1920, as a buffer state, China was one of the first to deal with it, and through it with Moscow.

One Chinese mission, headed by foreign advisers of Peking, Ferguson, an American, and Simpson, an Englishman, was sent to investigate the situation in the new Republic, while another,

Board to return all the vessels with steel cargo from the United States to Japan and with silk, from Japan to the United States.

⁴ See the two notes in the Appendices.

under General Chang-Si-Lian, went to Moscow. On this occasion, Mr. Karakhan sent a new note to Peking, offering at once to start negotiations for establishment of diplomatic relations on the basis of principles frequently advanced before and including the revision of the status of the Chinese Eastern Railway. A mission of the Far Eastern Republic headed by Yurin came to Peking and soon started negotiations to resume trade.

It was at this time that Peking withdrew its recognition from the Tsarist diplomats and consuls, discontinued paying them the annuities due as Boxer indemnity, and established a special bureau on Russian affairs in China. Notwithstanding the protests of the Diplomatic Corps, all those measures remained in force.

B. The Peking Agreement of 1924.

Realizing that it was "backing the wrong horse" and tempted by the offers of Moscow, the Peking Government was now inclined to accept the invitation of the Soviets for a conference. Wu-Pei-Fu and his group were willing and Dr. Sun-Yat-Sen did his best to bring about such an agreement. But the Powers, who were not as yet on speaking terms with Soviet Russia, made it clear that such a step could be very dangerous to China and the latter accordingly declined. Nevertheless, repeated attempts by the Russians resulted in some negotiations, and the number of Chinese who would welcome a Sino-Russian accord grew constantly.

After Yurin, the envoy of the Far Eastern Republic, came Agarieff in 1921. Finally at the close of the same year an official representative of Moscow arrived, and succeeded in paving the way for more regular intercourse; late in 1922, Joffe, a plenipotentiary of the Soviets, was in Peking. On greeting that envoy at a banquet the President of Peking University declared: "China and Russia are going to crush Imperialism. Young China will be a disciple of the Great Russian Revolution."¹ Negotiations were started at once and their outcome seemed for a time promising. But the downfall of Wang's cabinet, in which the leading rôles were played by the partisans of Wu-Pei-Fu, who advocated accord with Russia, brought into power a reactionary Ministry. This, together with the strong opposition of the Powers,

¹ Professor N. Kuhnér, "Outline of the Modern Political History of China" (in Russian), p. 327. Vladivostok, 1927.

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especially Japan, brought the conferences abruptly to a stop. Later, it was suggested that the negotiations should be transferred from Peking to Moscow, but Mr. Joffe's ill health necessitated his departure to Japan, and the settlement was postponed. In August 1923 Joffe was recalled, and Mr. Karakhan appointed to reopen the negotiations.

According to the Chinese press, the arrival in September 1923, of Karakhan, who was acclaimed by the populace on his way to Peking and warmly greeted by officials, including Chang-Tso-Lin, the War Lord of Manchuria, was the turning point in Sino-Russian relations. On March 14th, 1924, Mr. Karakhan and Dr. C. T. Wang, who represented China, reached a preliminary agreement which should have been signed within a few days. But a protest from the United States and France in regard to the way it settled the question of the Chinese Eastern Railway forced a postponement. The Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs explained the delay by the necessity of adjusting details, but the actual cause, apparently, was outside pressure.² Nevertheless, the widespread sympathy of the Chinese for Russia and the insistence of certain leaders of different political shades, including Dr. Sun-Yat-Sen and Wu-Pei-Fu, decided the fate of the agreements; and on May 31st, secretly from the Diplomatic Corps, they were signed at Peking by Wellington Koo for China and Karakhan for Soviet Russia. On the same date the diplomatic relations of these two countries were officially restored. A few days later Karakhan informed the Peking Government that Moscow was willing to advance her representative to the rank of Ambassador, and on July 15th China signified her acceptance.

The basic Treaty, known under the name of the "Agreement on General Principles for the Settlement of Questions between the Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," was accompanied by an agreement for the "Provisional Management of the Chinese Eastern Railway"³ and several declarations. The basic agreement provided for recognition of

² Prof. Kuhner, *ibid.*, p. 328. Certain other writers advance Peking's disapproval of the Mongolian settlement as the real reason why China then declined to sign the agreement, but if such were the case why should China sign it, and secretly from the Powers, only two months later?

³ This was protested by France, the United States and Japan, who claimed financial interests in the railroad.

the Soviet Government, and for the summoning of a Chinese-Soviet Conference to "conclude and carry out detailed arrangements relative to the questions in accordance with the principles as provided by the agreement." Such a conference was actually opened in September 1925, but was unable to work under the political conditions prevailing in China then and since. The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics "in accordance with its policy and Declarations of 1919 and 1920" declared all the treaties and agreements concluded by the Old Régime null and void (Article IV). Outer Mongolia was restated "as an integral part of China" and the withdrawal of Soviet troops was promised (Article V). The two contracting parties pledged (Article VI) "not to permit within their respective territories the existence and (or) activities of any organizations or groups whose aim is to struggle by acts of violence against the Government of either Contracting Party." They further pledged themselves "not to engage in propaganda directed against the political and social system of either." By Article IX it was agreed to settle at the aforementioned Conference the question of the Chinese Eastern Railway, declared to be a "purely commercial enterprise" which might be redeemed by China with Chinese capital. But its future was to be determined by China and Soviet Russia "to the exclusion of any third party or parties." By Article X the Soviets renounced "the special rights and privileges relating to all Concessions in any part of China acquired by the Tsarist Government . . ." and by Article XI—the Russian portion of the Boxer indemnity. In Article XII they agreed "to relinquish the rights of extraterritoriality and consular jurisdiction." Briefly, Russia actually renounced all special rights, privileges and concessions except her part in the Chinese Eastern Railway, which, on the advice of Dr. Sun-Yat-Sen, remained under the joint management of Russia and China.⁴ Russia, furthermore, made some important concessions to China on that point as well. The same agreement (Article IX, paragraph 7) had confirmed China's right to receive the road free of charge on the expiration of 80 years from

* Contrary to the widespread story that the Karakhan notes of 1919 and 1920 definitely offered immediately to return the Chinese Eastern Railway to China free of charge, no such direct offer was made, as may be seen from the texts of the said notes, given in the Appendices to this work.

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the time of the original contract and her right to redeem it in 36 years after its completion. China was thereafter to participate in the management on a principle of equality.

The advice of Dr. Sun-Yat-Sen not to give up the Chinese Eastern Railway in 1924 was based on his fear that, if returned, the road would become a prize for Chang-Tso-Lin, and so strengthen his reactionary régime; and, making more difficult the struggle then carried on against him by the Nationalist South, would delay the final victory of the Revolution. In consideration of this Soviet Russia decided to retain it for the time being. The Peking Government accepted this change by signing the Treaty. But it soon became evident that Peking was not always strong enough to enforce its engagements. Chang-Tso-Lin, unwilling to honor any acts of Peking in his "domain,"⁵ interfered and in order to apply the new arrangements agreed upon on May 31st, 1924, with the Central Government, his consent was sought and received through an agreement signed at Mukden on September 20th of the same year. By this agreement the time limit for returning the road to China free of charge was reduced from eighty to sixty years. The right to redeem the road was made unconditional of time limits, but the restriction requiring the use of Chinese capital only was retained.⁶

Peking protested against this separate agreement, considering it a recognition by the Soviets of Manchuria's independence. But such, certainly, was not the case. In March 1925 the Chinese Government confirmed that Agreement accepting its provisions as supplementary to the Agreement of May 1924.

Even the signing of this separate Treaty with Chang was not enough to protect Russia's position on the Chinese Eastern Railway. The Chinese general soon began to interfere in its management. He issued orders that the rolling stock should be used for the transportation of his troops, without payment; and, finally on January 22nd, 1926, he arrested the Russian manager, Ivanoff.⁷ Regarding such acts as absolutely intolerable, Moscow

⁵ And then again very antagonistic towards the Soviets.

⁶ Very decidedly the Mukden Treaty was more advantageous to China. Therefore the stories that Soviets "forced" it on Chang-Tso-Lin seem poorly based on facts.

⁷ The order of Ivanoff to refuse free transportation of Chang's troops, though legal, was of special significance at the moment because it hindered Chang's military moves.

sent an "Ultimatum," which was actually a complaint to Peking on the encroachment of Chang-Tso-Lin in the rights of the railway. Peking, happening to be in a strong position at that particular moment, ordered Chang to release Ivanoff and stop his unlawful behavior and thus prevented any aggravation of the conflict. Ivanoff was immediately released and continued in his post.

C. The Popularity of Soviet Russia in China.

The attitude of the Soviets towards China, as demonstrated by their determination to establish the friendliest relations with that neighbor on a basis of absolute equality, had never before been experienced by China in her dealings with the Powers. The actual renunciation by Moscow of special rights and privileges served to create for Soviet Russia an extraordinary popularity among the Chinese. The interest in the Russian experiment of Dr. Sun-Yat-Sen and many other Chinese leaders, the invitation of Russian advisers and their work in organizing Chinese social forces, served to make this popularity for a while the dominating factor in the Far Eastern situation.

Some antagonists of Bolshevism ridiculed the avowed friendliness of the Soviets towards China; but in asserting that Moscow only renounced "what was already taken back by China," they were deliberately closing their eyes to actualities; they forgot that the unilateral abrogation was not necessarily the final settlement; they recalled the indignation of Moscow when Peking adopted a similar policy, as quasi-indicating that Soviet Russia was anxious to keep all concessions and privileges intact and under her control—scarcely a logical explanation, for the great difference between disapproval of an illegal act and a voluntary grant must not be overlooked. But whatever intentions may have been ascribed to Soviet Russia, her way of treating China was so different from that to which the Chinese were accustomed, and so advantageous to them, that notwithstanding all the attempts to discredit the Russians in the eyes of Chinese, they remained for a period very popular. They were trusted and relied upon not only by such persons as Dr. Sun-Yat-Sen and other prominent leaders of China, but also by most of the honest patriots of that "object of foreign appetites."

D. The Struggle of the Powers Against the Soviets.

No wonder that this growing sympathy of the New China for the New Russia was not welcomed by other Powers, who did not renounce their special rights and continued to keep their concessions in the Orient. By a concentrated effort the representatives of the Powers in Peking even prevented for a time the entry of the Russian envoy to the Embassy quarter. But finally he was admitted, and being promoted to the rank of Ambassador, became automatically, the Dean of Diplomatic Corps there. Of course, this fact did not serve in any way to increase the friendship of the foreigners towards Mr. Karakhan, who became the first Soviet Russian Ambassador to Peking; nor did it stop all kinds of schemes to undermine the prestige of Russia and to convince China that the Soviets had evil intentions.

The Ultimatum sent by Moscow in January 1926 in connection with Chang-Tso-Lin's provocative acts in Manchuria described above, was seized upon at once by the enemies of the Soviets as a pretext; and a campaign was started to make people believe that here was a proof that Soviet Russia was not willing to abandon the Tsarist policy of aggression in China.

At that time the results were not what were expected and a conflict was properly prevented by China. But the work against the Soviets continued with unremitting energy. The Russian Embassy at Peking was raided with the consent of the Minister of the Netherlands¹ who at that time replaced the "ousted" Karakhan, as Dean; the Russian "immune" offices, supposed to be diplomatically extraterritorial, were ransacked both in the Chinese capital and in other places; arrests were made on accusations never proved by evidence; and in Canton some Russian Consular officers were even killed, not to mention all sorts of offenses committed and humiliations forced on the Russians with at least the tolerance of officials of the reactionary type.

It was not until June 1927 that Chang-Tso-Lin proclaimed himself Dictator after taking into his hands the Peking Administration. Yet in April he had been able to arrange the raid on the Soviet Embassy, as noted above. "It was no secret that Soviet Russia was supporting the Nationalists and that Chang-

¹ Foreign Policy Association Information Service, Sept. 28th, 1928.

Tso-Lin was hostile to what he termed Bolshevik machinations." On April 6th, 1927, the Dalbank,² the offices of the Chinese Eastern Railway, the barracks and the office of the military attaché, constituting a part of the Soviet Embassy premises, were raided by the Peking police and troops from Chang-Tso-Lin's army. A number of Chinese and Russian Communists were arrested, and much "inflammatory" literature was confiscated. Naturally Moscow protested against this "unprecedented breach of elementary principles of international law," presented some demands, and announced that until these were satisfied it would recall the whole staff of the Embassy, leaving only the personnel for performing consular functions.

Actually, Peking made no move to comply with the Soviet demands, and Moscow did not press the case, since, as China was passing through many revolutionary changes, there was often no real Government with which to deal.

Summing up the present chapter, we can state that the influence of the Russian Revolution on China and on the Far Eastern situation in general was deep and wide. It was more than a psychological shock to the Chinese that served to make them more audacious; it was a living example that was studied by the leaders of Chinese Revolution and helped the organization of the masses, for which they had to work. The invitation of Russian advisers and instructors contributed much to the organization of Chinese Nationalist forces and to training them for political administrative and military functions. This service rendered by the Russians was recognized again and again by the highest authorities in China, including such a bitter enemy of the Soviets as Chiang-Kai-Shek. The latter revolted against his tutors when he considered himself ready to apply his will-power independently, unrestrained by any party discipline, any control, any demand to account for his actions.

As for the observations the Orientals were enabled to make on the foreigners after the revolution in Russia released passions hitherto concealed by training and breeding, they added much to what the yellow peoples had learned during the World War. Now, it appeared to the alert Chinese, there were no restrictions that might not be annulled, no conventions that could not be forgotten. To what, he began to ask himself, did that sacro-

² Russian Bank of the Far East.

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sanct right of diplomatic immunity amount to when the question was one of chasing out Soviet diplomats? Where was the protection of extraterritoriality when the Soviet Embassy and Consulates might be ransacked? What was the meaning of protection of life and property when Russians were concerned? Who cared for laws and justice when a Soviet citizen was in court? What, even, was the fate of banks, when they acted for the Bolsheviks? In short, were not all the long established principles now discarded, all accepted values revised, all ethical maxims thrown overboard?

Any and every revolution brings radical changes in its train, and the 1917 cataclysm was no exception to the rule. But while adopting some of the changes brought about by the Russian experiment, China had learnt less about that "revision of values" from the Revolutionists than from those who were fighting against Revolution with the "noble aim of saving Civilization"; a task not entirely achieved by the World War! though such, they said, was its justification. The effect of all this on China and the entire Orient is already noticeable. But obvious though it is, it is as yet barely beginning. The full effect in the future is beyond the power of fancy.

CHAPTER VIII

THE CHINESE REVOLUTION

A. The Factors that Brought about its Beginning in 1911. B. Birth of the Kuo-min-tan. C. Constructive Forces. D. The Shantung Question—a Renewal of the Revolution. E. Dr. Sun-Yat-Sen and Lenin. F. Communist Influence. G. War between the Nationalist South and the Reactionary North. H. The "Differentiation" of Classes.

A. The Factors that Brought About Its Beginning in 1911.

For several decades before the overthrow of the Manchu Dynasty the lot of the Chinese masses had been increasingly miserable. They had been the most luckless victims of the economic chaos produced by the misgovernment and corruption of dishonest local representatives of the nominal central power of the degenerate Empire. Add to this the long list of abuses committed by foreigners ever since they first forced an entrance into the Empire of the Bogdohans, and it is small wonder that demonstrations of popular discontent had been prompted from time to time, and even as early as the Taiping Rebellion of 1851-1864. This was followed after the Sino-Japanese War by widespread unrest which, however, was quieted for a time by the quasi-reforms of 1898. But the Boxer Rebellion nevertheless followed, involving a great number of peasants who suffered from the agrarian policy of the Manchu Dynasty; while other sporadic outbursts of the people's indignation on different grounds finally necessitated the Constitutional reforms planned—though too late—by the Dowager Empress.

All these factors worked, in one way or another, towards the Revolution which broke out in 1911 and at the same time inaugurated the building of the "new" China. The latter process, however, is still far from complete. In an immense country such as China, with a population of over 400,000,000, the task of creating a democratic Republic from a nation accustomed for forty centuries to a monarchical régime is overwhelming. Equally

formidable is the problem of educating this mass of people laboring under the scarcity of modern means of communication, widespread poverty, inefficient political organization of the populace, dependence upon foreigners, and the abuses of the War Lords, who, themselves a heritage of the past, live by means of all the evils left by "old" China to the "new."

Though renowned for her elaborate organization of family life, the powerful economic structure of her guilds and her numerous secret societies, China seemed to ignore political formations in the Western sense. The best organized, and the most important, if not actually the only Chinese political group, was, until recent years, the Kuo-min-tan or the People's Party (frequently referred to by foreigners as the Nationalist Party) and founded in 1912 by the late Dr. Sun-Yat-Sen, the "father of the Chinese Revolution."

The history of the Kuo-min-tan is practically the history of the present Chinese Revolution. The revolutionist activity of Dr. Sun-Yat-Sen (or Sun-Wen, as he is more often called in China) can be traced as far back as 1885. In that year, while still a young student in the English medical school at Hong Kong, he started his work of arousing the Chinese people against oppression and the foreign yoke.

At the time of Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, when the decay of the Manchu Dynasty became so obvious and the humiliating defeat was so badly felt by his nation, Sun-Yat-Sen organized a party "for Regeneration of China" (Hsing-chung-hui);¹ but in September 1895 this secret body was detected by the police and dispersed. Sun-Yat-Sen himself escaped arrest and went abroad, where he continued to study economics and politics, and earnestly propagated his ideas among Chinese students and *émigrés*. The late nineties were marked by a growth of revolutionary activity in China, and Sun's disciples succeeded in finding a certain following among peasants and workers. With the help of such Japanese as Yamada, the ardent sympathizer of Sun, and, possibly, with assistance from Count Kodama (then the Governor-General of Formosa), a revolutionist army of almost 10,000 was gathered in the South. For a while it advanced more or less successfully towards Peking, where ruled the hated Central Government of alien Manchus, but the re-

¹ Several Americans participating in that work.

volt was curbed in 1901, the army disbanded, and the party itself practically annihilated.

B. Birth of the Kuo-min-tan.

The growth of foreign encroachment that followed served to bring new elements, mostly from the bourgeoisie, to the ranks of the discontented. The revolutionist spirit was accordingly strengthened and a new secret organization, Ge-min-tan, or "Party of Revolution" came into importance in 1905, though nominally it had been started by Sun-Yat-Sen at Tokyo in 1901. This was the original nucleus, around which the Kuo-min-tan was later formed. During the same period a number of other small groups, similarly anti-Manchu, were formed all over China, but none played a rôle comparable with that of the party of Dr. Sun-Yat-Sen, which after some reorganization, was renamed the Tung-men-hui, or Unity League. Here at last was a well organized political body headed by able leaders devoted to the Revolution.

In the meanwhile the burden of taxation of the Chinese people had grown heavier and the discontent of the masses spread. The strength of the Unity League increased accordingly. In 1910 the "League" succeeded in organizing through Hu-Han-Min and Chen-Chiung-Ming several mutinies in the army; and in 1911 almost the entire South of China was in hands of soldiery in revolt who sympathized with the aims preached by Dr. Sun-Yat-Sen, though not necessarily belonging to his party or even cognizant of his existence.

The mutiny on October 10th, 1911, of the Wuchang garrison under Colonel Li-Yuan-Hung (who in 1916 subsequently became President of China), was the signal for Revolution. Peking recalled Yuan-Shi-Kai, then in exile, and charged him with the task of restoring order. On November 2nd a draft for a Constitution was adopted by the Senate and made public the next day. On November 4th the Throne issued a manifesto, appealing to the loyalty of the people; on the 5th more concessions were offered and a Parliament was promised. On the 8th Yuan-Shi-Kai was elected Prime Minister, and on 13th he arrived at Peking. On November 26th the Regent took the oath to the new Constitution on behalf of the infant Emperor.

Events in the South were, however, developing rapidly

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towards a Republic; and the constitutional monarchy had no chance to survive. Early in November many provinces declared their independence; the Shanghai junta formed a republican Government of Nanking, that was recognized by fourteen provinces. On November 17th Dr. Wu-Ting-Fang, Minister of Foreign Affairs in that Government, addressed the Powers with notes explaining that the Revolution aimed to bring about the abdication of the Manchu Dynasty, and promising protection for the interests of foreigners.

Although on November 27th Wuchang fell into hands of troops loyal to Peking, on December 3rd an armistice was signed; and on 18th of the same month a conference was opened at Shanghai. On December 25th Dr. Sun-Yat-Sen returned to China, and on the 28th was elected Provisional President of the Chinese Republic, the inauguration taking place on January 1st, 1912. On February 12th, the Emperor abdicated. The next day Yuan-Shi-Kai was elected President; and Dr. Sun-Yat-Sen resigned his provisional Presidency and was made Vice-President.

In the same year the "Tung-Men-hui" or Unity League was reorganized and the new party became known as the People's Party, or in Chinese, Kuo-min-tan. Actually the Revolution of 1911 has not brought to the fore any united class or large and well organized group to replace the overthrown monarchy. Hence, as we have seen, the Revolution was not successful for a number of years. In brief, there were eight or nine changes in the Presidency, and two unsuccessful attempts at the restoration of monarchy (one in 1916 by Yuan-Shi-Kai on his own behalf and another in 1917 by Chang-Hsun—for the ex-Emperor). Repeated dissolutions of Parliament occurred; and from time to time opposing Governments have been established in Canton, with two Parliaments sitting at the same time, each claiming constitutionality. Frequently also, different military and political parties found cause to group themselves in various ways either to declare independence from the Central Government or to wage war one with the other.¹

For a few years China was at the mercy of these War Lords; but at the same time the process of "differentiation" of classes

¹ Dr. P. W. Kuo in the "Oriental Interpretations of the Far Eastern Problems," p. 107. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1925.

developed and worked towards the crystallization of definite leading groups. The activities of the War Lords were encouraged at that time by the fact that enormous numbers of people had been impoverished in the years preceding. Endless bands of food-seekers, even more numerous than the adventure-seekers, augmented the ranks of the generals, who in most cases were interested in nothing but their own profit and aggrandizement. But as the process of differentiation of groups or classes developed, several generals of another character came into prominence. Those represented not their own personal interests, but the interests of groups or classes.

C. Constructive Forces.

Along with these disintegrating and destructive factors there were apparent constructive and unifying forces as well.

The telegraph, the railway, and the new roads introduced by foreigners combined to weld the isolated parts of China. The development of trade and the coming of foreign manufacturers had, of course, an inevitable influence on the internal life of the country at large and in the field of domestic industries especially. Constantly, though very slowly, these things were working towards unification of China. They helped to arouse the self-consciousness of the Chinese people, to intensify the desire to get rid of the foreign yoke, and to teach the nation to understand its best interests.

The unsuccessful attempt of Yuan-Shi-Kai to restore the Monarchy in 1916 was the climax of the fight to check the decay of Old China. Its downfall continued with acceleration till 1926, when events indicated that the worst stage of the ruinous process was past, that constructive elements were already at work, that the Old China had no chance for restoration, and that the new one was coming to the fore.¹

The bourgeoisie was united to some extent by the desire to free China of foreigners. Students, who returned home after study abroad, were influenced by the propaganda carried on in the Occident under the leadership of Dr. Sun-Yat-Sen, brought

¹ Already in April 1916 a Southern Confederacy was organized by five southern provinces which declared their independence from Peking. Szechwan joined them in May. A supreme military council at Canton was at the head of that Confederacy.

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with them new ideas and strove for their materialization; Chinese bankers began to organize; Chinese manufacturers were already numerous and self-conscious. To some extent these groups, though each in a different way, represented constructive forces with definite programs. But all embraced and helped to work out the leading doctrine that Dr. Sun had instituted.

D. The Shantung Question—a Renewal of the Revolution.

When the results of the Versailles Conference made it clear to the Chinese that they could not rely on the justice of the Powers, and taught them that China must rely on herself, the guilds and other antiquated organizations of traders were yielding place to trade unions. The proletariat came into existence as a political force and began to organize. Even the peasants, the most backward part of any nation, not excluding China, now raised their heads. The first signs of peasant organization appeared in the southern province of Kwangtung; but later the movement expanded over almost the entire country as instanced by the "Red-Spears" and similar associations of husbandmen. The return of upwards of a hundred thousand Chinese coolies from "fronts," where they were used by the Allies for trench-digging, was another factor that should not be neglected in appraising the situation that prevailed in China after the World War.

It was in 1919, the very year of the Versailles Treaty, that the Kuo-min-tan (suppressed for a time and in 1913 even made illegal by Yuan-Shi-Kai) resumed activity in fostering the liberation of China. In that year, just after the decision of the conference to lay aside the Chinese claims for the return by Japan of Shantung, a country-wide demonstration of protest was arranged and a marked growth of the revolutionist spirit was witnessed. The social support was materially increased, and the Kuo-min-tan again became a leading factor in China's life.

E. Dr. Sun-Yat-Sen and Lenin.

After repeated but invariably unsuccessful appeals to the Powers for assistance in his revolutionary work, Dr. Sun-Yat-Sen turned finally to Russia. Though not completely sharing the views of the famous revolutionary leader of Russia, Dr. Sun established a contact with Lenin and became his ardent admirer.

The remarkable organization of the party led by Lenin, and the iron discipline enforced within it, impressed Sun-Yat-Sen so deeply that he started soon to reorganize the Kuo-min-tan on similar lines. Acting in conjunction with several other Chinese leaders, who had visited Moscow,¹ Dr. Sun-Yat-Sen invited to China a number of Russian advisers in political and military matters. Michael Borodin became the chief political adviser and Galen (or Blucher) was appointed head of a military mission that included experts on the different branches of warfare.

F. The Communist Influence.

In 1922 the Chinese Communist Party was organized. Though insignificant in numbers it was strong in able leaders, and started at once to play a conspicuous rôle in the Chinese Revolution.¹ Its program was worked out in 1923 and its first legal congress was held at Hankow in 1927. The members of this new political force entered the Kuo-min-tan and started at once invigorating the older party by spreading its membership among the lower strata of the nation, especially the industrial workers. In its early years the Kuo-min-tan had been mainly composed of intellectuals and bourgeoisie; but eventually its program was revised to attract broader groups. By 1919 it already had some backing among workingmen and peasants. In 1920 a split occurred in the party; the conservative elements, under General Chen-Chiung-Ming, parted with more radical ones, headed by Dr. Sun-Yat-Sen. Chen-Chiung-Ming advocated decentralization and coalition, Dr. Sun-Yat-Sen was inclined, at that period, towards centralization and the dictatorship of Kuo-min-tan. Finally these two groups came to a prolonged clash of arms that did not terminate in the victory of Sun-Yat-Sen's party until after that leader's death in 1925.²

This split in its ranks and the lessons offered by the October Revolution of Russia prompted further and more radical changes in the Kuo-min-tan program, and in January 1924 it was revised radically. The party itself was reorganized on the line of the Communists of Russia. Probably the most important change

¹ Including Chiang-Kai-Shek, who was at that time a loyal disciple of Dr. Sun-Yat-Sen.

² Actually the Chinese Communist Party came to existence in 1920, at Shanghai, but, formally, it was organized at Canton only in 1922.

² Chen-Chiung-Min disappeared from the political stage in 1921-22.

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in that line was in elaborating the interpretation of nationalism, one of the three basic principles of Revolution advanced by Dr. Sun-Yat-Sen. Formerly the struggle for nationalism meant striving for a political status under which persons of any nationality living in China might enjoy equal rights and opportunities; but the term "nationalism" was now stretched to include the struggle of the Chinese nation for liberation from the foreign yoke.

Notwithstanding the fact that the Kuo-min-tan had been reorganized to resemble somewhat the Communist Party and adopted some of the latter's tactics, the main difference between the two, their attitude towards class-warfare, remained unchanged. The Kuo-min-tan still considered class-warfare unessential in achieving revolutionary changes in the social structure, though its leader Sun-Yat-Sen, under the influence of the Russian Revolution, had greatly modified this part of his teachings.

Moderate though the alterations were, the new program nevertheless laid stress on the part that workers and peasants were to play in the Revolution.³ The Kuo-min-tan now made special efforts to extend its membership to these groups, and succeeded in growing very materially. Being then to a great degree under the influence of the Communists, they enlarged at the same time the field of work of the latter. The Communists, both Chinese and those Russians who were invited by the Southern Government of China (and not, as some observers claimed, exclusively the latter), did not fail to welcome such an opportunity to develop their activities; and in a short time the virtual control of the Chinese Revolution fell into their hands.

Participation in military affairs also opened to them unusual possibilities, though later on it proved to be a trap for the Communists themselves. Knowing that without a well organized and properly trained army the revolutionist South could not expect to curb the reactionary North, Dr. Sun-Yat-Sen was anxious to organize a force of his own, and decided to establish at Whampoa a modern military training school for officers. Being deeply impressed by the status of the Red Army of the Soviets, he called

1. The "manifesto" issued by the Kuo-min-tan at its convention of 1924 outlined the "three principles of the people" and set forth the "fighting program" of the party. The convention also accepted aid from Soviet Russia.

for Russian advisers to assist him in his endeavor. "Sun-Yat-Sen had little talent for finding the bayonets," writes Professor Arthur H. Holcombe; ⁴ "it was the Bolshevists from Russia who showed his followers how to transform his idea into a revolution which could take the field in force and rout its enemies."

G. War Between the Nationalist South and the Reactionary North.

After 1919 the Chinese Revolution developed more speedily than ever. Though still without a well trained force upon which to rely, the South had by 1923 already started a regular war against the North. This was on the occasion of Tsao-Kun's "election" to the Presidency through bribes openly distributed among the members of the Parliament.

Late in 1924, however, a reliable Nationalist army under better trained leaders from Whampoa seemed ready to start a contest with the numerous military leaders of Old China. The first test of these Revolutionist soldiers was in Canton, where they succeeded in replacing the merchants' Guards. Next year they drove out the Yunnanese detachments, and soon were reinforced by thousands of new volunteers from the ranks of labor, especially those who were fighting against the British in Hong Kong. About that time,¹ also, the new Nationalist Government was organized with "many features suggestive of the institutions of Soviet Russia."²

Such a shift to the Left naturally prompted disagreements. In March 1926 General Chiang-Kai-Shek, then the principal of the Whampou Academy (and who belonged to the Centre of the Kuo-min-tan) staged in Canton a *coup*, which forced some of the more radical leaders, including Wang-Ching-Wei, to flight. In less than two months the "Rights" and the "Centrists" were forced to compromise and agree upon many concessions to the "Lefts" in order to gain the support of the masses, so badly needed for carrying on the military campaign which seemed to be the only way to curb the Northerners. In May, therefore, the factions were reconciled; and Chiang-Kai-Shek became the

⁴ "The Chinese Revolution," p. 156. Harvard University Press, 1930.

¹ Soon after the death of Dr. Sun-Yat-Sen, that occurred on March 12th, 1925.

² Holcombe, *ibid.*, p. 104.

leader of the Kuo-min-tan and Commander-in-Chief of the Revolutionary Armies charged with the task of overthrowing the Peking Government and unifying the country under the Nationalist flag.

About this time Chang-Tso-Lin set up a Dictatorship in the North; while several other War Lords, though not in his jurisdiction, made alliance with him, thus forming an advanced front of Northerners and offering resistance to the Nationalists.

In July the Southern Armies started their advance. In August Hunan was in their hands; in September Hankow; and in October practically the entire Central China was under their control. General Wu-Pei-Fu was defeated and forced to disappear from active political life for a while. As usual in China, all military activity was suspended during the Winter; but the following Spring the victorious Nationalist Armies occupied Anhui³ and Kiangsu, and on March 24th, 1927, entered Nanking, which had been abandoned by its defenders. A few days later the remnants of the Northerners in that area were forced to retreat across the Yangtze so as to escape encirclement by other Nationalist columns advancing from Hankow and from the West under Feng-Yu-Hsiang. In the middle of 1927 the greater part of China Proper was already under control of the Nationalists, though quarrels in their own midst now delayed further success. Along with their advance the armies of Chiang-Kai-Shek had incorporated large numbers of Northern deserters who, being inferior in morale, greatly impaired the high quality of Southern forces. In the meanwhile the compromise that allowed Chiang-Kai-Shek to enlist the support of radicals came to naught; and disagreements between factions necessitated much attention to internal strife. In June Feng-Yu-Hsiang discontinued backing the Left Wing Wuhan Government and declared allegiance to Chiang-Kai-Shek (in order to fight Communism!).

In July Borodin and most of the other Russian counselors were forced to leave China. In August Chiang-Kai-Shek under pressure of the "Left" resigned and departed for Japan, only to return in November. In December a Communist *coup* occurred in Canton and the Nanking Government that was formed in April 18, 1927, decreed a break with the Soviets. Next Spring the Nationalists resumed their drive on Peking, and, though

³ In other transcriptions "Ngan-Hwei" or "An-Hwei."

delayed by the Japanese (the Shantung incident), succeeded early in June in entering Peking, which was abandoned by Chang-Tso-Lin, their main opponent. On returning home to Manchuria Chang was assassinated by a bomb, the origin of which provided an exciting puzzle for the months that followed.

So in about two years from the start of their advance the Nationalists, victorious over the reactionary Northerners, claimed control over the whole country,⁴ thanks to the sympathy of the workers, the peasants and the soldiers who deserted the Northern armies to join the Nationalist banners.

H. The "Differentiation" of Classes.

The success of this campaign now carried the Revolution to a new stage, a stage of further social readjustment. It brought about a radical regrouping. War Lords altered their alignments; soldiers of different armies were frequently forced to change their chiefs. But more important still was the problem of assimilating the many Chinese who, having supported the campaign to curb the Northern reactionaries and thus demonstrated their revolutionary spirit, now turned their backs upon the Revolution in its new process of social readjustment. That process affected all classes and all groups, including the Kuo-min-tan itself.

Social differences had, of course, existed for a long time among the members of that party. But they had been held more or less in abeyance until 1924, when the party was reorganized principally under the influence of Chinese Communists, helped and guided by Russian advisers. This reorganization served, naturally, to bring about a split in the ranks of the Kuo-min-tan. The "Moderates," including Sun-Fo, Chiang-Kai-Shek, Tai-Chi-Tao and others, opposed the class war; they frowned upon the growing influence of the Communists and finally, after the death of their leader Sun-Yat-Sen, started to undermine them. In March 1926, Chiang-Kai-Shek organized an armed demonstration against the "Lefts" and, as already stated, forced the withdrawal from political activity of the two leaders who had succeeded Sun-Yat-Sen. One of these, Wang-Ching-Wei, went abroad, while the other, Hu-Han-Min, merely retired.

This was the signal for the masses to go to the support of

⁴ Rather nominally.

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the Communists and to desert the Kuo-min-tan. The class composition of that party in October 1926, as given by Professor Holcombe,¹ was as follows: workmen, 29%; liberal professions, 25%; soldiers, 23%; students, 10.5%; peasants, 7.5%, and merchants, 4.3%. In other words, the lower strata of society were represented rather well; but the backing of the party from outside its ranks was decreasing quite materially.

By May 1926, or within two months of this Canton *coup*, Chiang-Kai-Shek, acting on the advice of his political tutor Tai-Chi-Tao, agreed to compromise and came to an understanding with the Communists; for, as we have seen, the development of the campaign against the North demanded reconciliation if force and support were to be gained.

The obvious dependence of Chiang-Kai-Shek's success upon the attitude of the masses had proved to many the rôle and the importance of the proletariat. It served to awaken the nation to the realization of its strength in gaining its own liberty. On the other hand, the bourgeoisie, who had started the campaign in order to stop the intolerable and unjustifiable competition of the foreigners and had attained some results, were now afraid of combining forces with the peasants and the proletariat. The latter had shown unmistakably where its interests lay, and the bourgeoisie, henceforward, turning their backs to Revolution, now started to organize against the masses.²

¹ The Chinese Revolution, p. 173.

² The Chinese bourgeoisie, being closely connected with the agrarian interests (actually representing the remnants of feudalism), was and is concerned with the status of farmers and can hardly be expected to welcome the liberation of the peasants from the yoke imposed on them by the bourgeoisie itself.

PART TWO—(*Continued*)

II. FACTORS NOW AT WORK IN CHINA

CHAPTER IX

NATIONALISM VS. IMPERIALISM

A. Dr. Sun-Yat-Sen's Teachings. B. The Returned Students. C. The Bourgeoisie. D. Industrial Growth. E. The Coolies Back from Europe.

A. Dr. Sun-Yat-Sen's Teachings.

In the early years of Sun-Yat-Sen's activity he dreamed of liberation for China with help from the more advanced nations, and expected in due course to see foreign capital fertilizing the almost untouched soil of Chinese industry. In those days he neither voiced any suggestion of fighting the foreigners nor preached any sort of hatred towards them. But realities brought disillusion, and made him change these views.

The political principles of Dr. Sun-Yat-Sen, known to the Chinese as San-Min-Chu-I, or the "Three Principles of the People," were in their main outlines of American origin. The immediate inspiration, thinks Professor Holcombe, was Lincoln's Gettysburg Address.¹ However, the three principles of Nationalism, Democracy and Socialism represented no blind borrowing of Western ideas, but were shrewdly adapted to Chinese life, history and traditions.

The first of these principles, that of national independence and the equality of the different groups inhabiting China, originally was used by Sun-Yat-Sen to promote patriotism among countrymen for centuries loyal to their family and clan, but with little regard for the state. Eventually the meaning of that principle was enlarged and was finally directed towards ridding the country of the foreign yoke. Hence Sun's teachings became anti-imperialistic.² "The experience of these forty years has convinced me," wrote Sun-Yat-Sen in his last will, "that to

¹ Holcombe, *ibid.*, p. 134.

² "It was Sun-Yat-Sen who stamped the slogan 'Down with Imperialism,'" writes G. Amann in his "Legacy of Sun-Yat-Sen" (p. 81).

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attain this goal³ the people must be aroused and that we must associate ourselves in a common struggle with all the peoples of the World who treat us as equal.”⁴ To arouse the Chinese to the efforts and sacrifices necessary for making the state strong, Sun-Yat-Sen cited the wrongs which China suffered from foreign Powers. “He dwelt upon the evidence tending to show that the Powers were still bent upon aggression at the cost of China,” declares Professor Holcombe. “He pointed to the foreign possessions on the Chinese coast, to the foreign settlements in her cities, to the foreign consular jurisdiction over her people, to the foreign control of her customs revenue, to the foreign administration of her postal service, to the foreign gunboats on her soil . . .”⁵

The second principle of popular sovereignty or democracy (covering equality, liberty and fraternity) was given an original interpretation by Sun-Yat-Sen; he made a distinction between sovereignty and political ability. “The sovereignty, that is the control of public policy, should be vested in all the people but the public offices should be filled by those only who are able efficiently to perform their duties.”⁶ His idea of equality was not that all are created equal, but that all should enjoy equality of political status. The kind of liberty he thought his compatriots needed most was that “which is based on the recognition of duty, especially the duty of sacrificing the interests of the individual in order to promote the general welfare.”⁷

The Father of the Chinese Revolution had learned much about democratic movements in Western countries and found “that the people at large had little or no direct control over the conduct of public affairs.” Sun thought that “the reconciliation of democracy and efficiency seemed to be a task beyond the powers of Western political science . . . He remarked that in Russia a new type of Government had been recently developed which seemed promising . . .”⁸

The third principle, that of popular livelihood (or the promotion of the general welfare), meant Socialism, though Sun-Yat-Sen himself did not use that term and was not disposed to

³ I.e., The Three Principles.

⁴ M. Joshua Bau, “The Foreign Relations of China.” Revell, New York, 1922, p. 351.

⁵ Holcombe, *ibid.*, p. 137.

⁶ Holcombe, *ibid.*, p. 144.

⁷ Holcombe, *ibid.*, p. 141.

⁸ Holcombe, *ibid.*, pp. 142-143.

accept the teachings of Karl Marx "in toto." He flatly refused to subscribe to the theory of class-warfare; he believed that capitalism would help China to develop industrially and make good for all the long years in which she had remained behind the Westerners. Only through bitter experience and utter disappointment did he modify his views in that respect; and somewhat revised his ideas and altered their interpretation.

At the first national convention in January, 1924, the Kuo-min-tan was reorganized on the lines of the Russian Communist Party, and issued the "Manifesto" mentioned by Sun-Yat-Sen in his last will as one of the basic documents on which his countrymen must rely to achieve the aims of their Revolution. This Manifesto was the fighting platform of the party. In addition Sun-Yat-Sen signed on his deathbed a letter to the Moscow Government declaring very emphatically that in his opinion China must preserve the friendship of Soviet Russia. Taking this letter into consideration with the last will, one cannot fail to see that the formerly mild political doctrine of Sun-Yat-Sen with its opposition to class-warfare had been transformed into a much more radical brand of Socialism or modified Communism.⁹

B. The Returned Students.

In the early days of his activity, the propaganda instituted by Sun-Yat-Sen among the young Chinese students abroad prepared for that leader large numbers of ardent disciples. On their return to China these enthusiastic young revolutionaries worked with devotion to the cause, and proved on many occasions their readiness to sacrifice everything to obtaining liberty for their nation. Many, indeed, paid for their ideals with their own lives, being murdered not only by those Chinese who opposed Revolution, but in some cases even by foreigners. On account of the geographical situation it was natural that Canton should have been a principal source of supply of these student revolutionaries. But it is nevertheless curious that this city which had been the first Chinese port to learn of the aggressiveness of

⁹ Prof. Tai-Chi-Tao, one of the moderate leaders and a political mentor of Chiang-Kai-Shek, considered that Sun-Yat-Sen's third principle of popular welfare concurred with Communism in its final goal, but greatly differed in the methods of attainment.

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foreigners and to witness the humiliation of Chinese national pride, should have sent so many of her sons abroad where they acquired those ideas which afterwards successfully incited their countrymen against the invaders. For in arousing the dormant patriotic feelings of their compatriots, these students were a major factor in forcing the Powers eventually to revise their policies in regard to China and to evaluate anew their status in that country.

The Chinese youth, including those who returned from abroad (and usually became leaders) made themselves heard in 1919, when the Allies at Versailles neglected the lawful demands of the Chinese delegates and left Shantung in the hands of Japan. At that time the students arranged, in Peking and elsewhere, demonstrations against those Ministers who were considered pro-Japanese and forced them to resign; they also organized a boycott of Japanese goods and thereby prompted certain changes in Tokyo's policy towards their country.

At first their activity was limited, but gradually the Young China movement spread to all parts of the former Empire. Indeed, certain pedagogues out of sympathy with youthful political activity complained that "the influence of the students became so great that it was difficult to check it."

On May 30th, 1925, a huge demonstration was arranged by the students as a protest against the killing of a Chinese workman by Japanese guards during a Japanese mill strike. The procession was fired upon by foreign-officered police and among the killed were six students. This slaughter incited widespread indignation against the foreigners; and in less than a month another massacre took place. At Shameen on June 23rd machine-guns from the foreign settlement killed fifty-two Chinese and wounded 117 more. This was a new stimulus to the growing animosity against Imperialist foreigners and helped greatly to strengthen the nationalism of China. In March 1926, the students at Peking learned a further lesson when several of their number were killed in a demonstration suppressed by order of Marshal Tuan-Chi-Jui. Knowing his affiliations, the students quickly concluded that those Chinese who associated themselves with the foreigners were enemies not only of the liberation movement but of the Nation itself.

C. The Bourgeoisie.

In the early days of the Revolutionary movement the Chinese bourgeoisie played, as we have seen, an important supporting rôle by opposing foreign aggression. Imperialism, being mainly if not exclusively of economic purpose, is naturally of great concern to merchants and manufacturers, and in the struggle between Nationalism and Imperialism the Chinese bourgeoisie was as a matter of course on the side of Revolution.

D. Industrial Growth.

Though still backward in economic development, China—impelled by necessity—nevertheless was already demonstrating her determination to become an industrial country. It was merely a matter of time before the rise and growth of her domestic factories would reach such a point that foreign competitors must give way either voluntarily or under pressure of force. In recent years, indeed, such force has already been displayed and to some extent even applied by China, with the direct participation of her bourgeoisie.¹

The main objectives of this brand of Chinese Nationalism were to abolish the unequal treaties with the Powers, to annul extraterritoriality and to restore China's right to formulate the tariff on goods imported by foreigners. In the opinion of Professor Holcombe, the Chinese considered the policies of the Westerners towards their country as "incompatible with their national independence, injurious to their vital interests and ruinous to their national honor,"² and the growing solidarity of Nationalist China compelled the Powers to reconsider their entire line of conduct in the Far East.

The new method applied by the Chinese to get the desired result was that of boycott. In 1919-20 this device was successfully applied against the Japanese; and in 1925-26 was instituted the anti-British boycott from which the trade of England suffered so severely. In 1924 Hong Kong's harbor had averaged 210 vessels a day; but after the Shameen incident its shipping

¹ The Left Wing leader Wang-Ching-Wei has stated in one of his articles that the main difference between China's Revolution and those of France and Russia lies in the fact that hers is a struggle against foreign Imperialism while the two others had as goal the overthrow of their own ruling classes.

² Holcombe, *ibid.*, p. 340.

fell down to 34 vessels daily. Hundreds of little firms failed. The share values of the great British banks dropped more than a hundred points. In six months British shipping at Canton fell from nearly three million tons in 1924 to a third of a million in 1925, and has continued to decline since. Finally, on December 18th, 1926, the British Government issued a memorandum declaring that "the idea that the economic and political development of China can only be secured under foreign tutelage" should be abandoned by the Powers, and expressly disclaimed "any intention of foreign control upon an unwilling China." Nevertheless during the Hankow and Kiukiang incidents in January 1927—i.e., about one month after that declaration of radical change in her policies,—and especially after the Nanking incident in March, England returned for a while to her old ways.

E. The Coolies back from Europe.

The two hundred odd thousands of Chinese coolies who were in Europe during the World War learned many things besides digging trenches for the Allies; and they were resolved to apply these things at home when they returned to China. A large number of them certainly entered different factories, and the majority doubtless became active in the events that followed the World War. In the struggle of Nationalism versus Imperialism these coolies have indisputably played a conspicuous part in inciting their fellow-workers to action against the foreigners.

Until comparatively recent times the Chinese masses have remained passive and unreceptive to the ideas of nationalism and patriotism. But the systematic work of the Kuo-min-tan, which since 1924 has included in its program the problem of organization and political education of peasants and industrial workers, coupled with propaganda and agitation carried on by the intelligentsia (especially the students) and the more advanced workmen (including the coolies back from Europe), has served to alter the situation and bring into the ranks of active revolutionists large numbers of new followers. But parallel with the growth of representation from the lower strata, a decline in the number of ardent revolutionists from the upper classes has been noticeable. As the Revolution developed it became more and more apparent that the part played by the bourgeoisie in the

national emancipation was not as consistent as that of other classes. The explanation probably lies in the fact that at least a part of the bourgeoisie is usually less nationalistic. In trading and similar dealings they enjoy longer and more intimate contact with other nations and are somewhat alienated from their own communities as specializing in business for their own profits rather than for the benefit of all. Be this as it may, the important fact remains that when the development of the Revolution threatened the interests of business men, they parted with the national liberation movement, deserted the Revolutionists, and sided with other groups.

CHAPTER X

IMPERIALISM VS. COMMUNISM

- A. The Nanking Incident. B. The Ups and Downs of Russian Influence.
C. The Split in the Kuo-min-tan. D. The Raids on the Russian Embassy, Consulates, etc. E. The Conflict on the Chinese Eastern Railway.

A. The Nanking Incident.

The series of strikes in China from 1923 onward, especially in 1925-26, and the boycott of foreign goods (especially British and Japanese) forced the Powers to make numerous concessions and prompted changes in their Chinese policies. England's declaration of December 1926 inaugurated the change, and was soon followed by others in one form or another. Under the pressure of realities the groups in control of existing régimes in the various countries gradually realized that their respective positions in China could no longer rely on arbitrary exploitation, but must be reinforced by alignment with some Chinese social and political group.

The development of the Revolution and the accentuated differentiation of classes rapidly created a new situation; for, as already emphasized, the bourgeoisie, dreading a too speedy advance of the most radical elements, withdrew support from the Revolution, and soon became the group on which the Powers found it possible to rely. The Nanking incident was, probably, the decisive moment; for at that time the moderates and the semi-reactionary elements, headed by Hu-Han-Min and Chiang-Kai-Shek, turned themselves against the radicals. The Communists were declared responsible for the outrages and were made scapegoats to whitewash their adversaries.

This incident occurred on March 24th, 1927, the day after Nanking was abandoned by the Northern troops. On that day some unruly soldiers looted the city, ransacked foreign concerns and private residences and even attacked the "barbar-

ians.”¹ Six of the latter were killed and five wounded during the day—an outrage that the population of Nanking has paid for very dearly, as foreign warships bombarded the city, “laying a barrage of shrapnel around the Socony Hill, to which gathered some of the foreigners.”

On April 11th the Powers sent ultimatums to the Hankow Government and also to General Chiang-Kai-Shek, protesting against the Nanking incident, and demanding: (1) punishment of the commander of the troops responsible; (2) apology in writing by the Commander-in-Chief of the Nationalist Army; and (3) reparation for personal injuries and material damages done. They concluded with a threat that “Unless the Nationalist authorities demonstrate to the satisfaction of the interested governments their intention to comply promptly with these terms, the said governments will find themselves compelled to take such measures as they consider appropriate.”

The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Eugene Chen, replied on the 14th with a promise to make good any damages done by Nationalists² and to make reparations for personal injuries; but suggested referring the question of apologies and punishment to a special Chinese or mixed commission of inquiry.

In the meanwhile, Chiang-Kai-Shek and his group had succeeded in gathering on April 15th enough members of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuo-min-tan to form a Plenary Session, and persuaded them to set up a new anti-Communist Government to the complete satisfaction of the foreigners.

Having started that way, the newly established régime had for a long time to continue coöperation with the Powers, often openly neglecting China's interests. In other words, the group in power (actually a neo-militaristic formation) dropped the fight for attaining the goal set up by Dr. Sun-Yat-Sen in his

¹ Those interested in placing responsibility for the incident upon the radicals asserted that these unruly soldiers were Southerners under the command of General Cheng-Chien, despatched by the government (then at Hankow) ostensibly to reinforce Chiang-Kai-Shek, but actually, they said, to discredit him (because he was the arch-enemy of the “Lefts”). Others declared these soldiers were the remnants of the Northerners; this explanation seemed more likely, considering the behavior of the latter in general. The old fashioned Chinese armies were notorious for plundering; the new formations were praised for refraining from it.

² But not by the Chinese in general, as the responsibility of any definite group was as yet not established.

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principle of Nationalism and became allied with its opposite—foreign Imperialism.

B. The Ups and Downs of Russian Influence.

It was in the Autumn of 1923 that Michael Borodin, the Chief Russian adviser, invited by Dr. Sun-Yat-Sen and other Chinese leaders, arrived at Canton with a number of associates in order to assist the Nationalists in organizing their civil and military forces. In January 1924 the Kuo-min-tan was reorganized to resemble the Russian Communist Party in so far as a definite body of party principles, unity of organization and strict discipline were concerned.

Communists, both Russian and Chinese, entered the party and easily secured control. For almost a year thereafter the Kuo-min-tan worked smoothly, experiencing only minor disagreements among its members; but shortly after the death of Sun-Yat-Sen¹ the factional struggle became acute, though the position of the radical "Left" wing continued to be very strong. Borodin thus became the outstanding figure, as one who had the complete confidence of the late leader, and was trusted and backed by the Revolutionists.

During 1925 Borodin was in the zenith of his influence over the Nationalist Government, then at Canton. He enjoyed the complete coöperation of the Kuo-min-tan and (whole-heartedly or not) of all its leaders, especially the widow of Sun-Yat-Sen. Wang-Ching-Wei was the head of the Government; Chiang-Kai-Shek was, at that time, his docile subordinate with no particular influence in the party's affairs. T. V. Soong, a prominent financier and the brother-in-law of Dr. Sun, became Minister of Finances, and Eugene Chen was the brilliant Minister of Foreign Affairs.

At the Second Party Congress in Canton, the Kuo-min-tan passed on January 26th a resolution urging an Alliance with Soviet Russia, for the purpose of undermining Imperialism. In February Hu-Han-Min wired from Moscow that the Third International agreed "that China was not ripe for Communism, that

¹Mr. Sun-Yat-Sen died on March 12th, 1925. Shortly afterwards a group of some 15 Wing members of Kuo-min-tan held a conference at Westernhills, in which they unsuccessfully urged some reactionary changes in party's program.

the economic and social conditions of the country made a successful revolution of the Russian type impossible.”²

Nevertheless the decision of the Party to ally with the Soviets served to split its membership; and in March Chiang-Kai-Shek, who was under the influence of the moderates and anti-Communists, took advantage of Borodin's absence from Canton, and staged a *coup*. Wang-Ching-Wei, the leader of Kuo-min-tan after Sun's death, and head of the Canton Government, was forced to leave the country, a number of troops loyal to the Communists were disarmed, and several Russian advisers were deported. The triumph of Chiang was short-lived. As Commander-in-Chief of the Nationalist Armies,³ he needed the material to carry on the war with the North, and this entailed the support of the masses. As the latter were largely behind Borodin and his followers, Chiang was forced to compromise. On May 15th the reconciliation was achieved, certain supporters of Chiang in his coup were driven from office, the Communists were reinstated, the Alliance with Soviet Russia was reaffirmed, and a number of Russian advisers were attached to the Army. Borodin's position continued paramount and the Russian influence reached its peak.

But, along with military success Chiang-Kai-Shek regained his lust for power. Again he showed his desire to be independent of the party's control, and occasionally made known his disapproval of its tactics. In October, 1926, an Extraordinary Congress of the party passed a resolution requesting the return of Dr. Wang-Ching-Wei. Chiang considered this a personal offense, and the split widened.

In December the Nationalist Government moved to Hankow (or Wuhan⁴). At that time it was Nationalistic, violently anti-imperialistic, (on account of the foreign intervention and the massing warships, gunboats and troops in China), and socially radical. Though not completely communistic, it was nevertheless strongly influenced by the Communists.

A series of grave incidents with foreigners in Kiukiang, Fuchow and Hankow culminated in that of March 24th, 1927, at

² Holcombe, *ibid.*, p. 195.

³ A post to which Chiang was appointed after that coup.

⁴ Hankow was merged with Hanyang and Wuchang, and the three became known as Wuhan.

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Nanking. This served, as has been seen, to split the party further, and encouraged the formation next month of a new Moderate Government at Nanking, opposing the old one at Wuhan. This development was naturally pleasing to those whose warships had a few days before bombarded Nanking, and started the fight for the elimination of the Communists and Russian influence.

In April Chiang-Kai-Shek issued a "Manifesto to the People;" for which he was expelled from the party, by those who remained loyal to Wuhan. But the Wuhan Government was dying: on May 17th Great Britain recalled her representative from Hankow, and so ended relations with this short-lived régime. On June 22nd Feng-Yu-Hsiang, the 'Christian General,' withdrew his support,⁵ and in July Borodin and the other Russian advisers, deserted by some of their followers, departed from China. Thus the Russian influence came to a halt.

On December 15th, four days after an abortive coup at Canton ascribed by Nanking to Russian propaganda, Chiang declared relations with Soviet Russia severed, and Soviet representatives and citizens alike were forced to leave Southern China or be deported.⁶

"Everything that others had done for the glorious rise of the cause and of Chiang-Kai-Shek, everything that had given his army victory, was forgotten," writes Gustav Amann in his "Legacy of Sun-Yat-Sen." "The worst had happened. The very thing had happened which Sun-Yat-Sen had always called the danger which threatened his work. The militarists of his own party got ready to exploit the victory of the Revolution.

"At last Borodin had been overtaken by that terrible disappointment which no foreigner is spared who devotes himself unconditionally to the service of this people," continues the same German observer, who spent many years among the Chinese. "An English writer has somewhere written of the Chinese as of a coarse people quite incapable of gratitude. How the Chinese stand in regard to each other in this deep thing, what they themselves feel, is hard to say. Probably what is treason to us, is to

⁵ Faced with the possibility of Chiang-Kai-Shek combining forces with Chang-Tso-Lin, and then turning against Hankow and eventually against Feng himself, and lured by \$5,000,000 (Mex.) offered to him by Nanking.

⁶ Chiang-Kai-Shek accused the Russians of "intriguing and using China for their own end of fostering the World Revolution."

them only human nature.”⁷ These words seem to be deserved by Chiang-Kai-Shek and his followers, unjust as they would be if applied to the Chinese as a nation.

C. The Split in the Kuo-min-tan.

The split in the Kuo-min-tan originated in these natural differences among members which are unavoidable in any human conglomerate. It became manifest in 1920 when Sun-Yat-Sen and Chen-Chiung-Ming disagreed on some details of the program and was widened in 1922 by the participation in its ranks of certain Communists. The breach was widened still farther in 1924, when the party was reorganized and voted to admit the Communists in number. At the time of Chiang-Kai-Shek's *coup* of March 1926 the process of differentiation developed to such an extent that two distinct opposing camps were formed: the pronouncedly revolutionary “Left” and the conservative or counter-revolutionary “Right.” As a matter of expediency, however, a truce was arranged between the groups. This allowed concentration of action by all Nationalists, regardless of their political differences, until military success encouraged greater audacity and independence of movement on the part of the moderates, the Nanking incident hastening the break.

At that time the majority of leaders in the Kuo-min-tan belonged to the moderates (Center) or to the Right Wing, though the rank and file of members were predominantly of the “Left.” Out of 278 delegates at the Second Party Congress at Canton in January 1926 there were 198 “Lefts,” 65 Centrists, and only 45 “Rights.” The class composition of the party (as per statistics given on the provincial conference of the party in Kwangtung¹) was as follows: 40.6% peasants, 20.4% workers, 10% students, 11% petty merchants, or 61% of peasants and workmen alone. But the majority of Nationalist soldiers, members of Kuo-min-tan, belonged to or were under the influence of the Center.

After the Nanking incident and the break between the moderates, headed by Chiang, and the “Lefts” represented by the Wuhan group, the unity of the Nationalists was completely lost.

⁷ Amann, Gustav, “The Legacy of Sun-Yat-Sen,” p. 268.

¹ Kwangtung had the largest membership of any individual province, namely, 158,085; or more than one half of the total 310,000 in 1926. As for the class of the members, those in Hankow and Shanghai were predominantly workingmen.

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But neither of these two opposing groups was itself homogeneous; they continued to disintegrate and their members frequently changed affiliation, siding now with one group, now with the other, according to their trends and interests. That process was marked by dissolution of the Wuhan administration and by serious disturbances in the Government set up at Nanking. Opposition from both Left and Right forced Chiang-Kai-Shek to resign on August 12th and disappear from the political horizon for almost three months. But in November, when the affairs of Nationalists were going from bad to worse, he returned from Japan to Nanking, regained power, partially restored the civil authority of the party, now on the verge of collapse, through a compromise uniting all the different factions,² under the slogan of fighting the Communists and the reactionary North. Chiang crushed several attempts of the "Lefts" to undermine him; inaugurated a merciless reign of terror; severed relations with Soviet Russia; renewed his military operations, backed by all those who were anxious to see the North defeated; and was applauded, if not openly supported, by the foreigners.

D. The Raids on the Russian Embassy, Consulate, etc.

Simultaneously with Chiang-Kai-Shek's settling of accounts with Borodin and his associates at Wuhan, the arch-enemy of the Nationalists, Marshal Chang-Tso-Lin¹ also demonstrated, in a rather peculiar way, his dislike of the Russian brand of radicalism. On April 6th, 1927, with a written approval of the Senior among the foreign diplomats at Peking, this ardent "defender" of civilization and "guardian of lawfulness" ordered the police (reinforced by his own soldiers) to raid the Soviet Russian Embassy. "Overstepping" the instructions (so was it officially explained for those who wanted to take such explanation seriously) the police entered the Embassy building, immune according to the international law, ransacked it, and seized papers, later declared to be incriminating.² A number of "Communists" were

² Except the Communists and Wang-Ching-Wei's followers.

¹ Chiang-Kai-Shek had negotiated with Chang-Tso-Lin only a short time before, with the object of combining their forces to crush the Communists; but Feng-Yu-Hsiang came out for Chiang and so prevented that *mésalliance*.

² Though much doubt was expressed from many quarters by more calm observers about the nature and origin of those "documents."

arrested, of whom about twenty-five were put to death after the merest pretense of a trial.³

This raid at Peking was followed on May 12th of the same year by that on Arcos House, the Russian trade delegation's headquarters in London, with its further "disclosure of Soviet Russia's activities in China and evidence of Russia's purpose to undermine British power in the Far East." Both raids "helped to promote a better feeling among the foreign powers towards the more moderate program of the Nanking Government."⁴

Notwithstanding the coördinated attack on them from all sides, the Communists, still remaining strong in the South, made on December 11th an ill-conceived attempt to seize the reins of power at Canton. At first they were successful; but in three days the city was recaptured by troops loyal to Nanking and a reign of terror against the "Reds" was inaugurated. Here again we quote from the narrative of the same usually well informed observer cited above: "For a number of days wholesale executions were carried on against persons of whom there was the slightest suspicion of Communism. The Russian Consul-General was arrested and very badly treated and the Vice-Consul and several other Russians were shot without any attempt to hold a fair trial."⁵

On December 15th the Nanking Government announced that its recognition of Soviet Russia was terminated; to which Moscow replied by an announcement to the effect that it never had even given official recognition to the Nanking Government.

In this way further steps were taken by Nanking with the help of Peking, in its campaign against Communists. By the logic of things, yet more principles of Dr. Sun-Yat-Sen were thrown overboard, and other compromises with aliens were necessitated. In their struggle with the radicals (imported and domestic), the moderates and reactionaries of China gradually allied themselves with the foreigners; and the contest between Chinese Nationalism and foreign Imperialism was replaced by one between Imperialism and Communism.

³ "The Rise of the Kuo-Mintang." Foreign Policy Association, New York, June 27th, 1928, p. 175.

⁴ F.P.A., *ibid.*, p. 175.

⁵ F.P.A., *ibid.*, p. 180.

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E. The Conflict on the Chinese Eastern Railway.

The raids just described were but a part of a "treat 'em rough" policy towards everything Russian continued for a long time. Soviet offices were ransacked; Russian citizens were arrested under all sorts of pretexts and frequently imprisoned later without trial or with such mockery of justice as took place in Harbin on October 15th, 1929, on the occasion of the so-called "conflict on the Chinese Eastern Railway." This was a new demonstration of the struggle of Imperialism vs. Communism. It was preceded by a raid on May 27th, 1929, on the Soviet Consulate at Harbin, the site of the headquarters of the Chinese Eastern Railway. The Chinese authorities invaded the premises, arrested a number of persons found there and seized (as had become customary) "documents," proving, they said, that this Soviet Consulate was the citadel of Communist activities in China, —a statement promptly denied by the Russians.¹ This additional example of "law-breaking and safe-breaking" did not constitute a *casus belli* and indeed caused very little excitement at the moment on either side. Russia merely protested but never had threatened to abrogate the Peking Agreement of 1924, as was the rumor published in some foreign papers. Nevertheless, the incident prepared the way for the "conflict" that started on July 10th of the same year. This conflict developed from the invasion of the Central telephone and telegraph station at Harbin by the Chinese in order to deprive the Russian Management of the road of these means of communicating with their subordinates and with Moscow. Then the Chinese authorities dismissed the Russian Manager and all the higher officers, some of whom were deported, and announced that they intended to take care of the road themselves.

It is enough to glance at the Peking Agreement of 1924² to see that those acts of the Chinese were a flagrant violation of

¹ In the "New York Times" of Dec. 3rd, 1929, the special correspondent of that paper in China described the trial by Chinese of the Russians arrested at that occasion as "a travesty of Justice." As revealed by him through an inquiry among consular and newspaper representatives who were present at the time. "The prosecution brought in no witnesses and introduced no evidence of any kind although the prisoners were tried on a grave charge of 'violation of the law forbidding subversive assemblages.'" The stenographic record of the trial, obtained by the author of this book, confirms this.

² See Appendices, especially articles I, III, V and VI.

that "scrap of paper." It was for this reason then, and not on account of love towards the Soviets, that the Powers, including the United States, hesitated to approve openly these arbitrary and unprovoked acts by the Nanking Government, the head of which declared at the outbreak of the "conflict" that his Government had decided "first to take over the railway from the Russians, and then to proceed to other issues." In this way he made it impossible to lay the responsibility on the Manchurian authorities, and incidentally by the same statement he made rather embarrassing the position of those who otherwise might applaud him for "energetic" handling of the Bear.

It would seem that Chiang-Kai-Shek expected approval, or at least to be left unnoticed by others, when he started his abuses of Russia. He was aware that the Powers had little sympathy for the Soviet Government and thought, apparently, that this lack of sympathy would blind them to the precedent he was creating in confiscating foreign-owned railways. But his calculations happened to be wrong! It matters little that other factors prompted Chiang-Kai-Shek's "*faux pas*" and that possibly he planned to undermine the prestige of the Mukden Government by pushing it into a "poor-play." It may also be that he was deceived by his adversaries, Feng-Yu-Hsiang and Yen-Hsi-Shan, who wanted his attention, and, incidentally, his troops, to be drawn to Manchuria, that they might weaken him in the South and in the West. Very likely also there were other factors at work in brewing the conflict. But the mainspring in the entire performance was apparently the desire to injure the Soviets and, probably, to gain thereby the appreciation of the outside world.

The widow of Dr. Sun-Yat-Sen, who was at that time in Shanghai, commented on the conflict in the following terms: "Notwithstanding the fact that the oppressed races of the World are now adopting a strong united front to oppose militarism and imperialistic wars the reactionary Nationalist Government of China is siding with the Imperialists and is relentlessly oppressing those Chinese who are demanding racial independence. On no other occasion have the leaders of the Kuo-min-tan, a reactionary body, more fully exposed their shameless and treacherous character to the world than on this particular occasion."⁸

On July 14th, four days after the seizure of the railroad by

⁸ "New York Times," August 18th, 1929.

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the Chinese, an ultimatum was presented by Russia to the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires in Moscow, declaring that unless the Nationalist Government agreed within three days to a peaceful adjustment of the Harbin incident, she would resort "to other means in defence of the legal rights of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics." At the same time the Soviet Government declared itself "willing to enter into negotiations with regard to all questions connected with the Chinese Eastern Railway," provided the Nationalist Government would immediately release the unlawfully arrested Russians and cancel all orders relating to the seizure of the railway. Nanking answered on the 16th by counter-demands, and Moscow—regarding that answer as unsatisfactory—recalled on the 18th all Soviet consular and commercial representatives in China and suspended communication between the Trans-Siberian and the Chinese Eastern Railway. On the 19th China followed by severing diplomatic and consular relations with Russia. Two days later the Nanking Government issued a Manifesto which (after reviewing Sino-Russian relations since 1920) declared that the Soviet Government had repudiated its promises, made in 1919 and 1920, to return the Chinese Eastern Railway to China, and had repeatedly violated the 1924 Agreements with respect to management and propaganda.⁴ While imbued with the spirit of the Pact of Paris (Kellogg Pact), the Manifesto declared China was prepared to take appropriate measures for self-defence. Moreover two days earlier Rudzutak, the acting head of the Council of People's Commissars, had declared that "while the Moscow Government was compelled to take steps to protect the frontier particularly because of the presence of 'White' Russian guards on the Chinese Eastern Railway, it had no intention of ordering Soviet troops to cross the frontier and occupy any of Chinese territory." He added that the financial interests of the Soviet Government in that railway were of less import than the observance of the Kellogg Pact.

After relations were severed China started mobilization in Manchuria and concentrated her troops on the Russian borders.

⁴ As we have seen in earlier chapters the offers of 1919 and 1920 were not accepted by China, and besides, they did not include a particular promise to return this railway. As to the propaganda it had little relation to such a commercial enterprise, as the Chinese Eastern Railway.

This was followed by similar movements of Russian troops. Then the raids were started bringing the endless arrests of Russians and mistreatment of them by Chinese, protested officially several times by the Soviet Government through Germany, who acted as intermediary. Unfortunately the Russian *émigrés* were driven again into fighting, as a screen for the Chinese attacks and probably to provoke and enrage the Bolsheviks still further. In the meanwhile negotiations were reported to be taking place between Moscow and Nanking through Berlin, but with no results. Generally speaking, the attitude of Russia in that conflict was: "Restore the *status quo ante* and then start negotiations on any and all misunderstandings." The Chinese position stubbornly held was: "Let us discuss at once, and then restore whatever we find possible!"

For a long period Russia displayed extraordinary restraint and self-control. Many provocative acts were left unanswered, for which certain outsiders ridiculed Moscow, claiming that Soviet Russia did not fight back because she had no real force with which to fight. On November 18th, however, the Russian troops finally struck a severe blow at the Chinese, who had annoyed them for several months by raids, unprotested by the outside world. Chinese soldiers started to desert *en masse*, and the population began to fear that a real war was coming. The Mukden authorities decided on November 21st to lay down their arms and asked Moscow's terms. On November 27th Mukden accepted the Russian terms and agreed, with Nanking's approval, to open a Conference at once.

The Russian troops, however, had been withdrawn immediately after the punitive expedition to Hailar, i.e., before the decision of Mukden to capitulate was known. The world was first informed of this fact by the Japanese press. The Japanese Government stated on that occasion most emphatically that it did not consider the Russian advance as anything more than a punitive raid and was convinced that Russia had no intention of occupying any part of Manchuria.

But notwithstanding these assurances by Japan and the fact that on November 27th Mukden, with the (seemingly half hearted) approval of Nanking, had come to an agreement with Moscow, a note was sent on December 2nd by the American Secretary of State to China and through France to Russia re-

minding them of their adherence to the Kellogg Pact and advising an amicable settlement. France and England backed this move, but Japan refused to participate, considering it untimely, as she knew definitely that hostilities had ceased and that a preliminary agreement had already been reached.

At the end of December the controversy virtually closed. Negotiations carried on at Khabarovsk ⁵ resulted in a protocol signed on December 22nd that provided for restoration of *status quo ante* on the Chinese Eastern Railway, immediate withdrawal of troops and the release of prisoners, including those Russians who were arrested at the Harbin Consulate during the raid on May 27th. Provision was also made for the dissolution by China of the Russian "White guard" troops, the banishment of its leaders and organizers from Manchuria and the reestablishment of the respective Consulates. The final settlement, it was agreed, should be reached at a conference in Moscow on January 25th, 1930. Actually this conference was postponed several times by Nanking under different pretexts, and it was not until May 9th, 1930, that the Chinese plenipotentiary Mo-Teh-Suey arrived at Moscow. In December Mo-Teh-Suey left Moscow for China without achieving any agreement, but in March 1931 he returned with new instructions from Nanking and Mukden.

⁵ In Eastern Siberia at the Amur River.

CHAPTER XI

REACTION VS. REVOLUTION

- A. Disintegration of the Kuo-min-tan: (1) Sun-Fo, C. C. Wu, etc.; (2) Tai-Chi-Tao, Chiang-Kai-Shek, etc.; (3) Wang-Ching-Wei, Sun-Tsin-Lin, etc. B. Chinese Communists: (1) The Growth of the Party; (2) The Agrarian Situation. The "Red-Spears" and Similar Organizations; (3) The Growth of the Organized Proletariat; (4) The Encouragement from Outside.

A. Disintegration of the Kuo-min-tan.

In the preceding chapters we have seen that the disintegration of the Kuo-min-tan, though commencing earlier, was accelerated by the party reorganization in 1924, which resulted in the victory of the more radical elements. The split finally widened to such an extent that the "Moderates," together with the Right Wing, were delivered straight into the arms of the Imperialists.¹

The ingress of Communists to the Kuo-min-tan contributed towards the popularity of that party among workmen and peasants, and so shifted the leadership to the Left.² As a result the upper middle class withdrew its support from the party and the Revolution, and certain other elements followed. The strikes of 1924-26 accentuated the difference of interests of the employers of labor and the employees. To strengthen their respective positions both groups had to seek coöperation from the rest of the population; and while the petty bourgeoisie, governmental employees, and part of the intelligentsia joined the upper part of the bourgeoisie and supported the Right Wing of the Kuo-min-tan, the majority of the peasants gradually sided with the proletariat to back the Left Wing. Notwithstanding the fact that the masses supported the Radicals, the Moderates and the Rights, having the military machine in their hands, succeeded in getting the upper hand in the situation, when Chiang-Kai-Shek, the

¹ See Chapter X.

² After the reorganization of its Kwangtung branch, the Kuo-min-tan included over 70% of laboringmen, peasants and students.

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Commander-in-Chief of the victorious Army, revolted against the Government in April 1927.

His coup at Canton in March 1926 was, so to say, a dress-rehearsal for that of 1927. It was short-lived because at that time party control was still in the hands of Borodin and the Left Wing—coöperating with the Communists. The Army had not, as yet, attained the prominence it gained in 1927, and its headquarters were still under the direct supervision of the Government and the Kuo-min-tan. The military successes of the following year, and the fact that the High Command was then located far away from the new site of the Government at Wuhan, made Chiang-Kai-Shek more independent and increased his chances of success in revolting against the Government and the party in 1927. His unremitting contact with the Powers (well represented in the zone of his activities by navy, army and diplomats) necessitated a *modus operandi* with them, and preordained his coöperation with foreigners. Actually on this basis and on the ashes of the Nanking incident the Nanking Government was formed and the struggle against the Powers was discontinued.

Following the swing to the Right which resulted in the creation of this new Government, the latter fell into the hands of the extreme "Rights." Even Chiang-Kai-Shek was now regarded as too radical; and in August 1927 he was forced to resign and leave the country. On his return,³ notwithstanding his declaration of loyalty to Dr. Sun-Yat-Sen's principles and his avowed devotion to the Revolution, he fell entirely under the influence of the extreme "Rights," who gradually became mere reactionaries and, under the pretext of fighting Communism, abandoned the legacy of their late leader and actually turned their guns against the Revolution.

(1) SUN-FO, C. C. WU AND OTHERS.

The extreme Right Wing of the Kuo-min-tan, that actually prepared the *coup d'état* staged in 1927 by Chiang-Kai-Shek (with the backing of well-to-do bankers, merchants and landlords), included among its foremost leaders Sun-Fo (the son of Dr. Sun-Yat-Sen⁴) and Dr. C. C. Wu (the son of Wu-Ting-

³ After a few months spent in Japan, where he married one of the sisters of Dr. Sun-Yat-Sen's widow.

⁴ From his first wife, not Sun-Tsin-Lin.

Fang, Dr. Sun-Yat-Sen's friend and collaborator). Sun-Fo was for a number of years Mayor of Canton and member of the Political Department of the Canton Government. In 1927, at the time of the *coup d'état*, he was Minister of Communications in the Nationalist Government of Hankow (Wuhan), and after that *coup* held the same post in the new Government formed at Nanking.⁵ Dr. C. C. Wu, a lawyer, educated in the United States (where his father was Minister) and in England, started his career soon after the outbreak of the Chinese Revolution, in which his father had played a prominent rôle. In 1913 Dr. C. C. Wu was member of Parliament (then at Peking) and took part in drafting the Constitution. In 1915 he became councilor in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Peking; but in 1917 went over to the Canton Government. He became one of the Chinese delegates at Versailles; and from 1920 to 1924 Vice-Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Canton Government. In 1925 he was a member of the Military Council and Mayor of Canton. When Chiang-Kai-Shek came into power, Dr. C. C. Wu, being considered by Chiang as "reactionary and pro-imperialist," had to leave Canton; but after the April *coup* of 1927, in which he had taken a prominent part, he became Minister of Foreign Affairs in the new Government of Nanking. On Chiang-Kai-Shek's return from Japan, Dr. Wu resigned (December 1927) and left the country. Shortly afterwards, however, he was made special envoy to the United States and with the recognition of the Nanking Government by Washington (on July 25th, 1928)⁶ was appointed its Minister in that capital.

(2) TAI-CHI-TAO, CHIANG-KAI-SHEK AND OTHERS.

Through the process of the struggle with communism the moderate Center of the Kuo-min-tan gradually came into the camp of the "Rights"; and henceforward their political views, undergoing serious modifications, were revolutionary only in name. Professor Tai-Chi-Tao, their leading theoretician and the first President of the Board of Examiners under the Nanking

⁵ In May 1931 he left Nanking and joined the new Government organized at Canton in opposition to Chiang.

⁶ Representative Porter introduced a resolution to start negotiations for a new treaty between the United States and China, which was passed by the House on February 21, 1927.

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régime, is a strong antagonist of class-warfare, out of sympathy with the Agrarian Revolution. He opposes the dictatorship of the proletariat, and advocates in its place the "dictatorship of Revolution." In other words, he is against the hegemony of any particular group or class and believes in the predominance of "revolutionary elements." He has claimed to favor the abrogation of the unequal treaties and the abolition of Militarism, but the actual performances of the Government in which he has been an instrumental force have scarcely demonstrated the success of his followers in gaining these ends.

Tai-Chi-Tao's contention was that Sun-Yat-Sen's interpretation of his third "principle" (that of the people's welfare), though coinciding in its final goal with that of Communism, radically differed from it in the method of achievement. Claiming that Dr. Sun's teaching advocated dictatorship of the Revolution as effected by all classes, he stressed the national rather than the social aspect of Revolution. It seems that in such case the anti-foreign or rather the anti-imperialist character of Revolution should logically prevail; but—even if such was the aim of the Moderates—it has hardly been detectable, in the subsequent attitude of the Nanking Government. The disintegration of the Kuo-min-tan and the civil war necessitated concentration of effort on domestic problems, and a consequent neglect of foreign affairs and the struggle with foreign Imperialism.

According to Tai-Chi-Tao, the chief enemy of Revolution is Communism, as it advocates the class-warfare, and around this part of his program were united the extreme "Rights," the Centrists and some of the more modern "Lefts." To this enlarged "Center" belonged Chiang-Kai-Shek[†] at the time of his break with Wuhan, and together with it he swung over to the extreme "Right." The same course was adopted by Hu-Han-Min, a leader who, with Chen-Chiung-Ming (then the Tutuh of Kwangtung), had incited the revolt of soldiers in 1910-11 against the Manchus, but who became very moderate if not reactionary when the extreme "Lefts" obtained the upper hand in the Wuhan Government.

[†] Gustav Amann in "The Legacy of Sun-Yat-Sen" (p. 128) describes Chiang-Kai-Shek as "stubborn but loyal; a firm adherer to the revolutionary cause" but one who "could not be counted among the most modern."

(3) WANG-CHING-WEI, SUN-TSIN-LIN AND OTHERS.

At the time of the break in 1927 the Left block of the Kuo-min-tan consisted of the "radicals" and Communists, and represented the proletarian and petty-bourgeois elements, merged with some peasants. This bloc was headed by Dr. Wang-Ching-Wei, the old friend and loyal disciple of Dr. Sun-Yat-Sen, who was ousted by Chiang-Kai-Shek in 1926 after the March *coup* at Canton. This group constituted about 90% of the membership of Kuo-min-tan and was very powerful, but lost greatly in prestige when it was deserted in 1927 by some of its members who parted with the Communists and joined the Nanking régime. The deportation of the Russian advisers, and persecution of the Chinese Communists, prompted the departure from China to Soviet Russia of such Left leaders as Eugene Chen, the Foreign Minister of the Wuhan Government, who went through Russia to Germany, and the widow of Dr. Sun, who closely co-operated with the Communists, and moved to Moscow, where she remained for a short period.

Under pressure of events the leader of the "Left," Wang-Ching-Wei, had somewhat moderated his views and, having parted with the Communists, became the spiritual head of the "revisionists." In December 1926 he had defined as counter-revolutionists "those who do not oppose Imperialism and are not active in promoting the labor and peasant movement." Defining the term "masses," he said: "Masses means, of course, the whole nation; but is not the majority of it composed of workmen and peasants? If one should neglect these two classes what would remain of the nation but an insignificant minority? Therefore to awake the masses means to promote the movement of workmen and peasants." . . . As for the term Imperialism—he defined it very sketchily by saying it was represented by "the Powers who do not treat China as an equal." "The anti-imperialist movement and the Workers' and Peasants' movement," he declared, "are actually one and the same," as "the liberation of peasants and workers spells the liberation of China and vice versa. . . . Furthermore those who are lenient to Imperialism are also apt to despise peasants and workmen," and "at the present time there are only two roads open for the Chinese; one of them is the

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Road of Revolution, the other—that of counter revolution.”⁸ But in the battle with Communism, and through opposition to class-warfare, Wang-Ching-Wei modified his teachings very materially. In one of his recent articles, when comparing the Chinese Revolution with those in France and Russia, he remarked, as we have seen, that the main difference between them lay in the fact that the Chinese Revolution is a struggle against foreign Imperialism, while the other two were directed against their own ruling classes. The chief task of the Chinese Revolution, he claimed, is to liberate China of the foreign yoke and to acquire complete equality with other Powers: therefore its methods cannot resemble those used in France and Russia. He declared himself strongly against the hegemony of the proletariat and therefore sided with those who insisted on the expulsion of the Communists⁹ from the Kuo-min-tan. In other words, he summarily joined Tai-Chi-Tao in theory, though he remained opposed to the régime of Nanking and worked for its overthrow, regarding it as a reactionary body. Eventually his opponents succeeded in expelling him from the Kuo-min-tan.¹⁰

As for such more consistent leaders of the “Left” as Dr. Eugene Chen and Madame Sun-Yat-Sen (Sun-Tsin-Lin), they preferred to leave China simultaneously with the commencement of outrages against their Communist associates, and (again by the logic of things) modified their respective views. Those two, however, moved farther to the Left (unlike Wang-Ching-Wei, who first remained and tried to coöperate with the Nanking régime, but finally became its bitter opponent, denouncing it as extremely reactionary). In this attitude they were joined by such a well-known Chinese scholar as Dr. Hu-Shih, who was “reprimanded and warned” by the leaders of the Kuo-min-tan and was even threatened with arrest for his criticism. Dr. Hu-Shih declared the Kuo-min-tan an “intellectually reactionary organization,” which welcomed liberalism to its ranks until it attained to power, “after which the disguising mantle fell away revealing it in its true guise as reactionary.”¹¹

⁸ G. Nagiev, “Kuo-min-tan” (in Russian) p. 60-61. Moscow, 1928.

⁹ As advocates of class-warfare and dictatorship of the proletariat.

¹⁰ In 1930 he was prominently associated with Yen and Feng in their endeavor to defeat Chiang and form a Government at Peiping. In May, 1931, he joined the group of Chiang’s opponents, who organized a similar Government at Canton.

¹¹ A dispatch from Shanghai to the “New York Times” March 12th, 1930.

The same contentions are found, of course, in numerous documents issued by Feng-Yu-Hsiang, Yen-Hsi-Shan and other enemies of Chiang-Kai-Shek and his régime.

B. Chinese Communists.

(1) THE GROWTH OF THE PARTY.

In such circumstances as those created by the downfall of the Wuhan Government, the complete disintegration of the Kuo-min-tan, and the harsh treatment rendered to the Communists, Russian and Chinese alike, the latter had no choice but to disappear for a while from the daylight and to continue their work furtively. Not without the advice from the Third International (where they have, of course, their delegates), they inaugurated a campaign to foster an agrarian revolution by inducing the peasantry to organize themselves and to intensify their struggle with the gentry.

By the end of 1927 the Chinese Communist Party already numbered about 60,000. In June 1929 it had reached the figure of 133,365¹ and has seemingly continued to grow since. The march of events, prompted by the split of the Nationalists, made that growth inevitable. Certain elements were now driven far to the "Right" and hence probably several times as many people went to the "Left." From these elements blossomed the new followers of Communism.

"The left wing of the Kuo-min-tan, which had been the stoutest supporter of civil supremacy over the military was reduced to impotence," writes Professor Holcombe. "The Nationalist generals stood alone at the head of the revolutionary movement. Could they lead it to victory by force of arms alone? And if so, would the result not be merely the exchange of the old militarism for a new, which would still be the same? The masses never gained anything from war, especially from a civil war. Their condition in China is desperate. Indeed it is probably worse than ever if one considers the misgovernment, exploitation and the endless warfare constantly draining their already meager resources. The psychological setting of the Chinese has undergone lately serious modifications. Family discipline has lost much of its former power; nor can religion, which never had much hold

¹ "Pravda," June 25th, 1929. "Situation in the Chinese Communist Party."

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upon the popular mind in China, now render this service either. In such an atmosphere there are many stimuli for the development of Communism."

(2) THE AGRARIAN SITUATION. THE "RED-SPEARS" AND SIMILAR ORGANIZATIONS.

One of the most conspicuous activities carried on by the Communists in China during recent years was that among the rural population. The success of their propaganda was furthered by the attitude taken towards the peasants by a number of militarists who, siding with the reactionary elements of Kuo-min-tan, declared themselves to be enemies of the husbandmen. General Tan-Shen-Tsi, commander of Wuhan forces, having betrayed his group, was shooting the peasants mercilessly, as were many others.

For a period there were in the Northwest only a few militant organizations of farmers known as the "Red-Spears"; but subsequently similar groups came into existence in other provinces as well and have already played a prominent part in the political life of China. The majority of these are under Communist control. Early in 1930 it was estimated that at least 30,000,000 of China's 400,000,000 population were living under regional Communist régimes.

It must be remembered, of course, that China had no regular relations with Soviet Russia at that time. Very few Russian officials were located on her territory and a very rigid ban on the entry of the Russian Communists into China was enforced. Hence the number of Russian Communists actually found in China at that time even if they came unlawfully, must have been very small. Consequently one must be prudent in ascribing all these results to the direct interference of the Russians, and prone to credit the work of domestic agitators and organizers.

In Spring 1930 a Congress of Soviets of China was held and was attended by a large number of delegates from rural districts. Among the resolutions passed by this "First Congress of Soviets of China" were the abolition of private ownership of land; confiscation of private estates and those belonging to churches and monasteries, and their redistribution among needy peasants.

The rapid development of the peasants' uprising in the South

and the spreading of guerilla warfare to some regions of the North are further manifestations of the rise of a new consciousness in the humbler strata of Chinese society.

(3) THE GROWTH OF THE ORGANIZED PROLETARIAT.

Alongside the withdrawal of the bourgeoisie from an active part in the Revolution, the working people displayed a marked activity in organizing the proletarian forces. The years from 1923 onwards were distinguished by the development of industrial and agrarian unrest. Notwithstanding the many severe restrictions put on the labor movement in China by the Nanking "Nationalist" Government, over 400,000 industrial workers participated in strikes during 1928. In the following year this number was at least doubled, the strikes taking place mostly in large factories and mills and on the railways. If in 1928 more than one-half of the strikers lived in Shanghai, in 1929 the movement was widespread; and the year 1930 witnessed a further growth. The wages of industrial workers in China are desperately low, the working hours long and labor conditions usually intolerable. Unemployment, always acute, is made still worse by internal strife and hesitation of foreigners not only to enlarge but even to maintain their enterprises under present conditions. The scandalous situation in regard to child-labor adds to the picture. "From 154,000 workers in the mills studied in 1924 by the Shanghai Child Labor Commission," writes Mr. L. Gannett, "there were 86,000 women and 22,000 children under 12 years of age"; and the percentage of children under 12 employed by mills owned by different nationalities were: "5.5% in Japanese owned mills, 13% in Chinese, 18% in British, and 46% in French and Italian."² Why are strikes so common in China? What is the reason for the unrest among the unbelievably patient and hard-working coolies? The answer seems obvious. But undoubtedly the prevalence of strikes is largely due to the Communists, who agitated the workers of China, explained to them the situation, organized them or reorganized certain unions built earlier by the students, members of the Kuo-min-tan, when it was still actively engaged in realization of the three basic principles of Si Yat-Sen.

² Lewis S. Gannett, "Young China," p. 19.

(4) THE ENCOURAGEMENT FROM OUTSIDE.

Encouragement to consolidate their ranks reached the peasants and industrial workers of China from various sources. Partly it came from the Third International, which issued a series of directives, some of which are given in the Appendices. Partly it came through the activities of the Powers, the influence of which on the Nanking Government was too obvious and was resented by the masses. But most of all the rise of the peasants and workers was furthered by the terror, which became one of the cornerstones of Chiang-Kai-Shek's policy. Nor has this process yet reached its final stage. One can safely predict that this struggle between the Reaction and the Revolution will play a still more prominent rôle in the Chinese situation in years to come and so will affect the Far Eastern situation in general as well.

In surveying international events at the session of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet Union on April 24th, 1926, Mr. Maxim Litvinoff, then the acting Commissar for Foreign Affairs, said: "The recent period beginning approximately with the Fall of last year, could be designated as the period of systematic attack on the part of the aggressive imperialism in the Far East. English diplomacy playing a leading rôle in this policy. . . . In particular the success of the national armies in the past year is a matter of great significance, because these armies helped the development of the social forces of the national revolutionary movement, as well as the creation of favorable conditions for the development of a labor and peasant movement, and removed the danger of a sanguinary suppression of the national revolutionary movement. . . . It is therefore obvious that world reaction has set itself the task of creating a united front against the national armies. At present this situation must be reckoned with, with a full recognition of the fact that the movement aiming at the national emancipation of a people of 400 millions will infallibly continue to progress."³

Since that oration was delivered many things have happened. A change in British policy has been declared. The Nanking incident and the like provided the Chinese with more occasions to learn that those among them who do not enforce strictly the principles of the father of their Revolution have to rely on for-

³ "Russian Review," Washington, D. C., June 1926, p. 143.

eign guns. The peasants and workers have developed the movement foreseen in that oration. And, though the danger of sanguinary suppression of the national movement was not actually removed, as shown by the experience of the unfortunate citizens of Nanking bombarded by the Powers on March 24th, 1927, and then again of Tsinanfu, treated in the same way by the Japanese in the Spring of 1928, the national emancipation of China has infallibly continued to progress, because "Nationalism" has a much broader meaning than the "Nationalist Party." The latter may blunder and actually had blundered. It may split and disintegrate. In certain circumstances indeed it may even disappear. But the Nationalist movement, through which that party was brought into existence, and which served as one of the cornerstones of Sun-Yat-Sen's edifice, is another matter. Even by those of his disciples who became reactionaries and who have made all sorts of changes in their beliefs, the Nationalist movement is never spoken of lightly. It can never die, and must succeed. The Nationalists, led by Chiang-Kai-Shek, have rid their party of Communist control, with the result that the Communists, discontinuing their work in and coöperation with the Kuo-min-tan have turned their energy against the "moderate" Nationalists. The two, becoming more and more estranged, have accordingly gone in the opposite directions; the Communists toward extreme radicalism, fighting for Revolution, and the Nationalists to extreme conservatism and through it to the dependence on the Powers and downwards to positive reaction.

In the middle of 1930 a very serious crisis confronted the ruling group, and Nanking had to wage a desperate war against a large coalition of Northern generals, headed by Yen-Hsi-Shan, coöperating with Feng-Yu-Hsiang. Before the Winter came this coalition was defeated. But still Nanking had to contend with numerous groups in the West and in the South, some of them under the leadership of the Communists. In May 1931 a new powerful group, opposing Chiang, gathered at Canton, threatening a new war.

CHAPTER XII

THE WAR LORDS

- A. Changes in the Manchurian Situation after the Assassination of Chang-Tso-Lin. B. Chang-Hsueh-Liang: (1) His Characteristics; (2) Japan's Interference; (3) His Attitude Towards Nanking; (4) His Part in the Conflict on the Chinese Eastern Railway. C. Feng-Yu-Hsiang: (1) His former Affiliations; (2) His Rôle in the Defeat of the Wuhan Government; (3) His Break with the Soviets; (4) His Participation in the Nanking Government; (5) His Latest Attacks on Chiang-Kai-Shek. D. Yen-Hsi-Shan: (1) His Mysterious Stand in the Past; (2) His Coming Out Into the Open. E. Chiang-Kai-Shek: (1) His Rise and Achievements; (2) His Chances to Retain Power. F. Summary.

A. Changes in the Manchurian Situation after the Assassination of Chang-Tso-Lin.

For long centuries China was a conglomerate of semi-independent provinces, nominally subject to the central governors. But physical, ethnographical, economic and cultural differences made these provinces separate units, lack of communications hindering any attempt to subject them to effective central control. Of the five constituent parts of China, the four outlying dependencies, Manchuria, Mongolia, Tibet and Western Turkestan (or Sinkiang), remained practically unassimilated until recent days. China Proper was and is divided, broadly speaking, in two parts, the Southerners differing from Northerners greatly in temperament and otherwise.

Among other factors contributing to these peculiarities a prominent rôle was played by the foreign influence deriving from the contacts with the outside world. In that respect the South and the North of China had widely different experiences. The Southerners, especially in the maritime provinces headed by Kwangtung and its great port Canton, were the first to know the abuses of seagoing foreign trade, the opium traffic, and the like. They were the first to learn the value of superior military equipment to the Westerners, for they had not only to wage

wars with Great Britain and France, but also to smart under the punitive expedition of General Gordon. Theirs were the ports first "opened" to foreign trade; theirs were the lands where foreign settlements were established and "No Chinaman, no dog allowed!" signs were displayed. But the Southerners quickly learned a great deal from the foreigners. They started to send their youth abroad, and through these returned students learned many Western ideas, including those of liberty, nationalism, democracy and socialism.

The Northerners, on the other hand, enjoyed contact principally with two monarchies, Russia and Japan, and have invited fewer democratic ideas. Consequently while Republicanism gained a foothold with the Southerners, Monarchy remained the only known form of government to the North. But South and North were agreed in the desire to get rid of the foreign yoke and to be independent. It was with this in mind that Sun-Yat-Sen advanced as one of the basic principles of Revolution that idea of Nationalism which in 1928 brought the Southerners to victory in their struggle with the North and which will probably be able in the end to cement the heterogeneous elements of their enormous country.

After the Revolution of 1911 many provincial governors of China refused for a long time to recognize the new order and withheld their allegiance to the Republic. Their method of resistance was through armed force, a means of opposition which henceforward became increasingly important.

Particularly stubborn in this regard was the anti-Republican North, with the result that control eventually shifted to the Southerners. The civil war that ensued decided finally their fate to the benefit of the South. After the victorious advance of the Nationalist Armies (by that time representing the nation at large) the North was forced to abandon resistance, to accept the idea of a Republic, and even to ally itself (though temporarily) with the régime established at Nanking in 1927.

The old-time China had little sympathy with brute force. Those who served professionally as warriors were not regarded as popular heroes; nor did military men occupy positions of prominence in the Chinese community. There, the philosopher, the scholar, the "wise man" enjoyed the greatest respect, while the civil authorities, appointed in consideration of

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their learning, were also held in esteem until their greed, corruption and lack of justice finally brought them to disrepute. The farmers were the pillars of the national economic structure, and merchants and tradesmen had their share of respect. The military men were regarded as least of all.

Of course even China knew episodes in her history when the soldiers interfered in the civil life, defied and displaced governments, dethroned monarchs and enthroned new ones, usually from among their own leaders. But those were exceptional instances; in general, society proclaimed the soldier's profession as unworthy of respect or predominance. The Revolution changed this, as well as many other things.

Under the pressure of the international situation and to some extent the trend of its domestic affairs, the Peking Government started a few years before the Revolution to pay more attention to the army and navy. Steps were taken to improve the training of the leaders, some of the latter even being sent abroad for military education. Hence among those Chinese who received Western education and naturally had obtained certain Western civic ideas were a number of military and naval officers, who participated later in revolutionary activities and on certain occasions even played decisive rôles.

The active part taken by the army in the "first" Revolution of 1911-12 created a precedent for the military leaders to participate in politics; and as the forces under their command became more powerful, even to demand the dominating position.

At that time the population of China at large was not organized politically and therefore the military governors (Tutuhs) and the commanding officers (Tuchuns and super-Tuchuns) became almighty despots, sometimes benevolent, sometimes enlightened, sometimes brutal grafters and extortionists and sometimes mere brigands. But the work for unification and democratization of China inevitably served to eliminate or transform these remnants of an older day. The autocratic War Lords with characteristics of the bureaucrats of the Monarchy gave place to better trained leaders with qualities of statesmanship and a certain respect for the new order requiring coöperation with others. The earliest step in this direction was in joining forces and organizing groups in the military alliances of different generals and later of provincial armies. During the first years after

the Revolution of 1911 there were four main military alignments: First, there was the so-called Chihli group, headed by Feng-Kuo-Chang and Tsao-Kun and which drew support from the provinces of Chihli, Shensi, Hupei and parts of Kiangsu, Honan and Kiangsi. From a split in the Chihli party evolved the second important group, that of Anhwei, or the "Anfu clique," relying on Chekiang, Fukien, and part of Shantung. The name of this party derived not from the province of Anfu or Anhwei, but from Anfu Street, where the club was located in Peking; and it was led by Tuan-Chi-Jui, the first Minister of War of Republican China, Prime Minister in several Cabinets, and Provisional Chief Executive at Peking from 1924 to 1926. The third, or Manchurian group, represented the Three Eastern Provinces, parts of Mongolia and the province of Anhwei, and was under the leadership of Chang-Tso-Lin, then War Lord of Manchuria. The fourth or Southern group relied on Kwangtung and Kwangsi, and to some extent on Szechwan, Kweichow and Hunan. Throughout the presidencies of Yuan-Shi-Kai (1912-1916), Li-Yuan-Hung (1916-1917 and 1922-1923), Feng-Kuo-Chang (1917-1918), Hsu-Shih-Chang (1918-1922) and Tsao-Kun (1923-1924), and the provisional governments of Tuan-Chi-Jui (1924-1926) and Chang-Tso-Lin (1924-1926), these several groups were constantly at odds and frequently engaged in civil warfare.

The Revolution of 1911 originated, as we know, in a revolt of the garrison at Wuchang, under Li-Yuan-Hung. But although the uprising was started by provincial soldiers, the troops involved in it were soon defeated by the modernized army, loyal to the old régime, which was sent by Yuan-Shi-Kai to crush the revolt; and the negotiations with Peking, which shortly afterwards took place at Shanghai, were entrusted to the civilian leaders of the Revolution. After the abdication of the Emperor, the office of President was assumed by Yuan-Shi-Kai. He received loyal support from Li-Yuan-Hung and other generals who had participated in the revolt, as well as from the army which had been organized and trained under his personal supervision in the years before the Revolution. But he was still faced with the problem of disbanding the numerous provincial armies which had sprung up in the years preceding the revolt, and this he never succeeded in achieving.

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From the very beginning of his Presidency Yuan-Shi-Kai showed contempt for the new order, dislike of the Revolutionist Southerners and occasionally an open disregard for the Constitution. All these things served to brew opposition. In March 1913 one of the parliamentary leaders of the Kuo-min-tan, Sun-Chiao-Jen, was mysteriously assassinated at Shanghai, and opposition deepened when rumors placed the responsibility for this crime on Yuan-Shi-Kai. Already seven provinces were united in their plans to oust Yuan and were only awaiting a pretext. Such an occasion was found in the conclusion by Yuan of the so-called Reorganization Loan without referring it to Parliament, and in the order issued by the President in July to remove several Southern "Tutuhs" whose attitude he considered as defiant. The consequent uprising spread all over the South, including the Yangtze Valley, and became known as the "Second Revolution." This rebellion was, however, crushed within two months. Certain leaders were arrested. Others, including Dr. Sun-Yat-Sen, were forced to leave China. But the struggle between the North and the South, so started, continued with infrequent intervals through all the years that followed, but with periodic shifting of forces, changing alliances and altering aims and methods.

From time to time hostilities were suspended, peace conferences convened (in 1917 by Feng-Kuo-Chang, in 1918-19 by President Hsu-Shih-Chang, etc.), and solemn declarations of conciliation were issued. But always the quarrels quickly recurred and fighting was renewed by one group or another, or by one combination of generals or another.

In 1917 the Southerners formed at Canton their own independent Government which continued under Sun-Yat-Sen with some intervals until his death in 1925, and which with occasional lapses has survived at Canton, Hankow and Nanking to the present time.

In 1918 the strength and arrogance of the militarists of the North grew to such a degree that they even organized a Parliament composed of their own nominees and therefore known as the "Tuchuns' Parliament."

In 1919 President Hsu-Shih-Chang, a sworn brother of Yuan-Shi-Kai, convened at Shanghai a peace conference, which, however, proved fruitless. In 1920 an actual war arose from the

quarrel between the Chihli group and its offspring "Anfu-clique" which was trying to dislodge all the militarists who were not in sympathy with them. The Chihli group, then led by Tsao-Kun, benefited by the arrival from Honan of troops under Wu-Pei-Fu (the Loyang War Lord), not only defeated the Anfu Army, but also brought to an end the Anfu party itself. At that juncture, the notorious War Lord of Manchuria and former brigand, Chang-Tso-Lin, appeared in Peking, moved his troops inside the Great Wall and offered to Tsao-Kun his coöperation. This move, however, was not welcomed by Wu-Pei-Fu, whose aims conflicted with those of Chang. Therefore in April 1922, when Chang-Tso-Lin was massing his armies around Peking, he was attacked by Wu-Pei-Fu assisted by Feng-Yu-Hsiang. The two latter generals won a decisive victory, forcing Chang's armies to retreat and Chang himself to return to his own capital at Mukden.

In October, 1923, President Li-Yuan-Hung (who had been reëlected only about a year before, after Hsu-Shih-Chang was forced to resign) was replaced by Tsao-Kun. The bribes paid by the new President to members of Parliament in the "election" prompted the Southern leaders to start war against "corrupt" Peking, though without much effect. With circumstances thus favoring his plans, Wu-Pei-Fu succeeded in consolidating the military forces behind the Chihli group. By 1924 he had under his control the armies of Chihli, Shensi, Hupei, Szechwan, Hunan, Fukien and parts of Kwangsi and Kweichow,—in other words, the total power of the former Chihli and Anfu groups combined with considerable support from the former territory of the Southern militarists.

September of that year found the power of Chang-Tso-Lin increasing. He was backed at that time by certain foreign interests, and started a war against Tsao-Kun and Wu-Pei-Fu, declaring them "traitors." From this contest between Chang and Wu a third leader, Feng-Yu-Hsiang, unexpectedly sprang up as the victor. Acting on the side of Wu-Pei-Fu, he betrayed him, occupied Peking on October 22nd, arrested President Tsao-Kun, ejected the ex-Emperor from his palace, declared for peace and formed a provisional government. Wu-Pei-Fu had to retire for a while, Chang to halt his campaign. In November Tuan-Chi-Jui, the former chief of the Anfu party, was made Provisional

Chief Executive and remained in that office till April 1926, when he was replaced by Chang-Tso-Lin.

Allies only by circumstances, Feng and Chang soon became the chief contestants for control over North China. The troops of Feng-Yu-Hsiang, reinforced by deserters from Wu-Pei-Fu, were reorganized and formed the so-called People's army (or Kuo-min-chun in Chinese) and late in 1925 were already fighting against Chang-Tso-Lin. The participation of Wu-Pei-Fu on the side of Chang, and interference by Japanese, who prevented Kuo-Sun-Lin (a subordinate of Chang, who revolted against him) from marching on Mukden,¹ turned this war into a victory for Chang. Menaced by Chang's troops, despatched by the sea, and pressed by the foreigners, Feng evacuated Tientsin in March 1926, and in April abandoned Peking. Shortly afterwards he went into temporary retirement from military and political life and departed to Soviet Russia.

Control of the Government now fell into the hands of Chang-Tso-Lin. On December 2nd the formation of the Northern Military Alliance (An-kuo-chun) with Chang-Tso-Lin as Commander-in-Chief was announced, and its aim was declared to be the annihilation of the Nationalist armies, then advancing under Chiang-Kai-Shek northwards to Peking. On January 12th, 1927, after a short period of coöperation with Wu-Pei-Fu and feigned respect to the Constitution, Chang-Tso-Lin declared himself Dictator of the Chinese Republic.

Notwithstanding all the barriers created on their way by those who did not believe in or did not desire their final success, the Nationalists continued their triumphant advance. Even the Nanking incident and the invasion of Shantung by Japan could not permanently impede their progress and thanks to the support of the masses they dispersed the armies of Chang-Tso-Lin's allies and brought to an end his régime. He abandoned Peking on June 1st, 1928, and the city was occupied by the victorious troops of the Revolution. On his way home Chang's train was bombed near Mukden, and the notorious bandit, who was for a time the supreme ruler of at least a part of China, ended his colorful career. That death brought in its wake far-reaching changes all over China and especially in Manchuria. In Chang-Tso-Lin disappeared a powerful supporter of the

¹ Kuo-Sun-Lin was captured and executed by Chang-Tso-Lin's order.

reaction, a confirmed advocate of the old order, and, incidentally, a strong figure who had been of great value to Japan in her manifold activities in Manchuria.

B. Chang-Hsueh-Liang.

The death of Chang-Tso-Lin was a shock for Manchuria. Who could succeed him? What attitude should Manchuria adopt towards the new régime just established at Peking? What should be her relations with Japan, who claimed unusual rights in Manchuria, controlled all the movements of troops in that country and tried, though unsuccessfully, to protect her satellite, Chang-Tso-Lin (while he was obedient), and to prevent the Nationalists from gaining the upper hand (as in the Tsinanfu incident). Not until June 20th, about two weeks after the bombing of his train occurred, was the death of Chang-Tso-Lin announced. His son, Chang-Hsueh-Liang, the so-called "Young Marshal," was proclaimed his successor, mainly on consideration of his father's prestige, but also probably to avert a clash between pretenders for that "crown."

(1) HIS CHARACTERISTICS.

A man of about thirty, with no unusual abilities but with some Western education, Chang-Hsueh-Liang was a reformed addict of the opium-smoking habit (a proof of his strong will power), a sportsman and a soldier of experience. He inherited a domain economically stronger than any other part of China and with a large well trained army estimated by some students as 400,000 strong. It was equipped according to Western patterns with foreign advisers and experts in manufacturing ammunition.

(2) JAPAN'S INTERFERENCE.

Faced with the hostility of his subordinates, the governors of the Kirin and Heilungkiang provinces, and menaced by the prospect of Japanese domination, Chiang at once proposed negotiations with the Nationalists. But in doing so he drew upon himself the disfavor of Tokyo. The dictum "No fighting on Manchurian soil" had been a part of the "positive" policy of General Tanaka's Government since its inception; and to it the new dictum "No allegiance to Nationalists" was now added.

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The Tsinanfu incident originated on May 3rd in a clash between the Chinese and the 5000 Japanese troops which had been stationed there in 1927, under protest from China, and ostensibly for the purpose of protecting about 2000 Japanese residents and their property. The incident ended in the death of Tsai-Kung-Hsi, the Commissioner of Foreign Affairs, and about 3000 other Chinese, while the Japanese losses numbered 50 killed and 200 wounded. On May 7th it was followed by a twelve-hour ultimatum from General Fukuda demanding drastic punishment of the Chinese commander and the complete disarmament of the troops engaged in the anti-Japanese outbreak. The incident blocked the Nationalist advance for a time; but, as we have seen, it failed to save Chang-Tso-Lin or to keep the Nationalists away from Peking and the neighborhood of Manchuria.

Having failed by one means Japan tried another. Through Hayashi, her Consul-General at Mukden, she advised the "Young Marshal" to terminate negotiations with Nanking¹ and, when he did not abide by that counsel, sent another Hayashi (namely Baron Gonsuke Hayashi, a diplomat of highest rank), as special envoy to Mukden to inform the local government "that she was opposed to the union of Manchuria with the rest of China and that if the negotiations for union were continued she would take such action as she felt proper to protect her interests."² Though urged to declare independence, Chang-Hsueh-Liang declined to do so. He suspended negotiations with Nanking but later on renewed them and finally, defying Japan, announced his allegiance to the Nationalist Government.

(3) HIS ATTITUDE TOWARDS NANKING.

Although he had officially recognized Nanking's authority, and was even included in the National Government Council at Nanking, Chang nevertheless reserved a great deal of independence for Manchuria and through it succeeded in keeping his domain out of the struggle that was shortly afterwards renewed between Chiang-Kai-Shek and other War Lords. As has happened

¹ This attitude of Japan apparently was prompted not only by her desire to see Manchuria "independent," i.e., under her own control with probably the same fate as that of Korea, but also by her desire to gain a better bargain from Nanking with which she was negotiating on the latter's plan to abrogate unilaterally the commercial Treaty of 1896.

² "Current History," October 1928.

on many similar occasions (for instance in Russia during recent years) foreign interference defeated its own purpose. In this instance it served to unite China against the external threat and so decided the fate of Manchuria contrary to the Japanese plan.

(4) HIS PART IN THE CONFLICT ON THE CHINESE EASTERN RAILWAY.

It was on territory under the jurisdiction of Chang-Hsueh-Liang that the unlawful dismissal and arrest of the Russian officials of the Chinese Eastern which occurred at Harbin on July 10th, 1929, took place, followed by the arbitrary decision of the Chinese authorities to assume the management of this road. The troops that subsequently attacked Russian territory were Manchurian troops; yet it seems that no one tried to lay the entire responsibility for this outrage upon the "Young Marshal." He had, apparently, merely sanctioned what had been done by local officials and had "coöperated" with Nanking (it was Chiang-Kai-Shek who had declared that his Government "had decided to take over the Railway from the Russians"). It was Manchuria who suffered the greatest material damage from that conflict. The Russians, after long weeks of patience and numerous warnings finally struck back at the Chinese; ³ but though the troops which were routed were Manchurian, the chief victim of the military and especially of diplomatic humiliation was Chiang-Kai-Shek, as the originator of the conflict, and not Chang-Hsueh-Liang.

When the conflict was over and the negotiations authorized by Mukden and Nanking had ended in the signing of the Khabarovsk protocol, Nanking continued to hinder the conference scheduled to convene at Moscow on January 25th, 1930, for the settlement of all the existing misunderstandings. Under different pretexts he postponed the appointment of delegates to this conference, though Chang-Hsueh-Liang (together with Dr. Wellington Koo, his Minister of Foreign Affairs) insisted on keeping the engagement and finally saw their demands met, when, early in May 1930, Mo-Teh-Suey, the new Chairman of the Administration of the Chinese Eastern Railway left for Moscow.

³ "Twenty-eight attacks upon Soviet territory by Chinese and Russian White soldiers between September 10th and 23rd, several of which resulted in killing of Russian non-combatants and robbery." "Current History," November 1929.

C. Feng-Yu-Hsiang.

An extremely interesting figure among the War Lords is Feng-Yu-Hsiang, or the "Christian General." As such he is known to many foreigners because he embraced Christianity, and being an ardent Methodist, at one time introduced into his army the custom of singing Christian hymns.

The son of a humble peasant in Anhwei province, Feng learned early in his life a good deal about nationalism and patriotism, even before he started his military education. He has remained a simple-living hard-working son and servant of the people, to whose welfare he has devoted his life.

At least until recent times, his armies have differed materially in discipline, training and manner of living from those of other Chinese leaders. As far as possible Feng preferred to recruit his ranks from among those simple peasants who had never before served as soldiers and were not spoiled by military life. He has endeavored to teach every one to read, write, and learn a trade. He has instilled in his troops the sentiment of loyalty to their country, an ideal new to most Chinamen. "Die for your country!" became the slogan of his army, "love the people and do not disturb them!" Instead of abusing the population his soldiers were directed to build roads and make all kinds of improvements in the countryside.

An avowed realist, Feng became known to the world as a man of rapidly changing friendships and affiliations, who has betrayed several of his allies and deserted various causes. But no one can rightly accuse him of consciously betraying the Revolution and the cause of his nation.

(1) HIS FORMER AFFILIATIONS.

Feng-Yu-Hsiang started his military training when already a man of experience in life and politics. Noted for his high ability, he progressed very rapidly in his career and by 1921 was acting Tsuchun of Shansi, where he worked in contact with Yen-Hsi-Shan, the "Model Governor" of that province. The following year Feng was transferred to Honan, where he met Wu-Pei-Fu, and after a few months was appointed Inspector of the Army and moved to Peking. A little later he was destined to play a prominent rôle in the war between Wu and Chang-Tso-

Lin; first in 1922, when he helped Wu to defeat Chang, and next in October 1924, when, as Director of Defense of the North-western frontier, he suddenly occupied Peking, arrested President Tsao-Kun, ejected the ex-Emperor, Pu-Yi, from his palace, and forced Wu-Pei-Fu, his ally, to retire. In 1926 Feng entered into a contest with Chang-Tso-Lin. But at that time Wu-Pei-Fu came out for Chang and helped him to defeat the "Christian General"; and the latter retired and shortly afterwards departed for Moscow, whence it was said he received ammunition and money.

(2) HIS RÔLE IN THE DEFEAT OF THE WUHAN GOVERNMENT.

After a sojourn of several months in Russia Feng returned home, and in December 1926 entered into an alliance with the Nationalists. Soon he was coöperating with the new allies in the war against Chang-Tso-Lin. He occupied the Lung-hai Railway with part of his troops and advanced eastward from Shensi with the remainder. That was the time when the Nationalists were split and Feng had to decide for which faction he was going to fight.

Early in June Feng was at Chengchow, where a conference with the representatives of the Wuhan Government took place. A few days later he moved to Hsuechowfu and conferred with Chiang-Kai-Shek. Considering the radical group as having no chances to win, knowing of some negotiations carried on by Chiang-Kai-Shek with Chang-Tso-Lin that made possible their coöperation for "the suppression of Communism," and being a realist by nature, Feng decided to side with the Moderates, and so hastened the defeat of the Radicals.

(3) HIS BREAK WITH THE SOVIETS.

Rumors claimed that for his consent (1) to denounce and suppress the "Reds" and (2) to assist Chiang-Kai-Shek in his attack on Peking, Feng received from Nanking quantities of ammunition and a certain sum of money as well.

Whatever Feng's relations with Moscow may have been they were now, naturally, at an end.

After his attempt to please Chiang by denouncing Communism the Christian General was forced to break with the Soviets. Notwithstanding this open rupture some students con-

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tinued to claim that Feng's coöperation with Russia remained in force and that supplies for him still came from Russia; but this is not an assertion that can be accepted as logical. Subsequently Feng made an attempt to reconcile the Nanking group with that of Wuhan, but with no effect. The Wuhan "Left-Wingers" were too radical for those in control of the Government at Nanking.

(4) HIS PARTICIPATION IN THE NANKING GOVERNMENT.

For a few months continuous disagreements in the South prevented any serious operations against the North. But in December, after Chiang-Kai-Shek's return from Japan, the advance was renewed and Feng-Yu-Hsiang had again to coöperate. The Fourth Plenary Session of the Kuo-min-tan, held on February 1st, 1928, succeeded in bringing together the scattered forces of Nationalists; and during the first months of that year the drive was resumed on the entire front. Chiang-Kai-Shek's armies advanced via Shantung along the Tientsin-Pukow Railway; Feng-Yu-Hsian, in coöperation with Yen-Hsi-Shan, moved along the Hankow-Peking line. By April these allied armies meeting practically no resistance were already on the line stretching from Kalgan, i.e., Northwest from Peking, to Southern Shantung, and would soon have encircled Peking but for the Japanese interference at Tsinanfu that brought the Eastern column to a halt.¹

In the meanwhile Feng and Yen continued to advance towards Peking and their troops were the first to enter the Northern Capital,² abandoned by Chang-Tso-Lin after his appeal to the adversaries to cease hostilities had failed to enlist any support.

When the military chiefs convened at Peking (or Peiping, as it was renamed) to discuss the question of disbanding some troops and redistributing others Chiang-Kai-Shek, obviously interested in centralization, suggested a drastic disbandment. He was supported by Yen, but Feng offered opposition, claiming that a larger force should be maintained at least until the settlement of the Manchurian situation. With the formation of the new Nanking Nationalist Government, Feng was made Minister of

¹ A considerable part was even disarmed by the Japanese.

² Actually Yen's troops were allowed to enter Peking first.

War and named as one of the five Chairmen of the Supreme boards of the Kuo-min-tan. But this coöperation was not lasting. Chiang's authority remained unrecognized by a number of provinces. When he tried to force it on them he applied methods resented even in his own party. On the other hand many objected to his dependence on foreigners. The conflict of interests of the different Powers in China further aggravated the situation, emphasizing the struggle of Imperialism versus Communism and alienating from Chiang-Kai-Shek the more radically inclined elements.

Apparently the struggle between the War Lords was becoming much more a matter of principles than it was before, when it seemed to be rather a matter of personal dislikes and ambitions or the desire to make money.

5. HIS LATEST ATTACKS ON CHIANG-KAI-SHEK.

The Third Kuo-min-tan Congress was convoked at Nanking in March 1929 in a political atmosphere highly unfavorable to the Nanking group. Feng and other leading generals were absent; opposition to Chiang was growing on all sides.

By April there were already serious disagreements between Chiang and the Christian General Feng. Certain other leaders also objected to Chiang's "Nationalization" in which they foresaw undue centralization and efforts to restrict the power of local commanders. When in the Spring of 1929 Chiang issued orders to arrest Li-Chai-Sun, head of the Canton regional government, and there were even rumors that the latter had been executed, Feng, following the example set by several other militarists, resigned his post of Minister of War, pleading illness, yet remained neutral in the renewed struggle between Nanking and Wuhan. But such an attitude was possible only for a short while. Soon Feng was forced to show more actively his disapproval of Chiang's policies. Fortune, however, was not on his side at that moment and he was forced to retire and leave the country. But he managed to delay his departure and in the Fall of the same year was ready to strike again.

In the beginning Feng himself was not identified as actually leading the troops, but his subordinates were in the field. On October 11th, the Nanking Government issued a punitive mandate against Feng's Kuo-min-chun, then marching towards Han-

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know, and ordered the arrest of Lu-Chung-Lin, Minister of War, and of Lien-Chi, two of Feng's ablest generals, who had been staying at Nanking but who had managed to slip away. At the same time Chiang sent a telegram to Yen, the Governor of Shensi, where Feng had been avoiding Nanking's wrath since July, demanding an explanation of the movements of Feng's troops southward at a time when Yen was responsible for their disbandment. Yen did not yield, and—though on October 23rd he declared his neutrality—he was soon thereafter a recognized leader of the "revolt."

At the time when the conflict on the Chinese Eastern Railway reached its climax an understanding was effected between Chiang, Feng and Yen in consideration of certain payments made by the former to the two latter. But according to the custom in China, hostilities were renewed with the coming of Spring and Feng was again fighting together with Yen against Chiang.

Early in July 1930 the ruling group in China reached a crisis. The civil war between Nanking and the large coalition of Northern generals headed by Yen-Hsi-Shan and Feng-Yu-Hsiang, and regarded with some favor by Chang-Hsueh-Liang, was being waged with persistence.

Various groups in the West and in the South were in revolt and a number were under Communist leadership. Coupled with the peasant uprisings and backed by the "Red Armies" composed of workmen and farmers (though called "bandits" by some naïve observers), they made the task of the Nanking Government extremely difficult, though before the end of the year (1930) the Northern Coalition was defeated, and Feng and Yen were forced to retire.

D. Yen-Hsi-Shan.

(1) HIS MYSTERIOUS STAND IN THE PAST.

The other very powerful War Lord was Yen-Hsi-Shan, the "Model Governor" of Shensi,¹ who remained a kind of mystery man as he preferred neutrality and seclusion, staying away from the wars and from the political game at large. The explanation

¹ Born in 1882 in Shansi, graduate of a military school in Japan, he joined Revolutionary cause before Revolution started. A scholar, he wrote an interesting book on the discipline of the Revolutionary army.

of that "mysterious" stand of Yen could be found probably in his geographical position, which enabled him to take the "right" side at the proper moment without involving himself in actual fighting, and without even making any hasty commitments. His province, Shensi, was far from the actual fields of encounters, and from the centers of foreign exploitation, and very near both Peking and Manchuria. Economically sound, and unaffected by the numerous civil wars, his province was until recent times exceptionally fortunate and relatively prosperous. In view of this favorable economic situation its people were not so ripe for revolt, and Yen-Hsi-Shan "the benevolent despot," paying due attention to the welfare of the population, wisely preferred, as long as possible, to guard them against the misery and vicissitudes inevitable in any war.

(2) HIS COMING OUT INTO THE OPEN.

But with the development of the Revolution and spreading of its influence over the whole of China no province could remain isolated. Shansi was no exception. Besides, the fate of Peking was not a matter of indifference to Yen. He was forced to take part in the coördinated attack on Peking in 1927-28 and even to occupy Peking with his troops after Chang's retreat. Late in 1928, Yen had to accept (though unwillingly) an official post in the Nanking Nationalist Government; and by the following year he found himself involved in the unpleasant struggle of the different factions. Having offered refuge in his province to Feng-Yu-Hsiang, and having connived at the delay of the disbandment of Feng's army, Yen was forced by Chiang-Kai-Shek to come out to the open. He did so by finally declaring himself against the Nanking dictator.

In the middle of February 1930, Yen wired Chiang a request that he resign his post and retire from politics, adding that he, Yen, was then willing to do the same. Chiang answered this request by making preparation for war; Yen-Hsi-Shan then declared himself in the coalition of the Northerners against the "personal dictatorship" of Chiang-Kai-Shek.

The events that followed during March and April completely eliminated the nominal authority of the Nanking Government over North China, leaving only parts of Honan and Shantung under its jurisdiction. On March 18th all the administration

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bureau at Peking were taken over by local authorities, who ousted the appointees of Nanking. On April 2nd, Yen-Hsi-Shan assumed the office of Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces (calling them "National") and pledged his support to the movement to overthrow Chiang.

Nanking answered in two days by a mandate for the arrest of Yen. On April 8th the armies of the Northern coalition started their advance southward. On the 14th Yen ordered all customs revenue of Tientsin to be kept for the needs of the Northerners (after laying aside what was necessary to cover the foreign debts) and appointed Lenox Simpson (Putnam Weale), the former associate of Chang-Tso-Lin, to take charge of the customs at that port.² In Shensi, his own province, Yen established a tobacco monopoly in violation of treaties and so undermined foreign interests there. In June Shantung was evacuated by troops loyal to Chiang and was occupied by the Northerners; early in July 1930, the war waged by Yen-Hsi-Shan, with large forces engaged, was continuing with unusually severe fighting. The attempts of the Manchurian War Lord to mediate between the rivaling parties were of no avail. But, finally, when Yen, together with Feng, were defeated and forced to retire, Chang openly joined Chiang.

E. Chiang-Kai-Shek.

It seems to be appropriate to close this gallery of portraits of the Chinese War Lords with one of the most modern. General Chiang-Kai-Shek, the "President of the Government" now at Nanking, represents the new type of War Lordism and is considered by the Westerners to be "the" strong man of contemporary China.

In his younger days Chiang-Kai-Shek was in the banking business at Shanghai.¹ He had studied military science in Japan and in 1923 visited Soviet Russia, where he enlarged his military education. On his return to China Chiang-Kai-Shek was made Principal of the Whampoa Military Academy. A man of no particular ability or prominence in political circles, he had not hitherto played any exceptional rôle, but from that time on

² Later in that year Lenox Simpson was shot by a Chinese and died soon afterwards.

¹ His father was an ardent admirer and supporter of Dr. Sun-Yat-Sen.

he pursued an unusual career that rapidly brought him to the highest post in the country.

(1) HIS RISE AND ACHIEVEMENTS.

As Principal of the Whampoa Academy, Chiang was practically under the control of the then omnipotent Borodin. Being a man of no profound learning and with very little experience in economics and politics, he was not, of course, a match for the Russian. However, as an ambitious soldier and a man with a strong will power, Chiang soon became restive. In March 1926, when Borodin was away from Canton, Chiang attempted to get rid of his mentor by staging an anti-Communist *coup*. But though this *coup* met with some success, the actual distribution of social forces at that moment made it imperative for Chiang to recant and seek a compromise with Borodin and his group. This was achieved and in June of the same year Chiang was even appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Nationalist armies.

A man of great personal courage and military and political daring, Chiang was, as we have seen in previous chapters, highly successful in military campaigns, but rather unlucky in his political endeavors. This was due partly to his own love of power and desire to be independent of the Kuo-min-tan and the Government, and partly to the pressure of events. Foreign armies, warships, and gunboats were factors to be considered; unexpectedly rapid developments in the Revolution had to be dealt with; and to finance the war it was necessary to please those who were able to supply cash at once, without the trouble of collecting it from the people. All these things helped to decide Chiang's affiliations.

His struggle with the Kuo-min-tan, though culminating in the ousting of the Communists, aggravated the party split; his struggle with the Wuhan Government, though ending in the organization of a new Government at Nanking, necessitated his own resignation and departure abroad; his compromise with the Powers, though preventing further open intervention, brought his Government into dependence upon the foreigners; his bargaining with the bourgeoisie, though replenishing his treasury, alienated the masses from himself and his group.

After Chiang-Kai-Shek's return to China in November 1927

he regained his prominence and even forced the Fourth Plenary Session of the Kuo-min-tan to abolish the law (passed one year earlier at Hankow), which prohibited the concurrence of High Command of the Army with the Chairmanship in the Military Council of the Kuo-min-tan. He then had himself reappointed Commander-in-Chief of the Nationalist Armies and elected Chairman not only of the Military Council, but also of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuo-min-tan.

A few months later the armies under Chiang and his allies were already celebrating their victory over the North and within a few months more he became the head of the reorganized Nationalist Government at Nanking. After declaring that the civil strife had ended in the final triumph of the Revolution, he turned his energy towards the building up of the new state.

(2) HIS CHANCES TO RETAIN POWER.

It is an old truism that the business of soldiers is to fight and that they should not be allowed to govern. If Chiang-Kai-Shek had proved himself a successful generalissimo by bringing to a victorious end the Nationalist campaign against the reactionary North, it was not a reason to make him the sponsor of China's fate. In the two years of its existence certain definite aims of his government were undoubtedly achieved. It seems likely, however, that this was not through his own ability. For many reasons Chiang-Kai-Shek was extremely unpopular in certain circles, but he had several able aides, and it was through their services that the Nanking Government established itself in the eyes of the world as deserving of respect and support. And it is also a fact that this respect from the outside world and the support seemingly rendered to Nanking by the Powers constituted one of the weakest points of Chiang's régime. It was interpreted by many Chinese as a mark of abandonment by the Nationalist Government of the first and foremost aim of the Revolution—to get rid of foreign control and restore the nation to independence.

By laying aside the struggle against foreign Imperialism and making numerous concessions to the Powers (especially to Japan), Chiang neglected the first principle of Sun-Yat-Sen, and soon abandoned the other two as well. Claiming that the Revo-

lution had entered its second stage described as that of "tutelage," he undertook a "purification" of Kuo-min-tan by ousting those who were not to his liking. He appointed his own partisans to leading positions and by his arbitrary handling of state affairs soon made himself a virtual Dictator. In that way the second principle, that of Democracy, was forgotten. Next and last, the principle of people's welfare was consigned to briefs. Persecution of labor unions occurred. Communists and other radicals were ruthlessly suppressed and no effective relief was provided for those millions of distressed Chinese who suffered from the famine. It is said that Chiang never made a strong personal appeal to the popular imagination; this now became the object of discontent and a target for attacks from all sides. Among his political adversaries soon were to be numbered not only many Left-Wingers of the Kuo-min-tan and "reorganizationists" under Wang-Ching-Wei, but also "moderates," not to mention the extremists on both flanks. His military opponents, who objected to his super-centralization and interference in their local affairs, ranged from Yen and Feng and Chang-Fa-Kwei, the leader of the "Ironsides," to minor War Lords in the South and in the West and numerous smaller groups of "Reds," armed peasants, and mere bandits. Moreover, to swell the list of odds against Chiang, his treasury was empty.² Though recognized and backed by the Powers to some extent, he had no real financial support from them on which to rely in his struggle against almost the entire country.

His army of about 400,000, seemingly well trained and equipped better than those of his adversaries, but including numerous deserters from other armies, who loosely pledged their allegiance to Nanking when their chieftains were defeated, was partly composed of the troops who remained probably loyal to the principles of Sun-Yat-Sen and who were aware that Chiang had betrayed them.³ Notwithstanding the defeat of the Northern coalition, late in the Fall of 1930, Chiang still remained confronted by numerous opposing groups and was not justified in his claim of being in control of a unified China.

Confucius once said that "a good government is one under

² As was testified by his own Minister of Finances, Dr. Soong.

³ It was estimated by certain students that the total under arms in China in 1930 was about 2,000,000 men.

which those who are near are made happy, and those who are far are attracted." By such a measurement Chiang's Government can hardly qualify as good. It must be noted, however, that certain leaders do not oppose it as a whole, but object principally to the "personal dictatorship" of Chiang-Kai-Shek, who became actually also a "Tuchun," i.e., a War Lord,—though modernized—still too arbitrary in his dealings and too dictatorial in his relations with collaborators.

F. Summary.

Summing up this chapter, dealing with the influence of "War Lordism" on present-day China, frankly it is hard to entertain any rosy hopes in this connection. For it seems unlikely that the unhappy country will be relieved of this yoke in the near future; and although some of these War Lords are men of modern training, possibly even of administrative ability, as well as a distinct improvement over the old fashioned type of super-bandit, they are by force of circumstances predatory and through their very existence will remain an abominable burden on the nation's shoulders, hampering its development and sapping its vitality.

CHAPTER XIII

RENAISSANCE

A. The Awakening of the Creative Power. B. Mass Education.

A factor of great importance in Modern China is, of course, the so-called Renaissance. This movement is characterized by a new spirit aiming to discontinue all those conditions and antiquated customs which for long years made China a backward nation. Among those factors were the system of education, nominally open to all, but actually attainable only to a very few, owing to that exaggerated esteem of classical learning which has handicapped real progress. Another was the worship of ancestors, and the attendant hindrances to a proper regard for the value of modern science.

The celebrated creative power of the Chinese which has made their culture a matter of admiration for some tens of centuries of course had some periods of brilliancy and others of decline. The classic age in China, when the great philosophers Lao-Tsze, Confucius, Meti, and Mencius lived, preceded by 300 to 500 years the beginning of the Christian era; and the Chinese classic Renaissance preceded that of Europe by about 500 years. The long years of China's expansion under the Mongolian Yüan Dynasty, followed by those of "seclusion and arrested development" under the Mings, and the "age of conflict against Western aggression," while revealing no particular signs of creative genius in the Chinese, undoubtedly witnessed an accumulation of energy and experience which exploded in the Revolution of 1911, with the result that they have now begun to express themselves in other directions.

One can hardly overemphasize the meaning of the modern Chinese Renaissance, already manifest in many things. The awakening of self-consciousness, the growth of self-esteem and proper appreciation of the genius of the nation, stimulated by the achievements of the Revolution and developing under the

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Renaissance, most probably will bring important results in coming years.

A. The Awakening of the Creative Power.

Dr. Hu-Shih, the outstanding leader in the intellectual life of Modern China, is well supported by many others in believing that the country is now at the beginning of a new period of cultural rise. The nation is becoming conscious of the renewal of a creative power that had remained dormant for long years, owing to the peculiarities of Chinese life.

"No age or place either in the past or present had seen a people that was so thoroughly controlled by the minutiae of custom, that regarded so sacredly its most punctilious observance, or that had persisted so long in this subserviency to the past," as China, writes Professor Paul Monroe. "Thoroughly interwoven as they were, with every aspect of their life, the educational ideals and practices of this people explained the long continuance of their unchanging social structure, their conservative character, their chief moral traits, their strength and weakness, either as individuals or as a nation."¹

Contact with the West necessitated revision of the traditional system of education, and a revaluation of many other things. The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 was followed by certain reforms, annulled for a while under the pressure of reaction, but restored and even elaborated after the Boxer Rebellion. Having thus started the process of revision, reorganization and modernization, China continued along this road and soon entered an era of renaissance which is known in the Orient as the "New Tide."

Largely literary in its origin, "this movement fused with various intellectual and social reform movements and in 1919 with the political reforms."² But the literary aspect was fundamental. Classical Chinese had long ago become a dead language, though it continued to be used by scholars and officials. Hence it was still the basis of the famous examination system, since the main purpose of the system was to select officials who could understand the classical language of the official edicts and regulations. In 1898 modern education was introduced, and in 1905 the old examination system was abrogated. But the novel

¹ Paul Monroe, "China—a Nation in Revolution." New York, 1928.

² P. Monroe, *ibid.*, p. 279.

ideas of the new learning made little further progress until 1916 when the modern literary movement began.

While the classical language had always been considered the only medium of scholarship, there had long been a limited literature of folk poems, plays and tales written in the vernacular. To replace the classical language by that simple, popular tongue was the first step of the Renaissance movement, and since its inception millions of text-books and a considerable number of newspapers and magazines have now been printed in the "Pei-hua" or "mandarin" dialect, suggested for the purpose. All the old standards of China, as well as certain new ones borrowed from abroad, were now challenged and subjected to critical tests. "Inquiry always provokes comparisons, comparisons—criticism, and criticism, in turn, develops scepticism."³ In fact this movement affected every phase of Chinese life, stimulated new thought and encouraged experimentation with new conditions. The wide range of speculative thought displayed by the Young Chinese seems to Professor Monroe "but a natural reaction to the centuries of slavish restrictions imposed by the examination system." And though up to the present this reaction has been mainly critical and destructive, the Chinese intellectuals seem to have profound faith in the ability of their people "to create intellectually, socially and politically."

The Chinese, like most other revolutions, was the result of the accumulation of irreconcilable conflicts between old forms and systems preserved by force and new ideas, irresistibly penetrating notwithstanding the barriers set up in their path. At the same time it released the dormant or suspended creative forces of the nation. The old order, the old customs and habits now dislocated and sometimes even destroyed, had to be replaced by new ideas borrowed from outside or created by the Chinese themselves. If borrowed, they had to be adapted to domestic conditions in the light of Chinese history and in accordance with Chinese needs.

Yet the change in the mental and psychological outlook of the Chinese was no mere sudden outgrowth of the Revolution; it had been crystallizing for many years and was greatly influenced by the contact of China with the Western world. Western

³ P. Monroe, *ibid.*, 282.

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emphasis on individualism undermined the basis of her old family life; ⁴ Western philosophy and Christian teaching contributed to the process of remolding China. The education obtained by numerous Chinese either abroad or in foreign schools established in their own country had a particularly deep influence. These students were regarded as "scholars" (very often without any justification in their scholastic achievements) and as such were entitled to reverence in the eyes of their countrymen, who held the "wise man" in traditional respect. Moreover, they were reputed to know those "secrets of the Occident" which appealed to the imagination of so many Orientals.

It is a characteristic of a successful Revolution in due course to arrive at a second or progressive stage with an atmosphere conducive to reconstruction. At that time the enthusiasm of creation may be expected to inflame multitudes striving to think, to invent, and to express themselves. This phenomenon has been noticed in the recent years in Russia by many observers and has now become a feature of the Chinese situation.

The growth of Nationalism and of a national consciousness undoubtedly helped to stimulate the Chinese Renaissance. Inevitably though unfortunately it was followed by a certain amount of anti-foreign feeling if not of contempt for everything foreign. But contempt or no contempt, numerous Western examples were followed, divers customs borrowed, and habits transplanted from Europe and America. Serious innovations of foreign pattern were introduced into family life; parents lost part of their prestige. Women became emancipated, and the sphere of their activity was greatly extended. Endless other changes were adopted and public opinion became a strong factor in all political and social movements.

One of the most serious handicaps to the participation of the Chinese masses in that movement was to be found in their widespread illiteracy; even so late as 1925 nearly 80% of China's population could not read or write.⁵ One of the explanations of this lay in the use of hieroglyphic script, with many thousands of "characters" to be learned before starting to read,

⁴ In the past the "family formed the social, industrial, and political unit in Chinese Society." P. W. Kuo, "China and the United States."

⁵ Y. C. James Yen, "The Mass Education Movement in China." Shanghai, 1925.

making education too lengthy and costly for the common people. Progressive Chinese, not to mention many foreigners, had, of course, long been aware of this and other radical defects in the old system of education based on the study of classics. But few changes were made until the new spirit of Revolution facilitated the introduction of reforms long cogitated but delayed by the same slowness and conservatism which were responsible for so many evils of China in the past.

B. Mass Education.

The modern educational system in China dates from the latter half of the XIXth century; and the pioneer in the movement was Kang-Yu-Wei (born 1858), a progressive Cantonese—who was called by his admirers “the Contemporary Confucius.” Deeply impressed by the study of history of the reforms of Peter the Great of Russia and by the awakening of Japan, Kang promoted the idea of modernizing his own country. He not only succeeded in bringing his views to the attention of the Emperor Kwang-Hsu, but in 1898 even saw some of them put into operation. These reforms though progressive in spirit were quite moderate, and provided for the conservation of the racial and cultural peculiarities of China. Nevertheless they were opposed by the reactionary elements and soon repealed. But the vitality of the modern spirit caused them to reappear in one form or another between 1900 and 1906.

In 1900 the old examination system yielded place to a modern curriculum; but after five years of unsuccessful attempt to fuse the old with the new, the innovations were abolished. Between 1906 and 1908 the tide of time advanced the policy of constitutional reform in China. The fight waged against the more fundamental political changes by the conservatives and reactionaries eased somewhat their opposition to departures in the educational system, and so made reforms more feasible. Their materialization was further simplified by the fact that under the former system the control of education was centralized in the old government, since the examinations (for which it prepared) were conducted from Peking. Once changed, the educational system continued to develop in this new direction and became a real instrument for the modernization of China.

“No one phase of traditional institutional organization of

Chinese society had more permeating influence on all other institutions—governmental, religious, social—than the educational system, and none has so completely disappeared from the modern life,” writes Professor Paul Monroe.¹ Dr. P. W. Kuo² enlarges on this point by expressing that “with the changing conception of education there has come a change in method and content of education.” He further observes that “the ideal of social responsibility” became stressed; and notes that “the tendency to emphasize freedom of education” came to replace “certain accepted standards of ideas and interpretations that meant a revolt against authority and rise of critical spirit” “A new emphasis upon scientific education and its vocational aim,” as “a reaction against the old one-sided emphasis on spiritual culture” followed inevitably those other innovations.

In the past China had practically no public schools controlled by the state. The reforms brought about a radical change in this respect. In 1908 there were 206 such schools in Peking and 35,597 in the provinces, with 1,028,088 pupils; in 1910 there were respectively 252 and 42,447 schools and 1,300,739 pupils.³ In 1923 there were 178,972 schools and over 6,615,000 pupils, providing already for about 7.2% of the children of school age.⁴

The growing demand for modern education and the inadequacy of funds in China furthermore provided an unusual opportunity for the institution of foreign schools; and many such were established by missionary and other interests.⁵

After the Revolution further reforms naturally followed. Article XX of the Constitution declared: “Citizens of the Republic of China shall be obliged to receive elementary education.” The National Association for the Advancement of Education was created. In 1912 new enlarged curricula for elementary, secondary and normal schools were introduced with a four year course in each. At the end of 1913 the state examination system was restored, but with revised programs.

¹ Paul Monroe, *ibid.*, p. 68.

² P. W. Kuo, “Oriental Interpretations of the Far Eastern Problem.” Chicago, 1925, pp. 131-142.

³ Professor Kuhner, *ibid.*, p. 143.

⁴ P. W. Kuo, *ibid.*, p. 130.

⁵ Another serious handicap was the inadequacy of trained teachers. In 1925, according to Dr. Kuo, there were only 123,732 instructors qualified to teach in modern schools, though 1,000,000 were required.

"In the belief that people are the foundation of the nation" and that "Democracy and illiteracy cannot stand side by side," the new régime turned its attention towards the popularization of learning. A commencement was made by simplifying the ancient script and remedying of the intricacies of the classical language. Through the literary Revolution of 1917-19 "Pei-Hua" had been substituted for the classical language. Through the introduction of phonetic symbols⁶ (simplifying reading) and of a selection of the 1000 characters most commonly used the arts of reading and writing were made more readily available to the masses.

This movement, however, was not particularly spectacular until the work of Y. C. James Yen and his collaborators was started. It was during the World War that Mr. Yen, at that time a secretary of Y. M. C. A. working among the Chinese coolies in France, came face to face with the problem of illiteracy of the Chinese masses. There were in France with the Allied armies two hundred thousand of these coolies, practically all of them illiterate. Hence they were unable to correspond with their friends and relatives at home except through the medium of those few educated Chinese such as Mr. Yen, who were attached to serve their needs. For the energetic young man, who had grown up under the influence of Revolution, this predicament of his countrymen was sufficient to inflame a strong desire to find the remedy.

After several years of study, and assisted by Professor H. C. Chen, he worked out a final list of 1000 "foundation" characters. New primers and readers were published, and the mass education movement was placed on a tangible basis: its aim as defined by Mr. Yen himself was "to make education feasible for the masses; that they can acquire a maximum of practical vocabulary within a minimum of time and at a minimum cost."

Several years of experience have shown that four months only are required for the completion of the course, and the cost per student is a mere 50 cents in American money. To meet various local conditions different methods of teaching have been

⁶ The hieroglyphs are supplemented by these phonetics in a parallel column and therefore reading is possible with the knowledge of only 39 symbols (instead of thousands) though this does not always guarantee an understanding of the actual meaning of the sounds pronounced.

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worked out. Those included (1) the mass-method of visual instruction and supervised mass recitations; (2) the individual class method for 20-30 students in a class; (3) the chart-method for classes of 40-60 students; (4) reading-circles; and (5) "people's question stations," where those illiterates who have no literate members in their family and cannot afford to attend regular classes may learn at their ease and have their questions answered.

"The full significance of the movement," writes its originator, "of course, will not be seen until a decade or more later. However, there are a few distinct contributions of 'by-products' of great value that may be briefly touched upon here."⁷

"(1) It is the first organized attempt on a large scale to educate the masses. While China has always given first place to education, there has been in reality what is called the aristocracy of learning. The Mass education movement is championing the cause of education for all.

"(2) It is a movement of the people, by the people for the people.

"(3) It is a stimulus to more adequate education . . . 'boosting of education.'

"(4) It works towards making of a new literature (people's literature).

"(5) It is a training for true citizenship.

"(6) It serves for the unification of the nation, and

"(7) It strives towards the realization of World Peace."

An admirable as well as an ambitious list surely! And of it that well qualified observer, Professor Monroe, writes: "While no doubt the hopes expressed are somewhat visionary, great progress has been made, with the expectation that this will form one of the great constructive movements, once peaceful political conditions are brought about."⁸

⁷ Y. C. James Yen, *ibid.*

⁸ Paul Monroe, *ibid.*, p. 284.

CHAPTER XIV

THE ECONOMIC SITUATION

A. The Unhealthy Industrial Situation. B. Numerous Bankruptcies. C. Finances. D. "Loans for Demilitarization." E. Famine and the Funds.

From time immemorial China has been predominantly an agricultural country. Always, of course, some portion of the population was engaged in industry and commerce. But those who followed "industrial" pursuits confined their activities to making finished products from the raw materials extracted for the most part by their own hands from the soil and very often for their own use. And while commerce has always been a common occupation of the Chinese, who have a natural predilection for trade, their transactions were ordinarily confined within the narrow limits of their local communities. In former times the amount and variety of her natural resources made China self-sufficient. Hence no exchange of goods with the outside world was necessary, which explains to some extent the continued isolation of the "Middle Kingdom."

Through long experience in cultivation of the soil the Chinese farmers were entitled to be considered as agricultural experts of very high degree. Thanks to the physical arrangement of their fields, their peculiar methods of planting and their scientific observance of the principle of rotation of crops—they had succeeded in maintaining the fertility of the soil through more than four thousand years of use. But with an evergrowing population dependent on the same area¹ the holdings of the farmers were inevitably curtailed. With almost 90% of the population living outside of the cities, and 80% occupied exclusively in farming (the other 10% giving part of their time to husbandry and the rest to other occupations), the acreage of individual farms became extremely small.

¹ About 90% of the entire population of China live on less than a third of the territory constituting the Chinese Republic.

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According to Professor Kuhner,² there were 42,345,668 individual owners out of over 69,000,000 farmers in 1918. The rest were tenants with no land of their own. From this number 17,914,331 (or about 40%) held a maximum of ten "mu," i.e., less than one acre of land each; 11,303,570 (or 25%) held between one and two acres; 6,712,366 (or about 15%) maintained from two to five acres; 4,137,136 had from five to eight acres and only 2,278,365—fifteen acres and up. In other words at least 65% of the Chinese peasants were dependent on "midget farms" and were forced to extremely hard work and intensive cultivation to keep body and soul together. The slightest unfavorable change of weather might mean famine for millions.

One of the most important characteristics of Chinese agriculture is its dependence upon properly regulated water supply; but the methods of irrigation and devices used for it in China are very archaic. The lack of modern agricultural machinery, except in some parts of Manchuria, means cultivation still with primitive implements. Chemical fertilizers are not used to any appreciable extent and the natural fecundity of soil is falling down. Furthermore scarcity of lands makes it practically impossible for the Chinese farmers to develop cattle breeding on any considerable scale.³

The incessant civil wars, followed sometimes by the ruin of irrigation systems; the decay of the governmental machine, making somewhat more difficult the modernization of agriculture and regulation of crops (resulting in overproduction of certain special crops, as tea, soya-beans, etc., and underproduction of others); and the frequently recurring famines (partly explainable by the civil strife and partly by the backwardness of the methods applied by the toilers), coupled with the growth of the disproportion between the prices for agricultural products and manufactured goods, all have contributed to the very acute crisis, through which Chinese farming at present is passing.

Quite characteristic of this crisis in Chinese agriculture is the following table of imports of rice into China: for the period 1900-1920 the yearly average was 375 thousand tons and in

² Kuhner, N. V., *Outline of the Modern Political History of China* (in Russian). Vladivostok, 1927, pp. 38-42.

³ This holds true for the major part of China Proper, but not for the outlying provinces and dependencies.

1921 it reached 643 thousand. Figures for subsequent years are as follows:

1,158	thousand tons in	1922
1,356	" "	1923
798	" "	1924
764	" "	1925
1,131	" "	1926
1,275	" "	1927
767	" "	1928 ⁴

Considering the fact that the farms in such outlying provinces and dependencies as Manchuria, Eastern Turkestan and Szechwan, are much larger than those in Central China (so cutting down the average size for the balance) the farms of the majority of denizens of China Proper are of minimum size. This inadequacy of holdings, which barely provided for mere existence, was, of course, a factor in turning many Chinese farmers to other means of livelihood. But the prevailing conservatism of Old China, lack of contact with the outside world and lack of communications, handicapped initiative in any direction for years. The traditional system of combining husbandry with handicraft, the development of the family or "clan" basis of life and economy were all instrumental in preserving isolation. Family, clan, village, town, and province lived each its own life. This diminished the importance of means of communication and so delayed their development. The absence of economic reasons for dealing with the rest of civilized mankind, and the prejudice against the "barbarians" for a long time prevented the establishment of regular intercourse with foreigners.

A. The Unhealthy Industrial Situation.

Gradually, however, the exchange of goods began to reach beyond the home or clan. Inter-village commerce developed, and inter-provincial trade followed. Artisans in various trades now commenced to organize, and gradually there were formed those "guilds" which until recent days played such an important part in China's life in general.

The "industrialization" of China had begun. But it was a

⁴ Madiar, L., *Outline of the Chinese Economics* (in Russian). Moscow, 1930, p. 160.

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slow process. For a long time the Central Government took no interest in the development of industry, which continued to struggle under the handicap of primitive methods and without the benefit of modern machinery. The absence of any general means of transportation other than pack animals made transportation prohibitive in cost. The inherent mistrust of the Chinese for outsiders lingered; and the artisans, even after union into guilds, continued to work for the most part each in his own little shop, and in his native village, and (according to Professor Frank J. Goodnow in "China: an Analysis") carrying on his trade "as an incident of farm life in the months when distinctly agricultural labor is impossible." Hence "all grain was ground on the farms and most of the tools were likewise made there" ⁵ and the merchant was hardly distinguishable from the artisan, since the commodities were usually sold in the place of their manufacture.

In the opinion of some students of economics who belong to the Communist branch of the Marxist school, China is still a semi-feudal state with a pre-capitalistic system of production and only embryonic industry in its Western sense. They believe that it is not necessary for China to go through a process of industrialization that would mean the development of the Capitalistic system of production. They claim that she may rebuild her national economy on the basis of the Soviet system, skipping over the Capitalistic stage, and advancing towards Communism.

However, after the contact with the West was established, the economic system of old China was doomed. Gradually, though rather slowly, it is being replaced by a more timely industrial régime. The development of foreign trade quickly brought about the appearance, for instance, of those Chinese wholesale merchants known as "compradors" who were agents for the foreigners in gathering tea, silk and other goods for export, and who also received from abroad divers products for sale in China. The cheapness of Chinese labor early induced foreigners to open factories in those ports which they had forced China to open to them; nor was it long before the example of European and American business men was followed by enterprising Chinese. Foreign owned factories and mills are now faced with a native competition, already growing so fast that the decline, if not

⁵ Frank J. Goodnow, "China: an Analysis." Baltimore, 1926, p. 53.

the gradual elimination, of alien concerns seems merely a matter of time. Indeed the number of British cotton mills already is diminishing.

Industries of Western pattern in China date back to the end of the XIXth century. It was in the late nineties, after the Sino-Japanese War, that the railroads began to appear in China, facilitating transportation, spreading foreign influence, introducing foreign goods, and hastening the establishment of foreign factories with foreign methods and foreign exploitation of domestic labor. From then on development was steady if slow. By 1906 there were already 14 cotton mills in China with 400,000 spindles; in 1916 there were 42—with 1,154,000 spindles; and 1923 found 83 with 2,666,000 spindles.⁶ In 1924 the total number of modern type mills and factories in China exceeded 2,000, including 109 textile mills, 218 spinning factories, 95 flour-mills, 121 electric power stations and plants, and 54 lime and brick factories.⁷

During the World War, and immediately after, Chinese industry developed more rapidly than ever. Especially fast was the advance of her textile industry. While in 1905 textiles constituted 40% of the total imports into China, in 1918 they represented only 27.2%, and in 1921 a mere 23.1% of the total imports. Indeed development might have been even more rapid but for the serious difficulty in purchasing machinery abroad at a period when most of the factories were overtaxed with orders for war supplies. Yet the growth continued until 1925 when it was halted by divers unfavorable factors. But with all these achievements the Chinese factories can still meet only an insignificant part of the domestic demand. In 1925 only 2.15% of the total came out of the local factories, 22.6% were imported goods, and the balance or about 75% was represented by home-spun cloth.⁸

As industry developed, the industrial population naturally increased by leaps and bounds; and with the growth of the industrial proletariat developed its organization. The first trade unions in China were organized at Shanghai in 1916. By 1930 they were already compassing (though somewhat loosely) al-

⁶ Lewis Gannett, "Young China," p. 18.

⁷ Professor N. V. Kuhnert, *ibid.*, p. 352.

⁸ Madiar, L., *ibid.*, p. 113.

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most 1,000,000 workers.⁹ Lacking substantial capital to rely upon in times of strike, these unions have on the whole remained weak and unable to resist any great pressure. Notwithstanding this, however, a series of rather well organized industrial strikes occurred in different places as early as 1919; and in 1922 a large-scale seamen's strike was started at Hong Kong by some 23,000 workingmen, followed by more than 100,000 others.¹⁰ From that time on organized labor in China has steadily put up a firmer front and struggles valiantly to improvement of its lot. There are indications that in the first stage of that struggle the Chinese workers were even subsidized by the Chinese Chambers of Commerce, members of which were interested in the elimination of their foreign competitors.¹¹ In 1925, with the outburst of the anti-foreign feeling, a series of strikes temporarily paralyzed many foreign owned industries in China, and a number of foreign owned mills had to be closed for good.

Yet, in spite of the serious obstacles outlined above, not to mention the lack of political stability, without which little real progress can be expected, Chinese industry is undoubtedly growing, though its growth is attended by certain very unhealthy conditions. The brigandage rife in many provinces, and the endless civil wars attended by heavy irregular taxation of the people through the levies of War Lords in addition to the usual taxes, are hardly conducive to normal healthy growth. In addition, it is to be noted that in spite of increased production, the development of railroads, and a foreign trade even in the years of the civil wars,¹² the imports of China have increased more rapidly than her exports. In short, the boom in production has not been for domestic benefit. It has centered largely in the extraction of coal and iron to be sold abroad in payment for imported goods, including war materials in large quantities. Such a condition could not, of course, serve to improve either the economic or the financial situation.

In other words, while it seems that the process of industrialization of China is on, it is bringing in its present stage

⁹ According to Professor Kuhner, in 1925 there were 500,000 unionized workmen in China.

¹⁰ Lewis Gannett, *ibid.*, p. 21.

¹¹ In 1922-23 in Shanghai alone there were 54 strikes. (Kuhner, *ibid.*, p. 352.)

¹² Dr. P. W. Kuo, *ibid.*, on page 125 states that in 1923 the total foreign trade of China was 1,676,330,303 taels, exceeding by 76 millions that in 1922.

plenty of tribulation to those who rule (or are trying to rule) that unhappy country. This rapid growth of modern industry in China "affecting as it does the social and economic as well as the political life of the Chinese people," writes Dr. P. W. Kuo, "has created new problems pressing for immediate solution. Although modern industry is still in its infancy, the workers in industry directly or indirectly influenced by the modern socialistic views of Marx, Lenin, and others, are rapidly developing a class-consciousness, and as a result, hundreds of labor unions have been organized to promote and to protect their interests." ¹⁸

B. Numerous Bankruptcies.

Under such conditions the bankers, manufacturers and merchants of China are confronted with appalling difficulties in their endeavor to pass safely through the period of readjustment. Few, if any, can expect to emerge unharmed from this state of chaos. Those who do survive will have good luck to thank rather than their own ability and capital.

In 1928 there were some signs of growing activity in the industrial life of China. But shortly afterwards a slump was noticeable, and in 1930 the Chinese industry was decidedly on a decline. A large number of flour-mills, silk-mills,¹ and tobacco and match factories were forced to close;² and some of the railroads and a number of steamship lines suspended services owing to the military operations in their neighborhood. Mining was decreasing. Only those industries which supply war needs seemed to be busy and working at capacity: arsenals, receiving direct help from foreigners, were feverishly active.

The rest of the business world experienced extremely hard times. Failures and insolvencies of even large and long established firms (as for instance—Noniang Bros.), coupled with cases of fraud, have been responsible for an unusually high percentage of bankruptcies in all branches of business registered in China during recent years.³

¹⁸ P. W. Kuo, "Oriental Interpretations of the Far Eastern Problem." Chicago, 1925, p. 122.

¹ The total production of silk in 1929 was only 60% of that in 1928.

² During first half of the year 1929 in the central provinces alone over 4,500 firms closed down. ("Pravda," 24/130.)

³ A number of Chinese banks had failed, owing to the depreciation of silver.

C. Finances.

The deplorable condition of Chinese finances is due to many and varied causes. Dr. Kiun-Wei-Shaw, author of the book "Democracy and Finance of China," regards the fiscal disorganization as among the most important. The bondage, till recent days, of the unequal treaties relating to the tariff restrictions and the exemption of alien residents in China from taxation were listed by him as "external causes," the internal causes of disorganization being the destruction by the War Lords of such necessary requirements of modern fiscal machinery as administrative, judicial, and legislative control of budget-making, accounting, reporting, and the proper handling of the responsible officers; and the lack of the democratic fiscal statesmanship, "which has made the Republic the prey of a host of selfish, greedy, and unprincipled ministers of public finances, who were content to be the cashiers of militarists rather than of the people at large."¹

The Chinese currency system is still in an alarming state of muddle. In the past it was neither properly controlled, nor even regulated, by the Central Government, as no such Government exercised actual power of control. During the early relations of China with the Westerners the latter introduced Spanish silver coins which were accepted as a medium of trade. Later these were replaced by the so-called Mexican, or silver, dollars; and in recent years the Chinese Government has itself coined silver dollars (Pei-Yang dollars). But there were many other coins in circulation as well, and every bank was authorized to issue its own bank-notes with no Government provision guaranteeing a cash reserve.²

Various attempts have been made to bring order into this confusion. But the vested interests as they are deemed, of the bankers and the money-changers, have up to the present been too strong for the reformers. Historically the banking facilities of China far outdate the development of banking in the West. In 1926, says Harold M. Vinacke in "Problems of Industrial Development of China,"³ there were four distinct types of banking

¹ Dr. Kiun-Wei-Shaw, "Democracy and Finance of China." New York, 1926, pp. 167-180.

² Frank J. Goodnow, *ibid.*, p. 67.

³ Harold M. Vinacke, "Problems of Industrial Development of China." Princeton University Press, 1926.

establishments: (1) the Governmental banks (among them the Bank of China, established in 1913, with its 99 branches scattered over the entire country, and the Bank of Communications) and the provincial governmental banks; (2) the banks organized by merchants doing large business, mainly for exchange; (3) the regular native banks and finally (4) such banks of modern type as the Canton, Chekiang, and Shanghai Commercial, and the Bank of the Salt Industry.

The foreign banks in China in 1913 outnumbered the Chinese institutions of similar type in the following proportion: 21 foreign banks with 121 branches as against 19 Chinese with 190 offices. Now the situation is reversed: in 1923 there were only 36 foreign establishments with 166 branches and 233 Chinese with 387 branches. The new Chinese banks and their branches are increasing much more rapidly than similar foreign establishments, though the capital invested by the latter still is bigger. Thus, the paid up capital of the foreign banks in 1923 was over \$400,000,000, while that of the Chinese banks was about \$100,000,000.⁴ Besides, the business of the majority of the foreign banks was not confined to China and they were able to rely on funds other than their own; all of which placed the foreign institutions in somewhat more advantageous position.

One of the first steps undertaken by the Nationalists, who organized the Nanking Government and claimed that they had succeeded with unification of the country, was to bring under its authority the economic resources of the whole of China, and to relieve the financial chaos. They succeeded in obtaining fiscal autonomy by annulling, with the consent of the Powers, the tariff restrictions; and they tried, though unsuccessfully, to establish civil control of finances as opposed to military control, and to supplant the system of finance by loans with finance by taxation.

As a result of the proposal made by the Minister of Finance, T. V. Soong, a National Budget Committee was established by the State Council of the Nationalist Government on August 26th, 1928. The personnel consisted of six military leaders and three civil officials. With the best intentions they planned to draw up and enforce a scientific budget, in which expenditure should correspond with revenue; but the continuance of the civil war and withholding of recognition of the central authority by many

⁴ Madiar, *ibid.*, p. 153.

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provinces rendered the results far from encouraging. The Nanking Government itself set a bad example in the distribution of its revenues. In 1927-28 from the total of \$148,256,001 available for expenditures, this Government applied \$131,176,340 or 92% to military needs.⁴ Such extravagance forced Mr. Soong in May, 1930, to warn the head of that Government that the National Treasury would be exhausted unless the war ended quickly. The war, nevertheless, did not end; expenses did not shrink; debts piled up; and the revenues failed to come in. The recovery of tariff autonomy had, of course, some positive effect; the total collections for 1929 amounted to 152,000,000 taels, as compared with only 70,000,000 in the previous year. But this marked a moral triumph rather than a substantial improvement in the financial outlook.

China had been badly in need of money long before the Nationalists came into power. During the World War Mr. Reinsch, the American Minister at Peking, urged his country to give the needed assistance. In this, however, he was not very successful. The Japanese were alive to this situation. They proceeded to lend 10,000,000 yen through the Yokohama Specie Bank and again 20,000,000 through the Bank of Communications, and to force on China the so-called "Nishihara loans" amounting to some \$100,000,000 (gold).

On October 15th, 1920, after prolonged negotiations, the new Consortium was formed by banking groups of England, France, Japan, and the United States "to participate . . . in such undertakings as may be calculated to assist China in the establishment of her great public utilities . . ." Actually this Consortium did not contribute materially towards the improvement of China's finances.

In the "China Year Book" for 1929-30 the entire Chinese foreign debt for July 1928 was estimated at over \$1,000,000,000 (gold). This figure is found also in Professor Arthur Coons' book, "The Foreign Public Debt of China": namely \$1,070,000,000 (silver) of secured Governmental foreign loans, \$538,000,000 inadequately secured, and \$597,000,000 representing debts of the Ministry of Communications. In addition there were considerable big debts incurred by the provinces; and on many of the foreign debts there were large arrears of capital and in-

⁴ China Year Book, 1929-30, p. 656.

terests. On the other hand, as we have already seen, the foreign trade of China has always shown an excess of imports over exports. The total for 1928, for instance, was 2,215,389,173 taels; exports being Tls. 1,005,307,445 and imports 1,210,001,728; the excess of imports over exports amounting to Tls. 205,000,000.⁵ Such are the figures and the facts composing the present gloomy picture of Chinese finances. And in spite of the pious expressions of hope, repeatedly voiced by Nanking, in spite of the exhaustive knowledge and energy applied by such financial advisers as the American commission (headed by Dr. Edwin Kemmerer) which was working with the Nanking Government during 1929⁶ no actual improvement can be expected in the near future.

D. "Loans for Demilitarization."

Such transactions as the "demilitarization" loans, the proceeds of which were actually spent in carrying on new wars, bribing the War Lords, and the like, naturally aggravated the financial chaos and contributed more trouble to the Government.

After the occupation of Peking by the coalition of Nationalists and their sympathizers of the North, Chiang immediately attempted to solve the problem of War Lordism by advancing the idea of disbandment. The generals present at the Conference, convoked to consider Chiang's proposal agreed to decrease the number of divisions to 50 or 60, to organize a *gendarmérie* of 200,000 for police service and to place the remainder of the troops in various industries. In July 1928 an official order had been issued forbidding further recruiting. Then came General Chiang's proposal for disbandment. He suggested summoning a special military conference, and his Minister of Finance backed the proposal of disbandment.

Dr. Soong suggested decreasing the military expenses to the figures of the budget: namely \$192,000,000 plus reasonable Disbandment Expenses. The Finance Minister further stated that if these and the five conditions to make it feasible which were outlined in his memorandum¹ were not accepted the future of China would be "dark indeed."

⁵ China Year Book, 1929-30, pp. 1023-1024.

⁶ The Kemmerer Commission recommended the adoption of a gold standard with a new currency unit which was criticized by some other experts on Chinese finances as not feasible

¹ The National taxes should be collected by the agents of the Ministry of

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Actually no disbandment was effected, as no general was willing to disband his own troops so long as others retained theirs. Rather the expenses for the upkeep of the armies increased. Nanking itself spent for 1928 and 1929 more than \$200,000,000 a year "in vain attempts to conquer or dominate this belt of doubtful mid-Northern provinces." Floating of over \$30,000,000 "Disbandment Bonds" only added to the indebtedness. Indeed, these bonds depreciated so constantly and rapidly that they were eventually offered at 65 cents per dollar. Whatever was realized by such transactions was applied to recruiting, equipping, and feeding soldiers, and to carrying on the war.

E. Famine and the Funds.

Notwithstanding the desperate efforts of the Chinese farmer to produce at least enough food for his own family, certain parts of China are stricken repeatedly if not regularly by famine. The high density of population, resulting in a very inadequate acreage per capita, and high strain laid on soil intensively cultivated through long centuries, are not less responsible for the recurrence of famines in such areas as the Northwest and parts of the Northeast, than the long continued droughts so familiar in those regions.

Undoubtedly the internal political situation in China involving military disturbances with heavy taxation, confiscation of food as well as other supplies, and actual devastation of large areas, contributed to the severity of the effects of such famines and helped to swell the number of victims to millions and millions every year.

In the past, when the Central Government which was but little concerned with local affairs and when the provincial governors were supposed to take care of any and all troubles in their spheres of jurisdiction, comparatively few complaints were heard about the inability of Peking to cope with these calamities. Now, however, with the change in the structure of the state (though

Finance and the military and local authorities should be strictly forbidden to detain any portion or impose surtaxes on any pretext whatever. 2, The Ministry of Finance should have undivided control over the appointment of the financial officers. 3, All subsidies (provincial and railway) to be remitted to the Nat'l Treasury. 4, Provincial gendarmerie and soldiers to be paid out of provincial revenue. 5, To apportion definitely military allowances among the different military units.

more nominal than actual), the failure of the Government to render relief is a serious charge. It is a particularly formidable weapon in hands of political opponents working for the Government's overthrow. Hence, all the evils experienced in time of famine by the affected provinces are unhesitatingly laid at the door of Nanking. And it is indeed true that the Nationalist Government has failed to relieve the situation, as it is using most of its revenues for military purposes and has no funds for famine prevention and relief work.

The virtual withdrawal of foreign aid (the American Red Cross decided in September 1929 against continuation of its famine relief in China) left the country to rely upon its own resources. These resources are far from adequate and the extent of the calamity is appalling. In 1929-30 about 60 million people were affected by famine; not far from 10 million of them were condemned to die from hunger. Early in 1930 the "Peking Leader" estimated that at least 5,000,000 had already died as a direct result of the famine of 1929. In some parts of China the crops were only about 50% of normal, and a scarcity of rice was felt all over the country. Food prices soared (rice went up 177%); exports of raw silk, tea, etc., fell considerably; banks were lending money to municipalities and provinces on usurer's terms. The Nanking Government floated over 500 million dollars in new loans. The price of silver collapsed to about 59% ¹ and in 1930 a panic took place on the Stock Exchange of Shanghai. The funds appropriated for famine-relief were misused and the hungry became easy prey of radical propaganda, flocking into the ranks of "Red Armies" and supporting the Communists, whose slogans promised more bread, more land, better times and better opportunities.

Notwithstanding this "favorable atmosphere" the Russian Communists did not participate in inciting and leading the masses. Having been ousted from the South of China late in 1927, and being still unwelcome there, they actually had no means of entry. But the work performed by Communists in China between 1923 and 1927 was far from lost; the seeds sown in those years came to flower in 1930. The enormous mass of labor and peasantry, which owned nothing, heard the call of

¹ Silver dollar, supposed to be worth 50 cents in American money, actually was worth late in August 1930 only 28 cents gold.

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Sun-Yat-Sen to rise in revolution against Imperialism and against militarists with their well-to-do followers. The slogan of the Revolution resounded, calling for the right of all classes to participate in the determination of living conditions; and Chinese—not Russian—Communists organized the masses and showed the way to the achievement of these aims.

Considering the unsettled condition of present day China it seems unlikely that she will receive any large-scale financial assistance from the Powers. Without such assistance she can hardly hope to put her house effectively in order. Rather it must be razed to the ground and built anew. Hence the prognosis for her near future can be only a dark one. The Revolution is still incomplete. It will persist and continue to develop, regardless of resistance from outside or within.

PART TWO—(*Continued*)

III. RUSSO-JAPANESE RELATIONS SINCE THE WORLD WAR

CHAPTER XV

JAPAN AND THE REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA

A. Intervention.

As we have seen in previous chapters¹ the relations between Russia and Japan had experienced a radical change in the years between the War of 1904-05 and the World War. Gradually improving, they culminated in 1916 in an understanding which was virtually an Alliance.

Russia's March Revolution was on the whole welcomed in Japan, especially among the intelligentsia. By the aristocracy and the bureaucrats, however, it was viewed with some disapproval on account of their loyalty to the monarchical principle. Well informed to the minutest details of the events in Russia, certain Japanese were from the outset sceptical about the development of a Revolution which, they thought, had arrived at a most inopportune moment, coming as it did in the midst of a war. The apprehension of many of the officials at Tokyo was already noticeable at the time of the July 4th demonstration in Petrograd, which closed the career of Paul Miliukov (Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Provisional Government), who contrary to the principles of the Revolution had advocated the annexation of Constantinople. Subsequently when General Kornilov staged his abortive *coup d'état* with the view to establishing a dictatorship, the views of many Japanese were far from friendly to Kerensky, who crushed the attempt by somewhat doubtful methods.

No sooner had the Bolsheviks overthrown the latter's régime, than official Japan at once displayed her animosity towards the new order. In consideration of her geographical proximity and her fear of radical propaganda in her territories (especially Korea and the adjacent regions), Japan was among the first, if not actually the first, of the Powers to suggest curbing the menace

¹ See Chapters II, IV, V, and VII.

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by interference in Russia's internal affairs. Actually as we know, Japan despatched her warships to Vladivostok as early as December 1917, or long before steps were taken by any other Power. Intervention on a large scale was, however, delayed by the refusal of those Powers, especially the United States, to consent to separate action by Japan.

A. Intervention.

The idea of sending troops to Siberia originated, apparently, in the offices of the General Staff of Japan; and General Tanaka, at that time Deputy Chief of Staff and later Minister of War, was its most ardent advocate.

It should be remembered in this connection that military Japan was to a great extent a pupil of the victorious Germany of 1870-71. Her officers were brought up on the ideals of Bismarck and Moltke and accepted the basic principles of Prussian theory as expounded by their own contemporaries von der Goltz Pasha and that cynical apologist of "Might is Right," Bernhardi. The watchword of Germany's policy, suggested von der Goltz, must be "Forward!" To achieve this end, he averred, the country must labor unceasingly to improve its military organization and to uplift the moral forces of the nation. "Advance, development—not preservation—of moral forces!" insisted Scharnhorst, the teacher of all these famous soldiers of Germany. "Moral forces are never static; they inevitably sink and decay if they stop developing," he claimed. "We must inspire our younger generation with the idea that the time of peace is not yet at hand; there are struggles ahead, and we must be prepared!"

Compare this with the prediction of Count Okuma that "in the middle of the XXth century Japan will meet Europe on the plains of Asia and will wrench from her the mastery of the World!" or the advice given by a Professor of Tokyo University to his students "not only to acquire hegemony over Asia but also to force the haughty Westerners to ask mercy of Japan!" and one can judge the pabulum provided even in recent days by some Japanese leaders to build up the morale of their nation.

There is no doubt, however, that the militant ardor of the descendants of the samurai, those untamable fighters and bullies, has now subsided considerably. The excitement produced by

victories over China and Russia has faded with time; the defeat of Germany in the World War has proved that it is not always easy to solve problems by the mailed fist, even when it is as splendidly armed and wonderfully trained as that of Prussia. And lessons of an economic nature have also contributed much towards a calmer and more reasonable interpretation of events. Great, however, as the benefits of a less aggressive attitude might be, the idea was not shamed by the Japanese militarists. The military party continued to rattle its sabres, and to believe that everything might be achieved by force. Theoretical advocates of intervention dreamed of new successes for Japanese arms, of new glory, and of new opportunities for the growth of their country. Others of lower mental caliber, coveted medals and promotions. Many merely sought adventure. But to all a policy of aggression opened up the most tempting possibilities.

The Government of Japan responded to the persistent cry of the military party and yielded to the demand for intervention. The reasons were various. In the first place the militarists were in a strong political position, as their leader and guiding spirit, Prince Yamagata, was at that time the virtual master of Japan. Fear of Bolshevik contagion pushed to the side of the interventionists all those who were responsible for the conservation of order in the Empire. Business circles favored aggression not only by reason of their fear of Bolshevism, but also in consideration of the unusual trading opportunities opened up by intervention. Many Japanese merchants looked avidly on the Russian Far East as a possible dumping ground for their surplus goods. Others expected to acquire there all sorts of bargains; while business men of larger calibre already had their eyes on important mining and lumber concessions.

There was also present, of course, a general desire to "render service" to the other Powers by undertaking the prevention of the social disorder that seemingly menaced them. Undoubtedly the representatives of the Powers in Tokyo instigated Japan to act, and in this the Russians played not the least part. Nor must we forget those Japanese who, drawing a parallel between the Russians after 1905 and the French after their defeat by Germany in 1870-71, overestimated the former's desire of revenge and—foolishly enough—expected to check it by an interference which promised to split that nation. All these stimuli

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combined to bring about the Japanese intervention jointly with other Powers; but finally it outgrew all expectations, and went far beyond the limits mutually agreed upon by the Allies in the Autumn of 1918. Eventually indeed it even outstripped the wildest schemes of Japan herself, involving her in expenses far larger than were ever anticipated.

During the sojourn of the Japanese in Siberia a number of separate episodes caused the Russians to suspect that their former enemies were in sympathy with anything that might serve to create more confusion and to promote demoralization. The active coöperation of the "invaders" with the infamous "atamans," who pillaged and murdered indiscriminately, made many Russians believe that the real aim of the Japanese was nothing less than the destruction of Russia. And there seems little doubt that certain influential Japanese officials did indeed actively promote at that time the idea of severing Siberia from the rest of Russia and the creation of a buffer-state from the Eastern provinces as a compromise. This was actually effected by the formation of the so-called Far Eastern Republic; but it was really only a device for temporarily appeasing outsiders.

Although bound by an understanding with America stipulating equality in the number of troops participating in the intervention, Japan violated the agreement and dispatched to Siberia about ten times as many soldiers as did the United States; and, though declaring now and again her willingness to withdraw, actually delayed evacuation until a threat of blockade came from Washington. Even after this she continued to occupy, though with smaller forces, Nikolaievsk on the Amur, where a massacre of Japanese residents took place (provoked by the acts of Japanese military officials) and the Northern or Russian half of the island of Sakhalin.

It was not until pressure was applied by the united Powers gathered at the Washington Conference that Japan agreed to a complete evacuation of Russian territory. This, to the bitter disappointment of the jingoists of Tokyo, took place during 1922,² Japan retaining only a part of Sakhalin as security for the settlement of her claim for the massacre at Nikolaievsk.

Thus, generally speaking, the aggressive policy of Japan was

² The American troops were evacuated early in 1920. The last echelon left Vladivostok on March 30th of that year.

a failure. The Russians fought desperately and effected numerous severe blows upon her troops, which were unable to cope with the guerilla warfare conducted by the "Reds." These in time were often supported in this struggle for the liberation of their native land by semi-Reds, "Pinks," and even by those who were not particularly in sympathy with Bolshevism but considered it their duty to defend Russia from intruders. Internationally Japan lost heavily through this adventure; she aroused animosity of the United States, increased the hostility of China, and estranged herself from England. Even economically Japan, as a whole, did not gain; for a while, it is true, her South Manchuria Railway diverted a considerable portion of the freight from the Russian-owned Chinese Eastern,³ but the expenses involved by the intervention were so heavy that the balance was far from comforting to Tokyo.

The decision to withdraw from Siberia, though actually taken under the pressure of the Powers, was also demanded by large groups of Japanese themselves. The internal situation of Japan at that time was anything but sound. The period of prosperity inaugurated by the War, the development of war-industries, and huge foreign orders for war-supplies, terminated abruptly soon after the end of the War. Until 1920, however, Japan continued to do splendid business. Europe had barely started to heal her wounds, and America still produced mainly for her domestic needs. Hence for a while Japan found herself in the enviable position of being almost without a rival in Asiatic commerce; and her part in the Chinese foreign trade increased from 23% in 1913 to over 40% in 1920. But by 1921 she was beginning to feel the return of her rivals; her industries were forced to slow down, factories began to close; and Japanese trade decreased to about 65% of that of the preceding year. Unemployment became a serious problem; labor grew restless; strikes occurred more often and were more difficult to cope with.⁴ In short, new

³ In 1913 that freight constituted only about 6% of the total business of the South Manchuria. In 1917 it jumped to 18% and, steadily increasing, reached in 1925 nearly 42% of the total traffic of the Japanese road.

⁴ In 1919 there were about 500 strikes affecting 63,000 workers; in 1923 over 200,000 workers struck in Tokyo alone. Wages increased between 1914 and 1920 only 10%, though the cost of living went up 30-40%. (Prof. A. Petroff, "The Japanese Proletariat," Leningrad, 1927. In Russian.)

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signs of general social unrest were appearing on all sides.⁵ To continue the intervention under such circumstances (especially in consideration of the already obvious success of the new régime in Russia and the disapproval of Japan's activities by the other Powers) was more than the Tokyo Government could risk; and so this none-too-glorious chapter was closed.

To complete the outline of the rôle played by Japan in the Russian Far East at that time, a few words must be said about her participation in the Inter-Allied control of the Chinese Eastern Railway after the outbreak of the Russian Revolution. This control was constituted by the Multi-Power Agreement signed on January 9th, 1919, "for the supervision of the Siberian Railway system, including the Chinese Eastern Railway." To supervise the railway a special Inter-Allied Committee composed of representatives of each of the Allied Powers having military forces in Siberia was set up, and two Boards were instituted, namely a "Technical Board" (under the presidency of John F. Stevens, an American engineer) for the purpose of administering technical and economic management of the railways in this zone, and a "Military Transportation Board" for the purpose of coördinating military transportation under instructions of the proper military authorities."

The disorganization of the Chinese Eastern Railway owing to the Revolution in Russia and the subsequent struggle between different factions prompted in 1918 a scheme (advanced by the foreign diplomats at Peking) to replace the former Russian administration of the railway by a Chinese board which was also to take charge of policing the system. The Japanese, however, opposed this arrangement on the ground that the existence of a Sino-Japanese Military Agreement of March 25th, 1918, gave Japan certain rights with reference to the transportation of her troops over the Chinese Eastern Railway. A supplementary Sino-Japanese Agreement of September 6th, 1918, provided that the transportation of "troops over that railway shall be in the hands of the organization having charge of the railway." A joint Sino-Japanese Bureau was established for the purpose of making arrangements "for the transportation of

⁵ In 1918 rice-riots occurred all over Japan. Socialists became more active. In 1921 the Communist Party of Japan was organized. The revolutionary spirit was growing with anarchism as most popular doctrine among the intelligentsia.

Chinese, Japanese and Czecho-Slovak forces over the railway," with the provision that other Allied Powers were to be permitted to participate in this proposed bureau if they should desire to carry on military operations in these regions.

"Although these agreements were devised ostensibly to permit Chinese control of the Chinese Eastern Railway," writes C. Walter Young, "this was not entirely secured, the situation resulting in policing of the railway by both Chinese and Japanese troops."⁶ After Inter-Allied control was established the Allied military forces were authorized to continue in charge of protection of that railway system; but in April 1919 it was decided that Chinese troops should be charged with the responsibility of patrolling the Chinese Eastern Railway. The only foreign troops to be employed within Manchuria were to be a garrison of one thousand Americans at Harbin and a small garrison of Japanese at Manchuli, on the Russo-Chinese border. This arrangement was to cease upon withdrawal of the foreign military forces from Siberia and the Inter-Allied Technical Board continued to function in Harbin until the end of October 1922 or practically until the evacuation of the Japanese troops was completed.

Soon afterwards Russia started negotiations with China and Japan respectively for the restoration of normal relations; and in 1924 and 1925 signed with them treaties which started a new epoch in the Far East.

⁶ C. Walter Young, *ibid.*, p. 153.

CHAPTER XVI

THE TREATY OF 1925

A. Concessions. B. Trade Relations. C. Conflict on the Chinese Eastern Railway. D. The Railroads in Manchuria. E. Summary

A. Concessions.

When the new Russia succeeded in fighting off all foreign interventions, emerged victorious from civil war, and survived such a terrible calamity as the great famine of 1921, Japan should have had sufficient proof of the stability of the Soviet Government. She should also have recognized that at that time no other party or group among Russians, at home or in exile, existed which could pretend to wrench the power from the Bolsheviks and retain it for any considerable length of time. Nevertheless for another couple of years Japan stubbornly continued to withhold her recognition of the new régime.

Though bringing upon herself all sorts of inconveniences through lack of consular and diplomatic relations, Japan delayed the settlement of many outstanding questions with her next-door neighbor until most of the Great Powers had reestablished diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia and had renewed trade with her. Even China, though still in the throes of Revolution, accomplished this resumption several months before Japan, having signed the Treaty of Peking on May 31, 1924.

Russia, on the other hand, spared no efforts to induce Japan to come to a formal understanding. Unofficial relations of a kind of course persisted; casual communications were intermittently exchanged between Moscow and Tokyo.¹ Trade was still carried on between the two countries and, during the three months beginning February 15th, 1923, amounted to about 3,500,000 gold roubles.² The two largest Japanese banks were still operating

¹ In January 1923 Mr. Joffe, a Russian diplomat, was invited by Baron S. Goto, to come for a visit to Japan in the capacity of a private citizen.

² "Russian Review," Washington, D. C., Oct. 15, 1923, p. 65.

at Vladivostok; numerous Japanese residents remained on Russian soil and carried on business; and some Japanese consular officers even remained in Russian cities to perform their duties.*

On May 8, 1923, the Soviet Government issued a decree by which all previous treaties, concessions, and agreements relating to the fisheries and seal-hunting grounds of the Far East were annulled and new regulations established. By this decree foreigners were allowed to obtain fishing rights under leases sold by public tender; but preference was given to nationals of those states with which the Soviets had already concluded treaties. This restriction was aimed of course at the Japanese, whose interests in the fisheries of the Russian Far East were and are paramount. Hence to delay further the restoration of normal relations meant a serious loss for Japan; and Tokyo hastened to look for at least a temporary understanding on that question, if not a permanent agreement.

In order to find a *modus vivendi* a mixed Russo-Japanese Commission was convoked at Vladivostok, and established at 6,265,000 gold roubles ⁴ the indebtedness of Japanese fishery contracts for those previous years in which no official relations existed but fishing was unlawfully continued. Possible fundamentals for a compromise were also discussed. Soon afterwards occurred the terrible earthquake in Japan. The Soviet Government of Russia immediately cabled its deep sympathy in this calamity and offered to send relief detachments and supplies. On September 11th, the Japanese Government replied by a telegram signed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and handed by the Japanese Consul at Vladivostok to the representative of the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs at Vladivostok, "with sincere thanks," and accepting the offer of material relief "with appreciation." At the same time Tokyo politely declined the proposal to send relief detachments, explaining that it had also refrained from accepting similar offers from America and other countries. On arrival at Yokohama the Russian relief vessels were detained by the local authorities, but were later admitted after an order from Tokyo expressing "regrets for the unfortunate incident."

* It was not until February 1924 that the Japanese Consul at Vladivostok was informed by Russian authorities that his official status was no longer recognized.

⁴ "Russian Review," October 1st, 1923, p. 56.

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The temporary absence of regular contact between the two cities was given as an explanation.

At approximately the same time a Japanese industrial delegation visited Russia in connection with an agricultural exhibition at Moscow. The leader, Mr. Yamasaki, speaking on behalf of the entire delegation, expressed a hope for the speediest restoration of commercial relations in friendly alliance with the U.S.S.R.⁵ This coincided with the visit of Senator de Monzie, of France, who, before leaving Moscow, declared that he had become convinced of the necessity of a trade *rapprochement* between Russia and his own country. It took about a year for France to achieve this end and almost 18 months for Japan, though the negotiations were started immediately.⁶

Notwithstanding these negotiations, unpleasant incidents continued to occur; and on October 29th, 1923, the official Agent of the U.S.S.R. in Great Britain handed to the British Government a declaration drawing the attention of the Governments of Great Britain, France and the United States to "the acts of violence committed by the Japanese Military Command, which prejudice peaceful international relations in the Far East." The incidents referred to in this declaration were described as follows: "On September 18th, during the night, the Japanese vessel 'Sydney Maru' entered the Soviet port of Samarga(?) and on its own initiative, without the authorization of the local Soviet authorities, attempted to take on board property on what was formerly a concession of Japanese citizens. The Soviet authorities protested, and prohibited this arbitrary act, and the Japanese vessel withdrew. After two days, on September 20th, two Japanese torpedo boats arrived from Sakhalin, and, keeping close to the Russian shores, turned their guns (of which the covers had been removed) upon them, requesting the Soviet authorities to annul their prohibition within five days, menacing them otherwise with the most serious consequences. The vessel 'Sydney Maru' then returned to Samarga and carried off the material in question, after damaging and burning what it could not carry away.

⁵ "Russian Review," September 15th, 1923, p. 28.

⁶ Or rather the negotiations started by Baron Shimpei Goto with Mr. Joffe (January-June) were reopened early in 1924 after a short interval, explained by illness of Mr. Joffe. Still earlier some negotiations were carried on at Dairen and at Changchun.

"Another incident of the same kind took place on October 6th. Four Japanese torpedo boats entered, without authorization, the territorial waters of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, and detained in the Amur Delta a vessel engaged in sweeping the mines from the Sakhalin Canal. The Japanese warships detained the boat forty-eight hours, took from it six buoys, and carried off to Japan a quantity of various material, the property of the Soviet Government."⁷

During these years of lagging negotiations and petty incidents such as those just described, the two parties showed markedly different attitudes towards each other. On the one hand, in spite of the absence of normal diplomatic relations between the two Governments, Japanese subjects had been granted the privilege of conducting certain commercial business in the territory of the U.S.S.R., and Japanese fishermen had been granted the right to lease fisheries. Furthermore in consideration of Japan's acute need of lumber after the earthquake, the prohibition against her citizens carrying on forest operations had been partly annulled. On the other hand the Japanese Military Administration of the occupied territory in Northern Sakhalin made the life of Russian peasants there a misery. Abuse and mistreatment were rampant. The absolute authority of the Japanese General in charge of administration seemed to be used exclusively for the defense of Japanese interests. Russians were not allowed, for instance, to do prospecting and mining; while the Japanese, under the pretext of supplying coal to the Military Command, worked in Dui, the richest coal deposit, as well as in other places, with the permission of the Military Administration. Russians were forcibly crowded out by Japanese fishing contractors from those places and from fisheries in which for a long time past only Russians have been permitted to fish. When the latter wanted to regain their rights and addressed a complaint to the Commanding General, the settlement of the matter was entrusted to his Chief of Fishing Department and settled without apparent justification in favor of the Japanese."⁸

Early in 1924 the Moscow press was devoting much attention to the situation created in the Far East. Referring to Japan's

⁷ Declaration signed by Chicherin, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, as given on p. 139 of the "Russian Review" for December 1st, 1923.

⁸ "Russian Review," February 1st, 1924, p. 221.

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resumption of a hostile attitude towards Russia, "Izvestia" said: "The aims of Japan's policy are twofold: to extend Japanese influence in Northern Manchuria (particularly along the Chinese Eastern Railway) and to prevent the recognition of Russia by China before her recognition by Japan. . . . While hinting its readiness to resume negotiations with the Union of S.S.R. the Japanese Government is simultaneously concentrating its forces for a new pressure on the Soviet Republics, in order to force them to grant intolerable concessions."

But in April of the same year negotiations between the Japanese fishery contractors and the Russian authorities in the Far East came to a fortunate conclusion. The Japanese had recognized the old claims amounting to 2,750,000 yen (though the mixed Russo-Japanese Commission a few months earlier had estimated this indebtedness at 6,265,000 gold roubles or gold yen) and agreed to pay 1,550,000 at once and to settle the balance in the course of three years. In this way a solid basis for a further adjustment was laid down.

On May 31st, 1924, the Peking Treaty was concluded by Soviet Russia and China, an event which served to accelerate the Russo-Japanese Agreement. In order to hasten the negotiations, Moscow declared that "the solution of the Chinese Eastern Railroad question reached at Peking must doubtless exercise a certain influence on the regularization of mutual relations between the Union of S.S.R. and China on one hand and Japan on the other, inasmuch as the activity of the Japanese South Manchuria lines depends to a considerable extent upon the further routine of freights via the Chinese Eastern Railway."

"In view of the unsettled condition of Russia's relations with Japan," declared Mr. Rudzutak, who soon afterwards became Commissar for Transportation, "we shall no doubt route the whole bulk of our cargoes over the Ussuri Railroad to Vladivostok completely avoiding the Japanese railways. The resumption of normal freight traffic on the basis of mutual agreement will become possible only after the establishment of normal inter-relations between the U.S.S.R. and Japan."⁹

On July 31st Mr. Karakhan, commenting on an interview given by the Japanese Premier, in a conversation with Japanese newspapermen in Peking made an interesting statement: "This

⁹ "Russian Review," July 15th, 1924, p. 37.

interview," he said, "admirably illustrates why relations between the Soviet Union and Japan have not yet been restored, for even now the Japanese Government is mistaken in its appraisal of the significance of this question. Japan imagines that by recognizing the Soviet Union it is making us a tremendous concession and placing us under great obligation. But so long as Japan does not comprehend that both sides are alike interested in the resumption of mutual relations, just so long will it be difficult to attain the desired result. . . . The Soviet Union's policy is based upon the principle of full reciprocity, and we do not wish to recede from this principle. . . . We want an agreement with Japan, but we cannot make any sacrifices, just as we do not ask for any sacrifices on the part of Japan."¹⁰

Early in August of the same year Karakhan made another declaration to the effect that the Soviet Union "cannot admit the Japanese claims to monopolistic exploitation rights in Northern Sakhalin." The reply of the Japanese Government was set forth in the press as follows: "Japan does not demand such broad rights for herself at all and does not claim any special and exclusive preferential rights whatsoever in this part of the Soviet territory. Japan, however, cannot rest content with any abstract settlement of the question of Sakhalin concessions and is striving for a detailed agreement in this matter."¹¹

The well-known Japanese newspaper "Kokumin" considered this open declaration by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs as "a victory for Soviet diplomacy." Another influential paper, "Osaka Asahi," counseled the Government to lay its cards frankly on the table and not to adopt an irreconcilable position, in so far as it is itself prepared to recede afterwards. The "Yorodzu" continued to point out the necessity of friendly relations between Japan and the Soviet Union. In connection with rumors current abroad, and seemingly emanating from Paris, concerning some sort of secret treaty between the Soviet Union and Japan, the Japanese Foreign Office stated that "these rumors were pure fictions" and added that "such false information was systematically broadcast with malicious intent."¹²

In the second half of October G. V. Chicherin, the Commissar

¹⁰ "Russian Review," September 1st, 1924, p. 95.

¹¹ "Russian Review," September 15th, 1924, p. 113.

¹² "Russian Review," September 15th, 1924, p. 113.

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for Foreign Affairs, declared that a treaty with Japan was in sight. "In the East more than in the West," he stated, "the past period is characterized by a rapid improvement of the international position of the U.S.S.R., accompanied, it is true, by fluctuations in one direction or another. Day by day, by dint of hard labor and struggle, one obstacle after another is being overcome, and it may be said that the final results represent a progress for the U.S.S.R." ¹⁸

On January 20th, 1925, this long awaited treaty was signed at Peking by Mr. Karakhan for Russia and Mr. Yoshizawa for Japan; and through it diplomatic and consular relations between the two countries were reestablished.

In Article II of this Treaty, or "Convention," as it was termed, it was stipulated that "the Treaty concluded in Portsmouth on September 5th, 1905, remains in full force." This arrangement was protested by a note of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to which the Russian Ambassador at Peking replied that such protest would have been timely if it had been made twenty years ago, i.e., when the Portsmouth Treaty was contracted and (in the parts concerning China) accepted by China herself through direct agreements with Japan. Mr. Karakhan further declared that he would welcome such a protest "if it were directed towards the protection of Chinese interests, but in this particular case such a protest is only bound to convey to the Chinese people the erroneous impression that the Soviet Government could violate the rights of China, while in reality the Soviet-Japanese Convention does not affect in any way the interests and sovereignty of China."

A closing paragraph of Protocol B, attached to the Convention, stated that the recognition by the Soviet Government of the validity of the Portsmouth Treaty "in no way signifies that the Government of the Union shares with the former Tsarist Government the political responsibility for the conclusion of the said Treaty."

By Article III the parties agreed to revise the fishing treaty of 1907. They further agreed (Article V) that "neither of the High Contracting Parties will permit on the territory under its jurisdiction the presence of: (a) Organizations or groups claiming to be the government of any part of the territory of the

¹⁸ "Russian Review," November 1924.

other party, or (b) Foreign subjects or citizens, in regard to whom it has been established that they actually carry on political work for these organizations or groups."

Article VI said: "In the interests of the development of economic relations between the two countries, and taking into consideration the needs of Japan with respect to natural resources, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is ready to grant to Japanese subjects, companies and associations concessions for the exploitation of mineral, timber and other natural resources in all parts of the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics."

In the two "protocols," A and B, attached to the Convention, certain questions already touched in the main body of the document were regulated further. It was agreed that any discussion of the debts contracted in Japan by the former Russian Governments should be postponed until subsequent negotiations. In the matter of concessions, the Soviet Government agreed to give to Japanese concerns, recommended by the Japanese Government, 40-50 year concessions for exploitation of "50% of the area of every oil field in Northern Sakhalin" mentioned in a Memorandum presented to the U.S.S.R. on August 29th, 1924, and also consented to allow to Japanese concerns the right, for a period of 5-10 years, of carrying on exploration work on the oil-fields along the eastern shore of Northern Sakhalin over an area of one thousand square versts. The Soviet Government agreed also to grant concessions for the exploitation of coal deposits on the western shore of that island and in the Dui district.

On February 26th the Convention became effective upon the exchange of ratifications between Mr. Yoshizawa and Mr. Karakhan at Peking.

B. Trade Relations.

By the time normal relations with Japan were resumed the Union of S.S.R. already had considerable experience in organizing trade with other countries. Always the principle of Foreign Trade Monopoly was employed as a basis. Soviet Trade Delegations were already functioning in Germany, Italy and other countries; and under similar conditions a Trade Delegation was now established in Japan. Being a Russian official agency to

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supervise and control all trade relations with that country, it also was authorized to transact the major portion of the foreign trade operations.

The Foreign Trade Monopoly was introduced into Russia as an instrument for carrying out the economic policy of the Soviet régime. The attempt to regulate the economic life of the country in a systematic way, together with the exigency of insuring a favorable balance of trade, inevitably implied restrictions on imports and exports. These were explained as necessary to guarantee the country's food supply and justified as in the interest of industry by securing the supply of raw materials and assuring protection against excessive competition by foreign industries.

The pre-war commerce between Russia and Japan was far from large; the total for 1913 was only about five million roubles. During the Revolution, however, a somewhat more extensive trade grew up between the Far Eastern region and Japan; and the total turnover for 1923-24 was over 15,500,000 gold roubles. Since that time large timber exports have been made to Japan; the exportation of fish products has increased steadily; and the Maritime Province has been shipping to the ports of Nippon such agricultural products as oats and linseed. After the resumption of normal relations it was planned to increase exports to Japan not only of products from the Far Eastern region but from the entire Union of S.S.R. Among these commodities oil products, salt and iron were outstanding. For Japan the U.S.S.R. was a market for many domestic goods; such as paper, nets and other fishing equipment, and raw silk. Actually, in the field of trade relations the results to Japan of the signing of the Convention were not very gratifying. The needs of the meager Russian population in the Far East remained very limited, and to the Russian market at large the Japanese were still unable to offer any considerable amount of good sufficiently attractive to warrant the heavy expenses of transportation around two continents by sea or over thousands of miles of land. Russia with her fish products, timber, etc., had always more to offer to Japan than she was prepared to buy; a situation which seems likely to persist at least for some years.

In 1927 an important Japanese mission, headed by a leading

industrialist, Mr. Kuhara, visited Russia and returned with some plans and hopes for enlivening the Russo-Japanese trade. The latter, however, still remains comparatively insignificant. In 1925-26 it reached 11,300,000 roubles, from which 9,100,000 represented exports from Russia and 2,200,000 imports from Japan. In 1926-27 it was 14,500,000 roubles from which 11,500,000 were exports and 3,000,000 imports. In the years that followed Kuhara's visit to Moscow the trade between the two reached Yen 32,312,000 in 1927-28 and Yen 33,114,000 in 1928.¹⁴

But trade is not the only source of contact between Russia and Japan. On January 23, 1928, a Soviet-Japanese Fisheries Convention was signed, which cemented still more closely the relations between the two countries.¹⁵ During the same year Baron Shimpei Goto,¹⁶ the ardent advocate of resumption of normal relations with Russia, visited that country himself. In 1929 a group of Japanese railway experts were invited to Moscow in the capacity of technical advisers. This mark of respect to Japan's technical ability was highly appreciated in the latter country, and has aided materially in the development of friendliness between the two neighbor nations.

C. Conflict on the Chinese Eastern Railway.

With the gradual resumption of official diplomatic and commercial relations, cultural contacts were reestablished and extended. Russian classics and the works of standard Russian authors had, indeed, long been popular in Japan; but now contemporary writers began to attract attention, and an entirely new literary field was laid open to the interested eyes of the Japanese—namely, the field of economics. The Marxian school of philosophy, Lenin's teachings, and the like, found in the Empire of the Rising Sun large numbers of students (if not necessarily followers). In 1928 the famous Japanese theatre "Kabuki" visited Moscow and several other cities of Russia; Russian art-exhibitions were arranged in Japan; Russian and Japanese sci-

¹⁴ Japanese Year Book, 1930, pp. 421-456 (1 yen = 1 rouble).

¹⁵ In 1927 Japanese fishers exploited 248 out of a total of 800 fishing grounds of the Russian Far East, and caught 296-627 "koku" (i.e., about 30,000 tons) of salmon, trout, etc.

¹⁶ Shimpei Goto was made a Count on consideration of his services in connection with the Russo-Japanese *rapprochement*.

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entists again began to coöperate, and extended their common researches.

On several recent occasions Japan has demonstrated her friendly attitude towards Russia by taking more or less definitely her part in international affairs. Probably the most striking example was in connection with the "conflict" between China and Soviet Russia over the Chinese Eastern Railway in 1929. At that time Japan not only refrained from taking advantage of the delicate situation created for Russia, and maintained strict and benevolent neutrality, but even openly declared herself convinced that Russia had no aggressive designs in Manchuria whatever.

Japan was, of course, interested in preventing China from arbitrarily taking the Chinese Eastern from the Russians; for this might have set a precedent menacing to the future of the Japanese owned South Manchuria Railway. When doubts were no longer entertained about the outcome of the "conflict," when it was already quite clear that Nanking's game was lost and that the *status quo ante* on the Chinese Eastern must be re-established, and no fears remained concerning possible precedents, the Japanese Government rendered a real service to Russia by coming out as a witness for her before the world, which was constantly misinformed about Russia's acts and intentions. Tokyo declared quite emphatically that the raid on Hailar, led by the "Red" troops (and which actually brought about China's acceptance of Russia's terms) was nothing but a punitive expedition designed to stop the numerous and sanguinary attacks on the Soviet territory by Chinese and the "Whites." Later, in declining to join other Powers in their December reminder to Moscow of the Kellogg Pact, when hostilities had been suspended and a conference for settlement was already arranged (in November), Japan rendered another signal service to Russia by blocking the plan to give that reprimand the color of a world-wide condemnation.

D. The Railroads in Manchuria.

Though the ownership of the South Manchuria Railway by Japan and of the Chinese Eastern by Russia involves some apparent similarity in their positions in Manchuria, this resemblance is on the whole superficial. Whereas Russia exercises only

partial control of her railway, even sharing with China the profits from its operation, and has no other concessions or interests in Manchuria, Japan is more solidly in the saddle, having only recently succeeded in extending her rights on the South Manchuria Railroad and the lease of Kwangtung for 99 years.¹ She has nothing to share with China either in management or profits. Japan's interests in Manchuria are numerous and diverse, her investments in that country very large, her enterprises (such as iron works and collieries) of great importance.

Not completely satisfied with all this, Japan is constantly striving to secure and enforce economic and, at least some, political control over Manchuria; and, as one of the means to achieve that end, is endeavoring to build new railways either independently or through financing construction by the Chinese. Quite naturally this activity is viewed with suspicion not only by China but by Russia as well. China's worries are obvious. Those of Russia are explainable partly by her fear of unfair competition with the Chinese Eastern Railway, but more so by anxiety regarding her frontiers in Siberia. Russia makes no secret that she would prefer China as a next-door neighbor, for the latter country can hardly menace her peaceful development for many years to come. She knows full well that the Governments of Japan are not always so considerate and willing to cooperate as that of Mr. Hamaguchi, with Baron Shidehara as Minister of Foreign Affairs.

As we have seen in Chapter IV, Japan obtained in recent years a number of concessions to construct or to finance construction of railways in Manchuria, such as the Scupingkai-Taonanfu-Tsitsihar line, the Kirin-Tunghua Railway, and those included in the "Four Manchurian and Mongolian Railways Loan Agreement of 1918." Though legally a Chinese Government railway, the Scupingkai-Tsitsihar line actually extends Japan's influence into North Manchuria. Not only is it financially dependent on Japan, as mortgagee, but it constitutes for Japan a direct approach into that part of the "Three Eastern Provinces," which is independent of the Chinese Eastern Railway, i.e., avoiding the use of the latter's Southern branch. All these new lines, especially the Kirin-Tunghua, which connects the Korean

¹ Though China, apparently, is not inclined to consider that agreement valid and binding upon herself.

railways with those in Manchuria, are undoubtedly of great strategic value for Japan should the "first line of Japan's defence" (as they call Manchuria in Tokyo) again become a battlefield.

To such facts as these Russia cannot afford to close her eyes in spite of all the hopes for lasting friendship with Japan, and her sincere desire to see peace in the Far East undisturbed. They are of greatest concern to her. Russia is not building or planning to build any railways in Manchuria; she is not preparing there either "lines of defence," nor of offence, and she would be glad to see others also refrain from such activities. They breed suspicion; and suspicion hinders neighborly intercourse.

E. Summary.

Whatever one's attitude, whatever one's approach to and interpretation of the events described in Part II of our book, it must be agreed that they altered profoundly the situation in the Far East. The changes brought about by the World War and the revolutions in Russia and in China forced upon all and every nation concerned with the Orient and interested in the problems of the Pacific Ocean the necessity of revising their old notions, of reconsidering their old interpretations, of reshaping their old policies. New situations involving entirely new elements naturally require other methods of handling from those applied in the past.

China is no longer a submissive, mute object for vivisection, nor a silent partner with no right to protest against the abuses of the outsiders, or ask for a fair distribution of "dividends" from the exploitation of her own domains. She learned a great deal from the World War, which demonstrated the cold truth about the omnipotence of the Whites and the extent to which they are united. How easy it is, think the Chinese, to neglect the demands of the foreigners if they are resisted by the joint forces of the nation. The way in which the World War was settled (Versailles Treaty, Shantung question, etc.) was instrumental in reawakening the revolutionary spirit of the Chinese; the Russian Revolution suggested some ways of action, and China actually entered a period of reconstruction (though very

painful one complicated by destructive forces adding to the already existing chaos).

Another important change in the Far Eastern situation was introduced, of course, by the fact that Russia ceased to be an "aggressor," actual or potential, real or imaginary, and became (by virtue of the doctrines constituting the corner-stones on which the U.S.S.R. is built not less than by the necessity forced on her by economic factors) a Power seeking to consolidate its position in the Far East. This has been attempted neither by encroaching on the territory of its neighbors, nor by taking advantage of their weakness, but by lawful agreements, based on equality of the contracting parties. Patiently enduring abuses and even humiliations in order not to fall a prey of provocations deliberately or not pointing to armed clash, and awaiting better days when the attitude of the outsiders will be changed and possibility for coöperation will be thus created, Soviet Russia has become actually a factor for peace in the Orient; even though objectively she still may be considered a factor for war in the sense that her political and economic system continue to be a target for many among those who control the destinies of the world of today.

As for Japan, her position in the Far East has probably been changed more profoundly than those of other Powers, outside of China and Russia. For it must be remembered that all the changes brought about by the World War and the Revolutions affected her first of all as the closest neighbor. Actually she is involved more deeply in the life of her neighbors in Asia than any other nation. Temporarily or permanently, the aggressive elements of the country became checked by the more conciliatory.

The period of "adventurous pioneering" (to use a very mild term) in Eastern Asia seems to be closed. The new situation, taking the place of the old, is still in process of formation. The present period, probably, can be called a transitory one, with readjustments occurring, regroupings to be planned and effected, new policies considered and tested. At such a time it seems most appropriate to study rather than act, and to accumulate information, thereby preventing in the future, as far as possible, the errors in policy so often born of ignorance and prejudice.

PART THREE

RUSSIA'S RÔLE IN THE FAR EAST AS A PART OF THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC OCEAN

I. THE FACTORS CONSTITUTING THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC OCEAN

CHAPTER XVII

THE PROBLEM OF POPULATION

- A. Chinese Migration to Manchuria, Mongolia and Elsewhere. B. The Overpopulation of Japan (American, Canadian and Australian Attitudes towards Japanese Immigration). C. Russia not Faced with any Difficulties of Overpopulation.

Ever since the commencement of the war between Japan and Russia it has become more and more the vogue to speak of the "Problem of the Pacific Ocean." Statesmen and historians, scientists and publicists, economists and writers on military subjects have already contributed a veritable library of works, good and otherwise, relating to this problem, and have analyzed it from the widely varying angles dictated by the individual and professional approach. But all are agreed on one point: namely, that it is a problem of international significance to both the present generation and, probably, the generation to come.

The Problem of the Pacific affects almost half of the world. That huge ocean covers over one-third of the face of the globe, and the number of human beings living around its rim, and directly concerned with its destinies, embraces about one-half the population of the entire world. On and around the Pacific there is sure to be staged, and possibly in the near future, a drama of gigantic proportions. Perhaps the Pacific will be the scene of a titanic struggle between different nations, if not different races, for its mastery; or it may apotheosize the reconciliation of old rivals, at last coöperating in their struggle with Nature, and attempting to build, through united forces, welfare for all.¹

The Pacific had played a considerable rôle in international trade long before the World War but its importance increased immeasurably thereafter. This was partly because the War seriously undermined the economic situation of Europe and so at-

¹ One could expect, of course, also a more temperate, middle course, development, but only as a transitory stage to one of the two extremes outlined above.

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tracted more attention towards Asia.² It was also in a measure the result of the opening of the Panama Canal, the annual traffic on which has increased so swiftly that by 1926 it was five times as large as in 1915.

In addition to enhancing her place as a world market, the War of 1914-18 introduced to Asia, as we have seen in the previous chapters, many new and grave political problems. All over the world downtrodden peoples have risen up in rebellion against the foreign yoke, and have embraced the spirit of self-determination. When the movement spread eastward, the revolt of the Asiatics against the white man's domination started by the Turks and followed by the Chinese, Hindus, Indo-Chinese and Malaysians, brought about a vital change in the Far Eastern situation. And at the same time the Problem of the Pacific Ocean has been complicated immensely.

But what is this problem? What nations are directly concerned in it and why? The problem, in brief, is that of the future of international relations on and around the Pacific Ocean; relations the development of which depends on the ways and means of satisfying the diverse and conflicting interests of the several nations involved. These nations are primarily Great Britain (with Canada and Australia), Japan, and the United States. But China, France, Holland and the Soviet Union, all of whom have possessions in the Far East, are also concerned, and have therefore a certain interest in the fate of the Pacific at large. And, finally, there are the numerous republics of Central and South America adjacent to this ocean, but which have not yet arrived at a stage of economic and political development, which would make them important and direct participants in the game.

In an attempt to understand this complex problem it seems advisable first to dissect it into constituent parts or subordinate problems and to subject each to separate analysis. They are: (1) the problem of population, (2) the problem of raw materials, (3) the problem of markets and (4) the problem of cultural intercourse of the races concerned in the destiny of the Pacific.

We know that the density of population of the different parts of the world varies greatly: Europe has 123 persons per square mile of her area, Asia 61, North America only 18 and South

² For instance the Asiatic trade of the United States has grown from 125 million dollars in 1913 to almost two billion in 1929.

America merely nine and Australia not more than two. We also know that these ratios are deceptive, since they do not take into consideration the very different conditions prevailing in the separate parts of the world. Let us take for example Asia, as the continent of immediate concern. She cannot be rightly considered a reserve ground of unoccupied space since, though her area is enormous, the inhabitable and arable parts are very limited. The extreme cold of the North excludes a considerable part of Siberia and the numerous deserts (still to be reclaimed, if possible of reclamation) and endless mountains,³ to say nothing of the boundless "tundras" and virgin forests of the North, which seriously restrict the arable area of that continent. It must be remembered, too, that although Asia occupies only about 33% of the entire land-surface of the globe, she has within her boundaries over 50% of the whole population of the world.

It is equally misleading to compute the density of population by merely finding a ratio of habitation per square mile of the area concerned. There are still vast spaces unoccupied, uncultivated, and unsuited for settlement for many years to come. Thus, to state that the density of population of Asia is less than one half ⁴ that of Europe is correct if the ratios alone are considered;—but it is misleading in that the bulk of the billion odd denizens of Asia are confined within the rather narrow limits of the habitable parts of that continent. Moreover conditions further differ from those in Europe, not only because the majority of Asiatics continue to live in a primitive and agricultural, if not nomadic, civilization, but also because the area of land per capita there is so pitifully inadequate. Hence the standard of living of the Asiatics often brings appalling misery, and it seems only too probable that unless room elsewhere can be found for emigrants from that overpopulated continent the world at large will have plenty of troubles in the near future. So, indeed, believed the French statesman, Albert Thomas, when, at a World Population Congress convoked in Geneva a few years ago, he warned the world that "migration difficulties are preparing the way for a war, a war greater than the last!"

³ The ratio of plains to mountains in Asia is 0.5:1. In Europe the ratio 2:1, or proportionally four times better than in Asia.

⁴ Europe with an area of 3,756,703 square miles has over 480 million people and Asia with 17,043,947 square miles, over 950 million.

Moreover, in a recently published book, called "Human Migration and the Future," Mr. J. W. Gregory restated the well known fact that the "European race" (as he chooses to call it) has extended its control over all but one ninth of the habitable land on the earth and asserts that the migration during the past century has been one of the most effective agencies for the betterment of the world.

The World War impoverished many countries, and the populations, which they were once able to support have now become excessive. "But," writes Mr. Gregory, "large tracts of fertile, well watered land still lie idle in different places of the globe. If they were tilled the overcrowded countries of the world might maintain this excess of people." Then he concludes that "for such areas to be adequately used, migration of Europeans is necessary to America, Australia and parts of Africa and of Asiatics from the densely to the sparsely populated parts of Asia."

Is not this a characteristic statement? The white race, which has under control 8/9 of the earth, has the right to expand to any and all lands in any and all continents, but the Asiatics are generously allowed to move within the limits of Asia only! Nor is Mr. Gregory alone in propounding this scarcely scientific point of view of the problem of human migration. There are many others; but, strangely enough, none, to our knowledge, belongs to other than the white race.

It is right and proper, of course, that the emigration of Europeans should be aided and encouraged. It is perhaps necessary to prevent the decline of the white race, which is already inferior numerically to the colored races combined. But there are many lands, such as Canada, Australasia, and some parts of the Americas still available for this purpose; indeed, Mr. Gregory himself estimates that Australia alone can accommodate one hundred, if not two hundred, million people.⁵

Authorities on the subject are almost unanimous in regarding migration as beneficial both to the countries which thereby dispose of excess population and those which receive it. Through cultivation of unused lands the power of the world to support mankind should steadily increase and gradually banish fears of

⁵ An estimate regarded as excessive by other students of the question.

starvation through overpopulation, formulated by the Malthusian and neo-Malthusian theories.

What is the actual situation? On the one hand we know that certain Asiatic countries are overcrowded; for instance Japan has a population of over 400 persons per square mile.⁶ This is less, to be sure, than is the case of Belgium with 664, Holland with 554, and England with 483 persons per square mile. But for at least two reasons the problem of overpopulation in these European countries is not so acute as in Japan; they are industrialized more completely than Japan, and they have colonies immeasurably greater in wealth and area than the few possessions of Nippon. And while China has an average density of well over 100 per square mile (if one considers the whole area of all her constituent parts), 90% of her population actually live in about 1/3 of her territory, and some of her overpopulated areas have upwards of 600 persons to the square mile. Besides, China is predominantly an agricultural country, making this density a far graver problem than any known to Europe.

On the other hand we also know that a ban has been set on Asiatic immigration by the United States, Canada, and Australia, and that the immigration of the Asiatics to such other American countries as Mexico or Brazil⁷ (which has given a favorable consideration to such immigration), is frowned upon by their neighbors. In this situation are found all the signs of a very dangerous *impasse*. No wonder that there is anxiety over the Pacific Problem and many exaggerated fears of a clash. But the clash is surely one which could be postponed, if not avoided completely, by a more considerate approach to its constituent sub-problems, beginning with that of migration.

A. Chinese Migration to Manchuria, Mongolia and Elsewhere.

The suggestion that Asiatics should be shifted from the densely to the sparsely populated areas of their own continent seems applicable mainly, if not exclusively, to China. Of these latter areas certain of the outlying provinces or dependencies of China are most frequently mentioned in this connection; Manchuria most of all. Let us examine the actual situation in that much disputed district. It is true that until recent times

⁶ 64,447,724 people of Japan Proper live on 159,562 square miles.

⁷ In 1930 there were over 100,000 Japanese in Brazil.

Manchuria has been more or less ignored by China as an outlet for excess population. Only when the Russians started the Chinese Eastern Railway across Manchuria was an influx of Chinese emigrants to the "Three Eastern Provinces" started. From less than six millions in 1890 the population in these provinces rose to about ten millions in 1900, to thirteen in 1910, to over twenty in 1920 and was about 30,000,000 in 1929. All the signs indicate that this process of colonization of these fertile lands by Chinese will continue steadily, if not systematically. What China can achieve in this line may be seen from the case of the colonization of the province of Szechwan, started at the time of the Taiping Rebellion in 1842. The growth in population of that remote, isolated, but richly endowed domain has been amazing. In 1842 it had 22 million and in 1894 no less than 80 million inhabitants. But late in the nineties a considerable number of settlers returned to their native provinces, and therefore the population decreased to 55,000,000 in 1910-11.¹ A peculiar situation existed in Manchuria as well. For a number of years a large number of newcomers to that country remained only for a limited period of time. They came unaccompanied by wives and children, and after a certain period would return to their old homes and their families. All this has now been changed, partly because with development and cultivation the living conditions in Manchuria have improved, and partly because of the recurrence of famine and the devastations of civil war in the other provinces. In more recent years large numbers of those who come to Manchuria, and they amounted to one million souls or more in 1927 (though decreased in the following years), are permanent settlers accompanied by their families.

The immigration of Chinese into Mongolia never developed on any large scale, though several attempts were made to encourage and even to force such emigration. But, as they were based on the political consideration of turning the Mongols into Chinese rather than on sound schemes for the reclamation and development of the idle lands of Inner and Outer Mongolia, these attempts failed and even at the present time no considerable number of Chinese are found in that country. The same applies also to the Far Western provinces. Chinese Turkestan (or

¹ Prof. Kuhner, "Outline of the Modern Political History of China" (in Russian), Vladivostok, 1927, p. 19.

Sinkiang) has a meager population of about 1,500,000, or less than one person per square mile; Tibet has about two. Both these "provinces" are still isolated from the rest of the world by lack of communications. But the situation in these regions may be expected to change with the completion of the so-called Turksib Railway, connecting Siberia with Russian Turkestan, and following closely the frontiers of these underpopulated parts of China. Large tracts of land will thus be made available for colonization by the Chinese, provided they can find funds to undertake emigration on a large scale.

In regard to Manchuria, which is our immediate concern, it is emphatically to be considered as a splendid outlet for the excess population of China Proper. But it cannot justly be included in the list of lands open to Japanese or other foreign immigration to any extent.

The total number of Chinese living abroad in 1928 was estimated by the Statesman's Year Book of 1930² at 6,246,682. Other authorities place their number as high as nine millions.

B. The Overpopulation of Japan. (American, Canadian and Australian Attitudes towards Japanese Immigration.)

In the overpopulation of Japan lies the crux of the problem of population on the rim of the Pacific. With an area of 159,562 square miles and a population of 64,447,724 in Japan Proper¹ (i.e., excluding Korea with 21,057,969, Formosa 4,594,161, and the mandated territories), Japan would at first glance seem better off than some of the European countries; but the low percentage of arable lands in her domains makes Japan's position really very unfavorable.²

It is true that Japan has still some possibilities for expansion in her own possessions, such as Korea and Formosa (both of which, by the way, were acquired through war) and in Hokkaido and Karafuto (or Sakhalin). The Japanese emigrant, however, is looking less for mere land, as such, than for new and better opportunities. Hence his choice lies not in these lands

² Page 732.

¹ Latest census figures, as given in the "Current History" magazine of February, 1931, on page 795. In 1920 the population of Japan Proper was estimated as 55,963,053 and in 1925, 59,736,822.

² The Japanese Year Book for 1930 estimates that only about 10% of the total area of Japan Proper is arable.

or even (as we shall see later) in Manchuria and Siberia, but in the warmer and more cultivated regions of the East and South Pacific.

It is quite true of course that even now Japan has in her possession certain territories capable of absorbing newcomers. Within her boundaries she can still shift her population from overcrowded points to the less populated areas; and possibly, in consideration of the difficulties met abroad, the Japanese farmers will for a few more years confine their migration within the national borders. But the time seems to be close at hand when emigration will be tested as a solution for Japan's economic problems, since the annual growth of her population already approaches the million mark, her industrialization is retarded by lack of funds and foreign trade handicapped by difficulties in finding new markets. The only alternatives to migration are increased misery and birth-control, but the former can be endured only to a certain limit, and the latter is a device not yet effectively tested by practice.

But where are these lands which will accept the advancing tide of Japanese? In what manner will their colonization proceed? Must they be acquired by force or can they be peaceably opened to the accommodation of new settlers in consideration of the just demands of Nature? Here are the questions pertaining so forcibly to the problem of population on the Pacific's rim that it is not too much to say that upon the answer depends to a large extent the future relations of the Powers. A just and sensible handling of this problem can spell peace and coöperation, while a selfish and irrational attitude may very well lead to war.

Of the three continents which border on the Pacific two at least must, apparently, be excluded as real outlets for the excess of Japanese population. Let us consider first the Americas, North and South. It is true, of course, that in this twin Continent there remains plenty of thinly populated territory. But such territory is more or less closed to the Japanese. Canada and the United States already bar any immigration from the Empire of the Rising Sun, and Mexico and the Central American republics are forced to defer to the attitude of their neighbors to the North. And while the South Americans are generally willing to welcome the Japanese, Tokyo is sufficiently cautious of the enlarged in-

terpretation of the Monroe Doctrine to prefer keeping the tide of her emigration in that direction as low as possible.

It must be said, however, that the attitude of the United States seems on the verge of some reconsideration and possibly revision. The Immigration Law of 1924, it will be recalled, excluded the Japanese from the States as permanent settlers in any number whatever, even stipulating that they should not be included in the quota permitting the entry of "not more than one hundred per annum." It is a well known fact that this treatment of Japan is bitterly resented in the Empire of the Rising Sun. As recently as the occasion of the Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, which took place at Kyoto in 1929, the lingering resentment of a nation of proud Samurai was echoed by Baron Shibusawa when, in his address of welcome to the delegates, he voiced the bitterness of his people towards this "insult," as it was and is termed in Japan.

That the Japanese continue to smart—and with some reason—under what seems to them an unjust and unreasonable American attitude is further demonstrated in a book entitled "*Les Conflicts Nippo-Américains et le Problème de Pacifique*." The author, Mr. Yoshitoni, is a young Japanese jurist and diplomat, who bitterly condemns the American immigration policy throughout his work. "If the United States does wish peace in the Pacific," he concludes, "the problem of Japanese immigration to the United States should be revised to the effect of reëstablishing the equality of the Japanese in that respect with other nations." Mr. Yoshitoni also asks how there can be real peace in the Pacific unless the desire of the United States to maintain the "Open Door" in Asia is counterbalanced by a modification of the Monroe Doctrine. In short, Japan demands that America choose between the Monroe Doctrine and the principle of equal opportunity in Asia. "If a nation has the right to live," writes Mr. Yoshitoni in the final paragraph of his book, "the policy of the United States in the Far East does not appear to be in accord with the right, as it bars the Japanese from getting a living in all the Americas. The attitude of the United States and the aspirations of Japan clash in a menacing manner, and there is every reason to raise the question: 'Can the Pacific Ocean remain true to its name? Quo vadis Pacific?' War or peace de-

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pends entirely on the attitude of the party which first created the situation."

That this is not solitary private opinion of Mr. Yoshitoni is witnessed by the fact that his book carries an approving preface by the Counselor of the Japanese Embassy at Paris. From that very fact it may be inferred that it coincides to some extent with the official point of view. If so, the situation is indeed serious. But it is not altogether hopeless, and already some signs of improvement are manifest. The widely publicized, though probably too liberally interpreted speeches of the special American Envoy, Mr. William R. Castle, at Tokyo in 1930, have already been heralded by some Japanese observers as indicative of a change in the American attitude, and the more optimistic section of the press even went so far as to predict revision as a result. And certainly it ought to be feasible to find some compromise which will at once satisfy the national honor of Japan and protect the United States from the dangers, real or imaginary, of the "Yellow peril," a compromise which will maintain exclusion as a fact but which will not specifically class the Japanese as undesirable intruders. Whether or not such a compromise could expect official recognition, or meet with the approval of Congress, time alone can tell. But unless something is done the irritation produced by the Law of 1924 is likely to linger in Japan and to remain one of the chief obstacles to the development of real friendship between the two countries.

So much for the situation in America. Let us now consider the prospects of Japanese emigration to Asia, and in regard to this the subject of Japanese imperialism must first be recalled. In his book entitled "Contemporary Politics in the Far East," Mr. Stanley Hornbeck wrote several years ago that "it can be readily demonstrated from history that Japan has not up to this date been the preserver of peace in the Far East, but the contrary . . ." A long list of territories acquired by Japan through wars, or as aftermath of war, might be here appended. Among them must be counted Korea, which was annexed in 1910 after a solemn declaration by the Mikado in 1904 that "the separate existence of Korea is essential to the safety of his realm," and the promises of Prince Ito, repeated as late as in 1908 that it was "no part of Japan's purpose to annex Korea." It should also be noted that during and after the Russo-

Japanese War, a certain section of American opinion was distinctly favorable to the expansion of Japan to the Asiatic mainland. This attitude was prompted, among other things, by the desire to compensate Japan for the annexation of the Philippine Islands by the United States in 1898. Even Manchuria was occasionally given American recognition as a sphere of special interest for Japan, not only at the time of the Lansing-Ishii Agreement, but even at less pressing moments.

Nevertheless, in spite of Japanese achievements, it may safely be said that the solution of her emigration problem does not lie in Asia. In the first place China needs every inch of her own territory for her own underfed, starving millions, and she is not likely to tolerate any territorial aggrandizement by Japan at her expense. Besides, Japanese immigrants cannot compete with Chinese coolies, who are more industrious and are satisfied with a lower standard of living than the Japanese. But what of Siberia and Korea? The former country, it is true, has been theoretically offered up on the altar of Japanese expansion as a kind of sacrifice to placate the "gods of justice" in Asia. But happily this plan was never put into operation, even at the time of the none-too-glorious intervention of 1918-22 (partly, it may be observed, through the good offices of those Americans who did not believe in robbing Russia to enrich Japan). But a more potent factor in discouraging Japanese immigration to Siberia is the severely cold climate, which offers no inducement to the Japanese farmer, who is unwilling to migrate even to Hokkaido, which has been a Japanese possession for centuries.⁸ There now remains Korea. It is true that this much abused country could, so far as mere space is concerned, accommodate a certain number of newcomers from the islands across the sea. But her capacity is limited, as her arable lands are already occupied, if not to the point of saturation, at least to the point where they promise little in return for industry expended. Even after twenty years of the Mikado's domination, Korea has absorbed only an insignificant number of Japanese farmers; and for the reasons given above there is little prospect that this number will materially increase in the years to come.

⁸ In 1926 the Hokkaido Government announced that the island could accommodate 1,770,000 more people (E. F. Penrose in "Food Supply and Raw Materials in Japan," Chicago, 1930, p. 37).

- Asia and America, then, may both be excluded as immediate and enduring outlets for the surplus population of Japan. But the third continent, Australia, presents a very different picture. In area about ten times as large as the Japanese Empire, this continent has now only one-fifteenth of Japan's population, or six millions compared with ninety; and the presence of this practically empty territory almost at her own back door cannot but tempt Japan as an outlet. Quite naturally this situation is regarded as alarming by many Englishmen, and in consequence a recognizable campaign is even waged to modify the Australian attitude towards white immigration. Australia, it is argued, must be stocked by the whites to a far greater extent if she is not to be overrun by the yellow race.

Believing that Australia is likely to change her policy of discouraging white immigration, a certain English author deems it possible that she may become one of the deciding factors in the future of the Pacific. With Canada on one side of the ocean, Singapore and India on the other, and with Great Britain and her naval and air forces behind her, Australia can, by proxy of the United Kingdom, easily make a formidable bid for the supremacy of the Pacific. But will she or will she not make this bid at the proper time? And is it really feasible to populate Australia by arbitrarily introducing immigrants from England and other parts of Europe?

When one considers the difficulties of such a venture, and the expense involved, one is not inclined to take this plan too seriously. And in dismissing this prospect as shadowy to say the most, one is more than ever convinced that the solution of Japan's emigration problem, if there is a solution, will be found not in Asia but in the South, towards Australia and the islands of the South Pacific. In an authoritative book entitled "Australia—White or Yellow?" by Fleetwood Chiddell, it is stated that "the responsibility for keeping Australia empty does not rest solely upon the Labor Party. Certain landed interests have hitherto successfully opposed all attempts to increase the powers of resumption (of the land) passed by the states, and, if these remain as they now are, the effect of all development schemes must be very slow. . . ." And in 1926 the ex-Prime Minister, Mr. Bruce, declared in a speech that "other nations vitally interested

in Australia would be justified in coming to Australia if Australians themselves could not properly develop and utilize the vast resources of their continent. . . ." Furthermore in his book entitled "The Peril of the White" Sir Leo Chiozza Money declares that "Australia, if she continues to throw cold water upon immigration, will number in fifty years 17,000,000 and Japan Proper (i.e., without Korea and Formosa) 105,000,000 of people. . . . These calculations are of service only as showing the impossibility of the situation! It is not likely that Australia will contain only 17,000,000 in fifty years: either it will have been stocked by the whites to a much greater extent or it will have been peopled by the Yellow race."

The boundless emptiness of Australia must therefore be recognized as a present menace to the amity of the Pacific nations. But such a danger would be greatly minimized if Australia herself should welcome immigrants from Asia or should be persuaded to do so by friendly advice of some such body as the League of Nations. The present writer, however, would hesitate to take for granted that Japan could be satisfied with such a compromise. The Japanese, apparently, do not care to settle in foreign countries in large numbers (there were only 650,000 Japanese living abroad in 1929, including about 200,000 in South Manchuria, 150,000 in China Proper, 129,387 in Hawaii, some 130,000 in Australia and the islands of the South Pacific, 35,000 in the United States and 21,000 in Canada). It is true, however, that they go rather more freely to the newly acquired lands, as was the case with Formosa, which had in 1927 a Japanese population of 185,000, and Korea with over 400,000. But therefore no one should deny the possibility under certain circumstances of Japanese emigration to foreign lands on a larger scale as well; particularly when it is a matter of national expediency.

If and when Japan is able to send her emigrants to the South Pacific she will probably no longer look eastward to the United States. Her vital interests are in the western and southern waters of this ocean and the adjacent countries, which offer all the markets and all the raw materials she requires. Being in the Far East, Japan is already at the door of the new world center, and she will most probably remain there, and will be loath to antagonize America by moving farther to the East.

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C. Russia not Faced with any Difficulties of Overpopulation.

Disregarding France, Holland and the United States, none of which are interested in the Far East as a place for colonization by their own people (though they all possess there certain territories), let us now examine Russia's Oriental interests, if any.

Russia's possessions in the Far East are, to be sure, enormous in area. They cover about 1,150,629 square miles,¹ or almost three times the entire area of Manchuria, and almost seven times that of Japan Proper. But they are still hardly developed, the largest part being covered by virgin woods and swamps. With a population of only a little over 2,500,000,² the density of it is less than two per square mile, i.e., less than that of Australia. But it must be borne in mind that considerable portions of these possessions are of no real value for any colonization purposes, lying as they do in an extremely rigorous climatic zone (the northern border of the Maritime Province lying on 70° N.), with long Winters in which the mercury drops to 60° below zero, Réaumur). A large part of the land even further to the South, namely in the neighborhood of the Amur River, is known as "eternally frozen." Even recently, not more than 10% of the entire area was considered arable, though apparently there are still large tracts, which could be added by reclamation work.

Almost 80% of the Maritime and Amur provinces and over 50% of Trans-Baikalia is covered with woods, mostly unexplored.³ The southern part of the Maritime Province and considerable parts of the Amur Province and Trans-Baikalia are quite favorable for agriculture (wheat, oats, rye, barley and, in the South, even rice). Their climates are such as can be endured by Russian farmers. Though new settlers, undoubtedly, must expect the hardships of the pioneer's life, nevertheless the opportunities offered are attractive enough to make colonization of these regions quite feasible under certain conditions.

¹ The Maritime Province, 738,851 square miles; the Amur Province, 173,543 square miles, and Trans-Baikalia, 238,285 square miles.

² In 1928 the population of Maritime and Amur provinces together was officially estimated as being 1,402,400; that of Trans-Baikalia was over 1,000,000 in 1922.

³ N. Baransky, "Economic Geography of the U.S.S.R. (in Russian), Moscow, 1926, p. 233.

The fertility of the virgin soil, the larger acreage per capita, the rivers rich in fish and woods abundant with game, and the natural wealth of the grounds, are all points to be considered by those planning to move to the Far East. And if all this has not as yet brought about any considerable migration, it seems largely on account of lack of funds and lack of the proper organization for such a complex and expensive venture.

As we have seen in Chapter I, the colonization of the Russian Far Eastern provinces did not develop successfully until quite recent years. In 1897 the total population of the Maritime and Amur provinces together was only 337,300; but in 1917 it was 889,800, in 1923 it rose to 1,033,700, and in 1928 it reached 1,402,400.⁴

The Soviet Government seems deeply interested in effecting an improved colonization policy; but, being seriously handicapped by limited finances, it has failed to produce as yet any revolutionary change in this respect. Nevertheless, in spite of this, the increase of population in the Maritime and Amur provinces for the period 1923-28 reached the surprising mark of 369,700 souls or over 30% increase in five years.

As a part of the "Five-Year Plan" the Commissariat of Agriculture of the Soviet Union suggested intensification of the colonization program and inaugurated a very ambitious work of reorganization of territories and melioration of lands in preparation for the admission of new settlers. It is planned to organize in the Far East during the period 1928-32 enough land for 830,000 newcomers, and actually to move during this time 687,000 persons; of which 567,000 are destined for agricultural pursuits and 120,000 for the industrial development of the region.⁵

The new idea of "industrialization of agriculture" by creating large state farms (which are actually grain factories) and of "collectivization" of farming by encouraging the cultivation of land collectively instead of individually, as applied already in practice, seems to promise to ease the task of colonization of the large areas in Russia which have remained idle till the present time. Accordingly it is expected that the utilization of the Far

⁴ "Statistics of the U.S.S.R.," Moscow, 1929, p. 83 (in Russian).

⁵ People's Commissariat of Agriculture, "Materials on the prospective plan for the development of agriculture and forestry," Part V; "Organization of the Territory," Moscow, 1929, pp. 3-4 and 38-39.

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East will now develop more successfully and more rapidly than ever.

For the same five years (1928-32) it is planned to break about 350,000 acres of new land in the Far East for the state farms alone and to double the total cultivated area of the region. To realize the whole plan just outlined an appropriation of 178,930,280 roubles has been assigned for the Far East alone.⁶

The Soviet Government has excellent reasons for paying such attention to the problem of the consolidation of its Far Eastern provinces, and to settlement and exploitation of their natural resources. The Soviets are, in short, doing their utmost to develop the country economically and to strengthen it politically. These possessions are economically vital to the U.S.S.R. and Moscow could not, if it would, remain aloof. They are rich in gold, silver and many other minerals, as well as in timber and game. Besides, Trans-Baikal, bordering as it does on Mongolia for over 2000 miles, and also on Manchuria, is also very important politically and strategically as the advance-post of Siberia. The value of the Amur Province also lies not only in the very fertile lands of its southern part, which is well suited for the cultivation of wheat and is rich in natural resources, but also in its position as the Russian thoroughfare to the Pacific Ocean. Finally, the Maritime Province, besides abounding in minerals and timber, is also rich in fisheries and provides Russia with ports on the coast of the Pacific. Its position on the border of Korea and Manchuria, and next door to Japan Proper, solidifies its political and strategic significance.

From this short outline it may be seen that while Russia's interests in the Far East are vital their nature is not such as to make probable any schemes on her part for acquiring new territory. Russia possesses enormous areas of land in her own domain, actually covering almost 1/6 of the entire earth surface of the globe, and still has plenty of room to shift her population within her own borders. Her possessions in the Far East alone represent such a large reservoir of lands for colonization that she will not be able to utilize them all for many years to come. It is true that she is planning now to bring new settlers to the Far East in large numbers, but this is scarcely likely to constitute a menace to peace in the Orient.

⁶ "People's Commissariat of Agriculture," *ibid.*, pp. 45-50.

More newcomers to these neglected regions, more toilers on these fertile but unused lands, can spell only larger crops, more manufactured goods, and consequently cheaper prices and better living conditions—not only for those Russians, who migrate to their own idle territories, but for the neighbors too.

There is not the slightest reason for Russia, whether or not under Soviet rule, to plan any territorial expansion in the Far East or elsewhere. She is faced with no problem of overpopulation; she has land enough and to spare. Nor, as will be seen in the following chapters, has she any other reasons for adopting a policy of aggression.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE PROBLEM OF RAW MATERIALS

A. Scarcity of Many Basic Raw Materials in Japan. B. Japan's Dependence on Chinese Supplies. C. China's Natural Resources and Needs. D. Russia's Independence and Enormous Wealth in Raw Materials. F. Other Powers and their Interests.

One of the outstanding results of the rapid and world-wide development of industry during the last century was the enormous volume of raw materials consumed. Most striking has been the increase in the industrial utilization of minerals, which multiplied fifteenfold in the last thirty years. During this time a larger amount of mineral raw material has been employed than in the entire annals of recorded history up to the coming of the Industrial Revolution.¹ So great indeed has been the consumption that reserve supplies of certain important minerals have been greatly depleted. The resultant pressure upon the world's supply has inevitably been a subject of Governmental consideration, and the mineral reserves of the world have now become an important factor affecting both national and international policies.

Nature, as we know only too well, has not distributed the deposits of many important raw materials evenly or with any regard to the needs of nations. Certain minerals are found only in a very few places, so creating natural monopolies. There are some countries so well provided that they may be considered almost, though not completely, self-sufficient. But the others—and they are by far the majority—must depend to a great extent on imports.

Even such raw materials as those which provide food and clothing (grain, cotton, etc.) cannot be produced in all countries alike; there are some parts of the world which are better fitted for their cultivation, and others which are distinctly un-

¹ H. Foster Bain at the Institute of Politics, Williamstown, Mass., in 1926.

favorable. Cotton, for example, has been produced up to the present time mainly in the United States (60%), Egypt (20%), and India; though now there are good prospects for a considerable development of cotton-growing in Trans-Caucasia and the three republics of the Central Asia which belong to the Soviet Union. Very few nations possess regions favorable to the growth of rubber, a commodity becoming more and more important in many manufactures. The recent discovery in Asiatic Russia of plants rich in caoutchouc may insure the Soviet Union's independence in this commodity too.

In addition to these physical handicaps, there are some of politico-economic origin. The so-called hyper-urbanization, resulting in a too rapid decline of the agricultural population, is responsible for the fact that a number of the highly industrialized European countries are not raising their own farm products in sufficient quantities and must depend on imports of foodstuffs from others. Such is partly the case with Japan.

But the most striking instance of the dependence of one nation upon another is in the field of mineral raw materials. The importance of iron as the chief construction metal, and of coal and oil as the chief mineral fuels, is self-evident, but the fact that these basic raw materials are very unevenly distributed is not always appreciated. To illustrate this point it is, probably, enough to state that over 70% of the annual world's oil supply is produced in the United States, that most of the oil wells operated throughout the world are under either British or American control.² About 75% of the iron and about the same percentage of steel are produced in the United States, Germany and France; the Soviet Union has a practical monopoly of platinum and manganese;³ China—on antimony (80% of the world's production) and tungsten (over 70%); while until recent times Canada supplied over 80% of the world's asbestos. About 60% of the coal comes from the United States and the United Kingdom. Consequently there are many countries which depend completely on imports for some commodities. This—for instance—is the case with Japan, which must import not only all the cotton and all

² Almost 98% of the world's oil comes from the United States, Venezuela, Russia, Mexico, the Dutch East Indies, Rumania, India and Galicia (temporarily in Poland).

³ Though manganese is also found in British India, Brazil, etc., platinum recently was discovered in Canada.

the wool consumed by her industries, but many other raw materials in considerable quantities as well.

In normal times this unevenness of distribution is adjusted through international trade, but various restrictions, such as the control of exports and state monopolies on certain commodities contribute serious difficulties to the problem of different nations in assuring the supply and constant flow of raw materials needed for their industries.

Control over Chilean nitrates, the restriction on sulphur instituted by the United States and Italy, the camphor monopoly of the Japanese Government, the Italian state-control of production of citric acid and mercury, Brazilian control over coffee, British restriction on the output of rubber, the Franco-German combine for control of potash, and the Soviet Russian State Monopoly of Trade, which includes complete control of exports (though of somewhat different nature than all the others enumerated), constitute factors of serious concern to those who depend on the importation of the commodities thus controlled.

An interesting *exposé* of this situation is found in the recent book by B. B. Wallace and L. R. Edminster, entitled "International Control of Raw-materials."⁴ In the Preface to this work we read that "Commercial and industrial developments following the World War have focused public attention with unusual sharpness upon questions of access to raw materials, production of which is localized in a particular country but for which the consumer demand is widespread. The resulting opposition between nationalistic interest and international comity has been at times acute and appears destined to be permanent in character." And elsewhere in the same book we find an expression of hope that an early international agreement on some means of coping with this problem may be secured.

A very serious situation arises in time of war. No nation can afford to store in peace-time sufficient amounts of raw material to meet her needs during a war. Often a nation will be entirely deprived of access to the source of supply of certain materials. Such was the case with Germany during the World War, even though she managed to survive the virtual blockade effected by the Allies. But this was largely owing to her ingenuity in such

⁴ Published by the Brookings Institution, Washington, D. C., 1930.

innovations as developing the process of production of nitrogen from air. Others in like circumstances might well be so handicapped as to be forced to capitulate through scarcity of raw materials during an emergency.

A. Scarcity of many Basic Raw Materials in Japan.

Despite her recent remarkable progress in industry, Japan is still a country where agriculture plays a prominent rôle. Some Japanese writers even assert, on consideration of her net wealth production, that she is still predominantly agricultural. Professor Shirosi Nasu, of Tokyo University, estimated¹ that in 1925 agriculture contributed 3,246 million yen to the net wealth of Japan Proper, though industry's part was only 1,895 millions. But his calculations are based on an unusually broad interpretation of the word "agriculture" since he includes under this heading mining and, apparently, anything that can be extracted from the earth. The same author also states that 52½% of the entire population of Japan Proper is sustained by tillage of land, though this figure, correct for 1920, has been reduced by 1926 to 48.6%.²

It is a well known fact that the holdings of Japanese farmers are very small; 69% cultivate less than one "cho" (or 2.45 acres),³ while almost 33% are tenants. The exhaustion of the supply of new land available for cultivation is forcing the farmers to leave the land. For the past twenty years the agricultural population of Japan Proper has been practically stationary, while the total population has continued a somewhat rapid increase.

"Industrialize Japan!" was the slogan of a certain period; the results have already been noticeable for a number of years. It is true the manufacturing industry in Japan includes many small-scale domestic industries; there are in Japan Proper about 52,000 workshops,⁴ approximately one half of which employ only 5 to 10 workers. And it is equally true, as Professor Shirosi

¹ In "Agriculture and the Japanese National Economy," published in "Foreign Affairs" for July, 1930 (New York).

² Japan Year Book, 1930, p. 337.

³ The average yield per "cho" being about 20 "koku," or about 100 bushels of rice.

⁴ With over 2 million workers employed.

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Nasu pointed out, that "capital does not flow liberally from agriculture to industry because of the high land value due to the pressure of population and also because of social obstacles, which prevent the free movement of capital."⁵ Yet, in spite of all this, the growth of industry in Japan is an outstanding phenomenon.

All the same, it cannot be denied that for a number of years to come Japan is likely to remain, to a large extent, an agricultural country. Japanese farm products are intended for home consumption, and the exports of such commodities are negligible. The annual average export of "Food and Drink" for the years 1912-18 was 10.4% of the total of exports of Japan and only 6.5% for the years 1919-23.⁶ But it is also undeniable that the part played by agriculture in Japan is declining, and is yielding place to industry.

The development of the Japanese industries consequently demand a correspondingly large supply of raw materials. But Nature has deprived Japan of many of these, including certain basic ones, while numerous others are insufficient. The total coal deposits of Japan are estimated by a competent Japanese writer, S. Uyehara, in "The Industry and Trade of Japan," as only 3,762,000,000 tons.⁷ And the even more optimistic estimate of H. Foster Bain in his "Ores and Industry in the Far-East," namely over 8 billion tons,⁸ provides Japan with a mere 150 tons of coal per capita, though the United States claims a per capita coal reserve of 34,274 tons and China 2,320 tons, respectively over 200 and 15 times larger than that of Japan. In regard to iron ores the situation is still worse. All the known and used deposits could provide only 1.5 ton per capita of the Japanese population (still less in China) to 37.9 tons in the United States.⁹ The known deposits of oil in Japan are also very meager. It is not surprising, therefore, Japan depends on imports to keep her industries running.

To appreciate the extent of Japan's dependence on commodities from abroad it is only necessary to realize that 100% of

⁵ Shiroshi Nasu, *ibid.*, pp. 662-663.

⁶ S. Uyehara, "The Industry and Trade of Japan," London, 1926, p. 59.

⁷ S. Uyehara, *ibid.*, p. 192.

⁸ H. Foster Bain, *ibid.*, p. 33.

⁹ H. Foster Bain, *ibid.*, p. 209.

the cotton and wool consumed by her is imported; 95% of lead and sugar; 80% of zinc; 75% of fuel oil and of chemical dyes; 55% of steel and 45% of iron. Japan must also import a considerable amount of timber and coal, and, as we know, large quantities of foodstuffs.¹⁰

B. Japan's Dependence on Chinese Supplies.

For obvious reasons Japan is seriously concerned in insuring a constant supply of such commodities as iron and steel, oil and coal, which are of special significance in wartime, and which in any case must be assured in the event of emergency. Hence for many years she has been systematically trying to secure this continuity of supply from nearby China, including Manchuria, and from Korea. "If Japan can rely on getting Chinese supply easily," comments Mr. Uyehara,¹ "its prospective future could be assured to a certain extent, although there will always be some disadvantages in relying upon importation of foreign raw materials."

Before the World War Japan imported over 30% of her pig-iron from England and about 15% from Sweden; but during the War the needs of the Allies prevented any large scale purchases by Japan on the European markets, and she was forced to turn to other sources. Actually she almost tripled her former purchases in China.²

Iron-ore was and is imported by Japan mostly from China (1910—82% of the total; 1918—99.6%; 1920—98.2%; 1921—89.7%); though she also draws heavily on Korean deposits, which are considered as domestic. The following table will indicate the relative importance of the two sources: ³

¹⁰ Total imports of food into Japan is steadily growing, especially since the World War, as can be seen from the index-numbers for the years 1914-26, as given in "Food Supply and Raw Materials in Japan," on p. 44. In 1914, 42.51; 1920, 36.49; 1924, 111.00, and 1926, 106.76. Imports from Korea and Formosa are growing more rapidly than those from foreign countries.

¹ S. Uyehara, *ibid.*, p. 188.

² V. Belly, "The Struggle for the Pacific," Moscow, 1929, p. 36, gives a table of Japan's imports, from which it appears that she imported pig-iron from China in the following quantities in percentage to the total: 1914, 24.11%; in 1918, 77.6%; in 1921, 63.6%.

³ Figures from S. Uyehara, *ibid.*, p. 187. The reserves of iron-ores in Korea are estimated as from 10 to 40,000,000 tons (Orchard, "Japan's Economic Position," pp. 289-290).

IMPORTS OF IRON-ORE BY JAPAN FROM CHINA AND KOREA

<i>Years</i>	<i>China</i>	<i>Korea</i>
	<i>in thousands of tons:</i>	
1913.....	277	144
1914.....	297	162
1916.....	229	190
1920.....	650	332
1921.....	439	190

In the recent years, apparently on account of the unsettled conditions in China, the Japanese import of iron from that source somewhat declined, being in 1927-28 almost equal to that from the British Indies or 14,819,000 and 19,986,000 yen worth from China to 11,040,000 and 12,930,000 yen worth from the British Indies.⁴

Only some steel and special products of iron were and still are imported by Japan from the United States in larger quantities than from any other source (in 1914—1.9%; in 1915—69.3%; in 1918—93.9%; and in 1921—68.6%). Coal was and is imported almost exclusively from China (1914—93.15%; in 1918—87.91%; and in 1921—79.10%). The decrease of imports from China after the War was balanced by increasing imports from Indo-China.⁵

As for oil and its products, before and during the War, Japan depended mainly on the supply from the United States, but since that time the British and Dutch Indies have become the predominant importers of this commodity, so necessary not only to Japan's industries but to her navy as well. The table on the next page will make clear the change in relative importance of the sources of oil imported by Japan.⁶

In 1927 and 1928, however, these two sources played almost equal parts; from the United States Japan imported Y. 16,964,-

⁴ Japan Year Book, 1930, p. 447.

⁵ Japan's reserves of coal are estimated at over 8 billion tons, practically all of which is bituminous. Usually she exports more coal than she imports.

⁶ Japan's own oil fields are producing only a very insignificant amount of oil, though the development of the newly acquired Sakhalin deposits may improve the situation materially. As a remedy for the difficulties arising from the scarcity of this fuel Japan is electrifying her industries and railways.

JAPAN'S IMPORTS OF OIL

Source	1914	1916	1918	1920	1921
United States.....	82.3%	100%	88.8%	26.6%	21.8%
British and Dutch					
East Indies	0.6	..	11.2	73.4	78.2

000 and 15,904,000 worth of oil and from British Indies Y. 16,-711,000 and 19,623,000.⁷

There remains but one commodity for which Japan continues to depend on the United States, namely—cotton, in exchange for which she is sending to America practically the whole exportable part of her raw silk and silk products (in 1912—76% of Japan's silk exports went to the United States; in 1914—80.9%; in 1919—96.1%; in 1921—94.6%). But even cotton is not imported by Japan exclusively from America, as may be seen from the following table: ⁸

JAPAN'S IMPORTS OF COTTON

Sources	1922	1923	1927	1928
	<i>in million yens:</i>			
United States.....	179	178	344	246
British India.....	209	263	202	232
China	29	39	49	50
Africa	8	19	21	17
Others	4.	13.		
Total in million yens.	427.	513.	616.	545.

The consumption of cotton in Japan increased 43% between 1913 and 1923, thanks to the development of her textile industry, which now exports large quantities of cotton-goods and cotton yarn. Consequently even if an emergency should bring a scarcity of raw cotton and force her to decrease or even discontinue entirely the exporting of cotton-goods Japan still would not suffer too seriously from the loss of one or the other source of supply.

⁷ Japan Year Book, 1930, p. 445.

⁸ Figures in this table from S. Uyehara, *ibid.*, p. 129, and from the Japan Year Book, p. 446.

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From the above outline of Japan's imports it will be instantly clear that the Empire of the Rising Sun is gradually freeing herself from dependence for basic raw materials on countries other than China. At the same time her dependence on Chinese raw materials is, naturally, becoming paramount.⁹

Among the Chinese sources of raw materials Manchuria is most important to Japan, Shantung comes next. The Manchurian reserves of iron-ore near Anshun are estimated at over 300,000,000 metric tons and her deposits of coal in the mines of Fushun and Yentai alone amount to over 1,500,000,000 metric tons, to say nothing of the fertile soil of the Three Eastern Provinces which supplies Japan with grain, soya-beans, etc.

C. China's Natural Resources and Needs.

Some students of the problem of raw materials, such as Mr. H. Foster Bain in his "Ores and Industries in the Far East," do not regard the natural resources of Eastern Asia as very rich. Yet without contesting this appraisal¹ we can probably agree that however small the resources may be, they exist in some measure and are badly needed by China and Japan.

The requirements of Japan are usually stressed more than those of China partly because the former is poorly endowed by Nature with many basic raw materials, and partly because Japan has already a well developed industry, which is not the case with China. But it is quite evident that China is getting industrialized too, and will need her own raw materials to convert them into manufactured goods by her own factories. Therefore it is natural to expect that she will do her best to keep her natural resources under her own control and not to allow any undue exploitation of them by others. It is true that China is only starting this new phase of her economic history, but along with her industrial expansion she will require raw materials in large quantities and these considerations seem of more im-

⁹ It is quite obvious that in case of a war with the United States or Great Britain, Japan must depend almost exclusively on China for all kinds of supplies (food, minerals, etc.).

¹ In the opinion of Arthur Coons in "The Foreign Public Debts of China," p. 214, Nature has endowed China with abundant supply of iron and copper, and also supplies of tin, lead, quicksilver, antimony, tungsten and other minerals. Mr. H. F. Bain's estimate of China's iron-ore reserves is about 950 million tons, with about one-third metallic iron contained.

portance to certain students of the Pacific Problem than definitive figures of the deposits of the diverse ores in China, the estimates of which, anyhow, vary so widely as to make them far from dependable.

At the outset of the XXth century there were in China only two textile factories; in 1930 there were already 120 and the total number of all kinds of Westernized factories was over 2,000. In 1911 the total value of the imported machinery was \$2,730,000, but in 1920 it was over \$34,000,000.² From facts and figures such as these we may gain some idea of the extent of the industrialization of China.³

D. Russia's Independence and Enormous Wealth in Raw Materials.

The subject of Russia's interest in the natural resources of the Far East may best be approached through a preliminary analysis of her own wealth generally and in the Orient particularly. Once her enormous wealth in natural resources is appreciated it will be clear that Russia's interests in the raw materials of her Asiatic neighbors cannot be regarded as holding a threat of any conflict on that basis.

The fuel reserves of the Soviet Union were estimated in 1929 at over 600 billion metric tons (combined: oil, coal, peat and timber). Indeed, taking into consideration the recent new discoveries, the oil deposits of Russia amount to near four billion metric tons, or over one-half of the known deposits of the world (7,700,000,000 metric tons). The coal deposits running to almost 500 billion metric tons¹ will be sufficient to meet the demands of Russia's now evergrowing industries for many hundreds of years. Another valuable fuel now widely used in Soviet Russia is peat, the deposits of which in her boundaries are the largest known in the world, being over 50 billion metric tons.

In regard to iron, the Soviet Union claims possession of about three billion metric tons of iron-ores in territory already surveyed and 20-30 billion estimated deposits in the newly discov-

² Madiar, *ibid.*, p. 149.

³ Import of machinery reached its peak in 1920 and has since declined very rapidly. In 1924 it was only about one-half of that of 1920.

¹ 64 billion metric tons in the Donbas, almost 450 billions in Siberia (Kuznetsk and Irkutsk basins) and in the Far East.

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ered Kursk district of the so-called Kursk magnetic anomaly. Manganese and platinum are practically Russian monopolies. Her reserves of gold, silver, lead, copper, aluminum, nickel and almost any and every mineral in quantities make the Soviet Union better provided with these raw materials than any other country in the world. Indeed they guarantee her a degree of self-sufficiency actually unknown to any other nation; a point well appreciated in the long years of actual blockade which Russia experienced from the very beginning of the World War and which endured in a most acute form after the Revolution.

It is possible, of course, that the natural resources of the Far Eastern possession of the U.S.S.R. are not as unlimited as certain geologists and practical engineers have asserted; but the numerous expeditions sent by the All-Russian Academy of Science during the recent years have already proved them to be large. Some are already being exploited, while many others are under consideration for future use.²

If the actual economic needs of a nation are a true index it may safely be said with emphasis that the U.S.S.R. is not a competitor in the field of raw materials on the shores of the Pacific Ocean. As in the case of the search for territories for migration, Russia plays, in this regard, no active part; since, being richly endowed in her own possessions, she has no interest in the natural wealth of the Far East beyond her present borders.

E. Other Powers and their Interests.

To complete the picture it is necessary to add a few lines defining the interests, if any, of other Powers in the exploitation of the raw materials of the Far East.

If we consult the tables of the foreign trade of China and Japan, we are impressed first of all by the fact that their imports are larger than exports, and that a considerable part of the latter consists of silk and silk-products, tea, curios, furs and some other items in rather small quantities. China is exporting antimony (about 20,000 tons yearly), tungsten (6-7,000 tons) and tin. Japan exports some copper and camphor (on which

² In a paper read before the First Pan-Pacific Commercial Conference, held in Honolulu in 1923, David White stated that "an estimate of 1,300 to 3,300 million barrels of oil for Eastern Siberia, including North Sakhalin, may not eventually be found excessive" (H. F. Bain, *ibid.*, p. 121).

she has a state monopoly). But, generally speaking, these two countries are not sources on which Europe and America are drawing heavily. For instance, in case of the United States, there are only two essential commodities—antimony from China, and camphor from Japan,—that could not be easily secured from other lands. Such imports as silk and tea, though imported in large quantities in normal times, are not necessities without which the purchasing countries would suffer in war-time.

Therefore, if any foreign interests are involved in the Chinese extracting industries¹ they are likely to be of a private nature, and do not directly reflect national needs and policy. In the case of some countries, however, it is a point of policy to support their traders and business men working abroad whether or not their endeavors coincide with national interest and Governmental aims. Hence we occasionally see these countries become involved in matters relating to the problem of raw materials, even when these particular materials are not directly needed by either the nation or its industries.

¹ In 1929 over 70% of coal-mines and almost 90% of the entire metallurgical industry of China were under foreign control (Madiar, *ibid.*, p. 161).

CHAPTER XIX

THE PROBLEM OF MARKETS

- A. Growing Importance of Asia as a World Market. B. Japan vs. Great Britain. C. Japan vs. the United States. D. Russia has no Excess of Manufactured Goods to Export.

A. Growing Importance of Asia as a World Market.

It is a truism that the growth of industries necessitates new markets. With the advent of the machine-age and especially with the development of mass-production and the so-called rationalization of manufacturing processes, the output of industry is growing rapidly all over the world. The demand for new markets follows inevitably.

Asia, with her endless millions of people, whose needs are far from being satisfied, is one of the largest of such potential markets. Her economic backwardness, prevailing in the major part of the continent, hinders the proper utilization of the producing capacity of these millions; and the impossibility of reorganizing them at once to bring a swift change in the situation, renders her a tempting field to exporters of manufactured goods from all corners of the globe.¹

The growth of Asia's importance in this respect can be illustrated by the expansion of American trade with that continent in the recent years. From 125 million dollars' worth in 1913, this trade jumped to almost two billion in 1928, i.e., multiplied 15 times in 15 years. But the United States is not alone in witnessing a tendency to expansion in her Asiatic trade; other countries are similarly situated. And consequently it is not surprising that the numerous aspirants for exploitation of this market quite often reach those disagreements which arise when the interests of competitors conflict.

The situation of the Chinese markets is especially delicate

¹ With a population constituting about 20% of that of the whole world, China does not take more than 2% of the international trade.

at the present juncture. These markets are rapidly developing and offer great temptation to several competitors at once. During a rather short period of time China's foreign trade has multiplied fourfold. In 1903 the total was only 561 million taels. But by 1913 it had almost doubled, having reached 1,005 millions; and in 1923 it mounted to 1,726,282,369 taels.² Then, owing to the Revolution and Civil War, its growth slowed down for several years, being 1,790 million taels in 1927; 1,724 in 1925; 1,989 in 1926, and 1,923 in 1927, which, nevertheless, is still almost four times as much as in 1913.³

For years the leading place in this trade was held by Great Britain. Not only was she the foremost manufacturing and trading nation of the world and the mistress of the seas, but she also possessed, till recent times, an unrivaled position as a Western country with possessions scattered all over the world. In some instances, too, these possessions were even interwoven in the tissue of the Oriental states (Hong Kong, Wei-hai-wei, etc.). England, furthermore, was the first country to start large-scale trade with China and Japan.

England remains, perhaps, the first among those Powers which now assume a dominant interest in these markets; and up to the present she has continued to play the leading rôle in the Chinese market.⁴ But the tempo of the growth of Chinese trade with Japan and the United States now seems to indicate that a change is coming. The United States, whose commerce in Asiatic markets has already occasionally compared favorably with that of England, lost much of her Oriental trade when the Suez Canal was opened. This Canal made it possible for Great Britain to deliver her goods more speedily and on cheaper freight-rates than the United States, which had not as yet built the Panama Canal.

The following table of China's foreign trade will illustrate this point:

² H. G. W. Woodhead in "Occidental Interpretations of the Far Eastern Problem," Chicago, 1925, p. 53.

³ China Year Book for 1929-30, p. 164.

⁴ If one includes the trade carried on by Hong Kong, Australia, British India, the total of Great Britain's trade with China was 659 million taels in 1923, 652 in 1924, 497 in 1925, 451 in 1926 and 572 in 1927. From these figures England's part was 163 million, 116, 111, 172 and 133 millions respectively. China Year Book, 1930, pp. 158-164.

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TONNAGE OF SHIPS ENTERED AND CLEARED AT OFFICES UNDER THE
INSPECTORATE-GENERAL OF CUSTOMS ⁵

<i>Countries</i>	1864	1874	1883	1893	1903	1912
	<i>in 1000 tons:</i>					
Great Britain..	2,862	4,738	11,003	19,204	28,123	38,106
U. S. A.....	2,609	3,184	151	78	560	715
Japan	1	1	195	567	7,965	19,913

The decline of American trade with the Far East was, of course, only temporary. From the end of the XIXth century (i.e., when the United States started her new Asiatic policy; occupied the Philippines, and advanced the idea of the "Open Door"), her commercial interests in the Orient in general and in the Far East in particular have become very striking. They have now grown to the point where the U.S.A. can be considered one of the three largest customers.

The growth of American trade with China and Japan, especially after the opening of the Panama Canal, may be seen from the following:

(a) *Totals of American trade with China per years in million taels:* ⁶

<i>Years</i>	1912	1916	1918	1919	1920	1921	1922	1923	1924	1925	1926	1927
<i>Totals</i>	54	112	164	259	340	209	235	281	291	286	338	289

(b) *American trade with Japan per years in million yen:* ^{6a}

<i>Years</i>	1902	1913	1921	1922	1923	1924	1927	1928	1929
<i>Totals</i>	129	307	1,071	1,329	1,196	1,416	1,507	1,452	1,568

During the period 1882-1923 the United States imported from Japan 7,164,515,000 yen worth and exported to Japan 5,939,378,000 yen worth, leaving a "favorable" balance for Japan of

⁵ Figures from H. B. Morse, "The International Relations of the Chinese Empire," v. I, p. 395.

⁶ Figures for years 1912-1921 from Galkovitch, *ibid.*, p. 164. The rest from China Year Book of 1929-30, p. 163. Philippine Islands included.

^{6a} Figures for years 1902-21 from Uyehara, *ibid.*, p. 74-75; for 1927-29 from the Japan Year Books for 1930-31.)

1,225,137,000 yen.⁷ The development of Japan's foreign trade may be regarded as commencing at the end of the XIXth century. In the year 1893, which immediately preceded the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, it amounted to the rather insignificant sum of Y. 176,000,000. But in the years that followed, Japan's foreign trade grew so rapidly that by 1898 its volume had increased almost 250% and in 1908 was 500% of that in 1893.⁸

In 1914 the total foreign trade of Japan was Y.1,186,000,000; in 1918—Y.3,630,838,393; comprising over 2 billion yen worth of exports.⁹ In the single decade between 1910 and 1920 the total multiplied almost five times; from some 923 million yen to 4,419 million.

Accordingly, Japan's part in the Asiatic markets has grown more rapidly than her European trade. For the period between 1893 and 1914 the percentage of the latter dropped from 39 to 21% of the total. Japan's Asiatic trade on the other hand, rose from 37 to 49%.

The distribution of Japan's foreign trade between 1913 and 1924 may be seen from the following table:¹⁰

JAPAN'S TRADE PER CONTINENTS

<i>Years</i>	<i>Asia</i>	<i>Europe</i>	<i>America</i>	<i>Others</i>
1913	exp. 43.62% imp. 47.70	23.28% 30.20	30.05% 17.03	3.05% 5.07
1916	exp. 44.83 imp. 48.69	19.20 14.34	31.30 27.20	4.67 9.77
1918	exp. 47.68 imp. 48.72	15.20 4.96	28.53 38.01	8.59 8.31
1920	exp. 51.22 imp. 40.35	10.04 13.67	30.44 37.61	8.30 8.47
1924	exp. 41.86 imp. 40.68	9.68 23.67	42.28 29.02	6.18 6.63

⁷ Figures from Galkovitch, *ibid.*, p. 167.

⁸ Ushisaburo, Kobayashi, "The Basic Industries and Social History of Japan, 1914-1918," Japanese Series of the "Economic and Social History of the World War," Carnegie Endowment, New Haven, 1930, pp. 23-7.

⁹ Kobayashi, *ibid.*, pp. 3-7.

¹⁰ Figures from Uyehara, *ibid.*, p. 72.

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During the World War, when Japan exerted a virtual monopoly of the Asiatic markets, the amount of her exports to China grew accordingly (141 million in 1915; 193 in 1916; 318 in 1917; 359 in 1918, and 447 in 1919). The growth, however, is not revealed in percentages, since, as we have seen, Japan's trade with the rest of the world grew proportionally. The development after that war may be seen from the following table:

JAPAN'S FOREIGN TRADE ¹¹ (IN MILLION YEN)

<i>Years</i>	<i>Export</i>	<i>Import</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Excess of imports</i>
1919	2,180	2,225	4,406	45
1920	2,040	2,379	4,419	339
1921	1,309	1,677	2,986	368
1922	1,683	1,954	3,637	271
1923	1,448	1,982	3,430	534
1924	1,807	2,453	4,260	646
1925	2,306	2,573	4,879	267
1926	2,045	2,377	4,422	332
1927	1,992	2,179	4,171	187
1928	1,972	2,196	4,168	224

From this table it will be seen that beginning with 1920 Japan's foreign trade in general has suffered from an adverse balance, with heavy excess of imports over exports; so draining for a total of 3,213 million yen the national wealth of the country in 10 years. The part occupied by Japan in China's commerce has, nevertheless, grown to such a degree that she is now apparently striving to outstrip England and become foremost among the nations trading with the Chinese Republic.

In 1913 Great Britain's share in China's trade was 36.5% in the latter's exports and 55.2% in her imports. Japan's share at the same time was 16.3% and 20.4% respectively, while that of the United States was 9.3% and 6.6%. In 1923 Great Britain slipped to 33% in exports and 46.1% in imports, while Japan jumped to 26.4% in exports and 22% in imports, and the United States to 16.8% and 16.5%.¹²

From the above figures one can see:

(1) that the foreign trade of China and Japan are steadily growing; (2) that the commercial interests of other countries in

¹¹ Japan Year Book for 1930, p. 422.

¹² Uyehara, *ibid.*, p. 79.

Asiatic markets are also growing, though not evenly; and (3) that China is the arena of competition between Great Britain, the United States and Japan; other countries having comparatively minor interests.

Now let us analyze the respective interests of these countries with a view to seeing wherein they conflict, and why.

B. Japan vs. Great Britain.

For many years one of the most important items of Great Britain's trade with China was the cotton-goods exported, to a considerable extent, from Lancashire. Latterly, however, this business of the United Kingdom has suffered a severe setback; partly because China was developing her own textile industry,¹ and partly because Japanese textiles, produced with increasing rapidity, were replacing English imports. In the fourteen years between 1913 and 1926, the number of cotton-spinning spindles in China increased 340.9%, in Japan 272.3%, but in the United Kingdom only 2%.²

In the period 1909-13 the average total exports of cotton yarn from the United Kingdom were 98,397 tons, and of cotton piece-goods 536,837 tons. The average for 1923-25 was 75,237 tons and 369,111 tons respectively, a loss of 23.5% in the one case and of 31.2% in the other. In the same period Japan's exports of cotton piece-goods grew from 10,336 tons to 104,329 tons.³

The following table ⁴ illustrates the trend of China's imports of cotton-goods very clearly.

CHINA'S IMPORTS OF COTTON-GOODS

<i>Importing Countries</i>	1913	1922	1923
Great Britain..	53%	42%	38%
Japan	20	47	51

¹ From 119 cotton mills in China only 3, according to the China Year Book for 1929-30 (pp. 1074-78) were British, of the remainder 41 Japanese and 75 Chinese. For a total of 3,612,606 spindles there were 2,099,042 Chinese and only 161,860 English.

² Ernest Minor Patterson in the *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, November, 1927, p. 21.

³ E. M. Patterson, *ibid.*, pp. 20-21.

⁴ Uyehara, *ibid.* p. 81.

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The total value of China's imports of cotton-goods was: in 1922—147 million taels, and in 1923—132 million.

Other items of imports to China over which there is a certain amount of competition between Japan and Great Britain are machinery and equipment. Though as yet this competition is on a minor scale, it is plain from the following table of Japan's exports to China (in 1913 and 1923) that the trend is towards considerable increase in these items as well.⁵

JAPAN'S EXPORTS TO CHINA IN 1913 AND 1923

<i>Goods:</i>	1913	1923
	<i>(in million yen)</i>	
Cotton-piece goods...	19	100
Cotton yarn.....	60	38
Sugar	14	13
Coal	7	10
Marine products....	7	9
Machinery	1.2	5.4
Iron manufactures...	0.227	3.775

The ability of Japan to compete with others in the exports of machinery can be illustrated by the fact that in 1918 she exported 110,680,000 yen worth.⁶ As a market for investments, also, China has latterly absorbed more and more Japanese capital, to the detriment of England.⁷ Similarly the shipping business of England is facing increased competition from Japan. In 1898 Great Britain owned 54% of the world's seagoing tonnage, in 1914—41.6%, and at the present time only about 30%. *Meanwhile Japan's merchant fleet has increased in size and tonnage very materially. During 10 years from 1914 onwards the tonnage alone gained 2 million tons.*⁸

Among the factors responsible for the shift of Chinese trade from Great Britain to Japan are the territorial proximity of the latter, the racial and cultural kinship of two Oriental neighbors, the rapid growth of Japan's industries and (through cheap labor) the lower cost of production in Japan, a higher Japanese standard of efficiency, in some instances, than the English (machinery and equipment in Japan being more modern since her in-

⁵ Figures from Uyehara, *ibid.*, p. 80.

⁶ Uyehara, *ibid.*, p. 216.

⁷ More Japanese money is invested in railroads of China and diverse concessions, more loans for China floated in Japan.

⁸ Uyehara, *ibid.*, p. 316.

dustries are younger), and last but not least the fact that the Sino-Japanese trade is better balanced from the Chinese point of view than the Sino-British trade. Japan imports from China almost to an equal sum of what she exports to her, as one can see from the following table⁹ (in which Formosa and Korea's participation is included):

JAPAN'S TRADE WITH CHINA

<i>Years</i>	<i>Exports to China</i>	<i>Imports from China</i>	<i>Total</i>
	<i>in million taels:</i>		
1923	223	229	452
1924	246	232	478
1925	309	232	541
1926	349	259	600
1927	309	270	579

It is true that exports to China from Japan Proper are normally somewhat larger than her imports from China; but Korea's part brings an adjustment.

As for England's exports to China, they are materially larger than her imports from the same, leaving a balance unfavorable to China. For instance in 1926 her exports to China amounted to 360 million H. taels and her imports from China to 197 million. In the following year the figures were 352 and 275 million respectively.¹⁰

Finally one must consider the economic expansion of Japan to the South and Southwest. Japanese goods are competing with those of England even in such domains of the latter as Australia, the Straits Settlements, and India. The following table indicates the growth of her exports of textiles to India:

JAPAN'S EXPORTS TO INDIA

<i>Goods</i>	1919	1926
	<i>in 1000 yen:</i>	
Cotton piece goods..	55,497	70,347
Cotton yarn.....		28,086
Silk goods.....	9,449	11,986

⁹ China Year Book for 1929-1930, pp. 162-163.

¹⁰ China Year Book, 1929-30, p. 1014.

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Which indicates a growth of 26% in 8 years. In 1927, however, these exports were diminished, as the Indian import tax was increased.

The trend of Japan's trade with other Far Eastern countries may be seen in the following table: ¹¹

JAPAN'S TRADE WITH CERTAIN FAR EASTERN COUNTRIES

<i>Countries</i>	1913	1923	1925	1926
	<i>in million yen</i>			
Straits Settlements...	15	46	82	81
Dutch Indies	43	113	189	178
Philippines	14	31	36	46
Siam	7	20	31	24
Australia	16	129	197	180

The growth in every item of this table must be a matter of serious concern for those who are dealing with the trade of Great Britain in the Pacific.

C. Japan vs. the United States.

The main items of the U.S.A. exports to China are oil, tobacco, cotton and more recently machinery and miscellaneous metal goods.¹ Her imports from that country include silk, textiles, furs, wool, tea, antimony, and tungsten. Formerly China sold to the United States more than she imported. But this favorable balance is likely to decrease, if not disappear and even become reversed, since the main items of American exports to China are commodities which will be increasingly necessary (in the development of her economic life in general and of her industries in particular).

A comparison of the goods exported to China by the United States and by Japan will, however, show that these two countries do not offer to China the same commodities.²

¹¹ Figures from an article by Yurievskaya, "Economic Expansion of Japan," Russian magazine, "Revolutionni Vostok," 1929, pp. 126-128.

¹ Before the World War machinery imported from China came from: Great Britain, 37.9%; from Germany, 18.3%; from Japan, 8.9%, and from the U.S.A., only 6.8%. After the War England's share fell to only 29.6%, Germany's to 17.7%, though that of the U.S.A. reached 20.7%, i.e., more than tripled, and that of Japan more than doubled, becoming 18.8%. (Madiar, *ibid.*, p. 149.)

² In case of the United States and Great Britain this is not so. Both are importing the same merchandise and are competing accordingly.

In such items as war materials, machinery and industrial equipment, it is true that Japan is beginning (though in a very moderate way) to compete with the United States in China; but generally speaking these two countries are not yet bitter commercial rivals on the Asiatic mainland. Though Japan is now forcing an entrance into some markets where previously the Americans had predominated (Hawaii, Philippines, Dutch Indies) and *vice versa*, both are growing industrially and both are introducing new products for exports.

When, however, we come to consider their respective interests in China as a field for future investments, we contemplate a rather different picture. It is true that the actual investments of the United States in China at the present juncture (about 75 million dollars *) are far below those of Japan (over one billion dollars) in railroads and other concessions, as well as in industrial outlay and financial capital in the form of loans to China. But it seems more than likely that in future years, if and when China has become more stable and business there less hazardous, the financiers of the United States will turn their attention and capital more frequently towards China and seek investment in the development of her natural resources, the building of her industries and the construction of public utilities. Already certain deals of this nature (e.g., in Shanghai for power and light) have been registered.

And it is quite possible that such an economic expansion of the United States will eventually conflict with Japan's interests in Asia and so complicate further their mutual relations.

Japan is not only growing industrially, but rightly regards industrialization as the best way to relieve her economic difficulties. For a number of years her foreign trade has had heavy adverse balances. Hence she is now looking for larger exports. China is a splendid market for Japan, but the latter is industrially still behind America and certain other countries and therefore is somewhat handicapped in competition. As a result she is striving for exclusive rights, for privileges and, if possible, for monopoly in certain parts of China such as Manchuria. Not unnaturally she seems extremely sensitive to any economic expansion of her rivals in this field, or to any foreign plans which might interfere with her own.

* Some sources give larger total of American investments in China.

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D. Russia has no Excess of Manufactured Goods to Export.

Russia in the past was predominantly an agricultural country. Her exports consisted mainly of grain, which was not offered on the Far Eastern markets, if for no other reason than that freight was prohibitive. Hence inasmuch as China and Japan also had not much to offer her for export in the past, Russia had no considerable trade with her Far Eastern neighbors. But of the two China was in this respect far ahead of Japan. Yet even so her part amounted (in the years which preceded the World War) only to some 3-4% of China's total foreign trade.¹ Of this about three-quarters consisted of commodities purchased by Russia in China (tea, foodstuffs, etc.) and only 25% of what she exported to that country (cotton piece-goods, cigarettes, metals, etc.).²

Russo-Japanese trade was, at the same time, quite insignificant; in 1913 it was worth only about 5 million roubles. But during the World War Japan suddenly became a source of supplies for Russia's needs, since in view of the blockade, the latter country was cut off from the regular sources on which she depended in time of peace.

Practically all the goods imported by Russia at that time from abroad were introduced through the port of Murmansk, on the White Sea, or through Vladivostok. The routes to the former being under constant menace from the German submarines, were used only to a limited degree and, generally speaking, exclusively for the delivery of war materials. The other port of entry, Vladivostok, was used for the goods entering via the Pacific, some of them from America, but the largest part from Japan. The latter had supplied Russia during the years 1914-17 with guns, ammunition, raw materials and other goods to the amount of over 300 million yen. This emergency call on the Japanese industries forced a considerable expansion of their activity, and a number of new "mushroom" factories came into existence in

¹ In 1894 it was only 1.5%, in 1907 less than 3%, and in 1913, 3.78% of China's imports and 4.5% of her exports. The total Sino-Russian trade amounted to 46 million taels in 1900, to 61 million in 1905, 97 million in 1906, and about 90 million in 1913.

² For instance, in 1907 tea constituted 60% of the total of Russia's exports from China, foodstuffs 17%. From the total of imports, cotton piece-goods made 30%, cigarettes 9%, metal goods 5%. (N. Steinfeldt, *ibid.*, pp. 69-70.)

the Empire of the Rising Sun between 1914 and 1917, only to be shut down after the War was over.

The Revolution in Russia naturally put a stop to this influx of Japanese products. As a matter of fact a considerable part of what was ordered there by the old régime never left Japan, and still larger quantities of raw materials (copper, brass, pot-ash, etc.) and manufactured goods, which were shipped from Japan but detained at Vladivostok by traffic congestion on the Trans-Siberian,³ were taken back by Japanese and other interventionists.

Soon after the October Revolution, when the civil war and the intervention were started, the Allies instituted a virtual blockade of Russia, and thus prevented for several years the importation of any commodities from abroad. The stores remaining to Russia from the past were soon exhausted, and a famine of goods followed. This terrible lesson forced Russians to turn their attention towards the elimination of their dependence on foreign manufactured goods, and prepared the way for the inauguration of an ambitious industrialization program for their country.

By 1930 this program had already materialized to a certain degree. The production of Russia's industries was not only restored to the pre-war level, but increased to 150-200% of the 1913 figures. But however extensive the latest achievements of the U.S.S.R. in this field may be, the country is still very far from producing enough even to meet the needs of its own population. Naturally, she has comparatively little surplus for exports, outside of raw materials. If, therefore, Soviet Russia was exporting by 1930 considerable quantities of a variety of goods, including manufactured products,⁴ it was not because she had any excess, but in consideration of her urgent need for cash to pay for the machinery and industrial equipment she was buying abroad.

Even in 1930 the ratio of consumption by the Russians of many basic commodities was still so appallingly low that they were faced with a gigantic task in satisfying the needs of their domestic markets before attempting any serious large-scale ex-

³ The railway traffic became (long before the Revolution started) so congested that the entire transportation system of Russia almost collapsed.

⁴ Though the total foreign trade of Soviet Russia in 1929 amounted to about only 58% of that in 1913, and in 1930 hardly exceeded 75%.

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porting. Home requirements will tax the new industries heavily for a number of years to come.

During recent years Russia's Far Eastern trade was restored and reached the following figures:

RUSSO-JAPANESE TRADE.⁵

1925-6	—11,800,000 gold roubles, of which 9,100,000 of exports from Russia.
1926-7	—14,500,000 of which over 11,500,000—exports from Russia.
1927-8	—32,312,000 and
1928-9	—33,114,000.

SINO-RUSSIAN TRADE.⁶

1923	—34 million H. taels of imports to Russia and 10 million—of exports from Russia to China.
1924	—46 and 10.
1925	—48 and 13.
1926	—64 and 23.
1927	—77 and 23.

These figures testify that after the official relations between Russia and her Far Eastern neighbors were restored, trade relations returned to a level somewhat similar to that of pre-war days.

There is plenty of room, of course, to speculate whether the growth of Russian industries and the consequent excess production will not necessitate a search for larger markets and whether China will not provide one of the most tempting outlets. It is quite likely that the western parts of that country, especially Sinkiang (now accessible through the newly opened Turksib Railway), will, like Mongolia, develop into important markets for Russian products, though not necessarily as scenes of Russian trade monopoly. It may very well be that with the development of the Russian Far East, and after the new industrial establishments have satisfied local demands, Russian products will be offered to China, and, if the prices are attractive, will obtain a considerable foothold there. But one thing at least seems sure: the New Russia will not employ force to acquire

⁵ Japan Year Book, 1930, pp. 421-456.

⁶ China Year Book for 1929-30, p. 162.

markets in China or elsewhere, first because her new régime professes disbelief in such methods of economic expansion, and secondly because the time when markets acquired by force can long be retained with benefit is apparently over. But that Russia will eventually participate in a peaceable struggle for Chinese markets is not only conceivable, but probable. In that case, of course, she will face the competition of major rivals. How she will meet this competition is a question to be considered in another chapter.

In concluding this discussion of the problem of markets in Asia, it is appropriate to say a few words regarding some other eventualities in this field. Japan and China are not alone in inviting foreign investors to develop their industrial life; the Russian Far East and Siberia are equally tempting to outside capital. The fabulous wealth of these regions in natural resources of all kinds, now more and more made known through numerous expeditions carried on by the All-Russian Academy of Science, remains still undeveloped to any considerable degree, though they have been offered by Moscow to foreign concessionaries for exploitation. A few concessions have already been acquired by the Japanese, and a grant for oil in Sakhalin was made to an American firm (Sinclair) which, however, failed to start exploitation within the time limits prescribed by the contract and so lost the concession. With the stabilization of the new régime, however, further foreign concessions are likely to be sought and granted. In addition to the mining, oil and timber concessions, and fisheries, largely exploited by Japanese, the realization of the ambitious plan of Russia to colonize her Far Eastern possessions will open an enormous field for investment in public utilities.

CHAPTER XX

THE PROBLEM OF CULTURAL INTERCOURSE

A. Difference of Races. B. Difference of Cultures. C. Difference of Economic Development. D. Possibility of a Synthesis.

Last but not least among the subordinate problems constituting the major question of the Pacific is that of cultural intercourse between the peoples living on its shores. Will it resolve itself in a predominance of Western or of Eastern culture, or in the co-existence of both through some sort of adjustment? In other words, is it possible for West and East to meet and remain together in the two hemispheres, with mutual esteem as the basis; or is a clash and mortal struggle unavoidable?

It may be true that the basic cause of any war is economic. Likewise, expansion to new lands and to new continents can usually be traced to the same economic stimulus. Nevertheless, it can scarcely be denied that in the process of expansion, and in the unavoidable conflicts, arising in connection therewith, other contributory—though, probably, secondary—causes can be detected. In the case of the Pacific such contributory causes may be recognized in the conflict of races, conflict of different cultures, and of different stages of economic development.

A. Difference of Races.

In our present stage of knowledge, no doubts are entertained by scientists that all human beings belong to a single genus or species, constituting mankind. Few outstanding authorities to-day maintain that there is such a thing as a pure race, or that one race is inherently superior to another. But at the same time no sane person will deny that certain groups of people differ from others in a variety of characteristics. One of these is color, which constitutes for the man in the street the main exterior sign of race. Yet even this classification is not unimpeachable; and we may expect to find in one and the same racial group elements

not entirely homogeneous, but having the characteristics of two or more other contributing sources.

Racial segregation is a phenomenon which seems to have occurred frequently in the past, at times conspicuously, at others less so. But hardly ever could it be considered a stable institution of Nature, whose basic law is eternal motion and general evolution. In the periods of temporary segregation, of course, the separated groups naturally developed certain characteristics which made them different from the others, who, in their turn developed individual traits. But there seems no justification for any assertion that races are permanent groups unable to change and unable to acquire characteristics similar, if not identical, with those of others. Interracial marriages, growing in number along with the increase of contacts between the continents and the development of intercourse between their inhabitants, prove their congeniality and their offspring disprove still further the theory of exclusiveness of races. The time is past when such proponents of the theory as the celebrated Count de Gobineau, with his volumes on the inequality of the human races, were enthusiastically acclaimed even by well educated people. Certain writers continue, of course, to expound the idea of racial chasms dividing humanity into heterogeneous cells; but their object is usually alien to science. The simple division of races and nations into two groups: one having great and noble historical missions to perform, and another qualified only to serve as building material and driving force, sounds strange nowadays, notwithstanding the fact that certain arrogant but poorly informed demagogues and egotists use (and will continue to use) this scientifically discredited premise to gain their own ends.

But, of course, it is one thing to ascertain that the racial differences are not inherent and immutable, to know even that such racial characteristics as the shape of the skull undergo marked modulations with the change of environment; and quite another to state that all the human beings are alike. Whatever their boundaries may be, whatever the errors in definition and classifications, the races of today are obviously unlike in many important respects. Who can deny that there is now a vast difference between the blacks and whites, at large, and similarly a certain difference between the whites and the yellow race, notwithstanding the fact that their origin in the remote past was

one and the same. But the most noticeable and significant dissimilarity lies neither in the pigment of their skins, nor in the shape of skulls, but in the variety of cultures and divergency of economic development in the numerous aggregates of people. Though it is true that they are still, to a great extent, divided by color, it is not the color that causes the division.

More intercourse, less difference—such seems to be the rule. Negroes who have for several generations lived among the whites and became their equals economically and culturally, are recognizable only by the color of their skin. In other respects their old characteristics are disappearing and rapidly yielding place to the characteristics of those who live in the identical cultural and economic environment. Though yellow in skin, numerous Japanese and Chinese who live among whites differ very little in thought and habit from the whites who belong to the same class. The adoption to a large extent of Western culture and of the Western economic system has, in the short time of their intercourse with Europe, done more to change the Japanese and Chinese than all the long centuries of their isolation.

Consequently it is more profitable to concentrate on cultural and economic differences between the groups than to explore racial distinctions. In the case we are considering, it so happens that the groups under examination are of different colors, and belong to different races. Undoubtedly this dissimilarity of color might be used "in case of emergency" to incite the ignorant, and even can produce the "ideological justification" of a war on a quasi-racial basis. But this would in no respect challenge the soundness of the claim that race is really a secondary consideration.

B. Difference of Cultures.

For many centuries the nations of the Orient lived a more or less isolated existence and had a highly developed culture of their own long before many of the white nations came into the purview of history. When, in comparatively recent times, the Westerners came to Asia and started to abuse the Orientals, the latter were for a long time unable to resist, since the main point of Occidental superiority, namely firearms, was not a part of their equipment. Force, though glorified in Japan, was not reckoned among the virtues in China. But necessity is the mother

not only of invention, but often of imitation and adjustment. Though it is against the basic principles of their national philosophy, even the Chinese are now becoming more inclined to believe that the "might" is necessary to establish their "right"; and they are following the example set by their neighbors, the Japanese, who were the first to transplant Western weapons and Western methods of warfare to the Orient.

By force or otherwise, the Westerners introduced into the life of the Asiatics a number of innovations. The use of foreign manufactured goods naturally influenced their ways of living, modified their tastes and stimulated new trends. In other words, the contact of East with West undoubtedly meant a certain loss to the old culture of the Orient. The appearance of Western machinery inevitably was followed by the shattering of old social structure and the coming of a new organization. The old order was altered and the advent of a new one, displaying the influence of the West in all branches of national life, including science, philosophy, religion, art, manners and customs, soon became noticeable.

New methods of work, new distribution of tasks, new relations between classes, were established, and with them came also the same conflicts between classes which afflict the Occident. On account of the close interdependence of culture at large and economics (as one of its manifestations), a change in one necessitated a change in the other, and *vice versa*. The changes produced by the adoption of a new economic system reflected on the cultural outlook in general, and the change in the cultural outlook forced further modification in the field of economics.

C. Difference of Economic Development.

Probably the most serious and important difference between the Westerners and the Asiatics lay in their uneven economic development. For if in this respect Japan is now rapidly becoming Westernized, if her industrialization is swiftly bringing her more and more in line with other Powers, such is not the case with China, still far behind in the process of modernization. To some extent China is still living in an almost medieval stage, and many characteristics of feudalism are still not completely eradicated.

The industrial revolution, though advancing mercilessly and

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victoriously, has still to conquer completely not only China, but even Japan. The tempo and volume of production in these countries do not yet compare favorably with those of the highly industrialized Western nations; and, coupled with the scarcity of capital,¹ are responsible for the lower standards of living in the East. Undoubtedly certain differences in character and mental setting (lower versatility, slower reactions, and possibly less initiative) must be taken into account as well. But whether they are inherent characteristics of this or that racial group, or only actual traits of a given people living in a given climatic zone under a given economic system at the given moment, they are important only in so far as they explain the difference in the levels of economic development. Orientals and Occidentals still have, indeed, dissimilar approaches to many problems; and so, naturally, have plenty of points on which to disagree when they meet. Conflict between the two economic levels is therefore unavoidable. Indeed, it is actually visible, raising the question of the extent to which the two can co-exist and of the chances for an adjustment able to prevent a clash.

In brief, one economic system relies on machinery and mass production, with higher standards of living, more expensive labor costs and, consequently, higher prices for its products. The other is dependent mainly on manual labor, is slow and less efficient, with low standards of living and low wages, and therefore, in the main, with cheaper prices. But the first system, with its growing production, far in excess of the domestic requirements, needs outlets for the surplus and is therefore looking for new markets. Not only must it develop also those which are undeveloped but potentially promising, but it must assist the "backwards" in their transformation into an economically more advanced stage, thus creating future competitors. The second, though usually offering first a passive and later an active resistance to the invasion, must gradually yield and finally disappear as an entity, either by merging with the other and incorporating certain of its own characteristics, or by becoming extinct and so losing them entirely.

The trend in Asia leaves little reason for doubt. The machine is coming to the economically backward countries and is forcing

¹ Because low production handicaps acquiring surpluses and accumulation of reserves.

changes which nothing can prevent. Westerners, fearing the effects of this, should realize that the benefit derived by the Asiatics from this change will not necessarily constitute a loss to the Occident; since it will create new needs, which for a considerable time can be satisfied only with manufactured goods from the West. If this trend is allowed to follow a normal course, the difference in economic development will gradually fade, and the conflict based on it will disappear. But when and how this will be achieved is another question.

D. Possibility of a Synthesis.

When we consider that differentiation is the result of separation and isolated existence, we may as well agree on the reverse situation. If the peculiarities of the two races (the white and the yellow¹), which now meet on the Pacific, are the result of their separate development and isolated life (for long centuries after their ancestors departed from a certain common ground), it seemed only logical to expect that after they have met again, restored their intercourse, and so begun to influence one another, the differences are likely to diminish. A new "race," which will be a synthesis of both, and with a culture incorporating the strong features of each, must then appear. But here, again, we are confronted with the old questions: When will this happen? What will be the process of this transformation? What is to be expected on the way to this goal?

Without pretending to know the answers—which are still in the making and dependent on many factors now still at work in shaping them—we shall endeavor in the chapters following merely to outline some of the possible solutions of the conflict of races and cultures. But we shall attempt only to discover their merits and faults, leaving the question of which one will be actually followed to those who enjoy this kind of guess-work.

In closing this chapter on the problem of cultural intercourse a few words must be said regarding Russia's position in the problem. The doctrine on which the present régime of the Soviet Union is built and its constitution is based declares quite emphatically that all races are equal and should be treated as such. As far as the actual performances of that régime are concerned, there seems to have been no discrepancy between the acts

¹ Only these two are of direct concern here.

and professions. In her internal policy Soviet Russia does not discriminate among races (and her population, as is well known, includes a great variety). Neither are there detectable any signs of a "superiority complex" in her relations with her "backward" neighbors, including the great nations of the Far East. The existence of a considerable mixture of blood in the veins of some Russians, with a marked contribution from the Mongolian, would serve to explain why they seem not so alien to the yellow race as some other "pure" Europeans might be. Besides, there were and are numerous other signs of the interinfluence of the Russians and the Mongolian race. A number of Russian thinkers in the past (Solovieff, Danilevsky, Leontieff) have declared Russia's normal orientation to be towards her yellow neighbors in Asia, and have repeatedly stated that Russians living in Europe and Asia are actually "Eurasians" and as such are destined to be a link between these two continents, between the Occident and Orient, between the whites and the yellows.

Even at the present juncture it is plain that the ties between them are strong; and the tendency seems to be towards further consolidation of accord. Russo-Japanese relations, while not wholly cordial as yet, are improving; and, if one considers the inclinations of peoples to be more important than the attitudes of governments, the friendliness between the Japanese and the Russians is more obvious. Sino-Russian relations are basically amicable. The hostile attitude taken by Nanking towards Moscow seems at variance with the real feeling between these two nations.

In a letter to the chiefs of the Soviets at Moscow, written on his deathbed and just before he completed his last will, Dr. Sun-Yat-Sen expressed himself as follows: "I charge the Kuomintang to continue the work of the Revolutionary movement, so that China, reduced by the imperialists to the position of a semi-colonial country, shall become free. With this object I have instructed the party to be in constant contact with you. I firmly believe in the continuance of the support which you have hitherto accorded to my country. Taking leave of you, dear comrades, I want to express the hope that the day will soon come when the U. S. S. R. will welcome a friend and an ally in a mighty free China and that in the great struggle for the liberation of the

oppressed peoples of the world those allies will go forward to victory hand in hand." ²

Does the appearance of machinery and of new technique in the Orient necessitate its passage through the identical forms of economic structure of society which Europe underwent? The past history of Japan had not prevented her from taking the same path as her tutors had to follow. China, on the other hand, may prove able to work out her own new forms, influenced by her own specific past, and arrive at some sort of amalgamation or compromise of old and new.

It may be that her forms will be a new contribution in that field. It is far from certain that China must go through a long period of Capitalism (closely though the latter is related to the machine-age into which she has already entered), China may choose Communism instead, or develop some new form, more in accord with her peculiarities, her own culture, her own philosophy than either the opposing systems just mentioned.

² J. W. Hall, "Eminent Asians," 1930, pp. 88-89.

PART THREE (*Continued*)

II. THE WAYS OPEN FOR THEIR SOLUTION

CHAPTER XXI

THE OPEN DOOR POLICY

A. *Its Origin and Different Interpretations.* B. *Validity of Japan's Status in Liaotung.*

A. *Its Origin and Different Interpretations.*

Several ways are open for the solution of the problem of the Pacific Ocean. One of these, it is said, lies in equality of opportunity for all concerned. This plan is represented (in theory at least) by the policy of the "Open Door," in opposition to that of the "Closed Door," under which the control established by certain foreign governments over a nominally independent state prevents others from obtaining benefits of trade and enterprise.

The Closed Door policy usually implies (1) preferential or so-called assimilated tariffs, discriminating in favor of the country claiming special interests; (2) restriction of the shipping business to exclude other foreign ships from certain ports of the country under actual control of one of the Powers; and finally (3) granting of concessions only to the citizens of the country claiming the region in question as its sphere of influence. By instituting what is actually an economic monopoly it naturally nourishes conflicts and broadens rivalries. The Open Door policy, on the other hand, imposes no restrictions and offers equal opportunity to each and all.

During the XIXth century the United States were still occupied with settling their own continent, and therefore did not take part in the colonial expansion of the Powers in Asia. "If we had been an established nation at that time, perhaps we, too, would have acquired a vast indignation at the murder of missionaries and soothed ourselves with territorial grants," is the comment of the American Committee for Fair Play in China.¹

Though American trade with the Celestial Empire started as

¹ Bulletin No. 8, June 1928, San Francisco, Cal. "The Development of an American Policy in China."

long ago as 1784, the first treaty between the United States and China was not signed until 1844. Another followed in 1859, by which the United States obtained through the "most-favored-nation" clause the same advantages which the other Powers won in their wars with China. But the interests of the young American Republic, at that time, were confined almost entirely to trade and cultural activities. Hence it remained for a time outside of the struggle of the Powers for "leases," concessions, and spheres of influence in China, though certain statesmen and especially naval officers insisted on the reverse policy.

It was not until the "orgy of leases," which started after the Sino-Japanese War (1894-95), was followed by the establishment of "spheres of influence" and "inalienable perpetual occupation" menacing American trade, that the United States enunciated (in 1899) her "Open Door" policy for China. This was after the war with Spain (1898), the acquisition of the Philippine Islands, and the annexation of Hawaii had made the United States one of the great Pacific Powers with colonial interests, and at a time when the contest for greater benefits in China had brought the Powers almost to the verge of battle. England at that time was occupied with her war in the Transvaal, and her difficulties with Russia in the Near and in the Far East. Anglo-French relations were tense after the Fashoda incident. Germany was becoming more and more alienated from Great Britain. In short, the international situation was highly favorable to the American *démarche*.

The Philippines provided "a splendid base for economic operations in the Far East, brought nearer to fulfilment an old dream of American Imperial Statesmen," write the Beards in "The Rise of American Civilization."² In Lincoln's day Seward had declared that the United States ought to command the empire of the seas and that the vast Pacific basin was to become the chief theater of world's events in the coming years. "With indefeasible tenacity in his relations with the Orient, he pursued as Secretary of State the policy of the 'Open Door,' although he did not invent that clever phrase to catch, if not inform, the public imagination."

The first American to employ it in an official document was

² Charles A. Beard and Mary R. Beard, *ibid.*, pp. 490-491.

Secretary of State John Hay,³ in his notes addressed to the Powers in 1899.⁴ This policy, as formulated by its originator, in a letter to the American Minister at Tokyo, Mr. Buck, was intended "to insure to the commerce and industry of the United States and all other nations perfect equality of treatment within the limits of the Chinese Empire for their trade and navigation, especially within the so-called spheres of influence or interests claimed by certain European Powers in China."

To obtain the object in view and "to remove possible causes of international irritation and reëstablish confidence so essential to commerce," Mr. Hay asked the various Powers to give formal assurances that: (1) they will in no way interfere with any treaty port or any vested interest within any so-called sphere of interest or leased territory they have in China; (2) the Chinese treaty tariff of the time being shall apply to all merchandise landed or shipped to all such ports as are within said spheres . . . no matter to what nationality it may belong. . . . and (3) discriminatory dues and charges shall not be levied against merchandise belonging to nationals other than of the country dominating said sphere.

The Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Viscount Aoki, answered the note with the assurance that his Government "will have no hesitation to give their assent to so just and fair a proposal of the United States provided that all the other Powers concerned shall accept the same." But all the other Powers did not accept it immediately, and they never accepted it wholeheartedly.

In short, this policy was designed to regulate the administrations of the Powers in their spheres of influence, to protect them from each other and to prevent the partition of China, at the same time permitting American trade to develop unobstructed.

At the time of the negotiations settling the Boxer Rebellion Mr. Hay again invited the other Powers "to seek a solution which might bring about permanent safety and peace to China, preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly Powers by treaty and interna-

³ The term itself seems to have been used in England even earlier.

⁴ The notes, differing in minor details, were despatched to London, Berlin and St. Petersburg in September; to Tokyo on November 13th; to Rome on November 17th; and to Paris on the 21st.

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tional law, and safeguard for the World the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire."

During the period from 1899 to 1904 each of the Powers concerned proclaimed, in one form or another, its adherence to this policy, and has since made numerous commitments to observe commercial equality and the integrity of China.

The United States was not only the initiator and sponsor of the "Open Door" policy; she was also the Power whose interests were most effectively served by this policy. Therefore the U. S. A. has been extremely sensitive to its preservation, and has protested vigorously on every occasion when other nations, especially Russia and Japan, have attempted to overlook it.

After the Russo-Japanese War the eyes of the business world were centered on Manchuria. The victory of Japan was regarded as a triumph for free and unrestricted business competition in the former Russian sphere. But when it became obvious that the market would not be open until the Japanese armies had been withdrawn, the American and British interests, most deeply involved in the Manchurian trade, became alarmed at what seemed to them a direct attempt to close the door to international trade.

The Treaty of Portsmouth of 1905 and the Russo-Japanese Convention of 1907 included commitments by Russia and Japan to observe the Open Door principle. Japan moreover declared for "the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in China," in the Anglo-Japanese Treaties (of 1905 and 1911) and also in the Root-Takahira Agreement of 1908.

In the meanwhile the United States had built the Panama Canal, and so strengthened greatly their position on the Pacific. Russia and Japan, united by their opposition to the attempts of certain American interests to penetrate into Manchuria to the extent of their elimination (the Willard Straight and Knox plan and a multitude of railroad projects), became in 1916 virtual allies and continued to claim certain rights in their spheres of influence in the Three Eastern Provinces. This 1916 Convention prompted an inquiry by Washington as to whether there were any changes in the Russo-Japanese attitude towards the Open Door policy. This inquiry was answered with a reassurance of adherence.

The Russian Revolution of 1917 brought a change in this problem (as it did to many others), since there now remained no Russian spheres of influence in China.⁵

Japan, on the contrary, grew during the World War and the period of Tanaka's "positive policy" more arrogant than ever, and her attitude towards the Open Door principle became one of contempt. She attempted to close the doors in Manchuria on several occasions, but the United States were on the alert and tried (though not always vigorously and not always successfully) to prevent any such action. On May 11th, 1915 (in connection with "21 Demands") the American Ambassador at Tokyo was instructed by Washington to inform the Japanese authorities that the Government of the United States "cannot recognize any agreement or understanding which has been entered into or which may be entered into between the governments of Japan and China, impairing the treaty rights of the United States and its citizens in China, the political or territorial integrity of the Republic of China, or the international policy relative to China, commonly known as the Open Door policy."⁶

By the Lansing-Ishii Agreement of 1917, though reaffirming the Open Door policy principle, the United States recognized the special interests of Japan in China, particularly in the part to which her possessions are contiguous.⁷ This recognition met, of course, with the delight of Tokyo, the consternation of Peking and the shocked surprise of the American Minister in China, Paul S. Reinsch, who quickly resigned his post. But after the Washington Conference the agreement was declared void (April 14, 1923).

After the World War was over, when peace was restored and "the economic opportunism" was renewed, "the next major question of foreign concern before the Harding Administration was a readjustment in that strategic theater of American commercial and naval ambition, the Pacific Ocean."⁸

⁵ Though Outer Mongolia is now to a certain extent under the Russian influence rather than that of China. But it does not constitute a sphere of her influence in the sense of a "Closed Door" policy.

⁶ C. Walter Young, *ibid.*, p. 186.

⁷ Viscount Ishii sought to have the United States recognize that Japan had paramount interest in China, but failed because his Government rejected the suggestion of President Wilson to abolish all spheres of influence in China.

⁸ Charles A. Beard and Mary R. Beard, *ibid.*, v. II, p. 683.

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The extent to which Japan had taken advantage of war-time to strengthen her position in the Orient, seemed a menace to the commercial interests of the United States in China. Her actions exemplified an interpretation of the Open Door doctrine which differed widely from that advocated by the Americans. Hence among the other subjects in the agenda of the Washington Conference was included the revision of the meaning of the "Open Door."

"In the Far East the distinctive policies of the United States are the Open Door and the Integrity of China," writes Professor George H. Blakeslee.⁹ "The American people accept these with almost as little question as they do the Monroe Doctrine and Pan-Americanism for this hemisphere . . ."

But in matters of international importance the question is not one of the unilateral attitude and its interpretations. The other parties interested in this problem are not inclined to accept either the Monroe Doctrine or the Open Door policy in China in the same spirit as the United States. They appear to have objections, and no one will deny that some of these are well justified. The Monroe Doctrine declared not only that America is for the Americans, but also that Americans would not interfere in the affairs of other countries.¹⁰ The demand for the Open Door in China is scarcely in accord with the Closed Door policy of the United States in other places of the globe, such as Porto Rico, where the United States applies the tariff assimilation, or the Philippines, where the United States exercises tariff preference and restricts foreign shipping. While objecting to leases by others in China, the United States nevertheless leased the territory necessary for the construction of the Panama Canal, but with the marked difference that this lease was in perpetuity. Accordingly Japan advanced a Monroe Doctrine of her own applying at least to a certain part of Asia, and a Caribbean policy for her spheres of influence in China. Such a development naturally alarmed Washington. "From the point of view of the United States it seemed that for years Japan had been riding roughshod over the foremost American policies in the Far East—the Open

⁹ George H. Blakeslee, "The Recent Foreign Policy of the United States," New York, 1925, p. 171.

¹⁰ Though lately appeared a modified interpretation limiting the promise not to interfere only in the affairs of Europe, and excluding Asia from this reservation.

Door and the Integrity of China. The original Hay note was restricted in scope. It did not alter existing interests; it applied only to future policies in regard to certain limited areas; it was silent as to concessions. Seizing upon this omission at the Washington Conference the Japanese Government contended that the Open Door policy did not apply to concessions;—a contention which was successfully challenged by the United States on the ground that subsequent negotiations had extended the Open Door policy to include concessions.”¹¹

Finally the Open Door treaty of 1922 signed during the Washington Conference prohibited “general superiority of rights,” spheres of interests, monopolies, and unfair discrimination on the railways. Another pious step was also taken by a resolution providing for the establishment of a Board of Reference to which “any questions arising in connection with the execution of the Open Door provisions of the treaty may be referred.”¹² This Board, however, has never been established.

B. Validity of Japan's Status in Liaotung.

The superior position of Japan in Manchuria established by the Sino-Japanese “Treaty” and the Notes of 1915 was not shaken by the Washington Conference. The Conference failed to give decisive consideration to the intrinsic validity of either “Treaty” or Notes, and, according to C. Walter Young, consequently “left the status of the Kwantung leased territory and of the South Manchuria and Antung-Mukden Railways intact.”¹

The Chinese delegation at the Washington Conference questioned the validity of these documents, which were never actually sanctioned by China in a legally established way, i.e., through her Parliament. This delegation submitted for the consideration of the Committee on Pacific and Far Eastern questions the following four points: (1) that Japan offered no *quid pro quo* in return for the concessions obtained from China; (2) that the agreements were intrinsically in violation of treaties between China and other Powers; (3) that the Agreements were inconsistent with principles relating to China and adopted at the Conference; and (4) that, for practical reasons of expediency,

¹¹ Raymond Leslie Buell, “International Relations.” Revised Edition, 1929.

¹² Raymond Leslie Buell, *ibid.*, p. 462.

¹ C. Walter Young, *ibid.*, p. 191.

they should be the subject of impartial examination with a view to revision or abrogation.

The Japanese succeeded, however, in preventing the Conference from going into the question of the validity of these agreements, claiming that this was a question for consideration by China and Japan alone. At the same time, during one of the meetings, they reasserted the validity of the treaties and notes of 1915 and declared that "China's request for cancellation was tantamount in itself to a recognition of the binding force of the same."² All that Japan declared herself willing to do was to withdraw the reservations concerning the employment of advisers (Group V).

Finally, the Chinese delegation, seeing that there was no hope to bring others to their side, reserved the right for China to "seek a solution on all future appropriate occasions, concerning those portions of the treaties and notes of 1915 which did not appear to have been expressly relinquished by the Japanese Government."

In other words, the Japanese status in the leased territory on Liaotung was not altered by the Washington Conference. Notwithstanding the protest of the United States, Japan continues to consider Kwantung as in her possession for a total period of ninety-nine years dating from the moment of the signing of the original lease in 1898 and lasting until 1997.

The case of Japan in Kwantung offers a typical example of the difficulty of enforcing the Open Door policy, especially in its new enlarged interpretation which includes respect for China's territorial and administrative integrity and sovereign rights.

But even if the Open Door principle were duly applied, if equal opportunity for one and all were actually to be established, it would hardly offer a lasting solution for all the problems involved in the rivalries of nations in the Orient. Indeed it would scarcely solve the mere problem of markets. At its best the Open Door, being basically an application of the liberal doctrine of *Laissez-faire, laissez-passer*, can do no more than provide opportunity for free competition. But this competition, carried on in consideration of profit deriving from trade, means rivalry and not coöperation. The latter is not the same thing as the Open Door, as some students try to maintain. Besides, a

² C. Walter Young, *ibid.*, pp. 197-198.

competition on the Chinese markets between Japan and certain countries more advanced is hardly an instance of "equal" opportunity. It is no more equal than a contest between a junior high school student and a post-graduate scholar from a university. How can one classify as equal a contest between a bidder with millions of dollars at his command and one who must depend on limited credits?

In brief, the Open Door policy seems hardly the proper solution for the Pacific problems; though it sounds very well and seems to be very desirable under certain conditions, not yet at hand.

CHAPTER XXII.

MASTERY OF THE PACIFIC AND IMPERIALISM

A. Economic Imperialism.

As we have seen from the preceding chapter, the "Open Door policy" does not offer a satisfactory solution. Equality of opportunity is but a myth, a goal unattainable so long as no equality exists among the aspirants. But at present they are neither equally endowed nor equally advanced, and the favorably situated neither coöperate with the others nor are disposed to regard their interests. Therefore it is no wonder that other means are applied and other attempts made to solve the perplexing problem; and of these apparently the most vital, and undoubtedly the most disturbing to world peace, lies in the contest for mastery of the Pacific Ocean.

The idea of dominion over certain areas or even over the entire world originated well before our time. It came into prominence with the development of Colonial Empires, when the Great Powers, nearing the end of partition among themselves of whatever remained still undivided, entered a new era of distribution of markets and establishment of monopolistic control. The application of this principle to the Pacific is, however, a fairly recent addition to the troubles of the nations concerned.

From the beginning of this century to the commencement of the World War, the major interests in the Pacific were claimed by Great Britain as possessor of the largest Colonial Empire, including very extensive holdings in the Orient. As mistress of the seas and the most successful merchant-nation of the world, she alone was considered capable of independent efforts in the Pacific. Russia was eliminated after her defeat in the war with Japan; since she had practically no navy in the Far Eastern waters, her merchant marine was negligible (especially if compared with that of England), and since her ambitions were handicapped by lack of capital, the infancy of her industries and her

enormous domestic problems. Japan, though growing rapidly, was still far behind her ally. France, though already developing into a great Colonial Empire, was not yet able to compete with England in the Far East. In short, at the outbreak of the War, the only country which threatened to contest British supremacy in the Pacific was the United States. At that time certain students of the problem expressed the opinion that neither of these two Powers could hold the Pacific against the other and that a peaceful settlement could be found only in complete mutual understanding.

The World War changed this situation materially. The United States emerged stronger than ever with a tremendous accumulation of gold, and a commercial prestige hitherto unknown. Many new markets, formerly dominated by England, now shifted to their control, and a demand for further new markets rapidly developed. England, on the other hand, saw her economic basis shaken, her foreign trade curtailed, her industries undermined, and her whole Imperial structure deranged by the growing hopes of the Dominions for independent life. Her international position thus weakened, she naturally lost much ground and relaxed her grip on her once unrivaled and later but weakly contested position. An English author, Sir Frank Fox, who asserted in 1912 that Great Britain was the sole Power capable of independent effort in the Pacific, recently wrote a new book entitled "*The Mastery of the Pacific*,"¹ in which he advocated an Anglo-American Alliance as the sole combination of forces which could permanently solve the Pacific Problem. In his opinion the actual development of events brings the British and Americans nearer each year to the question of the hegemony of the Pacific. Of course it is naïvely argued that the dominance in question must satisfy all who aspire to world tranquillity. How could it be otherwise? Just leave in hands of Anglo-Saxons the unselfish protection of others and of Peace. The solution is simplicity itself. Yet with all apologies to our British author, we may perhaps question the practicability of his scheme. In the first place it offers no proper consideration for Japan and China. And in the second, the expectation that the parties invited to such an understanding will adjust their conflicting interests is a trifle optimistic.

¹ London, 1928.

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At the present stage of the problem it seems more reasonable to expect a contest for the mastery over the Pacific with Great Britain, Japan, and the United States as the main participants. The strength of these three countries is relatively equal, since Japan, though weakest in resources, is in far the best position of strategic concentration. Hence, in the opinion of many students, a contest between any two of these three sole and actual and the only rivals in the Pacific would, in the first stages at least, be an even one.

"A combination of any two could drive the third out of the ocean," writes Sir Frank Fox, "a fight to the finish between any two would leave the third in a dominant position." But it is as sure as anything human can be sure, that if two of these Pacific Powers went to war, the third would be dragged in, followed by the whole world. When the author just quoted tries to visualize what would happen if Japan should obtain control of the vast resources of China, he apparently intends to frighten his readers by asking if, with Japan's power multiplied, it is likely that "she would allow to continue the restrictions on her nationals imposed by the British Dominions and the United States?" Whereupon, he concludes pathetically that such a solution of the Pacific Problem by Japan would be "disastrous to the World Peace and would put an end to the white race hegemony in the world!"

In quoting the prediction that a fight between any two of the Pacific nations would leave the third in a dominant position, we are reminded of another quasi-solution of the Pacific Problem—namely, the provocation of a war between Japan and Russia. A few writers on both sides of the Atlantic advocate this sanguinary operation in the hope of weakening the hated Soviets and the menace of Japan. But the well-informed must feel that any such scheme is doomed to failure, since a war between Japan and Russia does not in the least coincide with the present-day interests of these countries. On the contrary, at the present juncture there is more possibility, if not of an alliance, at least of some sort of understanding between them to secure peace in the Far East.

If an armed clash on the Pacific should ever occur, it would, as we stated above, involve a world conflagration. All the principal nations would be forced to participate; and the question of alignments would become one of greatest importance. On Russia's

position at such a time might depend the entire outcome of the *débâcle*. "No Japanese statesman in his right mind would seek a war against the United States with Russia at his back," is an opinion quoted in the introductory chapter to this book. It is an opinion which seems to us a good hint on Russia's rôle in the Far East.

We have already seen that Russo-Japanese relations, though scarcely cordial as yet, are very greatly improved. On the part of Soviet Russia they are based, apparently, on the presumption that Russians are Eurasians predominantly sympathetic towards the Asiatics. Russia, it is said, is no longer a "European country with interests in Asia, but an Asiatic country with interests in Europe." Without being uncomplimentary towards Europe, one may nevertheless regard this change in Russia's orientation as proof that she is at least up-to-date! As for future alignments they depend, of course, on the attitude of the different Powers in the Pacific, and particularly on how they seek to use Russia's influence—the influence of a great Power with great possibilities.

In present conditions the way to secure dominance and mastery of the Pacific, seems to be in economic control. This is the way of Imperialism. But what do we mean by Imperialism, a word so widely used in our day and so variously interpreted?

There are at least three groups of theories about Imperialism, namely—the philosophical, the historical and the economic. The first is best represented by the voluminous work of Sailliére, "*La Philosophie de l'Impérialisme*," wherein the study is divided between (1) Imperialism of races (an analysis of Count Gobineau's idea of the dominance of the Aryan race); (2) Imperialism of individuals (a study of Nietzschean philosophy of egoism); (3) Imperialism of religions (as exemplified by the attempts of the Roman Catholic Church to dominate the world); and Imperialism of classes (criticism of Prudhon and Karl Marx); and finally (4) "Irrational Imperialism," represented by the idea of anarchism. This interpretation of Imperialism seems rather too inclusive. It deals with different aspects of struggle for domination in a variety of forms. But it does not specifically define the phenomenon itself, at least in the sense it has attained in recent years.

The historical interpretation, as given by W. S. Ferguson in his "Greek Imperialism," by Ferrero in "*La Grandeur et Dé-*

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cadence de Rome," or by such other historians as Mommsen and Marquardt, merely indicates what happens to a state when its ill-applied might (deriving from the growth and subjugation of other nations) brings it to decay. The proponents of this interpretation do not explain convincingly the motives of this aggressiveness and these abuses. Besides, these examples of arrogance and the spirit of "grab," though usually embellished by pretentious claims for grandeur and glory, were never called Imperialism in the new sense of the word.

The third group is based on economic considerations; deriving either directly from the teachings of Karl Marx or indirectly through such successors as Kautsky, Hilferding, Rosa Luxemburg and Nicholas Lenin. Though differing in many other respects, they nevertheless all see in Imperialism a definite economic phenomenon; arising from Capitalism and unknown to earlier stages of economic life.

Kautsky defines Imperialism as a product of a highly developed Industrial Capitalism and describes it as the striving of industrial states to subject to their control others who are still in the agrarian stage. In his opinion Imperialism originated in England, and is a specific kind of political ambition germane to the newest phase of Capitalism. In other words, Kautsky's conception of Imperialism involves the oppression of the weaker, agricultural countries, with no developed industry, by those who are strong and further developed industrially. To him Imperialism is only a policy of Capitalism. It is not the Capitalism of today itself.

This interpretation did not satisfy other students of the phenomenon. Some considered the explanation as not only incomplete but even partially incorrect in arguing that Imperialists confine their appetite to the backward agrarian countries. Actually, it is answered, they are as anxious to get control over lands where industry is well developed too. Later on Kautsky modified his definition and together with Hilferding¹ introduced to it the idea of "financial" capital.

Hilferding's idea seems to be that Imperialism is a specific policy of "financial" capital, aiming to procure as large a territory as possible for monopolistic exploitation, with a customs barrier as protection against foreign competition. This involves the export of money for various investments abroad, Hilferding

asserted that this activity of "financial" capital is apt to provoke wars. His contention, however, was disputed by others belonging to the same school, who indicated that financial capital is quite often interested in maintenance of peace. In their opinion it all depends on the nature of the industries with which this financial capital is mainly connected. For instance the manufacturers of textiles and similar goods are usually opposed to war, as theirs are peace-time products. Producers of steel, chemicals and the like are, on the other hand, more inclined to favor militarism since their products are needed in larger quantities when the guns roar. A Russian writer on this question, M. Pavlovitch, offered in his book "Imperialism"² a list of examples to prove this contention. The noted Imperialists, Cecil Rhodes and Joseph Chamberlain, he said, were from Birmingham, the center of the British iron and steel industry; and he pointed out that the "Black Country" was a center from which numerous Tory advocates of aggressiveness and war came. Manchester, the center of the textile industry, has on the other hand, argued Pavlovitch, produced a number of well-known Liberals and pacifists.

The newest definition, based on a long and profound study of the phenomenon, was given by Lenin.³ In his opinion the most vital characteristic of contemporary Capitalism is monopoly. Monopoly, he said, produces stagnation and decay, as it kills the stimulus for competition. Contemporary capitalism is becoming more and more parasitic, striving to live at the expense of others; not only on the exploitation of labor in its own country but also on the subjugation of other nations.

According to his definition "Imperialism is the monopolistic stage of Capitalism." Its five characteristics are: (1) A concentration of production and of capital intensified to monopoly; (2) conglomeration of "banker's capital" with "industrial capital" and the creation of "financial capital" and "financial oligarchy"; (3) exportation of capital, as differing from export of goods; (4) formation of international unions of financiers for monopolistic exploitation of the world; and (5) the fact that since all the

² Pavlovitch (M. Veltman), "Imperialism" (in Russian), Leningrad, 1925. This book was widely used by us for definitions of Imperialism. It is the first volume of a series of twelve entitled "Imperialism and the World Politics of Modern Times."

³ V. I. Lenin, "Imperialism as the Highest Stage of Capitalism," Moscow, 1923 edition.

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territories of the world are already partitioned among different Great Powers, and since there are no more vacant areas to be "peacefully" divided, they can now only be conquered or taken by force, in war. Therefore war is not only inseparably connected with Imperialism, but is actually a part of it.

If this point of view is correct there can be no way to mastery of the Pacific but through war. Whether it be fought or not depends on the further development of the general policies of such important Powers as Great Britain, Japan and the United States, and on their Far Eastern policies in particular.

There is hardly need to offer proofs of Great Britain's imperialistic ambitions. Lord Palmerston and Lord Beaconsfield, Cecil Rhodes and Joseph Chamberlain all did their best to expound this doctrine and tried, as best they could, to apply it to their own policies. England has not only been the most ardent and open proponent of Imperialism till recent times; she has also been the most consistent in its application, and most successful in achievement.

To a lesser extent and in a narrower sense (since limited to Asia alone), the imperialism of Japan is equally obvious. To consolidate her position in the Far East Japan has already fought three wars from which she has emerged with considerable territorial gains and increased prestige. In spite of her protestations, her success in the war with Russia did not insure peace to the Far East. Ten years later she attacked and defeated the Germans, again in order to insure that peace. But, "no sooner had she defeated Germans," wrote Stanley K. Hornbeck in "Contemporary Politics in the Far East" than "she found it necessary to fall upon the Chinese, likewise to insure peace! The process is cumulative! . . . The peace of the Far East will, it would appear, only be assured when there is no one left to disturb Japan's peace of mind; that is when all of Japan's rivals for commercial and political influence have been eliminated. And then, when the peace of the Far East has been established to Japan's satisfaction, what about the peace of the World?" and again: "it can readily be demonstrated from history that Japan has not up-to-date been the preserver of peace in the Far East but the contrary."⁴

⁴ Stanley K. Hornbeck, *Contemporary Politics in the Far East*, pp. 300 and 357.

The United States, on the other hand, had for long years maintained a policy of non-interference in the affairs of the outside world. Though she annexed Texas and forced a large territory out of Mexico, she succeeded to some extent in preventing her aggressive-minded elements from taking the upper hand in the direction of the country's diplomacy on the other continents. Numerous past attempts by individual Americans to secure territorial aggrandizement for the U. S. A. at the expense of the Asiatics (e.g., the occupation of Formosa and the attempts to annex Korea) have failed on consideration of this established policy.

But through the strength of economic factors the isolation of the United States, inaugurated in 1823 by the Monroe Doctrine, began to disappear. By the end of the World War, it was obviously a non-reality. But America had long been drifting towards an imperialistic policy. As we have remarked elsewhere in this book the Spanish-American War was a step in this direction. By the declaration of war on April 21, 1898, the United States definitely started on her road of militant imperialism. Opening by force new markets for her industries this war was only the first step in the struggle of the United States for the Pacific.

It is significant that the enunciation of the Open Door policy followed immediately after this first step. American industry was growing, and already its leaders were feeling the necessity for new markets. The commercial flag of the United States was already familiar to many ports of the world; and a re-interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine was inevitable.

At the Algeciras Conference in 1905 a European diplomat jokingly asked the American representative if he did not consider that the Monroe Doctrine prevented America from participating in such a Conference as the one they were both attending. To this the American answered that the Monroe Doctrine was concerned with the non-interference of America in European affairs but did not concern the affairs of other continents.

At the time of the Russo-Japanese War a book entitled "America, Asia, and the Pacific," by Wolf von Schierbrand, was published in New York. In its pages the author deals with the coming race in the Pacific. "The American expansion in the Pacific, immensely favored as it will be by the opening of the Panama Canal, is not a mere whim, not a thing merely desir-

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able, but something absolutely necessary to safeguard our farther national development to preserve us from the curse of ill balanced production generally called overproduction and all its attendant evils." In a chapter on "Rivals in the Pacific" Mr. von Schierbrand said: "In the Orient this British decadence is seen most conspicuously. England has been busy undoing the work of centuries in upbuilding commercial and political supremacy in the Orient . . . England will be one of our chief rivals, perhaps the chief one, in the Pacific." And then again: "The United States has all the advantages, qualifications and some of the ambitions necessary for the mastery of the Pacific."⁵

President Grant was quoted as having declared that the time was not far away when "any political contact of Europe and America will disappear." But the United States very soon decided it in a quite different way, having consented to take the "white man's burden" on her shoulders and so became involved in the "European affairs" of Morocco, Tripoli, and the Congo⁶ and more important still in the affairs of Asiatic countries. An American writer, Captain Mahan, declared at the close of the XIXth century that "the Monroe Doctrine has nothing to do with Japan, China and the Pacific in general, with all the countries along its shores."

The opening of the Panama Canal, the gate to the Pacific, strengthened America's position in that ocean enormously. And, though this ocean did not become an inner lake of the United States, as some romantic observers proclaimed, the growth of American interests in the Trans-Pacific countries undoubtedly developed to unprecedented dimensions. As we have already noted, in a short period of fifteen years (1913-1928) the Asiatic trade of the United States increased fifteenfold, and the further growth of her industries (already seriously concerned with "overproduction") undoubtedly necessitates her search for new markets.

It is a well known fact that the traditional policy of the United States declares that "the flag shall follow trade." In this policy there lies a great danger. Especially is it true in the case of the Pacific, where the interests of the three strongest

⁵ Wolf von Schierbrand, "America, Asia, and the Pacific," New York, 1904, pp. 253-255 and 315.

⁶ Conference of Berlin in 1885.

naval Powers meet. None of these can be expected to yield until it has tried its utmost, should an armed contest become unavoidable.

We repeat again that if imperialistic policies are pursued, there is hardly any way out of the conflict but through a war or even a series of wars. The stories about the technical impossibility of a war between such countries as Japan and the United States are no more convincing than the well known assurances of the years just preceding the World War that an Anglo-German armed encounter was unthinkable. There were humorists who compared it with the meeting of an elephant and a whale . . . yet it actually happened and was disastrous to all concerned!

Undoubtedly the enormous distance separating Japan from the United States makes a contest more unlikely and will necessitate plenty of thinking before making plans, developing methods, specifying strategy and tactics. But—in these days of fabulous developments in science and technique, of revaluation of values, will this really be such an obstacle? Or—if so—will the obstacle be a lasting one? Hardly! Aviation alone is progressing so rapidly nowadays and opens such undreamed of possibilities, that it would be prudent not to rely on such flexible protection as distance offers. The insurmountable obstacles of yesterday are no longer insurmountable and will soon fall down before the victorious advance of science. It seems advisable to look ahead in politics and especially in economics in order to meet new situations, better prepared and better equipped; and wiser to introduce at a proper time the necessary adjustments than to continue stubbornly to advance by old paths full of dangers! But is it probable that such adjustments will come at proper times? Is it possible at all? Here are questions most disquieting and discouraging to those who aspire to "peace and good-will on earth."

Some observers suggest a revision of the policies of the Powers in the Far East, and even a liquidation of "what was done there wrongly or otherwise" during the last fifty years or more,⁷ as "the spirit in which the Powers went out into the undeveloped parts of the Earth was exclusively the spirit of grab." So wrote

⁷ Sir Claude Macdonald, British Minister at Peking and at Tokyo for many years, wrote, "The immediate duty of the Western Powers is to undo all that has been done to weaken China."

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N. Peffer in his book "The White Man's Dilemma."⁸ But given the premise of Empire, the philosophy of force seems unimpeachable. "If one nation has the right to rule another because it is stronger and more efficient, then compromise or conciliation is a mistake!"

The whole history of modern economic Imperialism, writes H. Freser in his book "Foreign Trade and World Politics,"⁹ shows that "when capitalists really start concession hunting in earnest, they will inevitably come into contact with other concessionnaires and against them they will appeal to the national sentiment, arousing national jealousies and national hatreds and thereby sow the seeds of conflict. . . . It is quite clear," continues this author, "that it is not what John Hay wrote about China or what Mr. Hughes told the Washington Conference, that will create the situation in the Far East, with which our coming generation will have to deal; it is what our merchants, our railway-builders, our mine-operators, our bankers actually do, that will make the problem!"

And though the molders of the public opinion are busily trying to convince us that with the outlawry of war (on paper) the world is almost safe from this calamity, the facts indicate that the "last war" will not be that of 1914-18.

It would, of course, be rash to predict where and when the next one will be; but it seems safe to venture the assertion that a war, or even a series of wars, in the Pacific is more than possible in the not very remote future.

But who will start the armed contest, and how will it begin? On which side will the different nations stand? It is hard to guess. Not very long ago Mr. William Hughes, then the Prime Minister of the Australian Commonwealth, declared that "it is unthinkable and not within the bounds of possibility that we should ever take part in any struggle against America." Canada adopted the same attitude, and, probably, this stand of the Dominions was partly responsible for the non-renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance after the Washington Conference of 1921-22. But who knows? What, we may ask, is the rôle destined for Singapore? We can only wait and see.¹⁰

⁸ Nath. Peffer, *The White Man's Dilemma*, New York, 1927.

⁹ New York, 1926, pp. 232-234.

¹⁰ Although in this book we are not concerned with the strategic aspect of

Before closing this chapter, it seems appropriate to say a few words about the so-called "Red Imperialism" of Soviet Russia. A strange combination of words, at least to one who accepts the economic interpretation of Imperialism. If one considers the latter as a specific stage of Capitalism, how could it be exercised by Soviet Russia, which claims to be a Socialist state? How could she have any designs for economic exploitation, and survive as a Socialist state? It is beyond our comprehension! But it is entirely another thing if one prefers not the economic interpretation but a definition of Imperialism as merely domination.

Russia of today might seem to work towards spreading the ideas of Communism and Soviet System. She might be successful (as she was temporarily, at least, in China) in persuading certain states to adopt her doctrines and even to join the Federation or Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. She might become—by virtue of her longer experience for a while even a leader in such an enlarged federation. She might even become the dominating factor, even attain some sort of a mastery, if not of the Pacific, at least over certain areas adjoining it. But all this has nothing to do with Economic Imperialism and should not be confused with it when we try to analyze the actual situation and to foresee its possible outgrowth.

This is not the first time that certain outsiders have tried to make others believe that Russia has sinister designs in the Far East and elsewhere. But in consideration of such experience, there seems little chance of luring Russia into a false play. Knowing only too well the results of the Manchurian adventure, which culminated in the war with Japan, the Russian people could hardly be involved again in any similar schemes. Russia of today is no longer an active partner in the drama called Imperialism, though, of course, she is very much interested in its development.

Her leaders assert that unless the imperialistic policies of other Powers are checked, the latter will attempt (1) to divide China and (2) to eliminate one another from that market and

a possible war in the Pacific, we can refer those who are interested to such books as H. C. Bywater's "Sea Power in the Pacific," N. Golovin and Bubnov's "The Pacific Problem in the XXth Century," or J. Davis's "Japan, the Air Menace of the Pacific." As for the possible alignments there is some material for thought in the rather sensational but illuminating book of L. Denny, "America Conquers England."

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source of raw materials. If so, a war between the rival nations will become unavoidable and revolutions in some of them will naturally follow.

In that case the fears of the Japanese author, Yoshitoni (already quoted in one of the preceding chapters), as to the ability of the Pacific to live up to its name, will be more than justified. This probable scene of the future World War might then appropriately be rechristened "Mare Furiosum," as was suggested, in other days and on other considerations, by Admiral Drake.

CHAPTER XXIII.

THE PAN-ASIATIC MOVEMENT

The question of Pan-Nationalism or the supremacy of races is not the subject of this chapter. Rather the title implies the problem of a union of Asiatics somewhat similar to those ideas of Pan-Europe which were advanced by Count Coudenhove-Kalergi and elaborated by Aristide Briand. But while we consider it possible to discuss the Pan-Asiatic movement in this aspect as one of the ways open for the solution of the Pacific Problem, we do not necessarily regard it as feasible; just as, in discussing the "Open Door" policy, we did not feel bound to accept it as a workable one. We were concerned only with an examination of its merits and demerits.

We already know that for long centuries Eastern Asia lived isolated from the rest of the world. But, though never forming a political unit, she nevertheless represented a specific and somewhat homogeneous group of nations. It is true that nomads of the northern part, in their search of new lands, now and again were driven to the West, and under Jenghiz Khan and his successors occasionally involved certain parts of Europe. But these instances were exceptional, and did not alter materially the actual isolation with the consequent preservation, to a great degree, of racial purity. And it must be remembered that the nomads were repulsed later on, and forced to return to their native land. There they remained for the rest of the time that elapsed between this short period of aggressive expansion and our own day. Only a comparatively insignificant number of Asiatics, mostly Chinese from the South, and a certain number of Malaysians forced by growing density of population and the scarcity of vacant lands, penetrated into the islands to the East and Southeast of the mainland of Asia and settled there, mixing with the aborigines.

The other parts of Asia (i.e., outside the Far East) were and are inhabited by different races, by nations entirely alien to

the representatives of the Yellow race. At the present time the population of Asia as a whole is probably more heterogeneous than that of any other continent. It is true that the predominant part belongs to the Yellow race (China, Japan, Korea, sections of Indo-China and Asiatic parts of Russia). But there are very large groups of people representing the white, the black, and the olive races as well. And this makes any Pan-Asiatic movement based on racial consideration unnatural.

The idea of bringing together all the nations inhabiting Asia is, of course, far from new. But never has it been seriously advanced except as a means of offering a united front to the aggressiveness of the whites, and their Imperialism. In 1923, for example, a "White Peril" campaign was started in Japan by a distinguished editor, M. Tokutomi, who said: "We colored people must combine and crush the Albinocracy! We must make the whites realize that there are others as strong as they!"

Attempts were also made to start a so-called Pan-Mongolian movement uniting the Yellow peoples. All these schemes naturally were linked historically with the conquests of Jenghiz Khan and Tamerlane, and the days of their glory. But it is also well known that among the protagonists of this idea were found more Japanese than Chinese or Mongolians. It is particularly significant that certain of the Japanese who have advocated the movement, or at least supported those actively engaged in propagating the Pan-Mongolian spirit, have been persons of real prominence. It confirms the suspicion that the pan-national and pan-racial movements are, usually, led by more arrogant and aggressive elements, who do not have in mind the advancement of their race as such (supposedly superior to others and so deserving a special "place in the sun"), but are concerned with the advancement of their own economic interests through the exploitation of their less enterprising brethren of the same racial stock.

It does not take much to prove this point in the case of Japan, the actual leader in the Pan-Mongolian movement. The country of the Samurai, which in the past has endured endless internal wars between the clans, started on her road of expansion to the foreign lands with the war of 1894-95 against China. Ten years later, she turned against Russia. Then, after another decade, she fought Germany. Successful in all these wars, and dizzy with success, the military party, headed by the representatives of

the Chosu clan in the Army and those of the Satsuma clan in the Navy, were the most conspicuous advocates of Japan's hegemony of Asia, and actively supported the Pan-Mongolian and Pan-Asiatic movements with the slogan: "Asia for the Asiatics!"

Japan defeated China and obtained from her territories on no other consideration than her own economic benefits. Nor did she annex Korea for any other reason. She did not actually help the Koreans to help themselves, though naturally she strove to make others believe that such was the case. And up to the present she has failed to show any sincere inclination to coöperate with the Chinese in Manchuria either, though she has already accused the latter of non-coöperation. By this, apparently, she meant the unwillingness of China to give up her rights in Manchuria and to allow Japan to build railroads at her will and contrary to Chinese interests. It is even said that a Japanese diplomat tried to convince the Chinese that the "21 Demands" served on them in 1915 had mainly the Chinese interests in mind and represented only one step in the gigantic plan for the ultimate amalgamation of the Asiatics and the building of a great confederation for the purpose of ousting the "whites."

In her relations with other "Yellows" Japan has usually applied compulsion rather than persuasion, exploitation and not coöperation. Who would assert that these are reliable cornerstones on which to base a Pan-Mongolian movement, pretending to help the Yellow race?

Proposals have also been made to bring together not only the Yellows, but all those who live in Asia. There have been attempts to merge the Pan-Mongolian with Pan-Turanian movement, thus advancing the idea of a Pan-Asiatic union. But this again though ostensibly directed towards the building up of resistance to the whites and then of the ambition to dominate the world, belongs to the category of screens to conceal more prosaic motives of economic nature rather than to that of a racial dream of glory. As might be expected, the Pan-Asiatic movement finds much favor in Japan; and it has been endorsed by certain prominent leaders and statesmen of that country. Cabinet Ministers and members of Parliament, university professors, journalists and writers, are numbered among the aggressive-minded followers of this movement. Arai Teijiro has urged Japan to become the ruler of all the Powers of the world! Takahashi,

an author and legislator, has backed certain naval officers who advocated the seizure of Dutch East Indies. Baron Hayashi, Ambassador at the Court of St. James's, and Takahashi, once the Prime Minister, were proponents of the idea of a Sino-Japanese Alliance as a step towards a Federation of "Yellows." And the well-known Count Okuma, commenting on the desirability of a Japanese protectorate over India, has said: "From old times India has been a land of treasure. Why should not Japan stretch out her hand to that country? The Indians are looking for this! The Japanese ought to go to India, to the South Seas and other parts of the world!" His mouthpiece, the "Hochi Shimbun" recommended (with Russia in mind) the search for a strong ally in the West, followed by an advance westward to Europe; to conquer the world and bring it under Japan's domination. "Japan, not Europe or America, is to be supreme in Asia!"

Naturally, such aggressive schemes are not cherished, or even approved, by all Japanese. The liberal (and probably it would not be incorrect to say the better informed) elements have been opposed to arrogance. Thus even in the writings of such an avowed Imperialist as Yoshida, the late teacher of Prince Ito, we find definite signs of a preference for amity and peaceful coöperation with the rest of the world. As early as the middle of the XIXth century, Yoshida wrote: "According to the tendency of the times I believe there should be in the future an alliance between the five great continents and in this way avoid great conflicts. The chief of this great confederation will naturally be England or Russia, but I believe it should be Russia, as England is too avaricious. Russia is strong and strict and therefore Russia will probably make the best reputation. Japan, in order to maintain her independence, must have Korea and part of Manchuria and also should have territories in South America and India. This will be very difficult, however, as we are not strong enough and for this reason we should make an alliance with Russia, because she is our neighbour. If we depend upon Russia she will feel friendly toward us. Until this is accomplished it will be well to seek the sympathy of America and get her help in resisting aggression of England. In carrying out this imperial policy we must look upon America as our eastern ally and Russia as our

brother, and Europe as our territory. . . . And the first important thing is to take some territory in the nearest countries.”¹

If in the past certain Russians were inclined to take seriously the alarmist hints of Kaiser Wilhelm II regarding the “Yellow Peril,” their successors seem more interested in the idea of Pan-Mongolism as one not excluding themselves, and show their willingness to encourage the Pan-Asiatic tendencies. In 1920 Soviet Russia extended hospitality to the adherents of the Pan-Asiatic movement, and a Congress of Orientals was held at Baku. Some 1800 delegates poured in from all parts of the world and discussed together their grievances in regard to the white man’s abuses.

In 1924, immediately after the Japanese exclusion law was passed by the Congress of the United States, certain Japanese advocated the convocation of a Conference of Colored Races. At that time again the Russians came out with a declaration of sympathy with the cause of the oppressed “backward” nations. Their Ambassador in Peking, Karakhan, spoke of China as “an imposed-upon State, taking its rightful place in the world, with a true friend to help it, instead of cynically rude hypocrites to hinder.” In the same year, also, the Indian National Liberal party passed a resolution in favor of a federation of peoples for the emancipation of Asia.

When, after long years of isolation, Japan was “opened” by the foreigners, she experienced an invasion of things Western. She abandoned her feudal system, and introduced numerous innovations borrowed from the “whites.” Impressed by the technical progress of the Europeans, Japan started earnestly to imitate them and in very short time became almost as modernized as her teachers in the sense of material achievements. She adapted to her own use their ideas of governmental structure and their economic organization, and to all intents and purposes became one of them.

Extending her imitative faculty to the field of international relations, Japan embarked on an imperialistic policy and started territorial expansion at the expense of her “Yellow” neighbors. Her economic expansion was directed mainly to the Asiatic markets, where she met serious competition from “white” rivals,

¹ Walter Pitkin, “Must We Fight Japan?” *The Century*, New York, 1921, p. 445.

coming to China from all sides, East and West, North and South, by sea and by land. With years of experience in advance of Japan, these foreign competitors naturally constituted and still constitute a problem difficult of solution for the Mikado's Empire, notwithstanding the great energy applied by her people, and their already notable success.

Among the few advantages Japan has over the whites in Asia are, of course, her racial kinship with China and Korea; the pigment of skin which brings other colored peoples nearer to her than to the whites; and that common bitterness arising from the abuses committed by the whites, which serves to some extent as a basis for all the schemes for unification of the Asiatics.

But the process of gradual awakening of the East, of liberation of its peoples, though very obvious in our days, is not yet sufficiently advanced to render probable any large scale amalgamation, federation, or even understanding, among the Asiatics to offer a united front against the Whites.

To any such union of the Asiatics their diverse economic interests present a particularly formidable obstacle. Indeed, a Pan-Asia is hardly conceivable either on a cultural basis or an economic one. The cultures of such various parts of this continent as India and Japan; Persia and China; Turkey and Korea differ widely and their economic development is very unequal. Commercial relations among the peoples of Asia are as yet but poorly developed. An economic combination of highly industrialized Japan with semi-nomadic Persia or predominantly agricultural China with agro-industrial India is, of course, possible. But a solid unit able to withstand the economically still far more powerful and industrially far better equipped countries of Europe and America seems, at this juncture, impossible of formation. And this remains true, even though the "whites" are not co-operating one with another but are engaged in competition, price-wars, and once in a while in more orthodox brands of warfare as well.

On the other hand, it must be noted that the Asiatic countries are less divided and less antagonistic one to another than those of Europe, where boundary disputes, customs barriers, rivalry and disagreements surviving sometimes from the remote past, make the realization of the idea of "Pan-Europe" almost

impossible. Even so, however, and with due recognition of the many points in common which tend to bring the Asiatics together, we hardly expect to see any real unification for many years to come. Still less can we look to any sort of Pan-Asiatic movement as a successful means of amalgamating these various peoples in a Federation economic or political—which can promise a solution of their problems, including their part in that of the Pacific Ocean.

In other words, while the Pan-Asiatic movement is undoubtedly a phenomenon to be taken into consideration, it does not, in our opinion, offer either a serious threat of further complications or a relief from the existing tension.

CHAPTER XXIV

COÖPERATION IN THE FAR EAST

Last but not least among the ways open for solution of the Pacific Problem is that of coöperation. Discussion of this peaceful method has been reserved for the final chapter, though not, of course, in consideration of our Occidental love for the happy ending. Rather it is because coöperation seems the most characteristically modern, as well as historically the most recent, method of dealing with international problems. Although, as yet, it has by no means displaced those other methods discussed in the preceding chapters, the time of testing its feasibility seems near. It is what humanity has long been striving for.

In recent years the nations have become more dependent upon each other, as industry, commerce and finance have developed more and more on international lines. Modern methods of transportation have rendered possible the rapid conveyance of raw materials and other goods; modern devices for communication have so accelerated the transmission of orders and carrying on of negotiations that distances no longer present serious obstacles. The growth of specialization has increased the interdependence of the various parts of the world; and modern science has so facilitated international intercourse that each nation can now rely to a much greater extent than ever before on imports from the others while concentrating on its specific field. As a result their interests are now so thoroughly interwoven that any and every disturbance in the economic and political life of one nation must profoundly affect the others.

Disturbances of such magnitude as those produced by wars are now of deepest concern to every nation of the world. The experience of the World War and its economic aftermath are still felt, after twelve years, all over the world, and have, naturally, produced an atmosphere hostile to the thought of armed conflict. Any scheme, however wild, to abolish wars has become a matter of general interest; and secret diplomacy, blamed for

brewing misunderstandings and provoking conflicts, has been one of the first targets for popular attack. Such ideas as a "balance of power" through "alliances" have been discredited as absolutely unable to prevent clashes, if indeed they do not rather promote them. Competition in armaments must, in the light of the past, be looked upon as a calamity never to be reincurred. So at least affirm not only the more sanguine advocates of disarmament and the abolishment of war, but also many calm and sensitive statesmen. Thus the old idea of preventing wars by international organization has once again come into prominence. Tried at The Hague, on the initiative of the Russian Tsar Nicholas II, long before the World War, it was admittedly unable to prevent that conflict. Nor did it achieve much of importance in regard to the details of the actual conduct of warfare according to certain regulations and restrictions. But the World War served as a strong incentive to its revival; the formation of the League of Nations has been a strong evidence of its vitality.

According to the Covenant, the League of Nations was set up in order to promote international coöperation and maintain international peace and security. The members undertook not to resort to war, to establish open, just and honorable relations between the nations, to maintain justice, and to respect all treaty obligations in international dealings.

It was stated centuries ago by Alberico Gentili (1552-1608), the predecessor of Hugo Grotius, the great Dutch scholar of international law, that "in the absence of a supreme tribunal charged with passing judgment in international disputes, and in the absence of a superstate charged with the power to carry out the judgments of such a tribunal, states have no other alternative than to resort to force in order to have their rights recognized and their interests respected . . ." ¹

Such a supreme tribunal has now been created in the form of the League of Nations. Already it has been functioning over ten years. But with what results? What prospect does it hold of replacing the old method of solving an emergency through resorting to force by coöperation? In the first place, the League of Nations in its present shape is not the League designed by the framers of the Covenant. The mere fact that two Great Powers,

¹ Quoted by Raymond Leslie Buell, "International Relations," 2nd Edition, 1929.

Russia and the United States, are not members of the League greatly impairs, to say the least, the effectiveness of that body. But even with this discounted, the results of the work of the League (in the field we are concerned here) can scarcely be regarded as impressive; indeed its settlement of the Silesian question and the scandalous Vilna incident render its record something less than that.

Especially discouraging are the League's performances in the matter of disarmament. The long labors of the Preparatory Commission for that Disarmament Conference which is supposed to be convened by the League early in 1932 have become the laughing stock of the world! The obligation imposed upon the League by its Covenant to formulate plans for the reduction of armaments has not as yet been carried beyond the establishment of this Preparatory Commission.

It is not the idea of coöperation we doubt; on the contrary, as may be seen from the whole content of the present chapter, we believe very strongly in coöperation where coöperation is possible. We question only the ability of the League of Nations as at present constituted to cope with the problem of preventing armed conflicts. We question not the possibility of decreasing the number of minor clashes through conferences, but the chances of an international body to accomplish anything at present in a widespread calamity. Can it really settle such a major crisis without resort to arms? We are far from denying the usefulness of work accomplished by certain branches of the League in the field of coöperation, such as gathering statistics, fighting epidemics, bettering sanitary conditions, etc. But these highly commendable though secondary performances have no bearing on the more important matter of abolishing war. The accomplishments of the League of Nations in this respect do not convince one either of the sincerity of her attempts, or the feasibility of her plans.

It is true that the short existence of the League is such as to justify the question: "How could one expect a new organization, not much over ten years old, to solve at once the problems that have plagued the world for many centuries?" Undoubtedly the span of time was short and on consideration of this one may cherish hopes that future achievements of the League may be more impressive. But the fact remains that her performances

up to the present have not brought about any serious change in the basic problem of war, which is the only one we deal with at the moment.

Twelve years have now elapsed since the end of the World War. Yet despite all the professions of the League of Nations, and all the promises to disarm or at least to reduce armaments, the armies and navies of certain countries seem larger than ever before, and are supplemented by air forces of hitherto unconceived dimensions. The military budgets of certain Powers are constantly growing; and scarcely a step in the direction of disarmament is noticeable anywhere.²

Numerous conferences have been convoked, stacks of treaties and understandings have been signed, but to what avail? What signs remain of the "Spirit of Locarno" now that a few years have elapsed since the promulgation of this pact, so loudly acclaimed as a successful step in building up friendly relations? Has the World Court acquired any authority to prevent armed clashes? Does the Briand-Kellogg Pact bar any wars? Is it not true that the only tangible result of this well-heralded document is that, by defining what kinds of war are better than the others, it has indirectly sanctioned some of them? Is it not true that the League of Nations admits some wars as legitimate, though certain obliging interpreters decline to describe as war the actions taken under Articles X and XVI of its Covenant? It would seem that power today depends on the size of the armed force behind the words of statesmen to scarcely less degree than before the "last" war and the birth of the League; and the policy of coöperation remains a pious dream rather than a reality.

In connection with the Far East this policy came to the fore at the Washington Conference of 1921-22. But what definite results did this Conference achieve in regard to coöperation? The Anglo-Japanese Alliance was ended supposedly because the wider understanding then contracted rendered "illogical" the narrower one embracing only two participants. Whereupon four Powers (France, Great Britain, Japan and the United States) having agreed on a method of retaining their respective positions in the Pacific intact, invited five more to declare by the Nine-Power

² Denmark's noble plans in this direction are not yet quite fulfilled. As for the total amount spent by the Great Powers for "preparedness" in 1931, it was almost double that in 1913.

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Treaty a policy towards China. Neither the Four nor the Nine Power Treaty, it should be noted, included Soviet Russia.

The Four-Power Treaty contemplated, besides the termination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, an agreement by the High Contracting Parties (1) to respect each other's rights in relation to their insular possessions and insular dominions in the region of the Pacific Ocean; (2) to refer any controversy arising out of any Pacific question and involving the said rights to joint Conferences of the Contracting Parties (if no settlement by regular diplomatic procedure would seem possible) and (3) if the said rights are threatened by the aggressive action of any other Power to communicate with one another fully and frankly in order to arrive at an understanding as to the measures to be taken to meet the exigencies of the particular situation.

The Nine-Power Treaty solemnly declared that the Powers undertake to respect Chinese sovereignty and political and administrative integrity. Nevertheless, Japan was permitted, during Tanaka's régime, to violate China's sovereignty and integrity on several occasions; and her subsequent withdrawal was forced not by any action of the Powers, but by events in China itself.

It is quite obvious that the question of the peace of the Far East rests with the fate of China now no less than some fifteen years ago, when the American expert, Dr. Stanley Hornbeck, wrote: "If China can develop strength to defend her own integrity, the peace of the Orient may be preserved. If the partition of China once seriously begins, nothing will save the Far East for the next several decades from being a theater of aggression, conflict, and political redistribution."⁸ Of course China has not yet developed strength to defend her own integrity. Now, however, we have the League of Nations, the Kellogg Pact, the Nine-Power Treaty of 1922, and the resolutions passed by the Washington Conference in reference to respecting Chinese territorial and administrative integrity. To these such optimists as are inclined to regard them at their face value, and not to recognize the facts, refer. But they forget that economic, commercial, racial, and political features and considerations, the spirit of competition and a wide diversity in ideals, all enter into the problem of relations between the aspirants for the exploitation

⁸ Stanley Hornbeck, "Contemporary Politics in the Far East," 1916, pp. 356-357.

(benevolent or otherwise) of China. Neither the League nor all the treaties in the world have power completely to wipe out these problems and differences.

"The private persons, the Societies, the statesmen, who are interested in the furtherance of the cause of amicable relations, must bring themselves to an understanding of the facts," wrote the author quoted above, "and must face the realities. Sentimental theorizing, the exchange of pretty compliments and polite assurances of mutual good-will—in essence a process of deliberate deception . . . may postpone possible clashes but they will not remove the latent and potential causes of friction inherent in the respective situations, the economic needs and the diversity of institutions, ideals and aspirations of peoples."⁴

The policy of the United States in the Far East during the sixties of the XIXth century has been described by certain American historians as typical of a period of genuine international coöperation. But, we may ask, of what kind of coöperation? The Powers indeed worked together in three joint military operations against Japan (in 1862, 1864 and 1872) and in 1866 signed jointly a tariff treaty with the Mikado's Empire. A joint expedition against Korea was planned but never realized. And in China their coöperation, at that time, seems to have been restricted to curbing the liberation movement started by the Taipings.

Other amiable examples of international "coöperation" followed; and China was virtually partitioned among them, though in this the United States did not share. "Coöperation" appeared again in the dealing with the Boxer Rebellion of 1900-1, and also in the intervention into the Russian Far East after the Revolution of 1917. "Coöperation" is also to be seen in the Interallied Control of the Chinese Eastern Railway. But all such examples as these belong, of course, to the category of acts which incite wars rather than prevent them, deepen conflicts rather than settle them, cultivate hatred instead of promoting friendship, trust and coöperation of a kind likely to promote peace and the common welfare.

To declare that all the definite issues which caused friction between Japan and the United States before the Washington Conference irrespective of the vague racial issue, which was

⁴ Stanley Hornbeck, *ibid.*, p. 378.

merely latent at that time, were settled by this Conference, as was stated by an American historian of distinction, seems a trifle optimistic. It is difficult to reconcile the idea of political isolation (unnatural, in any case, where economic isolation is neither desirable nor possible) with that of coöperation. It is not enough to set up organizations for international peace and ask the participants to sacrifice their minor, or national, interests in order to achieve the greater object of international coöperation. To expect any tangible results from such an appeal it is necessary first to provide all nations with at least the barest necessities for existence, if not to put them on a more or less equal economic basis.

If the governments, representing—supposedly—the interests of their nations as a whole, could do something on their own volition, they probably would try at least to support the liberal forces willing to modify the prevailing evil of economic Imperialism in such a way that coöperation could take the place of rivalry. But what, we may ask doubtfully, are the chances for such a modification?

If it is true that the lust for domination is an eternal characteristic of the human race, as it is of the animal kingdom and, to some extent at least, the vegetable kingdom, it is logical to insist that wars are both natural and unavoidable. If so, it is vain to attempt either to prevent or abolish them. All the Conferences and Understandings, all the Leagues and Pacts must then be useless. "*Homo homini lupus est!*" If human beings are no better than wolves, individual nations must be adequately prepared for emergencies. "Those who want peace—must prepare for war," and other similar sayings, wise or otherwise, then become comprehensible.

But there are not only plenty of well informed erudite and experienced statesmen but also able and intelligent soldiers who insist that the truth of these assertions need not be eternal! What is true today is not necessarily so tomorrow! What is unavoidable in one environment may be escaped in another! What is inherent in one political and economic structure of society can be alien to the rest. Already there exists a school of thought which asserts that nations can live together in peace and amity by helping one another and replacing the waste of competition by properly planned coöperation. Boundless opportunities re-

main as yet untouched, enormous territories uncultivated, abundant natural resources undeveloped. Science continues to open new vistas and channels to Nature's wealth. Only the existing order of human society—with its segregation and barriers, rivalries and competition, suspicion and discord—prevents the application of what science offers as a means to conquer Nature.

If instead of quarreling and fighting, men would work jointly, they would produce more and live better. Nor do states differ from individuals in this respect. If nations would coöperate to battle Nature instead of fighting one another, they too would produce more and live better; and numerous problems which perplex us today would vanish instantly.

Such, at least, is said to be the creed of those who direct nowadays the policies of Russia and are trying to put theory into practice both at home and abroad. If we regard Russia's present rôle in the Far East in the light of these theories, we must conclude that she does not cherish any sinister schemes to acquire material benefits in this arena or elsewhere. This policy, incidentally, coincides with what the actual economic interests of Russia dictate. The analysis of Russia's interests in the Far East offered in preceding chapters indicates (we hope convincingly) that Russia has no need for further territorial expansion—if only because she has enormous areas of her own and is not faced by problems of overpopulation. She does not need the raw materials of her neighbors in Asia or the other continents, since she is so abundantly endowed within her own domain.

Nor is she likely to embark on any armed conquest of new markets. Not only is she still backward in the production of goods for export; she is also opposed in theory to the acquisition of markets by force, asserting that such acquisitions cannot long be retained.

Russia's activities in the Far East in the years between the World War and the present have been first of all directed towards the restoration of normal relations broken off after the Revolution, not by herself, but by others. Next she has striven to reëstablish friendly intercourse. If in this endeavor she has been greatly hindered, it has not been through her own propaganda, and "mischief making" (as it has been called by enemies

of Soviets), so much as by such outrages as raids on the Russian diplomatically "immune" Embassy and Consulates, and the endless intrigues and *démarches* of those who, fighting Communism and Bolshevism, have actually aimed at Russia.

No attempt, however, is made by the Moscow authorities to deny that Communism has made inroads into China and has found there a fertile soil for growth. It is a well-known fact that the Russian Soviet "emissaries," though acting as private individuals, played a most prominent rôle in organizing the forces of Nationalist China, and helped the leaders of the Kuo-min-tan to get a good start in their endeavor to put an end to the remnants of the old order in China. The Russians can hardly be blamed for the turn taken by this movement later on.

It is unquestionably true that the Russian leaders of today are anxious to see their theories succeed not only in their own country, where they are in full power, but abroad as well. Their aim, like that of all fanatics and missionaries, is to conquer the world. But their vision is not one of material conquest directed to the acquisition of more lands, more markets, and more wealth. The triumph of their ideas is what they desire; and their final goal is the union and coöperation of all humanity. Are they right or wrong? Will their dream come true? It is not our task to indulge in speculation. For us at present it is enough to note the Soviet bid for coöperation, and to realize that it is a bid for coöperation to the benefit of all and not for aggrandizement of those few who are strong and anxious to become still stronger at the expense of those who are weak and unable to resist.

In other words, coöperation of Soviet Russia with others in the Far East seems to be feasible, but only a coöperation for the benefit of China and not for her detriment.

APPENDICES

TREATIES

TREATY OF NERCHINSK OF 1689 *

1. The river Gorbitza which joins the river Shilka on the left, near the river Tchernaya, is to form the boundary between the two Empires. From the source of this river the boundary shall run along the top of the mountains in which the river rises and which extend towards the sea, dividing the jurisdiction of the two Empires so that all the rivers, great or small, flowing from the southern slope of these mountains and joining the river Amur, shall belong to the Empire of Hina, while all the rivers flowing on the other side of the mountains shall be similarly under the rule of His Majesty the Tsar of the Empire of Russia. As to the other rivers which lie between the Russian river Oud and the aforesaid mountains, which lie near the river Amur, in the possession of the Empire of Hina, and extending to the sea, and the valleys between the river Oud and the aforesaid mountains, the jurisdiction over them is to remain undecided because the envoys plenipotentiary have no explicit instructions from the Tsar. Hereafter, when the ambassadors of both sides shall have returned, and Their Majesties the Tsar and the Bogdohan shall desire to negotiate on that matter, it may be settled by correspondence or by special envoys authorized to agree on the line of demarcation in the aforesaid region.

2. Similarly the river named Argun, which flows into the Amur, shall form the frontier along its whole length, so that all the lands lying on its left bank when looking up stream are to be under the rule of the Khan of Hina and all the lands on the right side are to be under the rule of His Majesty the Tsar of the Russian Empire. All the dwellings, which are at present on the South side shall be removed to the other side of the same river.

3. The town of Albazin, built by His Majesty the Tsar, is to be entirely demolished, and the people residing there shall be moved with all military and other effects into the lands of His Majesty the Tsar without suffering any loss of property or damage whatever.

4. Fugitives from either side who may have settled in the other

* Translated from the Russian text as given in Bantysh-Kamensky. "Diplomatcheskoye Sobranie Diel mejdu Rossiiskim i Kitaiskim Gosudarstvami s 1619 po 1792 god," pp. 336-341.

country previous to the date of this Treaty may remain where they are: no claim for their rendition will be made on either side. But those who may take refuge in either country after the date of this Treaty of amity are to be sent without delay to the frontier and at once handed over to the authorities.

5. It is to be understood that from the time when this treaty of amity is made, the subjects of either nation, if provided with proper passports, may come and go (across the frontier) on their private business and may carry on commerce.

6. All the differences (lit. quarrels) which may have occurred between the peoples dwelling on either side of the frontier up to the date of this Treaty shall be forgotten and claims arising therefrom shall not be entertained. But if hereafter any persons, coming under the pretext of business, commit crimes of violence to property and life, they are at once to be arrested and sent to their own country and handed over to the authorities for execution. In the event that individual persons, or a group of persons, should commit similar crimes they shall be arrested and delivered to the frontier and handed to the authorities to be put to death; no such crimes and excesses committed by private people shall kindle a war and bloodshed by either side. When cases of this kind arise they are to be reported by the side on which they occur to the sovereign of both countries for amicable settlement by diplomatic negotiations.

If the Emperor of China desires to engrave on stones the articles of this Treaty determining the frontier, and to place the same on the frontier as a record, he is at liberty to do so.

Done on the frontier of His Majesty the Tsar's land of Dahours on August the 27th, 1797 (1689).

TREATY OF AIGUN *

Signed May 16th/28th, 1858.

Article I. The left bank of the Amur river from the Argun river to its mouth at the sea, shall be in the possession of Russia, and the right bank down to the Ussuri river, in the possession of the country of Daitsin. The lands lying further to the East beyond the river Ussuri must remain in the joint possession of the State of Daitsin and of Russia until the proper demarcation of the frontier in the future. The rivers Amur, Sungari, and Ussuri to be open for navigation for the vessels of China and Russia exclusively; no vessels of other

* Translated from the Russian text as given in Prof. E. D. Grimm's Collection of Treaties and Other Documents Pertaining to the History of International Relations in the Far East (1842-1925) (in Russian), Moscow, 1927, pp. 54-55.

countries to be allowed to navigate these rivers. The Manchus now living on the left bank of Amur from the river Zeya to the village of Khormoldsin may forever remain in the places where they now live, under the jurisdiction of the Manchu Government and with the provision that the Russians shall not abuse them or render any injustice.

Article II. To promote mutual friendship of the subjects of the two countries, trading is allowed between those subjects of both who live along the rivers Ussuri, Amur, and Sungari; and the officials must mutually protect the traders of both countries on either bank.

Article III. The plenipotentiary of Russia, the Governor General Mouravieff, and the plenipotentiary of China (country of the Dait-sins), the commanding officer at the Amur, I-Shan, have mutually agreed to declare that this shall be strictly enforced and never violated.

TREATY OF TIENTSIN *

Signed 1/13, June, 1858.

Article I. The present treaty confirms the peace and amity long existing between His Majesty the Emperor of Russia and His Majesty the Bogdohan of Daitsin and their subjects. The personal safety and security of property of the Russians living in China and of the Chinese, living in Russia, are henceforward placed under the protection and custody of the Governments of both Empires.

Article II. The former right of Russia to dispatch envoys to Peking, at any time the Russian Government deems it necessary, is confirmed by the present treaty.

The Government of Russia and the Government of China shall no longer communicate as before through the Senate and the Li-Fan-yuan, as intermediaries, but through the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia and the Senior Member of the Supreme Council of the Empire (Kiun-ki-tchou) or the Prime Minister, as intermediaries, on the basis of complete equality.

The ordinary correspondence between the two high officials mentioned above shall be transmitted by the frontier authorities. When it is necessary to send a dispatch concerning a matter of great importance, a special functionary shall be designated to carry it to the capital and to deliver it personally to the Prime Minister. On his arrival he shall present the dispatch through the good offices of the President of the Chamber of Ceremonies, Li-Pou.

* Translated from the original French text, as given in the "Trade Treaties of Russia with China," published by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry at St. Petersburg, in 1909, on pp. 8-14.

A complete equality shall be observed also in the correspondence and meetings of the Envoys or Ministers Plenipotentiary of Russia with the Members of the Council of the Empire, the Ministers of the Court at Peking and the Governors-General, and the other local authorities on the frontiers of the two Empires. In case the Russian Government shall deem it necessary to designate a Minister Plenipotentiary to reside in one of the Open Ports, the latter shall conform in his personal relations and in his correspondence with the superior local authorities, or the Minister at Peking, to the general regulations at present established for all the foreign countries.

The Russian Envoys may go from Kiakhta to Peking via Urga or via Taku, at the mouth of the river Peiho, or by any other way through the open cities and ports of China.

The Chinese Government engages, immediately on receiving advance notice, to take necessary measures for their prompt progress en route, as well as to render them due honors on their arrival at the capital, and for their proper accommodation and all necessary provisioning.

The expenses of these various articles shall be borne by the Russian Government, and in no respect by the Chinese Government.

Article III. Henceforth the commerce between China and Russia may be carried on not only by land at the points formerly established on the frontiers, but also by sea. Russian merchant vessels may enter for the purpose of trade the following ports: Shanghai, Ningpo, Foo-chow-fu, Amoy, Canton, Taiwan-fu, on the island of Formosa, Kiung-chow, on the island of Hainan, and other places open for foreign trade.

Article IV. Overland trade shall henceforth be subject to no restrictions in regard to the number of persons taking part in it, the quantity of imported goods, or the capital employed. As to overseas trade and all the details therewith concerned, as for example, declaration of goods imported, payment of anchorage, customs duties in accordance with the tariffs in force, etc., Russian vessels shall conform with the general regulations on foreign trade in the ports of China. In the case of contraband the Russians are liable to confiscation of their goods.

Article V. The Russian Government has the right to appoint consuls in all the ports enumerated above. It may send warships to watch and maintain order among Russian subjects residing in the Open Ports of China, and to support the authority of her consuls. The character of relations between the consuls and the local authorities, the assignment of lands for the building of churches, dwellings and stores, the purchase of land by Russians from the Chinese, by private agreement,

and other acts of this kind included in the consular functions, shall be based on the general rules adapted by the Chinese Government for foreigners.

Article VI. If a Russian warship or merchant vessel should suffer shipwreck on the coast of China the local authorities shall immediately take such measures as are necessary to remove the personnel, their property either to the nearest of the Open Ports where a Russian consul is located or an agent of a nation friendly to Russia or, if more convenient, to the frontier. Expenses involved in salvaging human beings and merchandise, shall be paid eventually by order of the Russian Government. In the event that Russian warships or merchant vessels, while navigating Chinese waters, shall need to make repairs, or secure water or fresh provisions, they shall have the right to enter for this purpose even those Chinese ports not open for trade, and to purchase all they need, paying prices voluntarily agreed upon, and with no obstacle on the part of the local authorities.

Article VII. No case arising between Russian and Chinese subjects in the Open Ports may be examined or judged by the Chinese Government except with the coöperation of the Russian consul or of the representative of the Russian Government in the district. Russian subjects accused of any crime or misdemeanor whatever are to be judged according to Russian laws. Similarly for all attempts on life or property or any crime or misdemeanor injurious to a Russian subject, Chinese subjects are to be judged and punished according to the laws of their Empire.

Russian subjects who penetrate to the interior of China and commit there any crime or misdemeanor must be sent to some place where a Russian consul is located, for trial and punishment according to Russian law.

Article VIII. The Chinese Government, recognizing that Christian teaching promotes order and accord among mankind, undertakes not only to refrain from persecuting its subjects for exercising the rituals of the Christian religion, but also to give them equal protection with those of other cults tolerated in the Empire.

Regarding the Christian missionaries as good people, who are not prompted by their personal interest, the Chinese Government authorizes them to propagate Christianity among its subjects and shall not hinder their entrance into the interior of the Empire through all the points open for foreigners; in consequence of which a definite number of missionaries shall receive certificates to that effect from the consuls or frontier officials of Russia.

Article IX. The parts not yet delimited of the frontier between China and Russia shall be surveyed without delay by persons duly

authorized by both Governments and the agreement arrived at by them in regard to the boundary line shall form an additional article to the present treaty. On completion of the delimitation, a detailed description with a map of the adjoining regions shall be made and shall henceforth serve both Governments as the authentic documents relative to the frontier.

Article X. Instead of members remaining in Peking for a definite period of time, determined by the former custom, all members of the Russian ecclesiastical mission may, by virtue of the decision of the higher authorities, return to Russia at any time, via Kiakhta or by any other way, and other persons may be appointed in their stead and place at Peking.

All expenses involved by the Mission shall henceforth be charged to the Russian Government and the Chinese Government shall no longer be responsible for expenses in this connection, as it was the case before.

The traveling expenses of members of the Mission, of couriers and of other persons dispatched by the Russian Government to Peking through Kiakhta or the Open Ports of China, either coming or going, shall be met by that Government. The Chinese local authorities on their part must assist by all means the prompt and comfortable passage of all the persons enumerated above to the place of their destination.

Article XI. To establish regular intercourse between the Russian and the Chinese Governments as well as for the needs of the Peking Ecclesiastical Mission there shall be organized a monthly light-mail service between Kiakhta and Peking.

Chinese couriers shall leave Peking and Kiakhta monthly at definite dates and must deliver at their respective destinations letters entrusted to them within a period not exceeding 15 days.

Moreover every three months, or four times a year, a heavy mail with parcel posts and goods shall be dispatched from Kiakhta to Peking and from Peking to Kiakhta; the duration of the journey is fixed at 1 month. All the expenses involved by the dispatch of either post shall be apportioned between the Chinese and the Russian Governments.

Article XII. All the rights, and political, commercial, and other privileges, that may in future be acquired by the countries most favored by the Chinese Government, shall be extended to Russia as well without any further negotiations on her part.

The present treaty is this day confirmed by His Majesty the Bogdohan of the Empire of Daitsin and, after its confirmation by His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, shall be ratified at Peking within a year or earlier if circumstances allow. For the present

there are exchanged copies of this treaty in the Russian, Manchurian and Chinese languages, signed and sealed by the Plenipotentiaries of the two Empires, and the Manchurian text shall be adopted as the basis for interpretation of the sense of the articles.

All the clauses of the present treaty shall in the future be faithfully and inviolably observed by the two High Contracting Parties.

Made and signed in the city of Tientsin on the 1st/13th June, year of the Lord one thousand eight hundred fifty eight, and the fourth year of the reign of the Emperor Alexander II.

(Signed) COUNT EUTHYM PUTIATINE. (Seal)

(Signed) KOUEI-LIANG-HOUA-CHA-NA. (Seal)

The exchange of ratifications took place at Peking on the 12/24th April of 1859.

TREATY OF PEKING *

Signed November 2/14, 1860, at Peking.

Article I. To confirm and elaborate the first article of the treaty concluded in the city of Aigun on May 16th, 1858, (on the 21st day of the IVth month of the VIIIth year of Hien-Fong) and in fulfilment of Article IX of the treaty contracted on June 1st of the same year (the 3rd day of the Vth month) in the city of Tientsin, it is agreed that:

Henceforth the Eastern boundary between the two Empires, to commence at the junction of the Shilka and Argun Rivers, shall continue down the River Amur to the junction of the Ussuri River with the latter. The lands lying on the left bank (to the North) of the Amur River belong to the Russian State, and the land lying on the right bank (to the South) of the Amur up to the junction with the Ussuri, belong to the Chinese State. Beyond, from the junction with the Ussuri up to Lake Khanka, the frontier follows the rivers Ussuri and Sungach. The lands lying on the right (Eastern) banks of these rivers belong to the Empire of Russia, and on the left (Western) to the Empire of China. Further on, the boundary line between these two Empires, from the point where the River Sungach branches off, crosses Lake Khanka and proceeds along the River Belenghe (Tour); from the mouth of that river it follows the crest of the mountains to the mouth of the River Khoubitou (Khubtu), and thence, following the mountains which lie between the River Hunchung and the sea, to the

* Translated from the original French text as given in the "Trade Treaties of Russia with China," published by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry at St. Petersburg in 1909, on pp. 14-25.

River Tumienkiang. Along this line also the land lying to the East belong to the Empire of Russia, and those to the West to the Empire of China. The boundary line crosses the River Tumienkiang at a point 20 Chinese versts (li) from her mouth.

Furthermore, in fulfilment of Article IX of the Tientsin Treaty, the map, prepared for this purpose and on which, for the sake of greater clarity, the frontier line traced in red and indicated by the letters А Б В Г Д Е Ж З И Й К Л М Н О П Р С Т У of the Russian alphabet, is hereby approved. This map is signed by the Plenipotentiaries of the two Empires and sealed with their seals. In the event that lands settled by Chinese subjects shall be found in the territories described, the Russian Government undertakes to leave the residents as they are and allow them to engage in fishing and hunting as in the past. After the boundary marks are affixed the demarcation line of the frontier must forever remain unalterable.

Article II. The boundary line to the West not established until now, should henceforth follow the mountains, the course of the great rivers, and the present line of the Chinese pickets. From the last light-house, known as Shabin-Dabag, erected in 1728 (the Vith year of Young-Tching) after the conclusion of the Treaty of Kiakhta, it shall proceed towards the South-West after Lake Zaisan (Dsai-sang), and thence to the mountains situated to the South of Lake Issyk-Kul and named Tengrishan or Kirghizuin-Alatau, and also known as Thian-Shan-nan-lou (the Southern branches of the Celestial Mountains), and along these mountains as far as the Kokan's possessions.

Article III. Henceforth all the frontier disputes which may arise in the future, are to be settled in accordance with Articles I and II of this Treaty, and in order to fix the boundary marks in the East from Lake Khanka to the River Tumienkiang, and in the West from the light-house at Shabin-Dabag to the Kokan's possessions, the Russian and the Chinese Governments shall appoint delegates (commissars). For the survey of the Eastern frontiers the commissars must meet at the mouth of the Ussuri River during April of the following year (the IIIrd month of the XIth year of Hien-Fong). For the survey of the Western frontier meeting of the commissars shall take place at Tarbagatai, but the time for this is not specified.

On the basis established by Articles I and II of the present Treaty the functionaries properly authorized (commissars) shall prepare maps and detailed descriptions of the frontier-line in four copies, of which two shall be in the Russian language and two in Chinese or Manchu. These maps and descriptions shall be signed and sealed by the commissars, after which two copies (one in Russian and another in the Chinese or Manchu language) shall be sent to the Russian Government

and two similar copies to the Chinese Government, to be kept by them. For the delivery of maps and the descriptions of the frontiers a protocol shall be drawn up, witnessed by the signatures and affixing of the seals of the commissars; and which shall be considered as an additional article to the present treaty.

Article IV. Along the entire boundary line, defined by the first article of the present treaty, a custom free barter trade is authorized between the citizens of the two states. The local border officials must render special protection to this trade and to those who carry it on. At the same time the regulations of trade established by Article II of the Aigun Treaty are hereby confirmed.

Article V. Besides the trade already existing at Kiakhta the Russian merchants shall enjoy their ancient privilege of traveling for commercial purposes from Kiakhta to Peking. En route they are also allowed to trade at Urga and Kalgan without the obligation of establishing there a wholesale business. The Russian Government shall have the right to have a consul at Urga (Lin-Tchi-Khouan) accompanied by several persons, and to construct there at their expense a dwelling place for these officers. As for a concession of land for this building and in regard to the regulations for its dimensions, as well as for the concession for pasturage, an understanding must be reached with the Government officials of Urga. Chinese merchants are equally authorized to travel in Russia for trading purposes, if they so desire.

Russian merchants have at all times the right to travel in China for trading purposes, only it is forbidden to them to assemble at any one time in numbers in excess of two hundred; moreover, they must be provided with documents issued by the Russian frontier authorities giving the name of the head of the caravan, number of persons in it, the place of destination. En route the merchants may buy or sell anything at their discretion. All their traveling expenses are chargeable to themselves.

Article VI. As an experiment, Kashgar is opened for trade on the same basis as at Ili and Tarbagatai. In Kashgar the Chinese Government shall concede land sufficient for building a "factoria," with all the necessary buildings, such as dwellings, stores for merchandise, church, etc., as well as for a cemetery and a pasturage, as at Ili and Tarbagatai. Orders shall be given immediately to the Governor of Kashgar for the concession of said lands.

The Chinese Government shall not be responsible for plunder suffered by Russian merchants trading in Kashgar from robberies in the event that such plunder is committed by persons coming from beyond the line of the Chinese guards.

Article VII. The Russians in China, as well as Chinese subjects in Russia, may freely carry on their business in the points open for trade without any annoyance on the part of the local authorities; visit with the same freedom and at all times the bazars, shops, houses of the local merchants; buy and sell various goods at wholesale or retail, for cash or by barter; borrow or lend money, on mutual trust. The period of sojourn for merchants in places where trade is carried on, is not limited and depends on their free judgment.

Article VIII. Russian merchants in China and the Chinese in Russia shall be under the special protection of both Governments. For the supervision over the merchants, and the prevention of misunderstandings arising between them and the local population the Russian Government, in accordance with the regulations agreed upon for Ili and Tarbagatai, may appoint her consuls to Kashgar and Urga immediately. The Chinese Government likewise may, if it so desires, appoint consuls in the capital and other cities of the Russian Empire.

The consuls of either Power shall be lodged in the buildings constructed at the expense of their respective Governments. However, it is not forbidden to them to hire, if convenient, living-quarters from the local population.

In their relations with the local authorities the consuls of the two Powers shall observe a complete equality in fulfilment of Article II of the Treaty of Tientsin. All business concerning the merchants of either Empire shall be examined according to private agreement; crimes and misdemeanors shall be judged, as provided for by the Article VII of the Treaty of Tientsin, according to the laws of that Empire of which the accused is a subject.

Litigations, claims, and other misunderstandings of the same nature, arising between merchants in connection with their commercial affairs shall be adjusted by the merchants themselves, through arbiters of their own selection. The consuls and the local authorities must confine themselves to coöperation in arranging an amicable settlement, without assuming any responsibility for claims.

In the places where trade is authorized, the merchants of either Empire may enter into written contracts for the ordering of goods, renting of stores and dwellings, etc., etc., and to present these contracts for legalization to the consulates and the local administration.

In case of non-fulfilment of a written contract the consul and the local chief official shall take steps to induce the parties to properly meet their obligations.

Disputes which do not concern the commercial affairs between merchants, such as litigations, complaints, etc., etc., are to be judged by mutual consent by the consul and the local chief official, and those

who are delinquent shall be punished according to the laws of their own country.

In case of concealment of a Russian subject among the Chinese or of his flight into the interior of the country, the local authority, immediately after being informed thereof by the Russian consul, shall instantly take measures to find the fugitive and immediately after locating him shall deliver him to the Russian consul. The same procedure shall be likewise observed in relation to all Chinese subjects who may hide themselves among the Russians or flee into Russia.

In cases of grave crimes, such as murder, brigandage coupled with grave injuries, attempts against human life, arson, etc., the culprit, if a Russian, must be sent—after investigation—to Russia to be dealt with according to the laws of his country; and if a Chinese, his punishment shall be imposed by the authority at the place the crime was committed; or, if the laws of the State demand, the culprit shall be sent to another town or Province, there to receive punishment.

In case of a crime, whatever its gravity, the consul and the local chief-official cannot take necessary measures except in regard to a culprit belonging to their country and neither shall have the right either of imprisonment or of pronouncing judgment, and still less to punish an individual who is not a subject of his Government.

Article IX. The present extension of the commercial relations between the subjects of the two countries and the demarcation of the new boundary line shall henceforth render invalid all the previous regulations established by the treaties contracted at Nerchinsk and Kiakhtha and by the agreements supplementing them; the mutual relations of the border authorities and the rules established for the examination of frontier business, likewise, are not in accord with the present circumstances. Consequently, in place of these regulations the following are established: Henceforth, besides the intercourse already existing on the Eastern frontier via Urga and Kiakhtha between the Governor-General of Western Siberia and the administration of Ili, border relations shall also be established between the Military Governors of Amur and the Maritime province and the Tuchuns (Commanders in Chief) of Heilungkiang and Kirin, and between the frontier commissar at Kiakhtha and the dzargoutchi (Pou-yuan) in conformity with Article VIII of the present Treaty.

In confirmation to Article II of the Treaty of Tientsin the above mentioned Governors and Commanders in Chief (Tuchuns) must observe complete equality in their relations, and are bound to negotiate only such business as falls directly within their own jurisdiction.

In regard to business of special importance the Governor-General of Eastern Siberia is authorized to negotiate in writing either with

the Supreme Council (Tsiuntzichu) or with the Chamber of Foreign Affairs (Li-Fan-yuan) as the principal administrative authority in charge of frontier intercourse and government.

Article X. In their instructions and decisions on frontier affairs of whatever importance, the chief frontier officials shall conform with the regulations laid down in Article VIII of the present Treaty as for the examination of the subjects of one or the other Empire and the punishments to be imposed on them, they shall be effected as provided in the Article VII of the Treaty of Tientsin, according to the laws of the country to which the culprit belongs.

In case of transportation, theft or removal of cattle beyond the frontier, the local authorities, as soon as they have been informed and the traces have been pointed out to the nearest frontier guards, shall send men charged with authority to search. When recovered, the cattle shall be immediately returned and if there will be any shortage a requisition shall be exercised according to law; but in such case the indemnity payable should not amount to several times the cost of the lost cattle (as was the practice formerly).

In case of a flight of an individual beyond the frontiers, measures shall instantly be taken on first information to find the fugitive. When seized, the fugitive shall be surrendered, without delay, with all his belongings, to the frontier authority; examination of his motives for flight and judgment upon the case itself shall be effected by that local authority of the country to which the fugitive belongs, who is nearest to the frontier. Throughout the time of his sojourn beyond the frontiers, from the moment of his arrest until his extradition, the fugitive shall be properly fed and, if necessary, clad; the guard accompanying him must treat him humanely and not indulge in any arbitrary acts towards him. They must act in the same manner towards any fugitive or subject about whom no information has been given.

Article XI. Communications in writing between the superior frontier authorities of either Empire shall be carried through the functionaries nearest to the frontier, and to whom the dispatches shall be handed and receipts taken.

The Governor-General of Eastern Siberia and the Governor of Kiakhta shall send their dispatches to the frontier-commissars at Kiakhta, who shall remit them to the dzargoutchi (Pou-yuan); the Governors of Urga shall forward theirs to the dzargoutchi (Pou-yuan) who shall remit them to the frontier-commissars at Kiakhta.

The Military Governor of the Amur province shall send his dispatches through the adjutant (fou-dou-toun) to the chief commanding officer (Tuchun) of the city of Aigun, and through the same agency the chief Commanding Officers of the Heilungkiang and Kirin

provinces shall transmit theirs to the Military Governor of the Amur province.

The Military Governor of the Maritime province and the Chief Commanding Officer (Tuchun) of Kirin shall transmit reciprocally their dispatches through chiefs of their frontier posts on the Rivers Ussuri and Hunchung. The transmission of correspondence between the Governor-General of the Western Siberia and the superior administration of the Chief Commanding Officer (Tuchun) of Ili, shall be effected through the Russian consul at the city of Ili (Kuldja).

In case of business of particular importance requiring verbal explanation, the superior authorities on the frontiers of either Empires might expedite reciprocally their dispatches through trusted Russian functionaries.

Article XII. Conforming to the provisions of Article XI of the Treaty of Tientsin the mail (letters and parcel-post) dispatched for the services between Kiakhta and Peking and vice versa shall depart as indicated below, namely: the letters every month from each point and the mail with parcel-post once every two months from Kiakhta to Peking and once every three months from Peking to Kiakhta.

The letter must arrive at its destination in no longer than twenty days, and the mails with parcel-posts in no longer than forty days.

On each trip the mail with parcel-posts must not carry more than twenty cases weighing not over one hundred and twenty Chinese pounds (ghin) or four pounds each.

The mail with letters must be forwarded the same day as it is received; in case of delay there shall be an inquiry and severe punishment.

The postman dispatched with the mails (letters or parcels) must report at the Russian Consulate at Urga, to deliver the letters and parcels, addressed to those residing in that town, and to receive from them the letters and parcels they have to dispatch.

In forwarding the parcel-posts the cases with them must be accompanied by shipping-invoices (tsin-tan). From Kiakhta these invoices together with an official notice shall be addressed to the Governor of Urga, and from Peking, likewise with an official notice, to the Court for Foreign Relations (Li-Fan-yuan).

The shipping invoices shall indicate the exact date of dispatch, the number of cases, and their total weight. The specific weight of each case must be inscribed on the cover of this case in Russian figures and their equivalents in Mongolian or Chinese measures.

If Russian merchants should deem it necessary, for their business, to establish on their own expense, a mail-service for transportation of

their letters or their merchandise they shall be accorded this facility in order to relieve the State mail-service.

In case of the establishment of a postal communication the merchants must merely inform the local authorities in order to obtain the latter's consent.

Article XIII. The ordinary correspondence of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia to the Supreme Council (Tsiuntzichu) of the Empire of Daitsin, and that of the Governor-General of the Eastern Siberia to the same Council or to the Chamber of Foreign Affairs (Li-Fan-yuan) shall be forwarded in a regular way by mail, but without being bound by the dates fixed for the latter's departure; in case of business of particular importance such correspondence may be forwarded by a Russian courier.

During the sojourn of the Russian Envoys at Peking dispatches of special importance may likewise be forwarded by Russian functionaries expressly assigned for that purpose.

The Russian couriers must not be detained anywhere en route by anyone.

The courier charged with carrying dispatches must positively be a Russian subject.

The departure of a courier shall be announced twenty-four hours in advance, at Kiakhta by the commissar to the dzargoutchi (Pou-yuan) and at Peking by the Russian Legation to the Military Court (Ping-pou).

Article XIV. If any of the regulations for the overland commerce contained in this Treaty, should subsequently cause inconvenience to either party, the Governor-General of Eastern Siberia is authorized to reach an agreement with the high officials of the State of Daitsins, and to conclude with them additional regulations in all case to be in accordance with the principles stipulated above.

Article XII of the Treaty of Tientsin is hereby confirmed and may not be altered in any respect.

Article XV. Having reached a mutual agreement on the above stipulations, the Plenipotentiaries of the Empires of Russia and China have signed with their hands, and sealed by their seals two copies of the Russian text and two copies of its translation into Chinese, and have handed over to each other, one copy of each.

The articles of the present Treaty shall be legally effective from the date of their exchange between the Plenipotentiaries of the two Empires as if they were inserted word by word into the Treaty of Tientsin, and must be forever executed faithfully and inviolably.

After having been ratified by the Sovereigns of the two Empires,

this Treaty shall be promulgated in each of the two States for the knowledge and guidance of those whom it may concern.

Concluded and signed at the capital city of Peking on the second (fourteenth) day of November of the year one thousand eight hundred sixty of the Christian era and the sixth year of the reign of the Emperor Alexander II, and the second day of the tenth moon of the tenth year of Hien-Fong.

(Signed) NICHOLAS IGNATIEFF.

(Signed) KONG.

Ratified at St. Petersburg, on the 20th December, 1860 (1st January, 1861).

SINO-RUSSIAN SECRET TREATY OF 1896 *

His Majesty the Emperor of Russia and his Majesty the Emperor of China in their desire to consolidate the peace happily restored in the Far East and to protect the Continent of Asia from a new foreign invasion, have decided to conclude between themselves a defensive alliance and have named as their plenipotentiaries:

His Majesty the Emperor of Russia—the Prince Alexis Lovanov-Rostovsky, His Minister of Foreign Affairs, Secretary of State, Senator and Privy Councillor, and Mr. Sergius de Witte, His Minister of Finance, Secretary of State and Privy Councillor; and His Majesty the Emperor of China—the Count Li-Hung-Chang, His Grand Secretary of State, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to His Majesty the Emperor of Russia.

Who, after having exchanged their credentials, found valid and in due form, have contracted the following articles:

Article I. Any aggression directed by Japan against the Russian territory in Eastern Asia, or territory of China or that of Korea shall be considered as necessitating the immediate application of the present treaty.

In such case the two High Contracting Parties engage to support reciprocally each other with all the land and sea forces they may be able to dispose of at that moment (lit. "*dont elles pourraient disposer en ce moment et a s'entr'aider autant que possible pour le ravitaillement de leurs forces respectives*").

Article II. As soon as the two High Contracting Parties shall be engaged in a common action, no treaty of peace with the adversary may be concluded by either without the consent of the other.

* Translated from the French text of the original consulted in the Archives of the Narcomindiel (Foreign Office) at Moscow.

Article III. During military operations all Chinese ports shall be open, when necessary, to the warships of Russia, which shall find there any assistance of the Chinese authorities they may require.

Article IV. In order to facilitate for the Russian land forces access to the points under menace and to assure the means of existence the Chinese Government consents to the construction of a railway across the Chinese provinces of Amur and Kirin in the direction of Vladivostok.

The junction of this railway with the railways of Russia shall not serve as a pretext for any encroachment on Chinese territory, nor for an attempt against the sovereign rights of His Majesty the Emperor of China. The construction and exploitation of this railway shall be accorded to the Russo-Chinese Bank and the clauses of the contract which shall be concluded to that effect, shall be duly discussed by the Minister of China at St. Petersburg and by the Russo-Chinese Bank.

Article V. It is understood that in case of war foreseen by the Article I, Russia shall be free to use the railway mentioned in Article IV for the transportation and provisioning of her troops. In peacetime Russia shall have the same right for the transportation and provisioning of her troops, with the right to stop over for no purpose other than those justified by the necessity of transportation.

Article VI. The present Treaty shall come into force from the date on which the contract stipulated by the Article IV shall be confirmed by His Majesty the Emperor of China. It shall have force for fifteen years. Six months before the expiration of that time the two High Contracting Parties shall consider the prolongation of this Treaty.

Made at Moscow on the 22nd of May, 1896.

Signed:

LOBANOV.

WITTE.

LI-HUNG-CHANG.

CONTRACT FOR THE CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION OF THE CHINESE EASTERN RAILWAY *

September 8, 1896.

Between the undersigned, His Excellency Shu-King-Chen, Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of China, at St. Petersburg, acting by virtue of an Imperial Edict, dated Kuang Hsu, 22nd year, 7th month, 20th day (August 16/28, 1896) of the one part and

* As published in MacMurray's "Treaties and Agreements with and concerning China," v. I, pp. 74-77.

the Russo-Chinese Bank of the other part, it has been agreed as follows:

The Chinese Government will pay the sum of five million kuping taels (kuping tls. 5,000,000) to the Russo-Chinese Bank, and will participate in proportion to this payment in the profits and losses of the Bank, on conditions set forth in a special contract.

The Chinese Government having decided upon the construction of a railway line, establishing direct communication between the city of Chita and the Russian South Ussuri Railway, entrusts the construction and operation of this railway to the Russo-Chinese Bank upon the following conditions:

1. The Russo-Chinese Bank will establish for the construction and operation of this railway a company under the name of the Chinese Eastern Railway Company. The seal which this company will employ will be given to it by the Chinese Government. The Statutes of this Company will be in conformity with the Russian usages in regard to railways. The shares of the Company can be acquired only by Chinese or Russian subjects. The president of this Company will be named by the Chinese Government, but paid by the Company. He may have his residence in Peking.

It will be the duty of the President to see particularly to the scrupulous fulfilment of the obligations of the Bank and of the Railway Company towards the Chinese Government; he will furthermore be responsible for the relations of the Bank and of the Railway Company with the Chinese Government and the central and local authorities.

The president of the Chinese Eastern Railway Company will likewise be responsible for examining all accounts of the Chinese Government with the Russo-Chinese Bank.

To facilitate local negotiations, the Russo-Chinese Bank will maintain an agent at Peking.

2. The route of the line will be determined by the deputies of the president (named by the Chinese Government) of the Company, in mutual agreement with the engineers of the Company and the local authorities. In laying out this line, cemeteries and tombs, as also towns and villages, should so far as possible be avoided and passed by.

3. The Company must commence the work within a period of twelve months from the day on which this contract shall be sanctioned by Imperial decree, and must so carry it on that the whole line will be finished within a period of six years from the day on which the route of the line is definitely established and the lands necessary therefor are placed at the disposal of the Company. The gauge of the line should be the same as that of the Russian railways (5 Russian feet, about four feet, two and one half inches, Chinese).

4. The Chinese Government will give orders to the local authorities to assist the Company to the extent of their ability in obtaining, at current prices, the materials necessary for the construction of the railway, as also laborers, means of transport by water and by land, the provision necessary for the feeding of men and animals, etc.

The Chinese Government should, as needed, take measures to facilitate such transportation.

5. The Chinese Government will take measures to assure the safety of the railway and of the persons in its service against any attack.

The Company will have the right to employ at will, as many foreigners or natives as it may find necessary for the purpose of administration, etc.

Criminal cases, lawsuits, etc., upon the territory of the railway must be settled by the local authorities in accordance with the stipulations of the treaties.

6. The lands actually necessary for the construction, operation, and protection of the lines, as also the lands in the vicinity of the line necessary for procuring sand, stone, lime, etc., will be turned over to the Company freely, if these lands are the property of the State; if they belong to individuals they will be turned over to the Company either upon a single payment or upon an annual rental to the proprietors at current prices. The lands belonging to the Company will be exempt from all land taxes (*impôt foncier*).

The Company will have absolute and exclusive right of administration of its lands. (*La Société aura le droit absolu et exclusif de l'administration de ses terrains.*)

The Company will have the right to construct on these lands buildings of all sorts, and likewise to construct and operate the telegraph necessary for the needs of the line.

The income of the Company, all its receipts and the charges for the transportation of passengers, and merchandise, telegraph, etc., will likewise be exempt from any tax or duty. Exception is made, however, as to mines, for which there will be a special arrangement.

7. All goods and materials for the construction, operation and repair of the line, will be exempt from any tax or customs duty and from any internal tax or duty.

8. The Company is responsible that the Russian troops and war material dispatched in transit over the line, will be carried through directly from one Russian station to another, without for any pretext stopping on the way longer than is strictly necessary.

9. Passengers who are not Chinese subjects, if they wish to leave the territory of the railway, should be supplied with Chinese passports. The Company is responsible that the passengers who are not

Chinese subjects, should not leave the territory of the railway if they do not have Chinese passports.

10. Passengers' baggage, as well as merchandise, dispatched in transit from one Russian station to another, will not be subject to customs duties; they will likewise be exempt from any internal tax or duty. The Company is bound to dispatch such merchandise, except passengers' baggage, in special cars, which, on arrival at the Chinese frontier, will be sealed by the office of the Chinese Customs, and cannot leave Chinese territory until after the office of the Customs shall have satisfied itself that the seals are intact; should it be established that these cars have been opened on the way without authorization, the merchandise shall be confiscated. Merchandise imported from Russia into China by the railway, and likewise merchandise exported from China into Russia by the same route, will respectively pay the import and export duty of the Chinese Maritime Customs less one-third. If merchandise is transported into the interior it will pay in addition the transit duty, equivalent to a half of the import duty collected, which frees it from any further charge. Merchandise not paying the transit tax will be subject to all the barriers and likin duties imposed in the interior. The Chinese Government must install customs offices at the two frontier points on the line.

11. The charges for the transportation of passengers and of merchandise, as well as for the loading and unloading of merchandise, are to be fixed by the Company, but it is obliged to transport free of charge the Chinese official letter post, and, at half price, Chinese land or sea forces and also Chinese war materials.

12. The Chinese Government transfers to the Company the complete and exclusive right to operate the line on its own account and risk, so that the Chinese Government will in no case be responsible for any deficit whatsoever of the Company, during the time allotted for the work and thereafter for a further eighty years from the day on which the line is finished and traffic is in operation. The period having elapsed, the line with all its appurtenances, will pass free of charge to the Chinese Government.

At the expiration of thirty-six years from the day on which the entire line is finished and traffic is in operation, the Chinese Government will have the right to buy back this line upon repaying in full all the capital involved, as well as all the debts contracted for this line, plus accrued interest. If in case the profit realized exceeds the dividends allowed to the shareholders, a part of such capital is repaid, that part will be deducted from the price of purchase. In no case may the Chinese Government enter into possession of this line before the appropriate sum is deposited in the Russian State Bank.

The day when the line is finished and traffic is in operation, the Company will make to the Chinese Government a payment of five million Kuping taels (Kuping tls. 5,000,000).

Kuang Hsu, 22nd year, 8th month, 2nd day.

(Signed) SHU.

Berlin, August 27, September 8, 1896.

Russo Chinese Bank.

(Signed) ROTHSTEIN

(Signed) PRINCE OUCHTOMSKY.

ANGLO-RUSSIAN AGREEMENT OF 1899 *

1. Russia engages not to seek for her own account, or on behalf of Russian subjects, or of others, any railway concessions in the basin of the Yangtze, and not to obstruct, directly or indirectly, applications for railway concessions in that region supported by the British Government.

2. Great Britain on her part engages not to seek for her own account, or on behalf of British subjects or of others, any railway concessions to the North of the Great Wall of China, and not to obstruct, directly or indirectly, applications for railway concessions in that region supported by the Russian Government.

TREATY OF PORTSMOUTH †

September 5, 1905

His Majesty the Emperor of Japan of the one part, and His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, on the other part, animated by the desire to restore the blessings of peace to Their countries and peoples, have resolved to conclude a Treaty of Peace, and have for this purpose, named Their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say:

His Majesty the Emperor of Japan: His Excellency Baron Komura Jutaro, Jusammi, Grand Cordon of the Imperial Order of the Rising Sun, His Minister for Foreign Affairs, and His Excellency M. Takahira Kogoro, Jusammi, Grand Cordon of the Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure, His Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the United States of America;

* The translation of the notes exchanged by the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs and the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, on April 28th, 1899, as published in Prof. E. D. Grimm's "Collection of Treaties and Other Documents Pertaining to the History of International Relations in the Far East."

† John van A. MacMurray, "Treaties and Agreements with and Concerning China." New York, 1921, pp. 522-525.

and His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias: His Excellency M. Serge Witte, His Secretary of State and President of the Committee of Ministers of the Empire of Russia, and His Excellency Baron Roman Rosen, Master of the Imperial Court of Russia and His Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the United States of America.

Who, after having exchanged their full powers which were found to be in good and due form, have concluded the following articles:

Article I. There shall henceforth be peace and amity between Their Majesties the Emperor of Japan and the Emperor of all the Russias and between their respective States and subjects.

Article II. The Imperial Russian Government, acknowledging that Japan possesses in Corea paramount political, military and economic interests, engage neither to obstruct nor interfere with the measures of guidance, protection and control which the Imperial Government of Japan may find it necessary to take in Corea.

It is understood that Russian subjects in Corea shall be treated exactly in the same manner as the subjects or citizens of other foreign Powers, that is to say, they shall be placed on the same footing as the subject or citizen of the most favoured nation.

It is also agreed that, in order to avoid all cause of misunderstanding, the two High Contracting Parties will abstain, on the Russo-Corean frontier, from taking any military measure which may menace the security of Russian or Corean territory.

Article III. Japan and Russia mutually engage:

1. To evacuate completely and simultaneously Manchuria except the territory affected by the lease of the Liao-tung Peninsula, in conformity with the provisions of additional Article I, annexed to this Treaty and:

2. To restore entirely and completely to the exclusive administration of China all portions of Manchuria now in the occupation or under the control of the Japanese or Russian troops, with the exception of the territory above mentioned. The Imperial Government of Russia declare that they have not in Manchuria any territorial advantages or preferential or exclusive concessions in impairment of Chinese sovereignty or inconsistent with the principle of equal opportunity.

Article IV. Japan and Russia reciprocally engage not to obstruct any general measures common to all countries, which China may take for the development of the commerce and industry of Manchuria.

Article V. The Imperial Russian Government transfer and assign to the Imperial Government of Japan with the consent of the Government of China, the lease of Port Arthur, Talien and adjacent territory and territorial waters and all rights, privileges and concessions connected with or forming part of such lease and they also transfer and assign to the Imperial Government of Japan all public works and prop-

erties in the territory affected by the above mentioned lease. The two High Contracting Parties mutually engage to obtain the consent of the Chinese Government mentioned in the foregoing stipulation.

The Imperial Government of Japan on their part undertake that the proprietary rights of Russian subjects in the territory above referred to shall be perfectly respected.

Article VI. The Imperial Russian Government engage to transfer and assign to the Imperial Government of Japan, without compensation and with the consent of the Chinese Government, the railway between Chang-Chun (Kuan-cheng-tzu) and Port Arthur and all its branches, together with all rights, privileges and properties appertaining thereto in that region as well as all coal mines in the said region belonging to or worked for the benefit of the railway.

The two High Contracting Parties mutually engage to obtain the consent of the Government of China mentioned in the foregoing stipulation.

Article VII. Japan and Russia engage to exploit their respective railways in Manchuria exclusively for commercial and industrial purposes and in no wise for strategic purposes.

It is understood that that restriction does not apply to the railway in the territory affected by the lease of the Liao-tung Peninsula.

Article VIII. The Imperial Governments of Japan and Russia with a view to promote and facilitate intercourse and traffic, will, as soon as possible, conclude a separate convention for the regulation of their connecting railway services in Manchuria.*

Article IX. The Imperial Russian Government cede to the Imperial Government of Japan in perpetuity and full sovereignty the Southern portion of the island of Saghalien and all islands adjacent thereto, and all public works and properties thereon. The fiftieth degree of North latitude is adopted as the northern boundary of the ceded territory. The exact alignment of such territory shall be determined in accordance with the provision of additional Article II, annexed to this treaty. Japan and Russia mutually agree not to construct in their respective possessions on the island of Saghalien or the adjacent islands any fortifications or other similar military works. They also respectively engage not to take any military measures which may impede the free navigation of the Straits of La Perouse and Tartary.

Article X. It is reserved to the Russian subjects, inhabitants of the territory ceded to Japan, to sell their real property and retire to their country; but, if they prefer to remain in the ceded territory they will be maintained and protected in the full exercise of their industries and rights of property on condition of submitting to Japanese laws and juris-

* Such a convention was concluded June 13, 1907. (V.Y.)

diction. Japan shall have full liberty to withdraw the right of residence in, or to deport from, such territory, any inhabitants who labour under political or administrative disability. She engages, however, that the proprietary rights of such inhabitants shall be fully respected.

Article XI. Russia engages to arrange with Japan for granting to Japanese subjects rights of fishery along the coasts of the Russian possessions in the Japan, Okhotsk and Behring Seas.* .

It is agreed that the foregoing engagement shall not affect rights already belonging to Russian or foreign subjects in those regions.

Article XII. The Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between Japan and Russia having been annulled by the War, the Imperial Governments of Japan and Russia engage to adopt as the basis of their commercial relations, pending the conclusion of a new treaty of commerce and navigation on the basis of the Treaty which was in force previous to the present war, the system of reciprocal treatment on the footing of the most favoured nation, in which are included import and export duties, customs formalities, transit and tonnage dues, and the admission and treatment of the agents, subjects and vessels of one country in the territories of the other.†

Article XIII. As soon as possible after the present Treaty comes into force, all prisoners of War shall be reciprocally restored. The Imperial Governments of Japan and Russia shall each appoint a special Commissioner to take charge of prisoners. All prisoners in the hands of one Government shall be delivered to and received by the Commissioner of the other Government or by his duly authorized representative, in such convenient numbers and at such convenient ports of the delivering State as such delivering State shall notify in advance to the Commissioner of the receiving State. The Governments of Japan and Russia shall present to each other, as soon as possible after the delivery of prisoners has been completed, a statement of the direct expenditures respectively incurred by them for the care and maintenance of prisoners from the date of capture or surrender up to the time of death or delivery. Russia engages to repay to Japan, as soon as possible after the exchange of the statements as above provided, the difference between the actual amount so expended by Japan and the actual amount similarly disbursed by Russia.

Article XIV. The present Treaty shall be ratified by Their Majesties the Emperor of Japan and the Emperor of All the Russias. Such ratifi-

* A fisheries convention was concluded between Japan and Russia on July 28, 1907.

† A treaty of commerce and navigation with separate articles, protocol and exchange of notes attached thereto, and a protocol relating to certain Japanese and Russian consulates, were concluded between Japan and Russia on July 28, 1907. See also the political convention of July 30, 1907.

cation shall, with as little delay as possible and in any case not later than fifty days from the date of the signature of the Treaty, be announced to the Imperial Governments of Japan and Russia respectively through the French Minister in Tokyo and the Ambassador of the United States in Saint Petersburg and from the date of the later of such announcements this Treaty shall in all its parts come into full force.

The formal exchange of the ratifications shall take place at Washington as soon as possible.*

Article XV. The present Treaty shall be signed in duplicate in both the English and French languages. The texts are in absolute conformity, but in case of discrepancy in interpretation, the French text shall prevail.

In witness thereof, the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed and affixed their seals to the present Treaty of Peace.

Done at Portsmouth (New Hampshire) this fifth day of the ninth month of the thirty-eighth year of Meiji corresponding to the twenty third day of August (fifth September) one thousand nine hundred and five.

(Signed) JUTARO KOMURA /L. S./

(Signed) K. TAKAHIRA /L. S./

(Signed) SERGE WITTE /L. S./

(Signed) ROSEN /L. S./

RUSSO-JAPANESE POLITICAL CONVENTION OF JULY 17/30th 1907 †

The Government of His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias and the Government of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, desiring to consolidate the relations of peace and neighborliness which have happily been reestablished between Japan and Russia, and wishing to remove for the future every cause of misunderstanding in the relations of the Empires, have agreed upon the following dispositions:

Article I. Each of the High Contracting Parties engages to respect the present territorial integrity of the other, and all the rights accruing to one and the other Party from the treaties, conventions and contracts in force between them and China, copies of which have been exchanged between the Contracting Parties (in so far as these rights are not incompatible with the principle of equal opportunity), from the Treaty signed at Portsmouth on the 5th day of September (23rd of

* Ratifications were exchanged at Washington, November 25, 1905.

† Translated from the French text of the original consulted in the Archives of the Narcomindiel (Foreign Office) at Moscow.

August) 1905 as well as from the special conventions concluded between Japan and Russia.

Article II. The two High Contracting Parties recognize the independence and the territorial integrity of the Empire of China and the principle of equal opportunity in whatever concerns the commerce and industry of all nations in that Empire, and undertake to support and defend the maintenance of the status quo and respect for this principle by all the peaceable means within their reach.

In witness whereof, the undersigned, duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Convention and have affixed their seals.

Done at St. Petersburg, the seventeenth (thirtieth) day of July, 1907, corresponding to the thirtieth day of the seventh month of the fortieth year of Meiji.

(Signed) ISWOLSKY.

(Signed) MOTONO.

THE SECRET RUSSO-JAPANESE CONVENTION OF 1907 *

The Government of His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias and the Government of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, desiring to avoid in the future all causes of friction or misunderstanding in connection with the questions pertaining to Manchuria, Mongolia and Korea, have agreed on the following arrangements:

Article I. In view of the natural tendency of interests and of political and economic activity in Manchuria, and desiring to avoid all complications which may arise from competition, Japan undertakes not to seek to obtain on her own behalf or for the profit of Japanese or other subjects any railway or telegraph concession in Manchuria to the North of the line defined by a supplementary article to the present Convention, and not to obstruct directly or indirectly any actions countenanced by the Russian Government with a view to concessions in these regions; and Russia on her part, motivated by the same desire of peace, undertakes not to seek on her own behalf or for the profit of any Russian or other subjects any railway or telegraph concession in Manchuria to the South of the abovementioned line and not to obstruct directly or indirectly any actions countenanced by the Japanese Government, with a view to such concessions in these regions.

It is well understood that all the rights and privileges appertaining to the Chinese Eastern Railway Company in accordance with the agreements for the construction of this railway dated the 16/28 of August, 1896, and of 13/25 of June, 1898, shall remain in force on the portion

* Translated from the French text of the original consulted in the Archives of the Narcomindiel (Foreign Office) at Moscow.

of the railway lying to the South of the line of demarcation defined by the Supplementary Article of this Treaty.

Article II. Russia recognizing the joint political relations between Japan and Korea, based on the conventions and agreements at present in force between them, and copies of which have been sent to the Russian Government by the Japanese Government, undertakes not to interfere and not to obstruct the further development of these relations; and Japan, on her part, undertakes to extend to the Government, consular agents, subjects, commerce, industry and navigation of Russia in Korea all the rights of the most favored nation until the conclusion of a final treaty.

Article III. The Imperial Government of Japan, recognizing special interests of Russia in the Outer Mongolia, undertakes to refrain from any interferences which might prejudice these interests.

Article IV. The present Convention shall be strictly confidential between the two High Contracting Parties.

In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Convention and have affixed their seals.

Done at St. Petersburg on the seventeenth (thirtieth) of July 1907, corresponding to the thirtieth day of the seventh month of the fortieth year of Meiji.

(Signed) ISWOLSKY.

(Signed) MOTONO.

Supplementary Article

The line of demarcation between the Northern and Southern Manchuria mentioned in Article I of the present Convention is established as follows:

Leaving at the north-western end of the Russo-Korean frontier, and forming a series of straight lines, it shall proceed past Hunchun and the northernmost point of Lake Pirteng, to Hsiushuichan; thence it shall follow the Sungari to the mouth of the Nunkiang; to follow the course of this river upwards to the junction of the river Tolaho. Commencing at this point the line shall follow this river till its crossing with the meridian 122 East of Greenwich.

(Signed) ISWOLSKY.

(Signed) MOTONO.

RUSSO-JAPANESE CONVENTION OF 1910 *

The Imperial Government of Russia and the Imperial Government of Japan, sincerely attached to the principles established by the Con-

* Translated from the French text consulted in the Archives of the Narcomindiel at Moscow.

vention concluded between them on July 17/30th, 1907, and desiring to develop the results of that Convention with a view to the consolidation of peace in the Far East, have agreed to complete the said arrangement by the following dispositions:

Article I. For the purpose of facilitating communications and of developing the commerce of the nations, the two High Contracting Parties engage mutually to lend each other their friendly coöperation with a view to the improvement of their respective railway lines in Manchuria, and to the perfecting of the connecting service of the said railways, and to refrain from all competition prejudicial to the attainment of this purpose.

Article II. Each of the High Contracting Parties engages to maintain and to respect the *status quo* in Manchuria resulting from all the treaties, conventions or other agreements hitherto concluded, either between Russia and Japan or between these two Powers and China. Copies of the aforesaid arrangements have been exchanged between Russia and Japan.

Article III. In case an event of a nature endangering the above mentioned *status quo* should be brought about, the two High Contracting Parties shall in each instance enter into communication with each other for the purpose of agreeing upon the measures that they may deem it necessary to take for the maintenance of the said *status quo*.

In earnest of which the undersigned, duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Convention and have affixed their seals thereto.

Done at St. Petersburg, the 21st of June (4th of July), 1910, corresponding to the 4th day of the 7th month of the forty third year of Meiji.

(Signed) ISWOLSKY.
(L. S.)

(Signed) MOTONO.
(L. S.)

RUSO-JAPANESE SECRET CONVENTION OF 1910 *

The Imperial Government of Russia and the Imperial Government of Japan, desiring to consolidate and to elaborate the dispositions of the secret Convention signed at St. Petersburg of the 17/30th July, 1907, are agreed on the following:

Article I. Russia and Japan recognize as the boundary of their respective spheres of special interest in Manchuria the line of demarcation defined by the supplementary article of the Secret Convention of 1907.

* Translated from the French text of the original consulted in the Archives of the Narcomindiel (Foreign Office) at Moscow.

Article II. The two High Contracting Parties undertake to respect reciprocally their special interests in the spheres indicated above. Consequently they recognize the right of each of them within its own sphere, to take such measures as shall be deemed necessary for the safeguarding and protection of these interests.

Article III. Each of the two High Contracting Parties undertakes not to hinder in any way the consolidation and future development of the special interests of the other Party within the limits of the above mentioned spheres.

Article IV. Each of the two High Contracting Parties undertakes to refrain from all political activity within the sphere of special interest of the other Party in Manchuria. Furthermore, it is understood that Russia shall not seek in the Japanese sphere—and Japan in the Russian sphere—any privilege or concession of a nature which might harm their mutual special interests, and that both Governments, Russian and Japanese, shall respect all the rights acquired by each in its sphere of interest by force of treaties, conventions and other agreements mentioned in Article II of the open treaty of today's date.

Article V. To insure the working of their mutual engagements the two High Contracting Parties will always enter frankly and honestly into communication in all matters of common concern to their special interests in Manchuria.

In case these special interests should be threatened the two High Contracting Parties shall agree on the measures to be taken in regard to common action or the support to be accorded for the protection and defence of these interests.

Article VI. The present Convention shall be strictly confidential between the two High Contracting Parties.

In earnest of which the undersigned, duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Convention and have affixed their seals thereto.

Done in St. Petersburg on the twenty first of June (the fourth of July) one thousand nine hundred ten, corresponding to the fourth day of the seventh month of the forty third year of Meiji.

(Signed) ISWOLSKY.
(L. S.)

(Signed) MOTONO.
(L. S.)

SECRET CONVENTION BETWEEN RUSSIA AND JAPAN
IN REGARD TO MONGOLIA *

Signed on June 25th, July 8th, 1912.

In order to determine more exactly and to complete the provisions of the secret treaties of July 17/30, 1907 and June 21, July 4th, 1910, and to prevent the possibility of any misunderstanding with regard to their special interests in Manchuria and Mongolia, the Russian and the Japanese Governments have decided to lengthen the line of demarcation defined in the amendment of the Treaty of July 17/30, 1907, and to draw up the confines of the spheres of their special interests in Inner Mongolia. The following have therefore been agreed upon:

Article I. Starting from the intersection of the Tola-Ho river and the 122nd meridian east of Greenwich, the demarcation line follows the course of the Oulountchour and Moushisha rivers to the watershed of the Moushisha and Haldaitai rivers; from there on it follows the border lines of the Hei-Lung-Kiang Province and Inner Mongolia to the furthest point on the frontier of Inner and Outer Mongolia.

Article II. Inner Mongolia is divided into two parts: one to the East, the other one to the West of the Peking meridian, 116° 27' East from Greenwich. The Imperial Government of Russia undertakes to recognize and observe the special interests of Japan in Inner Mongolia to the East of the abovementioned meridian; the Imperial Japanese Government assumes the same obligation in respect to the Russian interests West of the abovementioned meridian.

Article III. This convention will be kept strictly secret by the two High Contracting Parties.

(Signed) SAZONOW.

(Signed) MOTONO.

RUSO-JAPANESE CONVENTION OF JULY 3, 1916 †

The Imperial Government of Russia and the Imperial Government of Japan, having resolved to unite their efforts for the maintenance of permanent peace in the Far East, are agreed upon the following:

* Translated from the Russian text as published by Prof. E. D. Grimm in the Collection of Treaties and other Documents . . . on page 180 and checked with the original in the Archives of the Narcomindiel (i.e., Foreign Office) at Moscow.

† As published in MacMurray, John V. A., "Treaties and Agreements with and Concerning China," v. II, p. 1327, and checked with the original French text in the Archives of the Narcomindiel (Foreign Office) at Moscow.

Article I. Russia will not be a party to any arrangement or political combination directed against Japan.

Japan will not be a party to any arrangement or political combination directed against Russia.

Article II. In the event that the territorial rights or the special interests, in the Far East, of one of the High Contracting Parties, recognized by the other Contracting Party, should be menaced, Russia and Japan will confer in regard to the measures to be taken with a view to the support or coöperation to be given each other in order to safeguard and defend those rights and interests.

In faith whereof, the undersigned, duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Convention and affixed their seals thereto.

Done at Petrograd, June 20/ July 3, 1916, corresponding to the third day of the 7th month of the 5th year of Taisho.

(Sgd.) SAZONOW.
(SEAL)

(Sgd.) I. MOTONO
(SEAL)

THE SECRET CONVENTION BETWEEN RUSSIA AND JAPAN *
OF JULY 3rd, JUNE 20th, 1916

The Imperial Government of Russia and the Imperial Government of Japan, desiring to strengthen the sincerely friendly relations established by their secret Conventions of July 17/30, 1907, June 21st (July 4th) 1910, and June 25th (July 8th) 1912, are agreed on the following clauses designed to complete the abovementioned agreements:

Article I. The two High Contracting Parties, recognizing that their vital interests demand that China shall not fall under the political domination of any third Power whatsoever, which may be hostile to Russia or Japan, shall in the future enter frankly and honestly into communication whenever circumstances demand, and shall agree on the measures to be taken to prevent the occurrence of a like situation.

Article II. In the event that in consequence of measures taken by mutual consent as provided in the preceding article, a war should be declared between one of the Contracting Parties and one of the third Powers, contemplated by the preceding article, the other Contracting Party, at the demand of its Ally, shall come to its aid, and in such case each of the High Contracting Parties shall undertake not to make peace without a previous agreement with the other Contracting Party.

* Translated from the French text of the original consulted in the Archives of the Narcomindiel (Foreign Office) at Moscow.

Article III. The conditions under which each of the High Contracting Parties shall lend armed assistance to the other Contracting Party, as stipulated by the preceding article, and the means by which this assistance shall be accomplished, shall be established by the proper authorities of the two Contracting Parties.

Article IV. It is, however, understood that neither of the High Contracting Parties shall be bound to lend to its Ally the armed aid foreseen by Article II of this Convention without being assured by its Allies of coopération corresponding to the gravity of the approaching conflict.

Article V. The present Convention shall take effect immediately after the date of signature, and shall continue in force until July 1/14, 1921.

In case either of the High Contracting Parties shall not have given notice, twelve months prior to the expiration of said period, of its intention not to continue the present Convention in force, the latter shall continue to be binding until the expiration of one year from the day on which one or other of the High Contracting Parties shall have disclaimed it.

Article VI. The present Convention shall remain strictly confidential between the two High Contracting Parties.

In earnest of which the undersigned, duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Convention, and have affixed their seals thereto.

Done at St. Petersburg on the twentieth of June (July the third) 1916, corresponding to the third day of the seventh month of the fifth year of Taisho.

(Signed) SAZONOW.

(Signed) MOTONO.

TWO DECLARATIONS OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT OF RUSSIA, WHICH HAVE ESTABLISHED THE SOVIET POLICY TOWARDS THE CHINESE PEOPLE *

1. *Declaration to the Chinese Nation and the Governments of the Southern and Northern China.*

On the day, when the Soviet troops, after having defeated the army of the counter-revolutionary despot Kolchak, who depended on foreign bayonets and foreign gold, victoriously entered Siberia and advanced to join the revolutionary people there, the Council of the Peoples Commissars addressed all the peoples of China with the following fraternal words:

* Translated from the Russian text obtained at the Narcomindiel.

the true reason why the raid of the American, European and Japanese ravishers on Manchuria and Siberia occurred.

Now we appeal again to the Chinese nation to open its eyes. The Soviet Government has renounced all the acquisitions made by the Tsar's Government, which deprived China of Manchuria and other regions. Let the peoples residing in these regions decide for themselves within the boundaries of which State they desire to live.

The Soviet Government declines to receive from China the indemnity for the Boxer Rebellion of 1900, and is forced to repeat this for the third time, because, as far as we are informed, notwithstanding our refusal, this indemnity is collected by the Allies for the satisfaction of the fancy of the former Tsarist consuls in China. All these slaves of the Tsar were deprived long ago of their credentials, but continue in their places, cheating the Chinese people with the help of Japan and the Allies. The Chinese people ought to know of this and should deport them from their country as cheats and scoundrels.

The Soviet Government abolishes all the special privileges and all the concessions of the Russian merchants on Chinese soil. No Russian functionary, clergyman or missionary dare to interfere with Chinese affairs, and if any one should commit a crime he should justly be tried by the local courts. There should be no other power, no other courts in China but those of the Chinese people.

Besides these main subjects, the Soviet Government is prepared to settle with the Chinese people, represented by its delegates, all other questions and to liquidate once and forever all the acts of violence and injustice towards China committed by the former Russian Governments jointly with Japan and the Allies.

The Soviet Government is fully aware that the Allies and Japan will do everything possible in order that the voice of the Russian workers and peasants shall not reach the Chinese nation, and that in order to restore to the Chinese people what was taken away from them, it will be necessary first to get rid of the ravishers now intrenched in Manchuria and Siberia. Therefore it is now sending this message to the Chinese people together with its Red Army, which is advancing Eastward over the Urals to reinforce the Siberian peasants and workers in their efforts toward liberation from the bandit Kolchak and his ally Japan.

If the Chinese nation desires to become free like the Russian people, and to escape the destiny prescribed for it at Versailles in order to transform it into a second Korea or a second India, it should understand that its only allies and brothers in the struggle for liberty are the Russian worker and peasant and the Red Army of Russia. The Soviet Government proposes to the Chinese people, represented by its

Government, to start official negotiations at once and to send their delegates to meet our Army.

(Signed) DEPUTY PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
L. KARAKHAN.

25th July, 1919.
Moscow.

2. *To the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Chinese Republic.*

More than a year ago, on July 25th, 1919, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federated Soviet Republics made known a declaration addressed to the Chinese people and to the Governments of Northern and Southern China. By this the Russian Government, being ready to renounce all the previous treaties, concluded with China by the Tsar, and to restore to the Chinese nation all that has been taken from it by force and expropriated by the Tsar's Government and the Russian bourgeoisie, proposed to the Government of China to enter into official negotiations for the establishment of friendly relations.

Now we have information to the effect that our appeal has been received by the Chinese Government, and that the various strata of the Chinese people and divers organizations are expressing their sincere desire to see the Chinese Government enter into negotiations with us in order to establish friendly relations between China and Russia.

The Government of the Chinese Republic has delegated to Moscow a military-diplomatic mission headed by General Chan-Si-Lin. We welcome with the greatest joy the arrival of the Chinese Mission to Moscow and hope that through direct negotiations with your representatives we shall establish a mutual understanding of the common interests binding China and Russia. We are convinced that there are no problems between the Russian and the Chinese peoples which cannot be settled for the common good of both peoples. We are aware that the enemies of the Russian and the Chinese peoples are attempting to hinder our friendship and rapprochement, realizing that the friendship of these two great nations and their mutual assistance will strengthen China to such an extent that no foreign nation will be able to keep in bonds and to plunder the Chinese people, as is the case at present.

Unfortunately there is something that prevents a speedy establishment of friendly relations between China and Russia. Your mission, which had opportunity to be convinced in our sincere and friendly attitude towards China, has not received as yet the necessary instructions to start the molding of the friendship between the two nations.

Regretting that the rapprochement is delayed, and that therefore

certain important political and commercial interests of both countries do not reach realization, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, in his desire to render service to the issue and to hasten the establishment of friendship between the two nations, declares that he will still adhere invariably to the principles stipulated in the appeal of the Russian Soviet Government of July 25th, 1919, and will apply them on the basis of a friendly agreement between China and Russia.

In elaboration of the principles of the above mentioned appeal the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs deems it necessary for the good of the two Republics to suggest to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Chinese Republic the following basic points for the agreement.

I.

The Government of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republics declares as void all the treaties concluded by the former Government of Russia with China, renounces all the annexations of Chinese territory, all the concessions in China, and returns to China free of charge, and for ever, all that was ravenously taken from her by the Tsar's Government and by the Russian bourgeoisie.

II.

The Governments of the two Republics shall apply all the necessary means as to immediate establishment of regular commercial and economic relations. Eventually a special treaty shall be concluded, involving the principle of most favored treatment for both contracting parties.

III.

The Chinese Government undertakes:

1. Not to render any assistance to private persons, groups or organizations of the Russian counter-revolutionaries, and not to tolerate their activities on its territory.

2. To disarm, intern and deliver to the Government of the R.S.F.S.R. all the troops and organizations fighting the R.S.F.S.R. or its allies, and found on the territory of China at the moment of the signing of the present treaty, and to hand to the Government of the R.S.F.S.R. all their arms, provisions and property.

3. The Government of the R.S.F.S.R. undertakes similar obligations in regard to persons or organizations carrying on mutinous activities against the Chinese Republic.

IV.

All citizens of Russia residing in China must abide by all the laws and regulations in force in the territory of the Chinese Republic and

shall not enjoy any rights of extritoriality whatever; Chinese citizens, residing in Russia, must similarly abide by all the laws and regulations in force on the territory of Russia.

V.

The Government of the Chinese Republic undertakes:

Immediately upon the signing of the present treaty to discontinue relations with the individuals claiming for themselves the titles of diplomatic and consular representatives of the State of Russia and having no credentials from the Government of the R.S.F.S.R. and to deport them from China.

To return to the State of Russia, as represented by the Government of the R.S.F.S.R. all the buildings of the Embassy and consulates belonging to Russia in the territory of China as well as other property and archives of the Embassy and the consulates.

VI.

The Government of the R.S.F.S.R. declines to receive any compensation, payable by China for the Boxer Rebellion, provided that the Government of the Chinese Republic will not distribute the said payments to the Russian consuls or any other persons or Russian organizations unlawfully claiming them.

VII.

Immediately upon the signing of the present treaty reciprocal diplomatic and consular representation of the Chinese Republic and the R.S.F.S.R. shall be established.

VIII.

The Russian and the Chinese Governments agree to conclude a special treaty as for the rules and regulations of exploitation of the Chinese Eastern Railway for the needs of the R.S.F.S.R. In the making of said treaty, besides China and Russia, the Far Eastern Republic shall also participate.

The People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, communicating the above enumerated basic points, has in mind the possibility of amicable discussion of them with your representatives in order to introduce such changes, as the Chinese Government may deem necessary for the common good.

The relations between the two great nations are not completely covered by the above stipulated agreement and the delegates of the

both countries shall eventually adjust by special agreements other problems of commerce, frontiers, customs, etc.

We shall take all the measures for the establishment of the most sincere friendship between the two parties; and we hope that the Chinese Government in its turn will issue without delay similarly sincere proposals; and so a start towards the conclusion, as speedily as possible, of a treaty of friendship will be made.

(Signed) DEPUTY PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS.
L. KARAKHAN.

27th October, 1920.
#6373/2.
Moscow.

AGREEMENT ON GENERAL PRINCIPLES FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF THE QUESTIONS BETWEEN THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS AND THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA *

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Republic of China desiring to reestablish normal relations with each other, have agreed to conclude an agreement on general principles for the settlement of the questions between the two countries, and have to that end named as their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say—

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: LEV MIKHAILOVITCH KARAKHAN,
His Excellency the President of the Republic of China: V. KYUIN WELLINGTON KOO,

Who, having communicated to each other their respective full powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed upon the following Articles:

Article I. Immediately upon the signing of the present Agreement, the normal diplomatic and consular relations between the two Contracting Parties shall be reestablished.

The Government of the Republic of China agrees to take the necessary steps to transfer to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics the Legation and Consular buildings formerly belonging to the Tsarist Government.

Article II. The Governments of the two Contracting Parties agree to hold, within one month after signing the present Agreement, a

* As published in English in the "Russian Review" of October 15, 1925, Washington, D. C.

Conference * which shall conclude and carry out detailed arrangements relative to the questions in accordance with the principles as provided in the following Articles.

Such detailed arrangements shall be completed as soon as possible and, in any case, not later than six months from the date of the opening of the Conference as provided in the preceding paragraph.

Article III. The Governments of the two Contracting Parties agree to annul at the Conference as provided in the preceding Article, all Conventions, Treaties, Agreements, Protocols, Contracts, etc., concluded between the Government of China and the Tsarist Government and to replace them with new treaties, agreements, etc., on the basis of equality, reciprocity and justice, as well as the spirit of the Declarations of the Soviet Government of the years of 1919 and 1920.

Article IV. The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in accordance with its policy and Declarations of 1919 and 1920, declares that all Treaties, Agreements, etc., concluded between the former Tsarist Government and any third party or parties affecting the sovereign rights or interests of China, are null and void.

The Governments of both Contracting Parties declare that in future neither Government will conclude any treaties or agreements which prejudice the sovereign rights or interests of either of the Contracting Parties.

Article V. The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics recognizes that Outer Mongolia is an integral part of the Republic of China and respects China's sovereignty therein.

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics declares that as soon as the questions for the withdrawal of all the troops of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics from Outer Mongolia—namely, as to the time limit of the withdrawal of such troops and the measures to be adopted in the interests of the safety of the frontiers—are agreed upon on the Conference as provided in Article II of the present Agreement, it will effect the complete withdrawal of all the troops of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics from Outer Mongolia.

Article VI. The Governments of the two Contracting Parties mutually pledge themselves not to permit within their respective territories the existence and (or) activities of any organizations, or groups whose aim is to struggle by acts of violence against the Governments of either Contracting Party.

The Governments of the two Contracting Parties further pledge

** The Conference was opened early in September 1925. In an interview given recently to the press, Mr. Karakhan explained that the holding of the Chinese-Soviet Conference was delayed due to the fact that local Chinese authorities failed to carry out some of the stipulations of the Chinese-Soviet Agreement.

themselves not to engage in propaganda directed against the political and social systems of either Contracting Party.

Article VII. The Governments of the two Contracting Parties agree to redemarcate their national boundaries at the Conference as provided in Article II of the present Agreement, and pending such redemarcation, to maintain the present boundaries.

Article VIII. The Governments of the two Contracting Parties agree to regulate at the aforementioned Conference the questions relating to the navigation of rivers, lakes, and other bodies of water which are common to their respective frontiers, on the basis of equality and reciprocity.

Article IX. The Governments of the two Contracting Parties agree to settle at the aforementioned Conference the question of the Chinese Eastern Railway in conformity with the principles as hereinafter provided:

1. The Governments of the two Contracting Parties declare that the Chinese Eastern Railway is a purely commercial enterprise.

The Governments of the two Contracting Parties mutually declare that with the exception of matters pertaining to the business operations which are under the direct control of the Chinese Eastern Railway, all other matters affecting the rights of the National and the Local Governments of the Republic of China—such as judicial matters, matters relating to civil administration, military administration, police, municipal government, taxation and landed property (with the exception of lands required by the said Railway)—shall be administered by the Chinese Authorities.

2. The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agrees to the redemption by the Government of the Republic of China, with Chinese capital, of the Chinese Eastern Railway, as well as all appurtenant properties and the transfer to China of all shares and bonds of the said Railway.

3. The Governments of the two Contracting Parties shall settle at the Conference as provided in Article II of the present Agreement the amount and conditions governing the redemption as well as the procedure for the transfer of the Chinese Eastern Railway.

4. The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agrees to be responsible for the entire claims of the shareholders, bondholders and creditors of the Chinese Eastern Railway incurred prior to the Revolution of March 9, 1917.

5. The Governments of the two Contracting Parties mutually agree that the future of the Chinese Eastern Railway shall be determined by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Republic of China, to the exclusion of any third party or parties.

6. The Governments of the two Contracting Parties agree to draw up an arrangement for the provisional management of the Chinese Eastern Railway pending the settlement of the questions as provided under Sec. 3 of the present article.

7. Until the various questions relating to the Chinese Eastern Railway are settled at the Conference as provided in Article II of the present Agreement, the rights of the two Governments arising out of the Contract of August 27 (September 8), 1896, for the Construction and Operation of the Chinese Eastern Railway, which do not conflict with the present Agreement and the Agreement for the Provisional Management of the said Railway and which do not prejudice China's rights of sovereignty, shall be maintained.

Article X. The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agrees to renounce the special rights and privileges relating to all Concessions in any part of China acquired by the Tsarist Government under various Conventions, Treaties, Agreements, etc.

Article XI. The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic agrees to renounce the Russian portion of the Boxer indemnity.

Article XII. The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agrees to relinquish the rights of extraterritoriality and consular jurisdiction.

Article XIII. The Governments of the two Contracting Parties agree to draw up simultaneously with the conclusion of a Commercial Treaty at the Conference as provided in Article II of the present Agreement, a Customs Tariff for the two Contracting Parties in accordance with the principles of equality and reciprocity.

Article XIV. The Governments of the two Contracting Parties agree to discuss at the aforementioned Conference the questions relating to the claims for the compensation of losses.

Article XV. The present Agreement shall come into effect from the date of signature.

In witness whereof, the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Agreement in duplicate in the English language and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at the City of Peking this Thirty-first Day of May, One Thousand Nine Hundred and Twenty-Four, which is the Thirty-first day of the Fifth Month of the Thirteenth Year of the Republic of China.

L. M. KARAKHAN.
(Seal)

V. K. WELLINGTON KOO.
(Seal)

DECLARATION

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the Republic of China declare that immediately after the signing of the Agreement on General Principles between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Republic of China of May 31, 1924, they will reciprocally hand over to each other all the real estate and movable property owned by the former Tsarist Government and China, and found in their respective territories. For this purpose each Government will furnish the other with a list of the property to be so transferred.

In faith whereof, the respective Plenipotentiaries of the Governments of the two Contracting Parties have signed the present Declaration in duplicate in the English language and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at the City of Peking this Thirty-First Day of May, One Thousand Nine Hundred and Twenty-Four, which is the Thirty-First Day of the Fifth Month of the Thirteenth Year of the Republic of China.

Seals.

L. KARAKHAN.

V. K. WELLINGTON KOO.

DECLARATION

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the Republic of China hereby declare that it is understood that with regard to the buildings and landed property of the Russian Orthodox Mission belonging as it does to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics the question of transfer or other suitable disposal of the same will be jointly determined at the Conference provided in Article II of the Agreement on General Principles between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Republic of China of May 31, 1924, in accordance with the internal laws and regulations existing in China regarding property-holding in the inland. As regards the buildings and property of the Russian Orthodox Mission belonging as it does to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at Peking and Patachu, the Chinese Government will take steps to immediately transfer same as soon as the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will designate a Chinese person or organization, in accordance with the laws and regulations existing in China regarding property-holding in the inland.

Meanwhile the Government of the Republic of China will at once

take measures with a view to guarding all the said buildings and property and clearing them from all persons now living there.

It is further understood that this expression of understanding has the same force and validity as a general declaration embodies in the said Agreement on General Principles.

In faith whereof, the respective Plenipotentiaries of the Governments of the two Contracting Parties have signed the present Declaration in duplicate in the English language and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at the City of Peking this Thirty-First Day of May, One Thousand Nine Hundred and Twenty-Four, which is the Thirty-First Day of the Fifth Month of the Thirteenth Year of the Republic of China.

Seals.

L. KARAKHAN.

V. K. WELLINGTON KOO.

DECLARATION

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the Republic of China jointly declare that it is understood that with reference to Article IV of the Agreement on General Principles between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Republic of China of May 31, 1924, the Government of the Republic of China will not and does not recognize as valid any treaty, agreement, etc., concluded between Russia since the Tsarist regime and any third party or parties, affecting the sovereign rights and interests of the Republic of China. It is further understood that this expression of understanding has the same force and validity as a general declaration embodied in the said Agreement on General Principles.

In faith whereof, the respective Plenipotentiaries of the Governments of the two Contracting Parties have signed the present Declaration in duplicate in the English language and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at the City of Peking this Thirty-First Day of May, One Thousand Nine Hundred and Twenty-Four, which is the Thirty-First Day of the Fifth Month of the Thirteenth Year of the Republic of China.

Seals.

L. KARAKHAN.

V. K. WELLINGTON KOO.

DECLARATION

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the Republic of China jointly declare that it is

understood that the Government of the Republic of China will not transfer either in part or in whole to any third Power or any foreign organization the special rights and privileges renounced by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Article X of the Agreement on General Principles between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Republic of China of May 31, 1924. It is further understood that this expression of understanding has the same force and validity as a general declaration embodied in the said Agreement on General Principles.

In faith whereof, etc.

Seals.

L. KARAKHAN.

V. K. WELLINGTON KOO.

DECLARATION

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the Republic of China jointly declare that it is understood that with reference to Article XI of the Agreement on General Principles between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Republic of China of May 31, 1924:

1. The Russian share of the Boxer Indemnity which the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics renounces, will after the satisfaction of all prior obligations secured thereon be entirely appropriated to create a fund for the promotion of education among the Chinese people.

2. A special Commission will be established to administer and allocate the said fund. This Commission will consist of three persons two of whom will be appointed by the Government of the Republic of China and one by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Decisions of the said Commission will be taken by unanimous vote.

3. The said fund will be deposited as it accrues from time to time in a Bank to be designated by the said Commission.

It is further understood that this expression of understanding has the same force and validity as a general declaration embodied in the said Agreement of the two Contracting Parties, on General Principles.

In faith whereof, etc.

Seals.

L. KARAKHAN.

V. K. WELLINGTON KOO.

DECLARATION

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the Republic of China agree that they will estab-

lish equitable provisions at the Conference as provided in Article II of the Agreement on General Principles between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Republic of China of May 31, 1924, for the regulation of the situation created for the citizens of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the relinquishment of the rights of extraterritoriality and consular jurisdiction under Article XII of the aforementioned Agreement, it being understood, however, that the nationals of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall be entirely amenable to Chinese jurisdiction.

In faith whereof, etc.

Seals.

L. KARAKHAN.

V. K. WELLINGTON KOO.

DECLARATION

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the Republic of China, having signed the Agreement on General Principles between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Republic of China of May 31, 1924, hereby agree, in explanation of Article V of the Agreement for the Provisional Management of the Chinese Eastern Railway of the same date, which provides for the principle of equal representation in the filling of posts by citizens of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and those of the Republic of China, that the application of this principle is not to be understood to mean that the present employees of Russian nationality shall be dismissed for the sole purpose of enforcing the said principle. It is further understood that access to all posts is equally open to citizens of both Contracting Parties, that no special preference shall be shown to either nationality, and that the posts shall be filled in accordance with the ability and technical as well as educational qualifications of the applicants.

In faith whereof, etc.

Seals.

L. KARAKHAN.

V. K. WELLINGTON KOO.

Note of Wellington Koo to Karakhan

Peking, May 31, 1924.

Dear Mr. Karakhan:

On behalf of my Government, I have the honor to declare that, an agreement on General Principles for the settlement of the Questions between the Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics having been signed between us today, the Government of the Republic of China will, in the interests of friendship between the

Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, discontinue the services of all the subjects of the former Russian Empire now employed in the Chinese army and police force, as they constitute by their presence or activities a menace to the safety of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. If you will furnish my Government with a list of such persons, the authorities concerned will be instructed to adopt the necessary action.

I have the honor to remain,

Yours faithfully,

V. K. WELLINGTON KOO.

Note of Karakhan to Wellington Koo

Peking, May 31, 1924.

Dear Dr. Koo:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the following Note from you under this date:

[A repetition of Wellington Koo's note follows.]

In reply, I beg to state, on behalf of my Government, that I have taken note of the same and that I agree to the propositions as contained therein.

I have the honor to be,

Very truly yours,

L. M. KARAKHAN.

AGREEMENT FOR THE PROVISIONAL MANAGEMENT OF
THE CHINESE EASTERN RAILWAY *

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Republic of China mutually recognizing that, inasmuch as the Chinese Eastern Railway was built with capital furnished by the Russian Government and constructed entirely within Chinese territory, the said railway is a purely commercial enterprise and that, excepting for matters appertaining to its own business operations, all other matters which affect the rights of the Chinese National and Local Governments shall be administered by the Chinese Authorities, have agreed to conclude an Agreement for the Provisional Management of the Railway with a view of carrying on jointly the management of the said Railway until its final settlement at the Conference as provided in Article II of the Agreement on General Principles for the Settlement of the Questions between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Republic of China of

* As published in the "Russian Review" of November 1st, 1925, Washington, D. C.

May 31, 1924, and have to that end named as their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say:

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: LÉV MIKHAILOVITCH KARAKHAN.

His Excellency the President of the Republic of China: VÍ KYUIN WELLINGTON KOO.

Who having communicated to each other their respective full powers found to be in good and due form, have agreed upon the following Articles:

Article I. The Railway shall establish, for discussion and decision of all matters relative to the Chinese Eastern Railway, a Board of Directors to be composed of ten persons, of whom five shall be appointed by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and five by the Government of China.

The Government of the Republic of China shall appoint one of the Chinese Directors as President of the Board of Directors, who shall be the Director-General.

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall appoint one of the Russian Directors as Vice-President of the Board of Directors, who shall also be the Assistant Director-General.

Seven persons shall constitute a quorum, and all decisions of the Board of Directors shall have the consent of not less than six persons before they can be carried out.

The Director-General and Assistant Director-General shall jointly manage the affairs of the Board of Directors, and they shall both sign all the documents of the Board.

In the absence of either the Director-General or the Assistant Director-General, their respective Governments may appoint another Director to officiate as the Director-General or the Assistant Director-General (in case of the Director-General, by one of the Chinese Directors, and in that of the Assistant Director-General, by one of the Russian Directors).

Article II. The Railway shall establish a Board of Auditors to be composed of five persons, namely, three Russian Auditors, who shall be appointed by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and two Chinese Auditors, who shall be appointed by the Government of the Republic of China.

The Chairman of the Board of Auditors shall be elected from among the Chinese Auditors.

Article III. The Railway shall have a manager, who shall be a national of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and two Assistant Managers, one to be a national of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the other to be a national of the Republic of China.

The said officers shall be appointed by the Board of Directors and such appointments shall be confirmed by their respective Governments.

The rights and duties of the Manager and Assistant Managers shall be defined by the Board of Directors.

Article IV. The Chiefs and Assistant Chiefs of the various Departments of the Railway shall be appointed by the Board of Directors.

If the Chief of Department is a national of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Assistant Chief of the Department shall be a national of the Republic of China, and if the Chief of Department is a national of the Republic of China, the Assistant Chief of Department shall be a national of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Article V. The employment of persons in the various departments of the railway shall be in accordance with the principle of equal representation between the nationals of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and those of the Republic of China.

Article VI. With the exception of the estimates and budgets, as provided in Article VII, of the present agreement, all other matters, on which the Board of Directors cannot reach an agreement shall be referred for settlement to the Governments of the Contracting Parties.

Article VII. The Board of Directors shall present the estimates and budgets of the Railway to a joint meeting of the Board of Directors and the Board of Auditors for consideration and approval.

Article VIII. All the net profits of the Railway shall be held by the Board of Directors and shall not be used pending a final settlement of the question of the present Railway.

Article IX. The Board of Directors shall revise as soon as possible the statutes of the Chinese Eastern Railway Company, approved on December 4, 1896, by the Tsarist Government, in accordance with the present Agreement and the Agreement on General Principles for the Settlement of the Questions between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Republic of China of May 31, 1924, and, in any case, not later than six months from the date of the constitution of the Board of Directors.

Pending their revision, the aforesaid statutes, insofar as they do not conflict with the present Agreement on General Principles for the Settlement of the Questions between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Republic of China, and do not prejudice the rights of sovereignty of the Republic of China, shall continue to be observed.

Article X. The present Agreement shall cease to have effect as soon as the question of the Chinese Eastern Railway is finally settled at the Conference as provided in Article II of the Agreement on General Principles for the Settlement of the Questions between the Union

of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Republic of China of May 31, 1924.

Article XI. The present Agreement shall come into effect from the date of signature.

In witness whereof, the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present agreement in duplicate in the English language and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at the city of Peking this Thirty-First Day of May, One Thousand Nine Hundred and Twenty-Four, which is the Thirty-First Day of the Fifth Month of the Thirteenth Year of the Republic of China.

L. KARAKHAN.

V. K. WELLINGTON KOO.

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS AND THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE AUTONOMOUS THREE EASTERN
PROVINCES OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA.*

September 20th, 1924.

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the Autonomous Three Eastern Provinces of the Republic of China desiring to promote the friendly relations and regulate the questions affecting the interests of both Parties, and to that end named as Plenipotentiaries, that is to say:

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
NIKOLAI CYRILOVITCH KOUZNETSOFF.

The Government of the Autonomous Three Eastern Provinces:
CHEN-TSIAN, LUI-JUN-HUAN, and JUN-SHI-MIN.

The abovementioned delegates, having communicated to each other their respective full powers found to be in good and due form, have agreed upon the following articles:

Article I

CHINESE EASTERN RAILWAY. The Governments of the two Contracting Parties agree to settle the question of the Chinese Eastern Railway as hereinafter provided:

1. The Governments of the two Contracting Parties declare the Chinese Eastern Railway is a purely commercial enterprise.

The Governments of the two Contracting Parties declare that

* Translated from the Russian text, as published in the "Documents of the Narcomindiel—The Soviet-Chinese Conflict of 1929." Moscow, 1930.

with the exception of matters pertaining to the business of operations which are under the direct control of the Chinese Eastern Railway, all other matters, affecting the rights of the National and Local Governments of the Republic of China, such as judicial matters, matters relating to civil administration, military administration, police, municipal government, taxation and landed property (with the exception of lands required by the Chinese Eastern Railway itself) shall be administrated by the Chinese Authorities.

2. The time limit as provided in Article XII of the Contract for the Construction and Operation of the Chinese Eastern Railway of August 27th (September 8th), 1896, shall be reduced from eighty to sixty years, at the expiration of which the Chinese Government shall enter gratis into possession of the said Railway and its appurtenant properties.

Upon the consent of both Contracting Parties the question of a further reduction of the said time limit (that is, sixty years) may be discussed.

From the date of signing the present Agreement the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agrees that China has the right to redeem the Chinese Eastern Railway. At the time of redemption the two Contracting Parties shall determine what the Chinese Eastern Railway had actually cost, and it shall be redeemed by China with Chinese capital at a fair price.

3. The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agrees in a Commission to be organized by the two Contracting Parties to settle the question of the obligations of the Chinese Eastern Railway Company in accordance with the Section 4 of Article IX of the Agreement on General Principles for the Settlement of the Questions between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Republic of China, signed on May 31st, 1924 at Peking.

4. The Governments of the two Contracting Parties mutually agree that the future of the Chinese Eastern Railway shall be determined by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Republic of China to the exclusion of any third party or parties.

5. The Contract for Construction and Operation of the Chinese Eastern Railway of August 27th (September 8th), 1896, shall be completely revised, in accordance with the terms specified in this Agreement, by a Commission of the two Contracting Parties in four months from the date of signing the present Agreement.

Pending the revision, the rights of the two Governments, arising out of said Contract, which do not contradict the present Agreement, and do not prejudice China's rights of sovereignty, shall be maintained in force.

6. The Railway shall establish for discussion and decision of all matters relating to the Chinese Eastern Railway a Board of Directors to be composed of ten persons, of whom five shall be appointed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and five by the Government of China.

China shall appoint one of the Chinese Directors as President of the Board of Directors, who shall be ex officio the Director General.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall appoint one of the Russian Directors as Vice-President of the Board of Directors, who shall also be ex officio the Assistant Director General.

Seven persons shall constitute the quorum, and all decisions of the Board of Directors shall have the consent of not less than six persons before they can be carried out.

The Director General and the Assistant Director General shall jointly manage the affairs of the Board of Directors and shall both sign all the documents of the Board.

In the absence of either the Director General or the Assistant Director General, their respective Governments may appoint another General (in efficiate as the Director General or the Assistant Director Directors, and in case of the Director General, by one of the Chinese Russian Directors), that of the Assistant Director General by one of the

7. The Railway shall establish a Board of Auditors, to be composed of five persons, namely, three Russian Auditors who shall be appointed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and two Chinese Auditors who shall be appointed by China.

The Chairman of the Board of Auditors shall be elected from among the Chinese Auditors.

8. The Railway shall have a Manager, who shall be a citizen of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and two Assistant Managers, one to be a citizen of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the other a citizen of the Republic of China.

The said officers shall be appointed by the Board of Directors and such appointments shall be confirmed by their respective Governments.

The rights and duties of the Manager and Assistant Managers shall be defined by the Board of Directors.

9. The Chiefs and Assistant Chiefs of the various Departments of the Railway shall be appointed by the Board of Directors.

If the Chief of Department is a national of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Assistant Chief of the Department shall be a national of the Republic of China, and if the Chief of the Department is a national of the Republic of China, the Assistant Chief of the Department shall be a national of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

10. The employment of persons in the various departments of the Railway shall be in accordance with the principle of equal representation between the nationals of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and those of the Republic of China.

(NOTE: In carrying out the principle of equal representation the normal course of life and activities of the Railway shall in no case be interrupted or injured, that is to say the employment of the people of both nationalities shall be based in accordance with experience, personal qualifications and fitness of the applicants.)

11. With the exception of the estimates and budgets, as provided in Section 12 of the Article I of the present Agreement, all other matters, on which the Board of Directors cannot reach an agreement, shall be referred to the Governments of the Contracting Parties for a just and amicable settlement.

12. The Board of Directors shall present the estimates and budgets of the Railway to a joint meeting of the Board of Directors and the Board of the Auditors for consideration and approval.

13. All the net profits of the Railway shall be held by the Board of Directors and shall not be used pending a final settlement, in a joint Commission, of the question of its distribution between the two Contracting Parties.

14. The Board of Directors shall make a complete revision, as soon as possible of the Statutes of the Chinese Eastern Railway Company approved on December 4th, 1896, by the Tsarist Government, in accordance with the present Agreement and, in any case, not later than four months from the date of the constitution of the Board of Directors.

Pending their revision the aforesaid Statutes, insofar as they do not conflict with the present Agreement and do not prejudice the rights of sovereignty of the Republic of China, shall continue to be observed.

15. As soon as the conditions of the redemption by China of the Chinese Eastern Railway are settled by both Contracting Parties, or as soon as the Railway reverts to China upon the expiration of the time-limit as stipulated in Section 2 of Article I of the present Agreement all parts of this Agreement concerning the same shall cease to have any effect.

Article II

NAVIGATION. The Governments of the two Contracting Parties agree to settle, on the basis of equality, reciprocity and the respect of each other's sovereignty the question relating to the navigation of all kinds of their vessels on those parts of the rivers, lakes and other bodies of water, which are common to their respective borders, the details of this question to be regulated in a Commission of the two

Contracting Parties within two months from the date of signing of the present Agreement.

In view of the extensive freight and passenger interests of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the River Sungari up to and including Harbin, and the extensive freight and passenger interests of China on the lower Amur River into the sea, both Contracting Parties agree on the basis of equality and reciprocity to take up the questions of securing the said interests in the said Commission.

Article III

BOUNDARIES. The Governments of the two Contracting Parties agree to redemarcate their boundaries through a Commission to be organized by both Parties, and, pending such redemarcation to maintain the present boundaries.

Article IV

TARIFF AND TRADE AGREEMENT. The Governments of the two Contracting Parties agree to draw up a Customs Tariff and conclude a Commercial Treaty in a Commission to be organized by the said parties on the basis of equality and reciprocity.

Article V

PROPAGANDA. The Governments of the two Contracting Parties mutually pledge themselves not to permit within their respective territories the existence and (or) activities of any organization or groups whose aim is to struggle by acts of violence against the Government of either Contracting Party.

The Governments of the Contracting Parties further pledge themselves not to engage in propaganda directed against the political and social systems of either Contracting Party.

Article VI

COMMISSIONS. The Commissions as provided in the Articles of this Agreement shall commence their work within one month from the date of signing this Agreement, and shall complete their work as soon as possible and not later than six months. This does not apply to those Commissions, whose time-limits have been specified in the respective articles of this Agreement.

Article VII

The present Agreement shall come into effect from the day of signature.

In witness whereof, the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Agreement in duplicate in the Russian, Chinese and English languages, and have affixed thereto their seals.

In case of dispute the English text shall be accepted as the standard.

Done at the city of Mukden, this Twentieth day of September of One Thousand Nine Hundred and Twenty-Four, which corresponds to the Twentieth day of the Ninth month of the Thirteenth year of the Republic of China.

* * * * *

Declaration I

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the Autonomous Three Eastern Provinces of the Republic of China hereby declare that immediately after the signing of the Agreement of September 20th, 1924, between the Governments of the two Contracting Parties, the Government of the Autonomous Three Eastern Provinces of the Republic of China will hand to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics the consular buildings formerly belonging to the Tsarist Government.

In faith whereof the Plenipotentiaries of the two Contracting Parties have signed the present Declaration in duplicate in the Russian, Chinese and English languages and have affixed thereto their seals.

In case of dispute, the English text shall be accepted as standard.

Done at the city of Mukden this Twentieth day of September of One Thousand Nine Hundred and Twenty Four, corresponding to the Twentieth day of the Ninth month of the Thirteenth year of the Republic of China.

Declaration II

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the Autonomous Three Eastern Provinces of the Republic of China mutually declare that after the signing of the Agreement of September 20th, 1924, between the Governments of the two Contracting Parties, if there are at present any Chinese in any employ of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which by their presence and (or) activity constitute a menace to the interests of the Autonomous Three Eastern Provinces of the Republic of China or if there are at present in the employ of the Government of the Autonomous Three Eastern Provinces of the Republic of China former Russian subjects, which constitute by their presence and (or) activity a menace to the interests of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the respective Governments shall communicate to the other Party a

list of names of such persons and shall instruct the respective authorities to take measures necessary to put an end to the activities or the employment of the aforesaid persons.

In witness whereof the Plenipotentiaries of the two Parties have signed the present Declaration in duplicate in the Russian, Chinese, and English languages and have affixed thereto their seals.

In case of dispute, the English text shall be accepted as standard.

Done at the city of Mukden this Twentieth day of September of One Thousand Nine Hundred and Twenty Four, corresponding to the Twentieth day of the Ninth month of the Thirteenth year of the Republic of China.

THE SOVIET-JAPANESE CONVENTION OF JANUARY 20th, 1925 *

Regarding the Basic Principles of Interrelations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan, desiring to firmly establish mutual good-neighborly relations and economic cooperation, decided to conclude a convention regarding the basic principles of such relations and have for this purpose appointed their representatives, namely:

The Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics appointed: Lev Mikhailovich Karakhan, Ambassador to China.

His Majesty, the Emperor of Japan appointed:

Kenkiti Yoshizawa, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in China, Djushia, Chevalier, First Class Order of "Holy Treasure," who upon presenting to each other their respective credentials, these being found in proper and correct form, agreed upon the following:

Article I. The high contracting parties agree that with the coming into force of the present convention diplomatic and consular relations are established between them.

Article II. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agrees that the Treaty concluded in Portsmouth on September 5, 1905, remains in full force.

It is agreed that all treaties, conventions and agreements outside of the above mentioned Portsmouth treaty entered into between Japan and Russia up to November 7, 1917, will be revised at the conference

* As published in the "Russian Review" of April 1st, 1925, Washington, D. C.

which is to take place subsequently between the governments of the contracting parties, and that they may be changed or cancelled as will be called for by the changed circumstances.

Article III. The governments of the high contracting parties agree that with the coming into effect of the present convention they will take up the revision of the fishing treaty of 1907 taking into consideration those changes which might have taken place in the general conditions since the said fishing treaty was concluded.

Until such a revised treaty is concluded the government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will adhere to the practice established in 1924 in regard to the leasing of fisheries to Japanese subjects.

Article IV. The governments of the high contracting parties agree that with the coming into effect of the present convention they will take up the matter of concluding a treaty regarding trade and shipping in accordance with the principles set forth below and that until such a treaty is concluded the general relations between the two countries will be regulated by these principles:

1. Citizens and subjects of each of the high contracting parties, in accordance with the laws of each country, will have the right of (a) full freedom of entry, movement and stay in the territory of the other party, and (b) constant full protection of the safety of life and property.

2. In accordance with the laws of the country, each of the high contracting parties, gives on its territory, to citizens or subjects of the other party, to the widest possible extent and on conditions of reciprocity, the right of private ownership, as well as freedom to engage in trade, shipping, mining and other peaceful occupations.

3. Without prejudice to the right of each contracting party to regulate by its own laws the system of international trade in that country, it is understood that neither of the contracting parties will apply against the other party in particular any prohibitive measures, limitations or taxation, which might act as obstacles to the development of economic or other intercourse between the two countries; and both countries propose to grant to the trade, shipping and industry of each country, insofar as possible, the privileges of the most favored country.

The governments of the high contracting parties further agree from time to time, as circumstances may demand, to enter into negotiations to conclude special agreements regarding trade and shipping for the purpose of regulating and cementing the economic relations between the two countries.

Article V. The high contracting parties solemnly confirm their desire and intention to live in peace and amity with each other, conscientiously to respect the undisputed right of each State to arrange

its own life within the limits of its own jurisdiction at its own desire, to refrain and restrain all persons in their governmental service, as well as all organizations receiving any financial support from them, from any open or secret action, which may in any way whatsoever threaten the peace or safety of any part of the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or of Japan.

It is further agreed that neither of the high contracting parties will permit on the territory under its jurisdiction the presence of:

(a) Organizations or groups claiming to be the government of any part of the territory of the other party, or

(b) Foreign subjects or citizens, in regard to whom it has been established that they actually carry on political work for these organizations or groups.

Article VI. In the interests of the development of economic relations between the two countries, and taking into consideration the needs of Japan with respect to natural resources, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is ready to grant to Japanese subjects, companies and associations concessions for the exploitation of mineral, timber and other natural resources in all parts of the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Article VII. The present convention is subject to ratification. Such ratification by each of the high contracting parties should be notified as soon as possible through the diplomatic representatives in Peking to the government of the other party, and from the date of the last of such notifications this convention comes into full force.

The formal exchange of ratifications will take place in Peking within the shortest possible time.

In testimony whereof the respective representatives have signed the present convention in duplicate, in English, and have affixed their seals thereto.

Drawn up in Peking, this twentieth day of January, in the year one thousand nine hundred and twenty five.

(Signed)

L. KARAKHAN.

(Signed)

K. YOSHIZAWA.

PROTOCOL (A)

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan, upon signing this date the convention regarding the basic principles of interrelations between them, found it desirable to regulate certain questions in connection with the above convention and through their respective representatives have agreed upon the following stipulations:

Article I. Each of the high contracting parties binds itself to turn over to the other party the immovable and movable property belong-

ing to the embassy and consulates of that party and actually situated on the territory of the first party.

In the event that it be found that the land occupied by the former Russian government in Tokio is situated in such a way as to interfere with the plans for laying out the city of Tokio or for serving the public needs, the government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will be ready to consider the proposals, which may be made by the Japanese government with the view to eliminating such difficulties.

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will give to the Japanese government all reasonable facilities in the choice of suitable sites and buildings for a Japanese embassy and consulates to be established on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Article II. It is agreed that all questions regarding debts to the government or subjects of Japan in connection with State loans or treasury bonds issued by the former Russian governments, namely, the imperial Russian government and its successor—the Provisional government—are left for decision at subsequent negotiations between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Japanese Government.

It is intended that in regulating these questions the government or subjects of Japan, all conditions being equal, will not be placed in a less favorable position than that which the government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will concede to the government or citizens of any other country on the same questions.

It is also agreed that all questions relating to claims of the government of one party against the government of the other party, or of citizens of one party to the government of the other, are left to be regulated at the subsequent negotiations between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Japanese Government.

Article III. In view of the fact that the climatic conditions in Northern Sakhalin prevent immediate transportation home of the Japanese troops now stationed there, these troops will be completely evacuated from the said region by May 15, 1925.

This evacuation must commence just as soon as climatic conditions permit, and in each and all of the districts in Northern Sakhalin thus evacuated by Japanese troops will immediately afterwards be restored full sovereignty of corresponding authorities of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Details regarding the transfer of administration and winding up the occupation will be arranged in Alexandrovsk between the commander of the Japanese army of occupation and representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Article IV. The high contracting parties mutually declare that at the present time there exists no treaty or agreement regarding military alliance, or any other secret agreement concluded by either of them with any third party, which might constitute a violation of or threat to the sovereignty, territorial rights or national safety of the other contracting party.

Article V. The present protocol will be considered ratified with the ratification of the convention regarding the basic principles of the interrelations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan as signed this date.

In witness whereof the respective representatives have signed the present protocol in duplicate, in English, and affixed their seals thereto.

Drawn up in Peking, this twentieth day of January in the year One thousand nine hundred twenty five.

(Signed)

L. KARAKHAN.

(Signed)

K. YOSHIKAWA.

PROTOCOL (B)

The high contracting parties have agreed upon the following basic stipulations for concession agreements to be concluded during the period of five months from the day of complete evacuation of Northern Sakhalin by Japanese troops, as provided in Article III of Protocol (A), signed this date by representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and of Japan.

1. The government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agrees to give to Japanese concerns recommended by the Japanese government concessions for the exploitation of 50 per cent of the area of every oil-field in Northern Sakhalin, mentioned in the memorandum presented to the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on August 29, 1924. In order to ascertain the area which is to be leased to Japanese concerns for such exploitation, each of the mentioned oil-fields is to be divided into checkerboard squares, from 15 to 40 dessiatins each, the Japanese being given such a number of these squares as will represent 50 per cent of the entire area; it being understood that the squares thus to be leased to the Japanese, should not as a rule be adjacent, but should include all wells which are now being drilled or worked by the Japanese. As regards the remaining unleased oil lands mentioned in the same memorandum, it is agreed that should the government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics decide to offer these lands, in full or in part, on concessions to foreigners, Japanese concerns will enjoy equal chances in regard to such concessions.

2. The government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will

grant to Japanese concerns recommended by the Japanese Government the right, for a period from five to ten years, of carrying on exploration work on the oil-fields along the eastern shore of Northern Sakhalin over an area of one thousand square versts, which must be allotted within a year from the date of the conclusion of concession agreements, and if, as a result of such exploration work by the Japanese, oil should be located, a concession for the exploitation of 50 per cent of the oil-field area thus established will be granted to the Japanese.

3. The government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agrees to grant to Japanese concerns recommended by the Japanese government concessions for the exploitation of coal deposits on the western shore of Northern Sakhalin over a definite area, which is to be established by concession contracts. The government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics further agrees to grant to such Japanese concerns concessions for coal mining in the Dui district over an area to be established in the concession contracts. As regards coalfields situated outside the definite area mentioned in the previous two sentences, it is also agreed that should the government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics decide to offer them on concession to foreigners, Japanese concerns will be given equal rights in regard to such concessions.

4. The period of the concessions for the exploitation of oil and coal fields, as set forth in the previous paragraphs, is to be established for 40 to 50 years.

5. As payment for the above mentioned concessions Japanese concessionnaires will turn over annually to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—in the coalfields, from 5 to 8 per cent of the gross output; in the oil-fields, from 5 to 15 per cent of the gross output. It is proposed that in the event of striking oil gushers, the payment may be increased to 45 per cent of the gross production.

The percentage of production thus to revert as payment will be finally determined in the concession contracts, it being subject to change in accordance with the scale of annual production by a method to be established in the above mentioned contracts.

6. The said Japanese concerns shall have the right to cut timber necessary for the needs of the enterprise, and to erect various structures to facilitate communication and transportation of materials and products. The details in connection therewith will be stipulated in the concession contracts.

7. In view of the above mentioned rental and taking into consideration the unfavorable conditions, in which the enterprises will be placed owing to the geographical position and other general conditions in the said regions, it is agreed that there will be a duty-free import and export of all articles, materials and products necessary for such

enterprises or produced in the latter, and that the enterprises will not be subject to such taxation or limitations as would actually make profitable exploitation impossible.

8. The government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will provide for the said enterprises all reasonable protection and facilities.

9. The details in connection with the aforementioned articles will be stipulated in the concession contracts.

The present protocol is to be considered ratified with the ratification of the convention regarding the basic principles of interrelations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan as signed this date.

In witness whereof the respective representatives have signed the present protocol in duplicate, in English, and have affixed thereto their seals.

Drawn up in Peking, this twentieth day of January in the year One thousand nine hundred and twenty five.

(Signed)

L. KARAKHAN.

(Signed)

K. YOSHIZAWA.

Upon signing this day the convention regarding the basic principles of inter-relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan, the undersigned representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has the honor to declare that the recognition by his government of the validity of the Portsmouth treaty of September 5, 1905, in no way signifies that the government of the Union shares with the former Tsarist government the political responsibility for the conclusion of the said treaty.

Peking, January 20, 1925.

(Signed)

L. KARAKHAN.

THE RESOLUTION PASSED BY THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE THIRD INTERNATIONAL ON JULY 14th, 1927, ON THE CHINESE REVOLUTION.*

The struggle carried on by the Chinese workers and farmers is the battle on the advanced positions of the Comintern. The Revolution in China continues to be the center of interest for the Communist International.

Whereas:

1. The feverishly rapid tempo of the development of events in China unceasingly changes the political situation and the distribution of the forces of the social classes in the country; and

* Translated from the Russian.

2. The unusual difficulties, which are met continually by the Chinese Revolution through the treachery of the War Lords and their hired troops, together with the consolidation of the counter-revolutionary forces, brought those partial defeats which the Revolution had suffered recently; and

3. Finally, considering several very serious mistakes committed recently by the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, the Comintern deems it necessary to address all the comrades, the members of the Chinese Communist Party, and its Central Executive Committee, and all its parts, with the following resolution, which is an elaboration of the directions formerly issued by the Executive Committee:

1. The most important and indispensable prerequisite for the proper tactics of the Communists is a most strict and calm Marx-Leninian method of considering all the specific traits of the given moment of the revolutionary situation, and the finding of a proper definition of the period, through which the Revolution is passing. Only through understanding of the specific peculiarities of the given moment is it possible properly to define the special tasks of the Communist Party, which is carrying on the struggle, to provide vital revolutionary slogans, and to outline the proper tactics for the proletarian advance-guard. It is necessary to define with the utmost clarity and quite concretely the content of the present stage of the Chinese Revolution, after having for that purpose acquired a critical understanding of the dynamics of the revolutionary process as a whole.

2. The enlarged VIIth Plenary Session of the Executive Committee of the Communist International (in December 1926) has defined the Chinese Revolution as a bourgeois-democratic revolution—in the present stage—at the same time emphasizing the point that it is directed entirely against the Imperialistic yoke.

3. The Central Executive Committee of the Comintern has indicated that this bourgeois-democratic revolution has a tendency to transform itself into a social revolution. In defining the places and the weight of the forces struggling in China, the enlarged VIIth Plenary Session has at the same time pointed out the inevitable aggravation of the class-struggle and of class-differentiation, the growth of the disintegration of the united nationalistic revolutionary front, predicting at the first turn the inevitability of the getting away of the grand bourgeoisie. Therefore, the Central Executive Committee of the Comintern has issued directives concerning the preparedness of the workers and farmers for the struggle against the bourgeoisie and its armed forces. That was a few months before the coup d'état of Chiang-Kai-Shek. The events which followed it reached their bloody apogee in the shooting of the workers of Shanghai on April 12th of this year, and have proved

the prognosis of the Comintern to be true: a capital shifting of the classes had taken place, the bourgeoisie had betrayed the Revolution and had gone to the camp of enemies; the Revolution had suffered a partial defeat and proceeded to a new and higher stage.

4. The latest Plenary Session of the C. E. C. of the Comintern, which was summoned in May of this year, has passed an elaborate resolution concerning the Chinese problem. That May session has considered the defection of the bourgeoisie as a *fait accompli*. The Plenary Session had defined the concrete traits of the situation, which was created by the coup d'état of Chiang-Kai-Shek, and has outlined the adequate line of conduct for the Chinese Communist Party.

The general directives of the Plenary Session were: course—towards the masses; objective—to promote the agrarian revolution, arm the workers and the poorer among the farmers, prepare the way for the hegemony of the proletariat in the Revolution and look for a decisive trend towards democratization of the Kuo-min-tan. The Plenary Session had clearly and unequivocally outlined the conditions necessary for making possible the coöperation of the independent Chinese Communist Party with the left wing of the Kuo-min-tan in the Wuhan Government. The Plenary Session saw the peculiarity of the existing situation in the fact of a coexistence of the three camps (the feudalistic camp of Chang-Tso-Lin; that of Chiang-Kai-Shek, which is still struggling with the imperialists, but is already massacring workmen and peasants; and finally the revolutionary camp of Wuhan). The Central Executive Committee of the Comintern considered it very important to stress the unreliability of the generals and their troops, and therefore considered of great importance the reorganization of the army and the creation of absolutely loyal revolutionary troops. It considered plans for bringing about contact between the troops and the workmen and peasants' organizations and for providing the nucleus of picked forces which would make possible the transformation of the existing mercenary forces into regular army loyal to the Revolution, etc.

In the spirit of these decisions the Comintern has given to the Chinese comrades the following as its directives:

5. During the last few weeks the events have developed unusually rapidly. Chief among them, in the opinion of the Comintern, are the following:

There is a process of further and very severe sharpening of the differences among the classes. The movement among the Chinese proletariat is developing as well as the agrarian movement of the masses. Every political group, with no exception in the whole country, is confronted by the question of its attitude towards the agrarian revolution. The generals and the officers are openly moving into the counter-

revolutionary camp and declare themselves to be enemies of the peasants. The mutinous officers in Changsha are "getting square" with the peasants, and neither the government of Wuhan nor the heads of the Kuo-min-tan are offering any resistance. Feng-Yu-Hsiang is betraying the cause by forming a bloc with Chiang-Kai-Shek (their meeting in Sui-Sko) and they are asking the Wuhan Government to capitulate. General Tan-Shen-Tsi, commanding the armed forces of Wuhan, is shooting the peasants, executing the Communists, and expelling them from the army. It is a plot of the counter-revolutionary generals, extending from Chiang-Kai-Shek to Tan-Shen-Tsi. At the same time the governing groups of Wuhan are screening the acts of those counter-revolutionary generals; they help them to disarm the workmen, raid the proletarian organizations, handicap the agrarian revolution, and carry on the struggle against the Communists. As for the leaders of the Kuo-min-tan, they are preparing the exclusion of the Communists from the Kuo-min-tan. In such a way Wuhan is already becoming a counter-revolutionary force. Such is the development of events, such the main traits and specifications of the current moment of the Chinese struggle. But this same particular situation is dictating to the Chinese comrades the appropriate tactical orientation in the problem of powers, in their attitude towards the Wuhan Government, on forming blocs with others, in the further course of the struggle, etc.

6. On the basis of Lenin's teachings the Comintern has thought and shall think it is logical and quite permissible, and necessary, in some definite stages, to unite and ally with the national "colonial" bourgeoisie in so far as the latter carries on the struggle against imperialism. During some definite phases of the revolutionary process it is permissible and even compulsory to support the military campaigns of the bourgeoisie against the forces of imperialism or its militaristic compradors. For that struggle with imperialism is a gain for the cause of Revolution.

From this point of view of Lenin it was necessary to reject analogies with the bourgeois-democratic Revolution in Russia, where bolshevism has rightly rejected all and any agreements with counter-revolutionary liberalism. But, coalition with the groups of bourgeoisie and the support of their military forces is permissible only in so far as it does not interfere with the independent work of the Communist Party and until the liberal bourgeoisie is able to deal with the problems of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. It was quite proper to support the Northern campaign so long as it was fostering the revolutionary movement of the masses. It was quite proper to support Wuhan so long as it was acting as the foe of Chiang-Kai-Shek's Nanking Government. But the same policy of forming blocs becomes fundamentally erroneous from

the moment when the Wuhan Government capitulated before the enemies of the Revolution. What was good at the previous stage of the Revolution is absolutely inappropriate to the present moment.

Of course in all this there is a certain difficulty for the leadership of the party, the more so for one so young and inexperienced as the Communist Party of China. This difficulty is still increasing by virtue of the fact that the cosmic and irresistible march of events is gradually shortening the consecutive stages of the struggle, is forcing the process from one step to the other and decreasing the periods of time in which one or the other tactical orientation is applicable. In the conditions of a tense, revolutionary situation, it is necessary to appreciate the specific peculiarities of the moment with a maximum of rapidity; it is necessary to know how and when to manœuvre; it is necessary quickly and at the proper moment to change slogans; it is necessary to realign the advance-guard of the proletariat, to be able to react with energy on the changing situation, break up without hesitation these blocs which have been factors of the revolution but now are becoming its chains.

7. If, at a certain stage of the development of the Revolution, the support for the Wuhan Government by the Communist Party was necessary, such course would now be ruinous for the Communist Party since it would throw the latter into the marshes of opportunism. Notwithstanding the advice of the Comintern the leaders of the Kuo-min-tan have not only deprived the agrarian revolution of their support, but have even freed the hands of its foes. They have sanctioned the disarmament of the workmen, the sending of punitive expeditions against the peasants, and the repressions by Tan-Shen-tsi and others.

They have delayed and sabotaged the campaign against Nanking under all kinds of pretexts. The revolutionary rôle of the Wuhan Government is ended. It now becomes a counter-revolutionary force. The radical groups of the bourgeoisie and the intelligentsia of Wuhan may still dare to undertake "radical" quasi-revolutionary heroic gestures such as a declaration for a campaign against Nanking (the revolutionary meaning of which is nil if they are disarming the workmen and oppressing the agrarian revolution). But, such gestures have no social or class sense. The Government of Wuhan has become a satellite of the counter-revolution. That is the new and specific fact which should be recognized with the utmost clarity by the leading nucleus of the Chinese Communist Party and by all Chinese comrades.

The present leadership of the Chinese Communist Party has committed recently several grave political blunders. The Chinese Communist Party should, according to the directions of the Comintern, welcome and advance the agrarian revolution, openly criticize and unmask

the indefinite and cowardly position taken by the "radical" leaders of the Wuhan Government and of the Central Committee of the Kuo-min-tan, warn the masses about the possibility of betrayals on the part of the generals, arm more and more of the workingmen and push with all possible energy the Kuo-min-tan and the National Government towards the true revolutionary road. Neither the Central Committee nor the Polit-bureau of the Chinese Communist Party has fulfilled those directions.

Instead of assuming leadership in the agrarian revolution the Central Committee has appeared on several occasions as a factor which hindered it. Some individual leaders of the party have advanced clearly opportunistic slogans, like "deepening of the revolution only after its widening" or "first-Peking, and only then—an agrarian revolution" which were quite properly rejected by the General Conference of the party, which represented the mood of the rank and file of the party. At the time when the broad masses of the Chinese Communists were carrying on a gallant and truly revolutionary struggle in the lower social strata among the peasants, laborers, and the urban paupers, the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party were trying to keep the masses back. The revolutionary directions of the Central Executive Committee of the Comintern were rejected by the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party. It went even so far that the Polit-bureau of the Chinese Communist Party "agreed" on disarming of the workmen.

Notwithstanding the clearly counter-revolutionary conduct of the heads of the Wuhan Government, Tau-Pin-Sian did not find enough courage to declare openly that he must leave the Nationalist Government, but asked in a principleless and cowardly way for a "leave of absence." The Comintern several times had criticized most severely by confidential communications such conduct of leaders of the Chinese Communist Party. It had issued warnings that it would openly criticize the Central Committee if the latter did not correct its mistakes. At the present time, when the Central Committee of the party has rejected the directions of the Comintern, the Central Executive Committee of the Comintern deems it to be its revolutionary duty openly to ask the members of the Chinese Communist Party to start a fight against the opportunism of its Central Committee.

8. The Comintern deems it necessary to correct immediately the errors committed by the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party and to make this known to all the members of the Chinese Communist Party.

The Comintern deems it necessary:

1. That Chinese Communists withdraw immediately, in order to demonstrate their protest, from the Wuhan Government.

2. This act of leaving the Wuhan Government must be followed by

a declaration giving as the motive for taking that step the hostile attitude of the Wuhan Government toward the agrarian revolution and toward the labor movement, which deserves the severe punishment of all those who are responsible for the repressions against the workingmen and peasants, and unmasking on the whole front the policies of the Wuhan Government.

3. Not to leave the Kuo-min-tan. To remain in it, neglecting the drive for expulsion of the Communists from the Kuo-min-tan, which is carried on by the leaders of the Kuo-min-tan. To tighten the contacts with the lower strata of the Kuo-min-tan and to pass there resolutions of vigorous protest against the conduct of the Central Committee of the Kuo-min-tan and to prepare for a congress of the Kuo-min-tan summoned on that basis.

4. To strengthen by all means the activities among the proletariat, to build new labor organizations, to strengthen the labor unions, to prepare the labor masses for decisive *démarches* and to direct the current struggles of the proletariat.

5. To set up the agrarian revolution. To continue the struggle to bring to a finish the bourgeois-democratic revolution through "plebeian" ways, i.e. by a revolutionary advance of the bloc of workmen, peasants and paupers of the cities under the hegemony of the proletariat. To arm systematically the workmen and peasants.

6. In consideration of the repressions and the executions to build militant extra-legal apparatus of the party.

7. To provide for the correction of the opportunistic mistakes of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in order to purify politically the leading element of the party. The Central Executive Committee of the Comintern believes that the problem of the policy of the party in general and of the party leadership in particular is now most important.

The Central Executive Committee of the Comintern appeals therefore to all the members of the party to do their utmost to strengthen the ties of the rank and file on the basis of the resolutions passed by the Comintern. The Central Executive Committee of Comintern expresses its belief that the Chinese Communist Party will find enough strength for achieving a change in its own machine and to strip off the authority of its leaders who had broken the international discipline of the Comintern. It is necessary that the leaders of the workmen's and peasants' organizations who are the members of the party and who have grown up during the civil war should receive the decisive influence in the Central Committee of the party also. In that way, being in close contact with the entire mass which constitutes the party, they

would be able to get rid of the opportunism of the present leadership of the party.

The Central Executive Committee of Comintern believes that the march of the Great Chinese Revolution has awakened for political life and political action such wide masses of workmen and peasants that there is no force whatsoever able to stop it.

With a proper leadership the victory will be with the Chinese workmen and farmers.

(Signed) THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL.

EXTRACTS FROM THE STENOGRAPHIC RECORDS OF THE VI CONGRESS OF THE THIRD INTERNATIONAL *

August-September, 1928

A. From the address by Nicholas Boukharin on the International Situation and the Colonial Countries and the Chinese Revolution.

Art. 25. The general crisis of the world's capitalistic system finds at the present moment a vivid expression in the uprisings and revolutions in the colonial and semi-colonial countries. The resistance offered to the imperialistic policy of the U. S. A. (by Mexico and Nicaragua); the South American campaigns against the United States; the colonial revolts in Syria and Morocco; the permanent unrest in Egypt and Korea; the uprising in East Indies, the process of growth of a revolutionary crisis in India and finally the Great Revolution in China, all these events and facts indicate the gigantic rôle played by the colonial and semi-colonial countries in the revolutionary struggle against Imperialism.

Art. 26. The most important among these facts, as an event of world-wide historical significance, is the Great Chinese Revolution. It embraces in its orbit tens of millions directly and hundreds of millions indirectly, i.e., an enormous mass of human beings now coming out for the first time in such force to fight Imperialism. The close contact of China with Indo-China and India gives additional point to the Chinese Revolution. Finally, the mere development of the Revolution, its democratic character, its unavoidable transformation into a proletarian revolution:—all these things must demonstrate to the proletariat of the world the whole significance of the international aspect of the Chinese Revolution.

Art. 27. The Chinese Revolution, being both anti-imperialistic and a revolution for national emancipation, is at the same time in its present

* Translated from the Russian; pp. 66-68 of the stenographic records.

stage rendered by its objective content a democratic revolution of the bourgeoisie. Yet unavoidably it will transform itself into a proletarian one. Along with its development, with the mobilization of the broad masses of workingmen and peasants, and with the actual development of the agrarian revolution with its plebeian reckoning with the landlords (gentry and "toohoo") the national bourgeoisie (of the Kuo-min-tan) gradually moved into the camp of the counter-revolution, joined the feudalists, and came to agreement with the imperialistic aggressors. Therefore the struggle against Imperialism is inseparable from the struggle for the land and from the struggle against the power of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie. It can not be detached from the struggle against the landlords (gentry and toohoo) and the militarists, or from the struggle against the civil wars, responsible for the plundering of the masses of people and the strengthening of the position of the Imperialists. The emancipation of China can be achieved only through the struggle against the Chinese bourgeoisie, through the struggle for the agrarian revolution, confiscation of the holdings of the landlords and the liberation of the peasants from the unheard of and enormous taxes. The emancipation of China cannot be achieved without the victory of the proletariat and the peasants, without the confiscation of landed property, without the nationalization of foreign-owned concerns, banks, means of transportation, etc.

These problems can be solved only through a successful uprising of the broadest masses of the peasants, under the leadership and hegemony of the Chinese proletariat.

The present moment of the Chinese Revolution can be characterized as resulting from the following events: the bloc of the Imperialists, feudalists and bourgeoisie, notwithstanding the existing conflict of their interests, administered a heavy blow to the proletariat and the peasantry and annihilated physically a considerable part of the main body of the Communist Party. The labor movement has not yet recovered entirely from the severe defeat; the development of the peasant movement continues in a number of regions. Where the peasants' revolt was victorious certain organizations representing the power of the peasants have in some places been set up; these organizations being the rural Soviets. The Communist Party is acquiring strength and unity. Its authority and influence over broad masses of workingmen and peasants are growing. Generally speaking, the present moment should be characterized, in consideration of the vast difference in the progress in the various parts of China as a period of accumulation of forces for a new rise of the Revolution.

Art. 29. The revival of the Chinese Revolution and the inevitable development of the revolutionary prospects in India may produce an

entirely new political situation and overthrow the relative "stabilization" of the capitalistic order. The development of conflicts between the Capitalist Powers, their opposition to the U. S. S. R. and the grave accentuation of the struggle between Imperialism and the Colonial World again and again emphasize the general characteristic of this epoch as the "epoch of Wars and Revolutions."

Art. 30. The problem of the struggle against the approaching Imperialistic war, the defense of the U. S. S. R., the struggle against the intervention in China and her partition, the defense of the Chinese Revolution, and the colonial uprisings—these are the main international concerns of the Communist movement at the present moment: the problems, the solution of which must be coördinated with the daily struggle of the working class against the attack of capital, which is subordinated to the struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat.

*B. From an address by O. Kousinen on the Revolutionary Movement in Colonial and Semi-colonial Countries.**

2. The Chinese Revolution has paramount international significance. The execution of the Chinese workingmen at Shanghai on May 30th, 1925, was a signal for the rising of a revolutionary tide hitherto unknown in China. The largest industrial centers of China—Shanghai, Tientsin, Hankow, Canton—and the English colony of Hong Kong—became arenas for revolutionary mass-strikes, prompting a wave of peasant mass-uprisings against the Chinese landlords (gentry, etc.). Already at the starting point of the nation-wide revolution, the Chinese bourgeoisie attempted to limit the revolutionary struggle exclusively to the attainment of such national goals as the struggle against the militarists, boycott of Imperialists, etc. Almost simultaneously with the rising of the revolutionary tide, the counter-revolution began to organize its forces; the coup of Chiang-Kai-Shek in March 1926; the firing upon the student demonstrations in Peking; the formation of the Right Wing of the Kuo-min-tan, which instituted the struggle against peasants in Kwangtung, Kwangsi, etc. The Northern Expedition started in the Summer of 1926; the acquisition of a number of Provinces and the defeat and decomposition of several reactionary militarist groups were followed by an enormous growth in the movement of the masses, the occupation of English concessions at Hankow and Kiukiang, the general strike at Shanghai, developing into an armed uprising and a gigantic increase of the peasant movement. The rising at Shanghai in April 1927 brought to the forefront of the national-

* pp. 123-124 of the Stenographic Record of the Session of the VIth Congress of Comintern.

revolutionary movement the question of the hegemony of the proletariat; definitely pushed the domestic bourgeoisie into the reactionary camp; and prompted the counter-revolutionary coup of Chiang-Kai-Shek.

The independent action of the workingmen in the struggle for power and above all the further development of the peasant-movement, now became an agrarian revolution, forced the Wuhan Government (which was organized under the leadership of the petty bourgeois elements of the Kuo-min-tan) into the camp of counter-revolution. But the revolutionary tide was already ebbing. On some occasions (the uprisings of Ho-Loon and Ihe-Tin; the peasant rising in Hunan, Hupei Kwangtung, Kwangsi) the laboring class and the peasants attempted to take the power from the hands of the Imperialists, the bourgeoisie and the landlords, and so to prevent the defeat of the Revolution. But they did not succeed. The last of the powerful efforts of this revolutionary tide was the uprising of the heroic proletariat of Canton, which attempted to combine the agrarian revolution with the overthrow of the Kuo-min-tan and the establishment of the proletariat and the peasants.

*C. An Appeal to the Workers and All Laboring People of China.**

The VIth Congress of the Comintern extends its warmest greetings to the advance-guard of the Great Revolution, the proletariat of China, and to the hundreds of millions of laboring people led by it to the decisive battle with Imperialism and reaction, as represented by the landlords and the bourgeoisie.

Workers and peasants of China!

Proletarians of all the countries mournfully share the bitterness of your grave losses, and welcome your victories with joy and admiration. The overthrow of Imperialism in China, i.e. a break in the most important section of the imperialistic front, requires self-denial and firmness, and the laboring people of China are astonishing the whole world by their fearlessness and loyalty to the revolutionary cause, and by their readiness to meet death.

Tens of thousands of workers and peasants fall in their struggle against an Imperialism armed to the teeth, or fall under the ax of the hideous hangmen of the Kuo-min-tan. But the Revolution is alive and its rank and file grow stronger! May the memory of those who fall in the battles be everlasting! Glory to the fighters who have replaced them and are carrying now the red banner of the revolutionary struggle.

* pp. 123-124 of the Stenographic Record of the Session of the VIth Congress of Comintern.

Workers of China! The leadership of the national-revolutionary struggle against a whole world of bourgeois enemies requires the greatest class-consciousness, precise appreciation of the moving forces of the revolution, of the formidable impediments found in its path, and proper choice of the means to be applied in each particular stage of the struggle. The victory of the Chinese Revolution will be achieved only through the application of the teachings of Marx and Lenin, verified by the experience of actual struggle. To release the agrarian revolution, to lead the many millions of ununified peasants (without being lost among them), to watch carefully all the defections of unreliable allies from among the petty bourgeoisie and to sweep them away at the very first attempt at betrayal, the workers of China had to organize as a class fully conscious of its historical mission, and to build a mass-Communist Party.

Out of an amorphous mass suffering from the cruelest exploitation and mockery on the part of the Imperialist-drivers, the young proletariat of China and the Communist Party were transformed into a first-rate international revolutionary actuality.

This Congress declares that it is proud of its unit in China, of the unusually rapid growth and development of the Communist Party there, of the heroism with which it is advancing in the first ranks of the fighters, of the fearlessness with which it discloses and corrects the blunders in its own midst.

There is no country similarly oppressed where the echo of the alarm of Revolutionary China has not resounded. The examples of Shanghai, Hankow, and Canton not only invoke the beginning of the struggle, they teach the way to victory. China's experience in the struggle of revolution is already the property of all the workers of the Orient. The proletariat of India enters a new stage of the revolutionary struggle, mindful not only of the lessons of the infamous capitulation of its bourgeoisie in 1922, but also the whole example of treachery of the Kuo-min-tan. The uprising of the working masses of the East Indies, bloodily suppressed, is gathering fresh force and now rearms its warriors according to the Chinese example.

Everywhere—in Korea, in Egypt, etc.,—the peasant masses have learned from the case of the Chinese Revolution that it is possible to take the lands away from the hands of the conquerors and landlords only through a close alliance with the proletariat and under its leadership.

Everywhere, in colonial and semi-colonial countries, where the proletariat is conscientiously planning steps for a national-revolutionary struggle, it holds in view as the final goal the slogans which illuminated the banner of the heroes of Canton. The international intelligence-

service of the Imperialists is everywhere seeking for the revolutionary workers of China. The Second International, planning to poison the national struggle for emancipation by rotten reformism, fears more than anything else the disclosures of its aims and deeds by the revolutionaries of China. The workers of Shanghai, Canton, Hankow are the standard-bearers of the victorious revolutionary struggle against Imperialism throughout the oppressed nations of the Orient.

Dear Friends! The international proletariat fully appreciates the fact that your struggle is undermining the very basis of Capitalist society, that you are the shock-troops of the proletarian revolution. A great but increasingly difficult goal is before you; under the cross-fire of the Imperialists' artillery and the mad terror of the Chinese Government you are reorganizing your ranks, mobilizing new forces, enlisting new elements for the preparation of the forthcoming onslaught upon the positions still in the hands of the enemy. The revolutionary proletariat of the capitalistic countries is conscious of its historical duty to undergo every sacrifice in order to render you revolutionist support in this struggle.

The Communist International deems it necessary to declare that, notwithstanding the heroism of certain individuals in its ranks, the proletariat of the capitalist countries has not as yet succeeded in rendering sufficiently powerful support to the Workers and Peasants Revolution of China. The VIth Congress sees as one of its main objectives the organization of the international forces of the proletariat to support the national-revolutionary struggle to bring about the speedier victory of the Chinese Revolution.

The Canton uprising entered the consciousness of the laboring masses as an example of the greatest heroism of the Chinese workers. Let the forthcoming uprising of the broadest masses of the workers and peasants, organized on the well defined and systematically proven principles of Leninism, supported by the international proletariat, lend to the victorious "October" of China!

Long live the independent united Chinese Soviet Republic! Long live the victorious uprising of the oppressed nations! Long live the World Proletarian Revolution!

CHRONOLOGY

- B.C. 7000—Possible civilization of Central Asia.
 2800—China's early legends.
 2600-2200—China's traditional "Golden Age."
 2200-1700—Hsia Dynasty of China.
 1700-1100—Shang or Yiu Dynasty of China.
 1122—Foundation of Korean Kingdom.
 1100-500—Age of Classics in China.
 660—Jimmu Tenno (traditional first Emperor of Japan).
 571—Birth of Gautama (Buddha).
 500-200—Liao-Tsze, Confucius, Meti (the apostle of Universal love), Mencius.
 249—Great Wall of China.
 200-100—Age of Chinese Unification.
 100 B. C.-210 A. D.—"Era of Wide Empire" of China (Han Dynasty).
 A. D. 68—Buddhism introduced into China.
 203—Japanese Empress Jingo invades Korea.
 IV CENTURY—First records about Slavs.
 210-650—"The Dark Ages" of China.
 V-VI CENTURIES—Slavs around the Sea of Azov.
 552—Buddhism introduced into Japan.
 650-900—"The Age of renewed vigor and National greatness" of China (Tang).
 VIII-IX CENTURIES—Nomads' pressure forces the Slavs to the North and West.
 862—Traditional date of the beginning of Russia.
 988—Christianity introduced into Russia.
 1000-1200—"The Classic renaissance" of China.
 XI CENTURY—Russia's Struggle with the Nomads. (Petcheneg and Polovetz)
 XII CENTURY—The decline of Kiev (under the Nomads' pressure and the decline of trade with Byzantium).
 1186—Shogunate of Yoritomo in Japan.
 1223—Battle on Kalka.
 1227—Death of Jenghiz Khan.
 1223-1480—Mongolian Yoke over Russia.
 1245—Franciscan missionaries in China.

- 1260—Kublai Khan—(Marco Polo in China).
- 1267—Peking—New Capital of China.
- 1280-1368—"Age of Pan-Asiatic Empire" of China. Yüan (Mongol) Dynasty.
- 1326—Moscow—Capital of Russia.
- 1368-1644—Age of seclusion and arrested development of China (Ming).
- 1380—Battle of "Kulikovo-Polie" between the Russians and Tartars.
- 1395—Tamerlane in Russia.
- 1492—Discovery of America by Columbus.
- 1516—Portuguese reach China.
- 1542—Portuguese reach Japan.
- 1549—Jesuits missions in Japan.
- 1553—Beginning of Russian-English Trade.
- 1582—Yermak captures Sibir.
- 1585-1628—Russians advance toward Lena and Yenissei (Tiumen founded—1585, Tobolsk—1587, Narim—1596, Tomsk—1664, Yenisseisk—1618, Krasnoyarsk—1628).
- 1600—Tokugawa Shogunate in Japan.
- 1605—Jehangir the Great Mogul.
- 1613—Sir John Soris arrived in Japan.
- 1617—Russia ended war with Sweden.
- 1618—Russia ended war with Poland.
- 1620—First record of Russians in Manchuria.
- 1634—Treaty of Polianov between Russia and Poland.
- 1644—Ming Dynasty succumbs to the Manchus.
- 1646—Poyarkoff reached Okhotsk Sea.
- 1648—Dejniev reaches the Pacific.
- 1650—First record of Russians on Sungari River.
- 1651—Albazin founded.
- 1651—Khabarov at the mouth of Amur.
- 1652—Irkutsk founded.
- 1654—Nerchinsk founded (Pashkoff).
- 1654—Ukraine joins Russia.
- 1654-1656—Russo-Polish War.
- 1654—Baikoff sent to China.
- 1658—Perfilieff, Russian envoy to China.
- 1658-1667—Russo-Polish War.
- 1662-1721—Emperor Kwang-Hsi (Suan-ye).
- 1668-1671—Stenka Razin's rebellion (Russia).
- 1672—Milovanoff, Russian envoy to China.
- 1675—Spafaria, Russian envoy to China.
- 1682-1685—Siege of Albazin.

- 1686—"Everlasting Peace" of Russia with Poland.
- 1689—Nerchinsk Treaty.
- 1689-1725—Peter the Great of Russia.
- 1696—First Russian (Official) Caravan to China.
- 1700-1721—Russian-Swedish War.
- 1719—First Russian Expedition to Japan.
- 1722-1723—Russo-Persian War.
- 1727—Treaty of Bur.
- 1727-8—Treaty of Kiakhta.
- 1731—Tushi—Chinese envoy to Russia.
- 1732—Russians under Bering visit Japan.
- 1756-1763—Russia takes part in the "Seven Years War" (in Europe).
- 1768-1774—Russo-Turkish War.
- 1773—First partition of Poland.
- 1773-1775—Pougacheff's rebellion (Russia)
- 1783—Crimea annexed by Russia.
- 1784—First U. S. A. ship to China.
- 1787-1791—Russo-Turkish War.
- 1788-1790—Russo-Swedish War.
- 1798—Russian-American Trading Company founded.
- 1801—Georgia annexed by Russia (In Caucasus).
- 1804-5—Russians under Riazanov visit Nagasaki.
- 1806-1812—Russo-Turkish War.
- 1808-1809—Russo-Swedish War.
- 1805-1815—Russian wars with Napoleon.
- 1826-1828—Russo-Persian War.
- 1828-1829—Russo-Turkish War.
- 1842—Treaty of Nanking (ending the "Opium War" of Great Britain).
- 1844—First American (U. S. A.) Treaty with China.
- 1848—Occupation of Sakhalin by Nevelskoy.
- 1849—Nevelskoy discovers that Sakhalin is an island (Tartary Straits).
- 1850—Russian flag hoisted at the delta of Amur.
- 1851—Treaty of Kuldja opening Ili for Russian trade.
- 1853—Russians under Poutiatin visit Nagasaki.
- 1853-55—Crimean War.
- 1853—Commodore Perry's expedition to Japan.
- 1855—First Russo-Japanese Treaty (Shimoda).
- 1857—Indian mutiny.
- 1858—Franco-British war with China.
- 1858—American Commercial Treaty with Japan.
- 1858—Aigun Treaty (Mouravieff-Amursky signs the Treaty by which China recognizes Russian right to the Amur Region).

- 1858—Tientsin Treaty (Count Poutiatin signs this treaty with China confirming Russia's territorial rights in the Far East).
- 1859—Subjugation of Eastern Caucasus by Russia.
- 1860—(Nov. 15) Peking Treaty (Nicholas Ignatieff signs this Treaty with China recognizing the Maritime Province as Russian).
- 1862—Russian warships attempt to occupy Tsushima.
- 1863—Bombardment of Shimonoseki by the Westerners.
- 1864—Western Caucasus subjugated by Russia.
- 1864—End of the Taiping Rebellion (1851-1864) by British General Gordon.
- 1865-1881—Conquest of Turkestan by Russia.
- 1867—Alaska sold by Russia to the U. S. A.
- 1867—Burlingame mission from China to Europe and America.
- 1867—Shogunate ends in Japan.
- 1868—Meiji era begins in Japan.
- 1875—Exchange of Sakhalin (to Russia) for the Aleutian Islands (to Japan).
- 1877-78—Russo-Turkish War. Congress of Berlin.
- 1879—Treaty of Livadia.
- 1881—Treaty of St. Petersburg (Ili returned by Russia to China).
- 1889—Japanese constitution.
- 1891—Beginning of the Trans-Siberian Railway.
- 1891—First railroad in the Russian Far East (Ussuri R. R.).
- 1894—Survey for Amur Railroad.
- 1894—First Russian steamship on Sungari.
- 1894-5—Sino-Japanese War.
- 1895—(April 17th) Treaty of Shimonoseki.
- 1895—Dr. Sun-Yat-Sen organized a Revolutionary Party (Sin-hun-fu).
- 1896—Sino-Russian Treaty of friendship and mutual support (Lobanov-Li Treaty).
- 1896—Russia secures concession to build Chinese Eastern Railway.
- 1897—Germany occupies Kiao-Chow.
- 1897—(Dec.) Russian squadron arrives in Port Arthur.
- 1898—Concessions granted by China to Russia in Liaotung; England—Wei-hai-wei; France—Kuan-chan-wan.
- 1898—The United States acquires Philippine Islands.
- 1899—Recognition by Russia of Japan's special interests in Korea.
- 1899—Great Britain-Russian Agreement on Railroads in China.
- 1899-1900—American notes on "Open Door" in China.
- 1900—Boxer Rising.
- 1901—International agreement about China (liquidation of the Boxer Rising).

- 1902—Sino-Russian Convention on evacuation of Russian troops from Manchuria.
- 1902—Anglo-Japanese treaty of Alliance.
- 1904-05—Russo-Japanese War.
- 1904—British expedition to Tibet.
- 1905—Sept. 5—Treaty of Portsmouth.
- 1905—Kuo-min-tan—Nationalist party organized by Dr. Sun-Yat-Sen.
- 1905—Chinese mission to Europe (to study constitutionalism).
- 1905—(Aug. 12th) 2nd Anglo-Japanese Alliance.
- 1905—Sino-Japanese agreement of Peking.
- 1907—Russo-Japanese Conventions on Manchuria.
- 1908—Root-Takahira agreement (on status quo in the Pacific and equal opportunity in China).
- 1909—Knox project of neutralization of railroads in China.
- 1910—Russian protest on Aigun Railway project.
- 1910—Korea annexed by Japan.
- 1910—Russo-Japanese Conventions on Manchuria (status quo).
- 1911—Third Anglo-Japanese Alliance.
- 1911—Chinese Revolution.
- 1911—Mongolia proclaimed independent.
- 1912—Republic established in China. (Manchu Dynasty abdicated February 12th.)
- 1912—Meiji-tenno, Japanese Emperor, dies.
- 1912—Russo-Japanese treaty on Mongolia.
- 1912—(Nov.) Russian-Mongol agreement at Urga (pledging Russia's support of Mongolian autonomy).
- 1913—Yuan-Shi-Kai proclaimed President of China.
- 1913—(Nov. 13th) Sino-Russian declaration recognizing Mongol autonomy.
- 1914-1918—The World War.
- 1914—Sept.—Russian-Mongolian Railway agreement.
- 1915—June 7th—Sino-Russian Mongolian Treaty of Kiakhta (establishing the autonomy of the Outer Mongolia under Chinese suzerainty).
- 1915—The "21 Demands" of Japan to China.
- 1916—Yuan-Shi-Kai attempts to restore monarchy.
- 1916—(July 3rd) Russo-Japanese Conventions. (Alliance.)
- 1917—China breaks with Germany. Chang-Hsun attempts to restore the Manchu Dynasty. Russian Revolutions (in March and in November), Nov. 2nd—Lansing-Ishii Agreement.
- 1918—China and other Powers recall their representatives from Russia (March), Sino-Japanese agreement on military cooperation in Manchuria and Siberia.

- 1918-1922—Allied intervention in Asiatic possessions of Russia.
- 1919—Autonomy of the Outer Mongolia cancelled by a mandate of the Chinese President. China declines to sign the Versailles Treaty.
- 1920—(Feb.) Urga taken by the "White" Russians. Chinese Communist Party founded at Shanghai. Four-Power Consortium.
- 1921—(March) Provisional Revolutionary Mongol People's Government.
(March 6th) Urga occupied by the Soviet troops. Outer Mongolia—*independent*.
- 1921-22—Washington Conference.
- 1921—Japan returns Tsingtao to China.
- 1922—Four-Power Treaty.
Nine-Power Treaty (and the resolutions of the Washington Conference).
(August) Soviet Russia-Mongolia Treaty signed at Moscow.
- 1923—Termination of Lansing-Ishii Agreement. Revolutionary South China starts war against reactionary North. (Tsao-Kun's "election").
- 1924—May 31st—Peking Agreement on General Principles for the Settlement of Questions between China and Soviet Russia.
May 31st—Peking agreement for provisional management of the Chinese-Eastern Railway. Sino-Soviet Russian agreement recognizing that the Outer Mongolia is an integral part of China, though organized on the soviet system. Communists' influence in Kuo-min-tan paramount.
Sept. 20th—Treaty of Mukden (Soviet Russia-Manchuria).
Coup at Canton against Sun-Yat-Sen.
(Oct. 22nd) Feng-Yu-Hsiang occupies Peking.
- 1925—(Jan. 20th) Russo-Japanese convention, recognizing the Soviet Government of Russia.
(March 12th) Death of Dr. Sun-Yat-Sen.
May—Lockout in the textile industry at Shanghai, general strike, students' demonstration.
(December) Nationalist army occupies Tientsin. Go-Sun-Lin executed.
- 1926—(January 22nd) Russian Ultimatum to China (the Ivanoff incident).
(March) Feng-Yu-Hsiang resigns and departs to Soviet Russia.
(March) Chiang-Kai-Shek's coup d'état.
(June) Strikes and boycott of English goods in Hong Kong.
(July) Tariff Conference adjourned.
(December 18th) New British policy for China announced.

- (End) White terror begins in South China.
- 1927—(March 27th) Nanking incident.
 (April 8th) Raid on Soviet Russian Embassy at Peking.
 (May 27th) Inception of the Nanking Government.
 (June 22nd) Feng-Yu-Hsiang breaks with Wuhan Government.
 (July) Borodin, the Russian councilor of the Nationalists, leaves China.
 (August 12th) Chiang-Kai-Shek resigns.
 (November) Chiang-Kai-Shek returns to Shanghai from Japan.
 (December 11th) Communist coup at Canton
 (December 15th) Nanking breaks with Soviets.
 (December) J. P. Morgan contemplates a loan to the South Manchuria Railroad; China protests.
- 1928—(February) Plenary session of Kuo-min-tan.
 (Early Spring) Nationalists resume drive on Peking.
 (April) Japan in Shantung. Tsinanfu incident.
 (May 4th) Japanese ultimatum to China.
 (May 18th) Memorandum concerning Japanese interests in Manchuria.
 (June 1st) Peking surrendered by Chang-Tso-Lin to the Nationalists.
 (June 5th) Chang-Tso-Lin assassinated.
 (July 25th) U. S. A. recognizes nationalist Nanking Government.
 (August-December) Sino-Japanese deadlock on Manchuria.
 (October 9th) Chiang-Kai-Shek "President" of the Nationalist Government.
 (December 19th) Sino-British Treaty recognizing Nanking régime.
 (End) Manchuria declares her allegiance to Nanking Government.
- 1929—(January 1st) Tariff autonomy of China.
 (January) Japanese Cabinet Minister, Kuhara, urges publicly return to the policy of "21 Demands."
 (May 27) Chinese raid of the Russian consulate at Harbin.
 (July 2nd) Fall of Tanaka Cabinet in Japan. Inauguration of new policy towards China.
 (July 10th) Chinese arrest the Russian Manager of the Eastern Chinese Railway and others and take control over the road.
 (Nov. 26th) Mukden accepts Moscow's conditions for starting negotiations.
 (December 2nd) Reminder to Soviets and China about the Kellogg Pact; Litvinoff's reply.
 (December 22nd) Sino-Russian protocol of Khabarovsk reëstab-

- lishing the "status quo ante" on the Chinese Eastern Railway.
- 1930—(January 1st) China unilaterally abolishes extraterritoriality.
- (January 17th) The Italian Government notified Nanking of its refusal to abolish extraterritoriality.
- (February 20th) Second election under the universal manhood suffrage law in Japan resulting in a victory for the Minseito.
- (March 31st) Yen and Feng agreed to set a Provisional Government at Peiping.
- (April 2nd) Yen assumes command of forces operating against Nanking.
- (May 1st) Mo-Teh-Suey arrived at Moscow.
- (May) First Soviet District Conference in China (Kiangsi).
- (July 28th) Changsha captured by "Reds."
- (August 5th) Changsha recaptured by provincial government troops.
- (September 9th) "National Government of the North" installed at Peiping.
- (End of September) "Young Marshal" replaces the "National Government of the North."
- (November 12th) "Young Marshal's" visit to Nanking.
- (November 12th) Fourth Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuo-min-tan.
- (December 4-16th) Conference at Moscow (Mo-Teh-Suey and Karakhan).

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